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porting freight in addition to their passenger and express business and railroads of a different character." The commission, in 20 I. C. C. R. 486, construed the section with this proviso as authorizing through routes and joint rates between a steam railroad and a street electric railway where the latter has a freight as well as a passenger traffic. The commission said that it was the purpose of congress to widen the scope of the powers of the commission to establish through routes and joint rates rather than to narrow them, and to leave in the commission full discretion to act in such cases in the light of all the facts and circumstances and do what may seem fair, reasonable and equitable in the case. In this case, that of an electric railroad in Ohio, the commission said that it was immaterial that the electric street railway had no right under the state law to demand a switch connection and an interchange of traffic with a steam railway. Such a limitation was only controlling as to local traffic, and could not be permitted to operate as an impediment to the movement of interstate traffic, where congress had legislated upon the subject by requiring such connection and interchange under certain conditions, which in this case were shown to exist.

The commission said that it would not ordinarily lend its aid to an effort by the carrier to secure traffic that was reasonably tributary to another line, but on the other hand it was unfair to impose upon shippers the burden of an unduly long wagon haul. The commission therefore denied through routes and through billing to points on the complainant's line where it paralleled and closely approached the tracks of one or more of the defendants, but required on the special facts of the case in the interest of the shippers connections at other points from five to ten miles distant by the wagon roads. The commission said that the case did not justify requiring the defendants to go to the expense of printing their tariffs and getting the concurrence of their connections in new joint through rates to and from the local points on complainant's line, and said that it would be sufficient for complainant to file its local rates with the commission, which would make them applicable under the rules on through interstate movements.

§ 375. The two year limitation of commission's orders.The statute as amended provides that all orders of the commis

sion, excepting orders for the payment of money, shall take effect within such reasonable time, not less than thirty days, and shall continue in force for such period of time, not exceeding two years, as shall be prescribed in the order of the commission. The effect of this limitation in time is to give the carrier freedom at the expiration of the time to exercise his own intiative as to matters affected by the order. This was illustrated in a case recently decided by the supreme court, supra, § 238, known as the Trade Zone Case, wherein the order of the commission, directing the reduction of class rates from East St. Louis to Kansas City when applied to business from the Atlantic seaboard on the ground that the through rates of the Missouri River cities were too high and unreasonable, was finally affirmed by the supreme court only ten days before the expiration of the two years' limitation of the two years' order; and immediately upon that expiration the rate thus adjudged unreasonable was restored by the railroads. See commission's report 1909 p. 33, and 1910 p. 16.

An order of the commission relating to rates is not invalidated because it fails to prescribe the time it shall remain in force; but in such case the order remains in force for two years. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, circuit court of N. Y., 168 Fed. 131 (1909).

An appeal from a decree dismissing a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the commission requiring a carrier to desist from granting a shipper an alleged undue preference, will not be dismissed by the supreme court as presenting merely a moot case because the period of two years during which the order was by its term continued, had expired. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. et al. v. Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 55 L. Ed. (1911). The court said that notwithstanding this limitation the orders of the commission were in one sense continuing and might be the basis of further proceedings by way of reparation, and that otherwise the parties would have their rights determined without a chance of redress. The same ruling was made in Southern Pacific Co. v. Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 55 L. Ed. (1911), where the court reversed the circuiet court, northern district of California, in their opinion in 177 Fed. 963, which sustained the order of the commission, 14 I. C. C. R. 461, and held the order void, though more than two years had elapsed since it became effective.

§ 376. Selection of the route by the shipper.-The supreme court had held in the Southern California Fruit Case, (supra § 300), that the control of through routing by the carrier as a condition of granting a through rate was not violative of any section of the Interstate Commerce Act. It is provided in this section by the amendment of 1910, that the shipper shall have the right to select his own through route, where there are two or more and to designate in writing by which of said through routes his property shall be transported to its destination. It is made the duty of the carrier, and of each of the connecting carriers, to receive and transport the property accordingly.

