of this might be given. Indeed, our experience proves that many of the most important acts of congress are postponed to the last days, and often the last hours of a session, when they are disposed of in haste, and by houses but little exceeding the number necessary to form a quorum.

Besides, in most of the states the members of the house of representatives are chosen by pluralities, and not by majorities of all the voters in their respective districts; and it may happen that a majority of that house may be returned by a less aggregate vote of the people than that received by the minority.

If the principle insisted on be sound, then the constitution should be so changed that no bill shall become a law unless it is voted for by members representing in each house a majority of the whole people of the United States. We must remodel our whole system, strike down and abolish not only the salutary checks lodged in the executive branch, but must strike out and abolish those lodged in the senate also, and thus practically invest the whole power of the government in a majority of a single assembly-a majority uncontrolled and absolute, and which may become despotic. To conform to this doctrine of the right of majorities to rule, independent of the checks and limitations of the constitution, we must revolutionize our whole system. must destroy the constitutional compact by which the several states agreed to form a federal union, and rush into consolidation, which must end in monarchy or despotism. No one advocates such a proposition; and yet the doctrine maintained, if carried out, must lead to this result.

We

One great object of the constitution in conferring upon the president a qualified negative upon the legislation of congress, was to protect minorities from injustice and oppression by majorities.-The equality of their representation in the senate, and the veto power of the president, are the constitutional guarantees which the smaller states have that their rights will be respected. Without these guarantees, all their interests would be at the mercy of majorities in Congress, representing the larger states. To the smaller and weaker states, therefore, the preservation of this power, and its exercise on proper occasions demanding it, is of vital importance. They ratified the constitution, and entered into the union, securing to themselves an equal representation with the larger states in the senate; and they agreed to be bound by all laws passed by congress upon the express condition, and none other, that they should be approved by the president, or passed, his objections to the contrary notwithstanding, by a vote of two-thirds of both houses.-Upon this condition they have a right to insist, as a part of the compact to which they gave their

assent.

A bill might be passed by congress against the will of the whole people of a particular state, and against the votes of its senators and all its representatives. However prejudicial it might be to the interest of such state, it would be bound by it if the president shall approve it, or it should be passed by a vote of two-thirds of both houses; but it has a right to demand that the president shall exercise his constitutional power, and arrest it, if his judgment is against it. If he surrender this power, or fail to exercise it in a case where he cannot approve, it would make his former approval a mere mockery, and would be itself a violation of the constitution, and the dissenting state would become bound by a law which had not been passed according to the sanctions of the constitution.

The objection to the exercise of the veto power is founded upon an idea respecting the popular will, which, if carried out, would annihilate state sovereignty, and substitute for the present federal government a consolidation, directed by a supposed numerical majority. A revolution of the government would be silently effected, and the states would be subjected to laws to which they had never given their constitutional consent.

The Supreme Court of the United States is invested with the power to declare, and has declared, acts of congress passed with the concurrence of the senate, the house of representatives, and the approval of the president, to be unconstitutional and void; and yet none, it is presumed, can be found, who will be disposed to strip this highest judicial tribunal under the constitution of this acknowledged power-a power necessary alike to its independence and the rights of individuals.

For the same reason that the executive veto should, according to the doctrine maintained, be rendered nugatory, and be practically expunged from the constitution, this power of the court should also be rendered nugatory and be expunged, because it restrains the legislative and executive will, and because the exercise of such a power by the court may be regarded as being in conflict with the capacity of the people to govern themselves. Indeed, there is more reason for striking this power of the court from the constitution than there is that of the qualified veto of the president; because the decision of the court is final, and can never be reversed, even though both houses of congress and the president should be unanimous in opposition to it; whereas a veto of the president may be over-ruled by a vote of two-thirds of both houses of congress, or by the people at the polls.

It is obvious that to preserve the system established by the constitution, each of the co-ordinate branches of the government-the executive, legislative, and judicial-must be left in the exercise of its appropriate powers. If the executive or the judicial branch be deprived of powers conferred upon either as checks on the legislative, the preponderance of the latter will become disproportionate and absorbing, and the others impotent for the accomplishment of the great objects for which they were established. Organized as they are by the constitution, they work together harmoniously for the public good. If the executive and the judiciary shall be deprived of the constitutional powers invested in them, and of their due proportions, the equilibrium of the system must be destroyed, and consolidation with the most pernicious results, must ensue; a consolidation of unchecked, despotic power exercised by majorities of the legislative branch.

