The Theory of Institutional DesignRobert E. Goodin Cambridge University Press, 18 հնս, 1998 թ. - 288 էջ Problems of institutional design and redesign, structuring and restructuring, acquired particular poignancy through recent developments from eastern Europe to southern Africa. At the same time, scholars in each of several disciplines political science, economics, sociology, history and philosophy have increasingly come to appreciate the important independent role that is, and should be, played by institutional factors in social life. In this volume, disparate theories of institutional design given by each of those several disciplines are synthesized and their peculiar power illustrated. |
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Institutional Design and Rational Choice | 54 |
Second Best Theories and the Implications | 90 |
The Informal Logic of Institutional Design | 103 |
Institutional Morality | 126 |
The Publicity Principle | 154 |
Designing Institutions in East European | 199 |
Political Deals in Institutional Settings | 227 |
Institutional Design | 240 |
| 277 | |
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academic action agents analysis argued argument behavior Braithwaite Brennan Cambridge University Press categorical imperative causal central Claus Offe consequentialist constraints context critique deliberation democracy democratic deterrence deterrence theory deviant-centered strategy discourses discretion economic effect egocentric Elster example explain fact Federalist Papers function Goodin Hardin Hence ideal incentive individuals insti institutional design institutionalism institutionalists interest internal John Braithwaite justice Kant Kant's less maxim means mechanisms ment moral motivated nonegocentric normative notion nuclear Omega options organization outcomes particular parties Pettit Philip Pettit player Political Science possible preferences Prisoner's Dilemma problem public choice public choice theory publicity principle purpose Q methodology quasi-market question rational choice theory reasons relevant responsibility result rewards role rules sanctions screening second best selection self-interest sense society sort stitutions structure suppose tional tions tutions utilitarianism voting welfare Welfare Economics York