8377. The advanced rate cases of 1910.-In June, 1910, prior to the enactment of the amendatory statute of that year the principal carriers in the Western Trunk Line Territory through their agents acting in unison prepared and filed tariffs increasing their rates upon a number of important articles. Before these rates had gone into effect the attorney general of the United States caused suit to be brought in the circuit court of the United States in the eighth circuit at Hannibal, Missouri, alleging that such increased rates were the result of a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. A temporary injunction having been secured against putting these rates in effect, the carriers thereafter agreed to suspend the effectiveness of the rates pending a determination of their reasonableness by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This agreement was made in view of the bill then pending in congress vesting in the commission the power under this section 15 to suspend advanced rates. When the bill became law the carriers refiled their tariffs, but their taking effect was suspended by the commission pending the investigation.

Similar advances were attempted in what is known as the official classification territory including the territory in the northeastern section of the United States, east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers. These carriers also suspended the advances pending the investigation by the commission.

These advances were sought to be justified in both these cases on the ground of the increased cost of operation and the very general advance in wages. In both cases (20 I. C. C. R. 243, and

20 I. C. C. R. 307), it was ruled (Feb. 22, 1911), that the burden being upon the carriers to establish the reasonableness of the advanced rates, that they had failed to justify such increased rates. It was ruled also that the provision of this act differed from the English act, that under that statute the railway company need only prove that the increase of rate was unreasonable, while under the act to regulate commerce the carrier is called upon to prove that the new rate as a whole is reasonable.

In both cases it was ruled, that before any general advance of rates could be permitted it must appear with reasonable certainty that carriers had exercised proper economy in the purchase of their supplies, in the payment of their wages and in the general conduct of their business. In the Official Classification Case it was ruled that class rates had been continuously in effect for thirty years and their business had become adjusted to them while the situation was somewhat different with reference to commodity rates, and it was intimated that these rates might with justice be revised in some cases. The carriers were requested in both cases to withdraw their proposed tariffs, such action being without prejudice to the carriers, if changed conditions should be submitted to the commission.

§ 378. Jurisdiction over contracts of carriers.-While the commission has no general common law or equity jurisdiction and has no concern with the contractual relation of carriers other than with shippers and relating to transportation, it is especially authorized under this section as amended in 1906 to determine the just and reasonable charge or allowance for services rendered by a shipper to the carrier. This power was doubtless conferred to prevent the concealment of rebates or other discriminations or preferences to favored shippers in the guise for payments of services. The provision was strongly recommended by the commission in its annual report for 1905, where it says that there was no doubt that the payment of extravagant sums for such services was resorted to for the purpose and with the effect of preferring one shipper to another. It said also that this remedy will not be altogether adequate, and that any remedy was extremely difficult of application, but that nothing better appeared to be available.

This section has no application to the case of a contract made

by a carrier with a third party. This was ruled in the case, 17 I. C. C. R. 98, where complaint was made of allowances made to a warehouse company which was not the owner of the cotton which was there compressed and stored; and it was ruled that the mere fact that the owners of a majority of the stock were also shippers of freight did not show a violation of the act and did not make the allowance one for services rendered by a shipper to the carrier within the meaning of this provision.

This provision was invoked by the General Electric Company, 14 I. C. C. R. 238, which asked the commission to determine and fix the just and reasonable rates for the services which it rendered to the railroad in the industrial tracks upon its plant which it owned and operated and wherewith it hauled the loaded and empty cars to the main track. The commission ruled that the complainant did nothing within its plant enclosure which it could lawfully call upon the defendants to do for it, and therefore nothing for which it could lawfully demand compensation. It was claimed in this case that the railroad company had incurred contractual obligation by its course of conduct, but the commission said it had no power under the law either to enforce the specific performance of contracted obligations or to award damages for the breach of any such agreement.

§ 379. Allowances by carriers for shippers' services must not involve undue preference.-As this provision of the statute was enacted for the purpose of preventing concealment of rebates or other discriminations or preferences the commission has carefully examined such allowances when brought before it and has insisted that no such allowances can be recognized in favor of one shipper when a similar allowance is refused to another shipper competing in the same market and in the same line of business who offers to provide a similar facility and perform the same service in the transportation of his property. This principle was applied in the Federal Sugar Refining Company Case, involving an allowance made by railroads to the competitors of the Refining Company for lightering services in New York harbor. This case was twice before the commission. 17 I. C. C. R. 40, 20 I. C. C. R. 200. There was a difference of opinion as to the application of this principle to the facts in the case; but on the second hearing it was ruled by the majority that the allowance paid by the de

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