him, in opinion, that the present ruinous condition of our fettlements in India ought to attract the attention of the legiflature.

The Appendix, which he has given in illustration of his text, corroborates and fortifies his reafonings, in a manner so powerful, that no man, whofe feelings have not been corrupted by illiberal exertions of power, will be able to perufe it without giving way to the painful emotions of aftonishment, indignation, and horror.

The part of his performance the most detached and indepen dant regards the nature and defects of the constitution of the English Eaft India Company; and, on this account, we shall extract, for the obfervation of our Readers, what he has remarked on this fubject.

Of all political tyrannies, fays our Author, the aristocratic is worst, having ever been found, from experience, the most partial and oppreflive. And of all aristocracies, perhaps a trading one is leaft endurable, from being most likely to abufe power; as was frequently verified in ancient times, and in later ages has been practically exemplified in Venice and Genoa.

The Dutch East India Company is aristocratic in its executive; but then it is the fubject of a democratic trading-ftate, which has eftablished fuch effectual checks on all entrusted operative powers in India, as ferve fully to prevent both executive oppreffion, and the rapine of individuals.

The English Eaft India Company was originally intended to be a merely trading community, being firft inftituted by Queen Elizabeth's charter of the 30th December 1600, exprefly "for the honour of the nation, the increase of navigation, and the advancement of trade and merchandize within the British dominions; for the increase of the riches of the people, and the benefit of the commonwealth." And indeed this Company, by its conftitution, is as unfit to exercise sovereign authority, as by the conftitution of the kingdom it must be unqualified either to acquire or poffefs it.

The Company are inftitutionally a democratic body, the fupreme power, even over the management of their commercial concerns, being placed, at large, in the hands of all proprietors who have five hundred pounds ftock: and fo entirely popular is the government of this commercial community, that any nine proprietors who are qualified for voting at their meetings, or general courts, can at any time require and procure the affembling of the whole body, for fpecified bufinefs; where a majority of the members are entitled to demand whatever informations or infpections they please ; to regulate dividends, to establish bye-laws and refolutions, and to order their being carried into execution by their fubftitutes, the Twenty-four Directors, who are annually chofen; provided fuch regulations be conformable to the Company's charter, and not repugnant to the laws of the kingdom.

Such is the conftitution of this incorporated community; which is fuitable to the nature and ends of its inftitution, being the employment of the joint stock in commerce, to their own advantage,

and at the fame time to the benefit of the state. The exclufive right of trade granted to them was for the fake of encouraging a new and important branch of commerce that might prove beneficial to the kingdom, and which was not likely perhaps, at that time, to be properly undertaken or profecuted on any other conditions: and this in fact is the only constitutional reafon that could ever be advanced to authorize the granting of fuch exclufive rights by charters. While this incorporated body of merchants, therefore, were profecuting trade in pursuit of their own intereft, they were likewife to be confidered as acting in truft for the public, under the protection, infpection, and controul of government; because, like that which is carried on between Great Britain and every other country, the commerce with India is the commerce of the state.

So long as the concerns of the Company continued purely commercial, and while in India they were fubject to the controul of the Indian governments, the powers they were entrusted with, under the authority and protection of the crown of Great Britain, for the government of thofe fettlements which they were authorized to establish in fuch remote countries, for the better carrying on of their trade, might be confidered as fafe and requifite. The ftake then principally hazarded was the property of a trading community, who had no other views or expectations than of the profits arifing from their commerce, in their management of which there could be little pretence for government's interfering: though it must be confeffed the power which the Company were authorized to exercise in India was, even foon after their firft eftablishment, too frequently abused by grofs acts of injuftice and oppreffion; fuch as appear to have been fucceffively continued down, with great increase, to the prefent times.

• But the circumftances of this Company have, within a few years paft, become greatly different from what they were, or could be forefeen, either at the first grant, or on any renewal of their charter. By the forces of the Company, in conjunction with thofe of the kingdom, immense territories have been acquired in India. And though of right they can only belong to the ftate, yet hitherto they have been with-held by, or rather have been farmed to the Company, together, in fact, with the perfons and rights of their numerous inhabitants, for a ftipulated annual confideration: fo that the Company now poffefs and exercife in thofe territories, not only all their prior commercial privileges, but likewife all the powers of defpotic fovereignty, equally over their fellow European fubjects, and the helpless fubdued Afiatics; there being no courts of justice, in those countries, that are effectual for the due protection of either.

