cinations of the dangers that may arise from the performance of the duty, can have no influence upon those who have accepted office under an engagement to obey the injunctions of the constitution. If, like some of the religious denominations among us, they are conscientiously, from any cause, opposed to the execution of the power, their plain duty, as honest men, is to give place to those whose constitutional phantasies or conscientious scruples are not in conflict with their vows.

And viewing the federal government in its relations to the states, there is a source of honourable obligation, more sacred, if possible, than the plain injunetions of the constitution. This arises from the fact that by that instrument the revenues derived from commerce were surrendered by the states to the general government, for the purpose and with the sole object of having them applied to the common interests which it was the design of the confederacy to protect and maintain. And they were thus surrendered under the pledge given in the preamble of the constitution, that it was framed to provide for the common defence and promote the general welfare. The states were thus deprived of the appropriate sources of revenue to improve and increase the facilities of the business which produced that revenue; and they were, as has been shown, effectually denied all power over it. Can it be supposed that the sagacious advocates of state rights and interests of that day intended to deliver up to the care of the federal government their respective states, thus stripped of the means of securing the first elements of their prosperity, and thus manacled and fettered, without an equivalent? And what was that equivalent? The only one which the case admitted-namely, the substitution of the federal government for the exercise of those powers and the performance of those co-relative duties which the exigency of the confederacy forbade to the states. In the very nature of things the federal government took the place, and received the powers, and thereby assumed those duties of the states respectively which they could not separately exercise consistent with the peace and prosperity of the whole. This was the great compromise of the constitution. And an obligation results from it upon the federal government which it is not at liberty to evade by suggestions, real or pretended, of the difficulties and hazards of performing its duty.

But what are these difficulties and dangers that are so frequently paraded with all the aggravations that may render them tragic, to "frighten us from our propriety? Let us speak to them, and see whether, like other apparitions of the imagination, they will not dissolve in the light of day.

By classing them, we will better understand their exact dimensions.

It is urged, First, That combinations of individual and local interests to obtain appropriations for internal improvements, will be found strong enough to control legislation, absorb the revenues, and plunge the country into hopeless indebtedness.

Second, That the subject is liable to be perverted to the worst of political purposes.

Third, That it is impossible, in the nature of the subject, as connected with local representation, that objects of internal improvement should be weighed according to their respective merits, and appropriations confined to those whose importance would justify the employment of the revenue of the whole community.

And Fourth, It is emphatically asked, where shall the exercise of the power stop?

A general reply to all these forebodings of evil, is, that they are precisely such as have always been proclaimed by the adversaries of free government and of popular institutions, in Europe and in this country. Our plan of a representative democracy, in which popular sentiment should be felt, was always regarded by them as pregnant with dangers. Combinations of powerful individuals, of great states and local interests, have been freely predicted

as the inevitable result of the wide scope given for their operation, by our institutions. In vain have we urged the system of checks interposed against hasty and improvident legislation. In vain have we pointed to the diversified interests of the various sections of our country, as affording counteracting influences upon each other which must for ever prevent the predominance of any one; to the long term of service of the senate, and to the executive veto, and finally to the judicial power to arrest unconstitutional enactments. We have been answered by references to the ancient republics and their inability to restrain combinations, and more particularly to the disastrous results of the French revolution of 1794, as having been produced mainly by the dictation of combined clubs. As our arguments seemed to make no impression, we quietly waited for the proof of the sufficiency of our government to maintain liberty consistently with public order and public interests, to be developed by our history. Nearly sixty years of uninterrupted prosperity, with continual concessions to popular liberty, have furnished the expected proof. And in the meanwhile, what has become of those governments in which it was supposed the dangers to be apprehended from these combinations, were most effectually obviated by monarchical or aristocratic power? They have passed away and evaporated, like flax at the touch of flame. And this is our answer to all such forebodings; our fathers surveyed the ground calmly and deliberately, they were fully apprized of all the hazards attending the experiment, and yet they decided that the happiness of themselves, and their posterity, demanded that they should be encountered.

Similar predictions of evil were made by those who opposed the adoption of the constitution. The powers of congress were represented as overshadowing the states; the danger of combinations was dwelt upon, and state sovereignty and individual liberty were to be absorbed by the monster of their imaginations. The patriotic Patrick Henry, as their chief exponent, objected perticularly to the power of TAXATION given to congress, and maintained that "it was impossible to select any subject of general taxation which would not operate unequally on different sections of the union, produce discontent and heartburnings among the people, and most probably terminate in open resistance to the laws." He objected also to the power of raising armies and building navies, and to the control of the general government over the militia, which, with the power of taxation, he represented, gave to congress the sword in one hand and the purse in the other, and declared, "unless a miracle in human affairs shall interpose, no nation ever did, or can ever retain its liberty, after the loss of the sword and purse." The treaty-making power was arraigned as a most dangerous feature, "inasmuch as it put it in the power of the president and any ten senators who might represent the five smallest states, to enter into the most ruinous foreign engagements, and even to cede away the territory of the larger states." That the pay of the members of congress was to be fixed by themselves, was also considered a very dangerous power. The anticipations of evil then indulged, might be multiplied almost indefinitely. But these are sufficient for the purpose for which they are adduced, which is to show that the conceded and uncontroverted powers of congress, are exposed to the same charges of liability to perversion, abuse and corruption, which have been so freely made against the power in question, and to show also the utter fallacy of all such prophecies.

