indirect, of the infamous legislation of the Missouri usurpers, they alienated from them the good-will and the sympathy of immense masses of men. In those parts of the nation which are distinguished for their enterprise, their wealth, their intelligence, and their public spirit, they have been emphatically rebuked; their only salvation was the slaveholding interests of the South, and the lingering prejudices in favor of that interest, which still maintained a feeble hold upon the North. The old enchantment of their name was broken: the old magical sway which they exercised over the masses was gone: and they contrived to retain their control, not by any real or vital hold which they have on the populace, so much as by the interposition of the "Americans" to distract and divide the hostile camp. It must be clear, we think, to every attentive observer of political events, or, at any rate, to every observer, who does not satisfy himself with their superficial aspects, that the Republicans would have swept all the free states, by the same overwhelming majorities which they acquired in most of them, but for the check given to their movement by the candidacy of Mr. Fillmore. Between Mr. Fremont and Mr. Buchanan, as representatives of two distinct and welldefined lines of policy, there could have been, there is now, no question as to the popular choice. The former, by an almost spontaneous movement of the people, with a party scarcely organized, on the strength of his position alone, has achieved successes which astonish his friends as much as they appall his enemies, and it is universally perceived that, if the entire opposition had united upon him, these successes would have run up to a still more decided, and, in fact, to a final triumph. But when the apprehensions of the cautious and fearful were aroused by the cry of danger to the Union, and that cry was justified as a proper one in the premises-when a nucleus was afforded to the concentration of the scattered and discontented remnants of KnowNothingism-when the violent spirits of the South were furnished with a colorable pretext for the reiteration of their insane threats of civil war-a sufficient number were kept away or detached from the popular cause to render the bare victory to its foe. Not often before in human history has an end so noble been thwarted on grounds so inept. The question to be decided was, whether the institution of slavery, which prevails in certain parts of the confederacy, with all the political advantages it enjoys, should be carried into the new societies of the West; it was a question between the slaveholders and their interest, and all others and their interest who do not sustain the former. But it was adroitly turned into a question between the North and South, and the whole argument was thence conducted on one side, as if it had been an argument between two great territorial divisions of the nation. This was a fundamental perversion of the issue. The slaveholders, who seek to introduce their peculiar system of labor into the common territories are not "the South"-nor the "southern states"-nor is that system of theirs a part of the political constitution of those states. The "South," of which we hear so much, is a geographical term, designating a certain part of our country, within the bounds of which is comprised a large number of inhabitants, and a considerable variety of interests. The slaveholders are only a class among these inhabitants, and their interest only one among these interests. The inhabitants of the South number some ten millions, white and black, but the slaveholders number not more than three hundred and forty-seven thousand. With what propriety, then, can the latter be called the South? They are, as individuals, and as a class, it is true, very rich, very powerful, and very strongly entrenched in their possessions by the opinions of their neighbors; but, as individuals and as a class, they are no more than members of the community, not the community itself. The other residents of these regions cannot be passed over as nullities. They possess an existence and rights, and a certain position, as well as the slaveholders, and they are a part of the South as much as the slaveholders. The aristocracy of England, mighty as it is, in its privileges and its influences, is still not England: and the hierarchy of Rome is not the Catholic church, though it may officer and control the church, and fain persuade the multitude of the members that they and it are one. Neither is it to be conceded that the scheme of forced or bonded labor, which the slaveholders have adopted, is an "institution of the southern states." It is only a custom, or usage of southern society. The state, everywhere, is a great political corporation, composed of the entire electoral body, as defined in the fundamental law, and whose functions are performed by various legislative, judicial, and creative agents. But slavery is not one of these functions; it is simply a private or domestic relation. We may call it an "institution," by courtesy or custom of speech, just as we are apt to call everything established, an institution: yet we cannot call it a state-institution. We name our churches, for example, institutions, but we never regard them on that account, as institutions of the state. In several of the nations of Europe, where they are organized, maintained and directed as a part of the regular political machinery, they may properly be called institutions of the state. Our private academies, in the same way, are denominated institutions, but not state-institutions, as the public schools, in some states are, because they are endowed and controlled by the state. Nor because a thing is sanctioned by the law, is it therefore an institution of the state. Lotteries are sanctioned by law, in some states, but lotteries are not state-institutions. Houses of pleasure in France are regulated by law, but they are not an institution of the state in France. Slavery is sanctioned by the laws of our southern states, but slavery, for the same reason, is not an institution of the southern states. It is simply, as we have said, a usage of southern society, which the laws of the state permit, and to a very small extent regulate, but which the laws do not ordain, either as an element of political life, or as a part of the public administration. The legislature is an institution of the state, designed to enact laws -the governorship, with its inferior functionaries, is an institution of the state, designed to administer the laws -the courts of justice