The following are therefore now become interefting objects of confideration. Whether the protection and government of fuch extenfive, populous, and wealthy provinces as may be faid to conftitute a great empire, and the management and appropriation of a yearly revenue of feveral millions fterling, can wifely or fafely be intrufted, as at prefent, without adequate checks on the part of the crown and people, to the care of a fluctuating, democratic community of traders; compofed not only of the native fubjects of Great Britain, but likewife of aliens of all countries and religions? And fuch confidera

tions as these are the more neceffary at prefent, as the very stock of this Company, with all the powers and rights annexed to it, may,' in effect, be engroffed by combining proprietors. From what we have feen, it may even be apprehended, that one man might obtain the command of the Company, by dint of wealth perhaps acquired in its fervice; and by a dextrous management of fplit ftock, among temporary proprietors, get voted in his own favour, whatfoever he pleafed. Even foreigners may combine, and by engroffing much ftock, perhaps influence fuch measures as would endanger the Afiatic territorial poffeflions, and therewith the India trade of this nation. At a critical feafon they might poffibly be made inftruments for even disturbing the peace of Europe, and thereby expofe to hazard the future power and welfare of this kingdom.

Whatever view we take of the conftitution of the India Company, to whom thofe Indian territories, and with them no inconfiderable portion of the national influence and power in Europe are intrusted, it must appear, that fuch poffeffions are of too much consequence to be abandoned to twenty-four Directors, who, it may be feared, are on many accounts but ill qualified for the entire management of concerns of fuch infinite importance, being generally elected by the combinations and intrigues of a few monied men, who may be. actuated by no better motives than the acquifition of power and influence to themfelves, and of rapid fortunes to their families, dependents and creatures. And indeed the general prevalency of the Houfe-Lifts of candidates at elections for Directors, and of Houfe-Queftions, carried by the Household Troops, at most of the General Courts, might ferve to convince us, that those Minifters of the Company, after they are fo chofen, become in reality its Mafters; though perhaps on fome occafions they may act as the mere tools of fuch individuals as helped to exalt them, and who in fo doing had their own diftin&t interests in view.

But whether the Directors act under the influence of others or not, when we confider what they have at their disposal both in England and India; where there is fo much to beflow, and confequently fo much to acquire in the civil, military, and maritime departments; fo many preferences to be given in a variety of employments, and likewife in almoft all kinds of dealings; where the whole quantity of stock is fo limited, and of courfe the number of proprietors qualified for voting fo fmall; while the requifite property for candidatefhip for the Direction is fo inconfiderable, in comparison with the many advantages that may be reaped, and the gratifications that can be conferred; and when it is farther confidered, how much India ftock ufually belongs to foreigners abroad, to women, minors, and fuch proprietors as are not qualified for voting in the affemblies of the Company; when we confider all these circumstances together, the proofs daily given of the undue influence poffeffed by the Directors over the general body of voters, can excite in us no wonder.

Thus, though in conftitution the Company is a democracy, it is, from corruption, become in practice a mere oligarchy. A majority of the twenty-four Directors can exercife fuch defpotic powers as operate without limit both in Europe and Afia; not only over the property of that refpectable body THE REAL PROPRIETORS (which

ought

ought ever to be diftinguished from the cabals of the avaricious and ambitious) but likewife over the fortunes of all men who engage in the Company's fervice. And this power they no lefs exercise over the people, the revenues, the internal trade and external commerce of a very confiderable part of India, than over what they for fo long. a time have poffeffed, the whole traffic of this kingdom with the eaftern quarter of the globe.