The executive, legislative and judicial, each constitute a separate co-ordinate department of the government; and each is independent of the others. In the performance of their respective duties under the constitution, neither can, in its legitimate action, control the others. They each act upon their several responsibilities in their respective spheres; but if the doctrines now maintained be correct, the executive must become practically subordinate to the legislative, and the judiciary must become subordinate to both the legislative and the executive; and thus the whole power of the government would be merged in a single department. Whenever, if ever, this shall occur, our glorious system of well-regulated self-government will crumble into ruins-to be succeeded, first by anarchy, and finally by monarchy or despotism. I am far from believing that this doctrine is the sentiment of the American people; and during the short period which remains in which it will be my duty to administer the executive department, it will be my aim to maintain its independence, and discharge its duties, without infringing upon the powers or duties of either of the other departments of the government.

The power of the executive veto was exercised by the first and most illustrious of my predecessors, and by four of his successors who preceded me in the administration of the government, and it is believed, in no instance prejudicially to the public interests. It has never been, and there is but little danger that if ever can be abused. No president will ever desire, unnecessarily, to place his opinion in opposition to that of congress. He must always exercise the power reluctantly, and only in cases where his convictions make it a matter of stern duty which he cannot escape. Indeed, there is more

danger that the president, from the repugnance he must always feel to come in collision with congress, may fail to exercise it in cases where the preservation of the constitution from infraction, or the public good may demand it, than that he will ever exercise it unnecessarily or wantonly.

During the period I have administered the executive department of the government great and important questions of public policy, foreign and domestic, have arisen, upon which it was my duty to act. It may indeed be truly said that my administration has fallen upon eventful times. I have felt most sensibly the weight of the high responsibilities devolved upon me. With no other object than the public good, the enduring fame and permanent prosperity of my country, I have pursued the conviction of my own best judgment. The impartial arbitrament of enlightened public opinion, present and future, will determine how far the public policy I have maintained, and the measures I have from time to time recommended may have tended to advance or retard the public prosperity at home and to elevate or depress the estimate of our national character abroad.

Invoking the blessings of the Almighty upon your deliberations at your present important session, my ardent hope is, that in a spirit of harmony and concord, you may be guided to wise results, and such as may redound to the happiness, the honour, and the glory of our beloved country.

Washington, December 5th, 1848.

DOCUMENTS

JAMES K. POLK.

ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS BY THE GENERAL

GOVERNMENT.

In our history of the United States in the present number we have introduced the late congressional debate on the subject of slavery in the territories, in which some of the most distinguished men in the country took a part. On another great and absorbing question, which must continue to occupy largely the public attention, we present the arguments on both sides in the following able papers, the first from the chief magistrate of the Union, the other from an eminent statesman of New York.

VETO OF THE RIVER AND HARBOUR BILL.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RETURNING THE BILL ENTITLED "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUING CERTAIN WORKS IN THE TERRITORY OF WISCONSIN, and for other purPOSES," AND COMMUNICATING THEREWITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO ITS BECOMING A LAW.

To the House of Representatives:

On the last day of the last session of congress, a bill entitled "An act to provide for continuing certain works in the territory of Wisconsin and for other purposes," which had passed both houses, was presented to me for my approval. I entertained insuperable objections to its becoming a law; but the short period of the session which remained, afforded me no sufficient opportunity to prepare my objections, and communicate them, with the bill, to the house of representatives, in which it originated. For this reason the bill was retained, and I deem it proper now to state my objections to it.

Although, from the title of the bill, it would seem that its main object was to make provision for continuing certain works, already commenced in the

territory of Wisconsin, it appears, on examination of its provisions, that it contains only a single appropriation of six thousand dollars to be applied within that territory, while it appropriates more than half a million of dollars for the improvement of numerous harbours and rivers, lying within the limits and jurisdiction of several of the states of the union.

At the preceding session of congress it became my duty to return to the house, in which it originated, a bill making similar appropriations, and involving like principles, and the views then expressed remain unchanged.