Indeed, it is inseparable from any power to do good, that it may be perverted to evil. And the history of all governments establishes one melancholy fact, that human ingenuity has not yet devised any perfect remedy for human infirmity. The theories of other governments have placed the check on this liability to abuse, in the hands of a few supposed to be the most intelligent and virtuous of the community. Our theory is directly the reverse; it places the restraining and remedial power in the hands of the many-of the great mass who are interested in

preserving liberty, restraining factious combinations, and sustaining law and order. To say then, that the people themselves are or will become so corrupt and selfish that they cannot be trusted in the choice of representatives to legislate on this or any other subject-that it will be impossible to have just and rational legislation on any matter, in consequence of combinations of individual and local interests, and that these combinations are liable to be perverted to the worst of political purposes, is in effect assailing democracy and representative governments in their very citadel. It is in open conflict with the first principle of our institutions-the moral and political capacity of the people to govern themselves, and with the American doctrine, which teaches that there is more safety in large numbers-in the masses, than in any individual, whether he be a president or a king.

Having ourselves a firm faith in this doctrine-a faith strengthened and confirmed by our own history, and by what is passing at this moment on the European continent-a faith delivered to us by our fathers, and consecrated by their blood, we cannot surrender it. Nor do we believe that the representatives of the people and the states in congress will be the first to renounce and repudiate it, by declaring themselves to be unworthy and incapable, by reason of individual and local interests, to legislate upon any subject committed to their care by the constitution.

But we deny that there is more selfishness, more local and private interests to influence legislation on the subject of internal improvements, than upon many other subjects within the acknowledged competency of congress. Take, for instance, the power to lay and collect imposts; in other words, the establishment of a tariff of duties on importations. Where is there a greater opportunity for the combination of local and individual interests, to promote selfish purposes at the expense of the country? What subject is more liable to be perverted to political purposes? What presents greater difficulty as connected with local representation, in adjusting the proper subjects for revenue, and the proper amounts to be charged on them? And yet, has not this very question been repeatedly agitated in congress and disposed of, without producing any of those direful consequences? We therefore dismiss these fears to the same tomb that contains the evil prophecies of the monarchists of Europe. We have outlived and falsified them. We have proved that our people are not so selfish and unprincipled, and their representatives not so corrupt and profligate, as to be unworthy of a power to legislate upon a subject of the deepest interest to themselves.

But we are asked, where is this system to stop? We answer, where the necessities of foreign commerce and commerce among the states stop-when the country has adequate harbours for the shelter of its navy and its commercial marine on our sea coast and on our lakes-when the means of communication from the centre to every assailable point of our frontier, and from supporting distances along that frontier to each other, shall have been established and rendered as commodious as modern skill and industry can make them-then the system of appropriation for the common defence, and for facilitating commerce among the states will stop, and heaven forbid that it should stop any sooner. When, and where, we may ask in return, is the business of legislation for this vast country to stop? If the indefinite duration of the exercise of any power forms an objection to its being exercised at all, then your honourable bodies should adjourn, and leave the country without any regulation.

We are told that the policy of embarking the general government in appropriations for internal improvements, had its origin but little more than twenty years ago, and that it became so alarming as to require the strong and stern interposition of President Jackson to arrest its progress. General Jackson himself states, that the practice of appropriating money from the treasury of the United States for the establishment and support of light-houses, beacons, buoys, and public piers, to render navigation safe and easy, "is coeval with the adoption of the constitution, and has been continued without interruption or dispute."

If any corroboration of his testimony be required, it will be found by referring to an official report made under a call of the senate, by the distinguished head of the topographical engineers, on the 7th of January, 1847, and transmitted to the senate by the present secretary of war, being number 44 of the executive documents of the second session of the 29th congress. Annexed to this report is a recapitulation of the appropriations made in each year "for the construction and repair of roads, and the improvement of harbors," reaching back to the administration of Mr. Jefferson, which, being condensed, shows those made during the different administrations, as follows:

This topic has, however, been so fully and ably discussed recently, by a member of the present house of representatives from Connecticut, and the fallacy of the statement we have quoted, so thoroughly and triumphantly exposed, as to render quite unnecessary any farther comment from us.