Yet great as we know the power of Directors to be in Europe, we likewife know, that there have been, and may believe there till are fuch defpots in the fervice of the Company abroad, as dare not only to interpret the orders of their employers as may best serve their own purposes, whether in the establishment of fuch monopolies as are grievous to the native people, injurious to trade and freedom, and greatly hurtful to the Company; but even peremptorily to dispute their moft abfolute injunctions, and likewife to abufe the powers which are only intrufted to them for good purpofes, by grofs perverfions of justice, violations of law and established cuftom, arbitrary and unconstitutional applications of military force, and even the exercife of wanton tyranny for the worst of purposes. At the fame time we behold the impotency of power, if the expreffion may be allowed us, or the force of what is worse, to be fuch on this fide of the ocean, that not one delinquent in India is brought to justice in Europe: nor do we hear of any kind of redrefs having been ever otherwife than reluctantly granted, by Directors, to fuch unhappy people as had been barbarously trampled on, wantonly perfecuted, cruelly tripped, exiled, or even ruined; not only without proved guilt that deferved punishment, or without trial of any kind, but even without fo much as the open accufation of a misdemeanor! While, on the contrary, we have feen the very oppreffors of innocent men, not only careffed, but even affociated in the Direction foon after their arrival; while uncommon industry has been used to fille accufations, or even to bear down, by power, the fuffering complainants of injury and oppreffion. Inftances of conduct, which have served to remind the generous and humane, of the pro-confular ravages that were practifed in the Roman provinces, and of the applications that were afterwards ineffectually made either for juftice or redrefs, to the temporary Directors of public affairs in Rome, the feat of univerfal empire; during the lat, luxurious, corrupt, and rapacious ftages of that once glorious, but then degenerated and finking commonwealth.

Since their affuming the Dewannce, the views confequent of conqueft feem to have fo engroffed the attention of this Company, or rather of those who act for them, that they appear to have been as regardless of the true commercial interefts of the kingdom as they have fhewn themfelves inattentive to acts of justice, on complaints of the worst abuses of power; for, notwithstanding the great increase of their dominion, power, and influence, there has been little, if any increase in the fales of British woollens in Bengal. The Turkey trade in this branch is known to have greatly declined of late years,

The nature of this office our Author explains in another part of his work.

Rev. Mar. 1772.

R

infomuch

infomuch that the clothiers who manufacture white cloths have principally depended on the exportation to India, and are quite at a stand when the India Company fail in the quantity ufually exported by them. The trade in broad-cloths from hence to India is all, except in the meereft trifles, ftrictly prohibited to all dependents on the East India Company, from the general practice, which indeed is common to all monopolifts, not to clog markets with commodities, in order the better to fupport their prices. Nevertheless, without the abilities of confummate politicians, or even the knowledge of the moft experienced merchants, fuch regulations might be made, and fuch undertakings encouraged as would foon double the fales of broad-cloth, and the other woollen manufactures of this kingdom in Bengal and certainly nothing could be more laudable than the purfuit of every just measure that could be invented to encourage and increase the confumption of fuch articles.

With refpe&t to commerce and internal trade, which are the chief fources of wealth and power to a nation, as they likewife are of profperity to individuals, the whole of both, in Bengal, are in effect monopolies, either in the hands of the Company or thofe of its fervants: the former, from being the only merchant or commercial importer and exporter, is of courfe the exclusive buyer and feller from or to Europe, on felf-prefcribed conditions, at least as far as regards British commerce; and likewife is greatly prefcriptive, in effect, with refpect to the reft. The advantages of one buyer over many fellers, and of one feller over many buyers is no other than the acquifition of a doubly-monopolizing power over the property of a whole people, and therefore dangerous alike to the welfare of individuals and the profperity of a country; but of course must prove greatly more fo when united, as at prefent in Bengal, with unlimited fovereignty.

With respect to the latter, we mean the fervants of the Company, they directly or indirectly monopolize whatever branches they pleafe of the internal trade of thofe countries, whether of provisions and the necefiaries of life, or the raw materials for manufacturing: in which kinds of commodities, without full freedom of dealings, no country can ever be made, or kept profperous; nor will a trading one in fuch a fituation long fubfift; as, if fpeedy remedies be not applied, the Company and this nation muft, and will very foon experience, in the fatal effects of the evils refulting from fuch a conduct, on the manufactures, revenues, and the trade of the subjected Bengal provinces.

Many of the evils under which Bengal has laboured for fome years paft, as we have obferved in another place, may truly be faid, in a great measure, to have originated in Leadenhall-ftreet, from the ignorance, or worse, of Directors; from the continual changes and fluctuating ftate of that Court, as well as of the General Court of Proprietors; and for want of a permanent fyftem of government adequate to the altered ftate of the Company's affairs in those diftant regions. No fronger proof can be given of the defective conftitution of this Company, or of the incompetency of the Courts of Directors, than the very neceflity which the prefent Court have thought themfelves under of having recourfe to the expedient of fending Su

pervifors