are institutions of state, designed to interpret laws and declare penalties--public schools are often institutions of state, designed to train and educate citizensand the ballot-box is an institution of state, designed to secure an expression of the public will. But slavery is not of the nature of any of these. It is an entirely domestic status or relationa mode of existence in which individuals ret stand to each other, like a partnership, or like a contract for labor, or like an incorporation for special private purposes. In the state of New York the laws guarantee to every individual the right to buy and sell certain things, as in South Carolina the laws guarantee to a certain class the right to buy and sell certain persons; but, in either case, the laws are only regulations for the management and good order of society, and not the creation of a public or political function. In giving themselves out as the "southern states," the slaveholders commit the same mistake which has been made by aspiring classes in all ages, and, if they do not refrain, must encounter the same destiny. The old priesthood of Rome proclaimed that "we are the church"-but the reformation in Germany demonstrated that the congregation was the church. Louis, the Fourteenth said, "I am the state," but the descendants of Louis in the bloody experiences of 1789, discovered that the people had something to say about that. In the same way, the slaveholders desire to say, "we are the South; we are the southern states," but let them beware of the end! For they may rest assured that the good sense of the people, south as well as north, will soon discern, if it has not discerned already, that they are neither a geographical division of the country, nor a public authority of the country, but only a are class of citizens residing in particular parts. Now, as such, their rights, whatever they may be, wholly local, wholly indigenous, wholly municipal, having force and validity nowhere but in the states in which they are expressly recognized. Slavery exists exclusively by the law of its locality, and not by natural law, or by international or universal law. There are certain great personal or moral rights, which are secured to a man, under all jurisdictions wherever he may be in the civilized world-and which the courts of the civilized world will protect. But slavery, or the right of property in man, is not one of these. In our schemes of jurisprudence, there are three great branches or divisions of law: first, internal or municipal and state laws, peculiar to each state-second, constitutional laws, peculiar to the United States as a federation-and. third, international laws, which regulate, politic ally and judicially, the intercourse of different nations; and it is from the first alone that the right of property in man is derived. No one pretends to deduce it from international law, and we therefore dismiss that branch of the argument without further word. But does it enure from our constitutional law, as some main. tain? We assert not. Our federal constitution recognizes peculiar relations, subsisting between the inhabitants of certain states of this Union, but it knows nothing of slavery, as property in man. It respects all the local laws of all the states, and will maintain all rights acquired under these laws, within such localities; but, in its own sphere, the constitution designates and acts upon all human beings as persons. So far is it from regarding any men as chattels, that it expressly excludes that idea. Knowing human beings only as persons, it is impossible that it should know them as property, for the two ideas are essentially incompatible; so that the constitution, in choosing one of these ideas, necessarily rejects the other. It refers to certain "persons held to service," and to certain "inhabitants not free," i.e., not politically citizens; but it nowhere refers to "slaves" as such, nor to any class of men as property. How could it, without stultifying and annulling itself? How could the framers of that instrument, who were no fools, who understood the force of language and of logic, legislate for men as men in one clause, and for men as property in another, when property and manhood are two fundamentally opposite ideas? In its preamble, in its numerous provisions and prohibitions, and in its glorious amendments, the constitution proclaims and defends the liberty and rights of humanity; it organizes a free government; it guarantees republicanism; it shelters the freedom of speech, the freedom of action, the freedom of the press, and it nowhere imposes seals of bondage on any class of human beings. All that it does, in that direction, is to recognize the laws of each statė, as applicable wit within that state, but as valid nowhere else, unless expressly accepted. If slaves are held as property anywhere, the laws of the state where they are held are responsible, but not the constitution of the United States. tional, slavery is, then, local or municipal; and, as such, it has been almost universally recognized by the courts of the slave states themselves. "Slavery," says the Supreme Court of Mississippi, (Walker, 42), "is condemned by reason and the laws of nature, and can exist only by municipal regulation." "It is a right," says the Supreme Court of Kentucky (2 Marshall, 470), " existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or in the unwritten or common law." But, being local, it has no right in the territories. In refusing it admittance there, you simply refuse to give universal validity to a private and peculiar usage; you infringe no right of any state, nor of the people of any state. As a state, and as a people, the rights of each remain intact. You say to all men, to those who are so unfortunate as to live where slavery is tolerated, as to others, that as people, as members of a community, as citizens of a state, they may go where they please-into the territories or not, as they please-but as slaveholders, as a peculiar class, they will not be recognized there. Their status or condition as citizens, and all that belongs to them as citizens, is guaranteed them by the constitution, and by the universal laws of political societybut their status and rights, as slaveholders, are specialities, which they owe to their own municipality, and which the constitution and general laws of political society know nothing about. In their character of people, or of citizens, they are as free of the territories as any other people; but, in their character as a class, endowed with certain municipal rights, they must