The circumstances under which this heavy expenditure of public money was proposed, were of imposing weight in determining upon its expediency. Congress had recognised the existence of war with Mexico, and to prosecute it to "a speedy and successful termination," had made appropriations exceeding our ordinary revenues. To meet the emergency, and provide for the expenses of the government, a loan of twenty-three millions of dollars was authorized at the same session, which has since been negotiated. The practical effect of this bill, had it become a law, would have been to add the whole amount appropriated by it to the national debt. It would, in fact, have made necessary an additional loan to that amount, as effectually as if in terms it had required the secretary of the treasury to borrow the money therein appropriated. The main question in that aspect is, whether it is wise, while all the means and credit of the government are needed to bring the existing war to an honourable close, to impair the one and endanger the other by borrowing money to be expended in a system of internal improvements, capable of an expansion sufficient to swallow up the revenues, not only of our own country, but of the civilized world. It is to be apprehended that by entering upon such a career at this moment, confidence at home and abroad, in the wisdom and prudence of the government, would be so far impaired, as to make it difficult, without an immediate resort to heavy taxation, to maintain the public credit, and to preserve the honour of the nation and the glory of our arms, in prosecuting the existing war to a successful conclusion. Had this bill become a law, it is easy to foresee that largely increased demands upon the treasury would have been made at each succeeding session of congress, for the improvement of numerous other harbours, bays, inlets and rivers, of equal importance with those embraced by its provisions. Many millions would probably have been added to the necessary amount of the war debt, the annual interest on which must also have been borrowed, and finally a permanent national debt been fastened on the country and entailed on posterity. The policy of embarking the federal government in a general system of internal improvements, had its origin but little more than twenty years ago. In a very few years the applications to congress, for appropriations in furtherance of such objects, exceeded two hundred millions of dollars. In this alarming crisis, President Jackson refused to approve and sign the Maysville road bill, the Wabash river bill, and other bills of similar character. His interposition put a check upon the new policy of throwing the cost of local improvements upon the national treasury, preserved the revenues of the nation for their legitimate objects, by which he was enabled to extinguish the then existing public debt and to present to an admiring world the unprecedented spectacle in modern times of a nation free from debt, and advancing to greatness with unequalled strides under a government which was content to act within its appropriate sphere, in protecting the states and individuals in their own chosen career of improvement and of enterprise. Although the bill under consideration proposes no appropriation for a road or canal, it is not easy to perceive the difference in principle, or mischievous tendency, between appropriations for making roads and digging canals, and appropriations to deepen rivers and improve harbours. All are alike within the limits and jurisdiction of the states; and rivers and harbours alone open an abyss of ex

penditure sufficient to swallow up the wealth of the nation, and load it with a debt which may fetter its energies and tax its industry for ages to come. The experience of several of the states, as well as that of the United States, during the period that congress exercised the power of appropriating the public money for internal improvements, is full of eloquent warnings. It seems impossible in the nature of the subject, as connected with local representation, that the several objects presented for improvement, shall be weighed according to their respective merits, and appropriations confined to those whose importance would justify a tax on the whole community to effect their accomplishment.

In some of the states, systems of internal improvement have been projected, consisting of roads and canals, many of which, taken separately, were not of sufficient public importance to justify a tax on the entire population of the state to effect their construction; and, yet by a combination of local interests operating on a majority of the legislature, the whole have been authorized, and the states plunged into heavy debts. To an extent so ruinous has this system of legislation been carried in some portions of the union, that the people have found it necessary to their own safety and prosperity, to forbid their legislatures, by constitutional restrictions, to contract public debts for such purposes without their immediate consent.

If the abuse of power has been so fatal in the states where the systems of taxation are direct, and the representatives responsible at short periods to small masses of constituents, how much greater danger of abuse is to be apprehended in the general government, whose revenues are raised by indirect taxation, and whose functionaries are responsible to the people in larger masses and for longer terms.

Regarding only objects of improvement of the nature of those embraced in this bill, how inexhaustible we shall find them. Let the imagination run along our coast, from the river St. Croix to the Rio Grande, and trace every river emptying into the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico to its source; let it coast along our lakes, and ascend all their tributaries; let it pass to Oregon, and explore all its bays, inlets, and streams; and, then let it raise the curtain of the future, and contemplate the extent of this republic, and the objects of improvement it will embrace as it advances to its high destiny, and the mind will be startled at the immensity and danger of the power which the prin ciple of this bill involves.

Already our confederacy consists of twenty-nine states. Other states may, at no distant period, be expected to be formed on the west of our present settlements. We own an extensive country in Oregon, stretching many hundreds of miles from east to west, and seven degrees of latitude from south to north. By the admission of Texas into the union, we have recently added many hundreds of miles to our sea coast. In all this vast country, bordering on the Atlantic and Pacific, there are many thousands of bays, inlets and rivers, equally entitled to appropriations for their improvement with the objects embraced in this bill.

We have seen in our states that the interests of individuals or neighbourhoods, combining against the general interest, have involved their governments in debts and bankruptcy; and when the system prevailed in the general government, and was checked by President Jackson, it had begun to be considered the highest merit, in a member of congress, to be able to procure appropriations of public money to be expended within his district or state, whatever might be the object. We should be blind to the experience of the past if we did not see abundant evidences that if this system of expenditure is to be indulged in, combinations of individual and local interests will be found strong enough to control legislation, absorb the revenues of the country, and plunge the government into a hopeless indebtedness.