FALLACY OF THE PROPOSED EXPEDIENT OF STATE TONNAGE DUTY.

But to provide some remedy for the admitted wants of the country, a suggestion has been brought out, which, if not original, has all the freshness of novelty. It is, that there is no occasion for the exercise of this power by congress, because "the constitution itself indicates a process by which harbors and rivers within the states may be improved-a process not suscepti ble of the abuses necessarily (supposed) to flow from the assumption of the power to impose them by the general government, just in its operation, and actually practised upon during more than thirty years from the organization of the present government." And we are told this process is indicated by a passage in the last clause of the 10th section of the first article of the constitution, by which it is provided that "no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace," &c. And the laying of a tonnage duty by the states with the consent of congress, is recommended as a safe provision to accomplish all the desired objects; and among its safe-guards it is specified that the funds raised "are to be in every instance levied upon the commerce of those ports which are to profit by the proposed improvement." And it is stated, that it appears in Mr. Madison's report of the proceedings of the convention, "that one object of the reservation was, that the states should not be restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbors."

It is deemed necessary, to a full understanding of the clause, that what was actually said should be known. The report referred to says: "Mr. M'Henry and Mr. Carroll moved that 'no state shall be restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbors and erecting light-houses.' Col. Mason, in support of this, explained and urged the situation of the Chesapeake, which peculiarly required expenses of this sort. Mr. Madison observed that there were other objects for tonnage duties, as the support of seamen, &c. He was more and more convinced that the regulation of commerce was in its nature indivisible, and ought to be wholly under one authority." (Madison papers, 3d, p. 1587.)

It appears, then, that the establishment of light-houses was as much an object of the reservation to the states as the clearing of harbors. If then, the argument derived from the debates prove any thing, it proves that the maintenance of light houses by the general government is not a power granted by

the constitution, and that they should be sustained by tonnage duties imposed by the states. And light boats, buoys, and beacons, must stand upon the same footing. The practice of the government, as already shown, has given a very different interpretation. The congress has assumed these duties without state legislation, and no one has yet been so hardy or reckless as to deny its power and its duty to do so.

The writers of the essays collected under the title of "The Federalist,” no where speak of this reserved power of laying a tonnage duty, and the quotation from No. 44 of that work, which has been cited as applicable to this subject, has no reference whatever to it, but relates wholly to the reserved power of laying duties on imports and exports.

It seems to your memorialists quite evident that under this reservation to the states of the right to lay a "duty on tonnage," it must be confined to the vessels of the state imposing it, and to foreign vessels, for by the sixth clause of the ninth section of the first article of the constitution, it is provided as follows: "No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to or from one state, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another." We are unable to comprehend how, under this prohibition, vessels navigating from one state to another, can, by any act of a state, with or without the consent of congress, be obliged to pay a tonnage duty in such other state. The provision operates to make common highways of all the navigable waters of the states, to vessels bound to or from one state, and by its terms, precludes what might otherwise be claimed, a reasonable toll or compensation for making or keeping such highways in proper condition for use.

The history of the times and of the debates in the convention furnishes abundant evidence, that among the evils of the confederation no one was deemed so intolerable and so destructive of the harmony and peace of the states or so ruinous to their commerce as the local duties imposed by several states upon cargoes and tonnage; and it seems to have been a primary object, utterly and for ever to abolish and prohibit them. And to this feeling do we attribute the clause in question.*

And we find that the qualification we have intimated, has been recognised in several of the acts of the states imposing tonnage duties, which have received the sanction of congress, and which have been specially communicated to your honourable Houses.-Thus, the act of May 6, 1796, gives the consent of congress to an act of Maryland, "so far as to enable the state aforesaid to collect one per cent. per ton upon all vessels coming into the district of Baltimore from a foreign voyage." And the act of February 28, 1806, gives the like consent that the state of Pennsylvania "may collect a duty of four cents per ton upon all vessels clearing out of Philadelphia for any port or place." By the act of March 28, 1806, consent is given to an act of South Carolina, authorizing "the city of Charleston to levy a duty not exceeding six cents per ton upon vessels entering the port of Charleston from any foreign port or place whatever." And by the act of April 29, 1816, the like consent is given to an act of the same state, for collecting a duty of ten cents per ton upon vessels from a foreign port.

Having no purpose to mislead, we state also, that we find several of the acts of congress referred to, assenting to laws of the states levying tonnage duties on ships and vessels, in some cases generally and without discrimination, and

[The late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of the constitutionality of the passenger tax by New York and Massachusetts, declares, that this clause of the constitution, was a limitation upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce, for the purpose of producing entire commercial uniformity within the states; and also a prohibition upon the states to destroy such uniformity by any legislation prescribing a condition upon which vessels bound from one state shall enter the port of another state.-ED.]