remain where they are if they wish to retain their possession. Nor, in thus doing, do you make any odious distinctions. There are citizens in New Jersey, to whom the laws of New Jersey allow the privilege of carrying passengers by railroad, across the state-there are citizens in Iowa, to whom the laws allow twelve per cent. on money lent-there are citizens of Utah, to whom the laws allow a dozen or twenty wives each; but are not these peculiar and local arrangements? Have they any validity beyond the states in which they exist? It may be a misfortune to them that they cannot carry their local rights along with them wherever they go, but it is a mis Not being international nor constitu- fortune which they suffer under the es tablished principles of law, and not by the aggression or arbitrary act of others. The equality of the states consists in their equal privileges, under the constitution, and not in the assumed right of any one or any ten citizens of them to establish their peculiar customs in the territories. Property in slaves is a special and peculiar property, known alone to peculiar localities, and having no existence in constitutional or international law, unless specifically recognized. We have said that the prohibition of slavery in the territories does not exclude the people of any state; and the proof of this, in practice, is to be found in the operation of the old ordinance of 1787. By that timely and immortal deed, slavery was forever shut out from the whole northwestern territory-from all the territory then in possession of the United States, or which they ever expected to possess. But, were the residents of the South thereby excluded? Consult the census: five states have been formed out of that territory; Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, and how have they been peopled? Indiscriminately from all parts of the Union! Ohio has a population of two millions, of whom 700,000 came from other states, and of these, 152,000 from slave states. Illinois has a population of 846,000, of whom 400,000 were not born in the state; and of these, 144,000 came from slave states. It is the same with the other northwestern states. From one-third to one-half of the emigrants from other states were derived from the South, which, considering how much more active and mobile the free states are, from the nature of their society, is their just proportion, at least. Virginia has 154,000 of her children in these states; can she be said to have been excluded? Maryland has as many as 54,000; has she been excluded? Kentucky nearly as many; has she? There have gone from the slave states into the free territories, 556,900 persons-more than five times the whole number of effective slaveholders in the Union. That is, oneninth of the entire white population of the slave states, have settled in states where slavery was prohibited! What means the clamor, then, that the South is excluded from the territories by the prohibition of slavery? It does not mean that their people, but that their peculiar laws, are excluded; not that the men of those states, but that the slaves -as slaves of those states, cannot be taken there. Meantime, there is another side of the account. White freedom does not exclude the South, to any great ex * We have hastily compiled, from the last census, the following tables, which exhibit this matter in its practical aspects, in a nut-shell. NATIVES OF FREE STATES INHABITING THE SOUTHWESTERN (SLAVE) TERRITORIES. Vermont Rhode Island. Pennsylvania. New Jersey New Totals New York. Hampshire. 8.489 12,737 8,291 124 630 123 55,610 952 594 981 62141 4.579 1,473 2,493 239 283 7 14,566 947 1,005 56 144 42 9,985 Virginia Arkansas 121 3,276 2,128 106 80 174 17 49 117 537 1,051 702 36 82 13 Grand Total, 93,229. (1) It appears from this that the slave states have sent nearly six times as many of their population into the free territories as the free states have sent into slave territories. (2) Kentucky, alone, has sent into free territory 60,000 more than all the free states have sent into slave territory. (3) Virginia, alone, has sent 60,000 more into the free territory than all the free states have sent into slave territory. (4) North Carolina and Tennessee have sent several thousands more into the free territories than all the free states have sent into slave territory. (5) Maryland, with a total white population of 418,000, has sent more than half as many → persons into the free territories, as all the free states together, with a total white population of 13,300,000, have sent into the slave territories. Mississippi. Maryland NATIVES OF SLAVE STATES IN THE NORTHWESTERN (FREE) TERRITORY. 598 4,715 17 447 13,829 648 36,698 422 656 Illinois 1,335 727 226 1,397 23 1,341 49,588 480 6,898 490 7,228 13,851 4,162 32,303 63 24,697 Indiana 395 151 Michigan 19 25 Wisconsin 49 67 45 368.12 33 141 4 495 1,429 68 402 227 2,737 21 761 68,651 321 10,177 Texas Tennessee South Carolina North Carolina Missouri 4,807 1,468 1,873 29 85,762 287 1,006 33,175 4,069 12,734 44 41,819 30 78 462 537 Total 2,007 1,111 1,129 9,258,777,112 153,899 1,557 54,772 1,268 9,994 52,467 10,030 47,384 150 154,685 Delaware Dist. Columbia Arkansas Alabama One-ninth of all the natives of the slave states are in the free states of the northwest. tent, from the new regions of settlement; slavery, when it is established there, does exclude our free people. It is a fact, demonstrated by the whole course of our experience of internal migrations, that free-labor will not willingly go where slave-labor exists. As long ago as 1787, George Mason, of Virginia, said, in the Convention which framed the Federal Constitution, that "slavery discourages arts and manufactures. The poor despise labor when performed by slaves. They prevent the immigration of whites, who really enrich and strengthen a country." And our history since has been an ample proof of the truth of his remarks. Our farmers, our mechanics, our laborers, avoid settling, and when a region is opened to slavery, it is virtually a banishment of free-labor. New York has sent 130,000 people to Michigan, 67,000 to Illinois, 83,000 to Ohio, which were free, as territories; but to Missouri, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisana, which were slave territories, not 12,000 altogether! Pennsylvania has sent 300,000 to the free northwestern territories ; but to all the slave-territories not 15,000 altogether. Is it by excluding slavery, that we destroy the equality of the states? Is it not clear that by establishing it we do so? We have dwelt upon these points |
