Opinion of the Court. It is obvious that the confirmation was of a tract with specified boundaries, and as such covered all the land within those boundaries, irrespective of quantity, and this, notwithstanding there appeared in the prior proceedings statements that the tract contained a certain amount, "a little more or less," which amount was very much less than that included within the boundaries. "When a decree gives the boundaries of the tract to which the claim is confirmed, with precision, and has become final by stipulation of the United States and the withdrawal of their appeal therefrom, it is conclusive, not only on the question of title, but also as to the boundaries which it specifies." United States v. Halleck, 1 Wall. 439; United States v. Billing, 2 Wall. 444; Higueras v. United States, 5 Wall. 827. And the act of Congress of July 1, 1864, 13 Stat. 334, § 7, requires the surveyor general, "in making surveys of the private land claims finally confirmed, to follow the decree of confirmation as closely as practicable whenever such decree designates the specific boundaries of the claim." The charge of fraudulent misconduct on the part of the surveyor, Hancock, is not substantiated. Mr. Hancock was not appointed surveyor with reference to this survey. He was the regular deputy surveyor for this district, having been appointed more than ten years prior thereto. While at one time he had owned an interest in the grant, he had more than eight years before the survey sold and conveyed it for a full consideration to his brother, and from that time forward, during all these proceedings, was without any interest in the premises. It is true that during these years Mr. Hancock acted as the general agent of his brother, and that is all the ground there is to suspect wrong on his part. There is not a syllable of testimony that, after the Secretary had ordered the new survey, Mr. Hancock had anything to do with the matter, either in suggestion, recommendation or otherwise, so that the report of the surveyor general was not made by virtue of anything that Hancock had said or done. The examination referred to by the surveyor general in his report was made by one R. C. Hopkins, under the direction of the surveyor general, a person who was at the time, so far as the testimony discloses, entirely disinterested. Opinion of the Court. It is true there is testimony furnished by Mr. Hopkins himself that some time after the patent had been issued he accepted a deed of a portion of this grant as a present from the owners-a tract which he subsequently sold for $1500. Whatever criticism may be placed upon the acceptance of this gifta gift made long after his relations to the survey had ceased-it certainly does not establish dereliction in his discharge of prior official duty. These matters, together with the failure to publish notice in the nearest paper, are all the evidences of fraud in the transaction. Not only are they not "the clear, convincing and unambiguous" proofs of fraud required to set aside a patent, as declared by this court in the case of Colorado Coal Company v. United States, 123 U. S. 307, 317, but they, all combined, create nothing more than a suspicion. They may leave a doubt, but they do not bring the assurance of certain wrong. Some question is made as to the correctness of the survey, and that turns as a question of fact upon what is meant by the expression "Agua Caliente" in the various descriptions. If it means a stream known as Agua Caliente, then the government has no cause to challenge the survey, for it includes less than was really confirmed, but if it means a district of country known by that name in the northwestern portion of the San Bernardino rancho, a neighboring tract, then the survey was excessive. If it were necessary for us to determine this question, we think the evidence in the case indicates that the stream and not the district was intended, but it is not the province of this court to correct a mere matter of survey like that. If made in good faith and unchallenged as this has been for over fifteen years, whatever doubts may exist as to its correctness must be resolved in favor of the title as patented. We see no error in the decree, and it is MR. JUSTICE FIELD takes no part in this decision. Affirmed. Statement of the Case. COMANCHE COUNTY v. LEWIS. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS. No. 1022. Submitted January 7, 1890.- Decided January 27, 1890. Full control over the matter of the organization of new counties in the State of Kansas is, by its constitution, article 9, § 1, given to the legislature of the State, which has power, not only to organize a county in any manner it sees fit, but also to validate by recognition any organization already existing, no matter how fraudulent the proceedings therefor were. When a legislature has full power to create corporations, its act recognizing as valid a de facto corporation, whether private or municipal, operates to cure all defects in steps leading up to an organization, and makes a de jure out of what was before only a de facto corporation. When both the executive and legislative departments of the State have given notice to the world that a county within the territorial limits of the State of Kansas has been duly organized, and exists, with full power of contracting, it is not open to the county to dispute those facts in an action brought against it by a holder of its bonds, who bought them in good faith in open market. The debts of a county, contracted during a valid organization, remain the obligations of the county, although, for a time, the organization be abandoned, and there are no officers, to be reached by the process of the court. A recital in the bond of a municipal corporation in Kansas that it was issued in accordance with authority conferred by the act of March 2, 1872, Kansas Laws of 1872, 110, c. 68, and in accordance with a vote of a majority of the qualified voters, is sufficient to validate the bonds in the hands of a bona fide holder; and the certificate of the auditor of the State thereon that the bond was regularly issued, that the signatures were genuine, and that the bond had been duly registered, is conclusive upon the municipality. A recital in a bond issued by a county in Kansas for the purpose of building a bridge, need not necessarily refer to the particular bridge for the construction of which it was issued. In Kansas a county has power to borrow money for the erection of county buildings, and to issue its bonds therefor. AT LAW, to recover on coupons of bonds issued by a municipal corporation in Kansas. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion. Opinion of the Court. Mr. G. C. Clemens and Mr. A. H. Smith for plaintiff in error. Mr. W. H. Rossington for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action on coupons. There were three classes of bonds, namely, court-house, bridge and current expense bonds. The Circuit Court held the latter void, the others valid, and judgment was rendered accordingly Lewis v. Comanche County, 35 Fed. Rep. 343. The county alleges error. inquiry, therefore, is limited to the bridge and court-house bonds. Our The first and principal contention of the plaintift in error is that at the time of the issue of these bonds there was no valid county organization, no corporate entity capable of contracting, that the pretended organization in 1873 was fraudulent and void, and shortly thereafter abandoned, the county remaining unorganized until 1885, when, upon memorial presented and census taken, it was organized anew as in the case of an unorganized county. In order to fully understand the question here presented, a brief retrospect of the condition, the legislation and judicial decisions of the State is necessary. At the time of its admission into the Union, in 1861, the settlements were confined to the eastern portion of the State, the west being wholly unoccupied. The territory of the State was divided into counties, those in the eastern portion being organized, and those in the western unorganized, the legislation as to the latter being limited to the matter of names and boundaries. Of course there were no courts in these unorganized counties, for the machinery was wanting; there were no county buildings, county officers or jurors. So they were by statute attached to the organized counties for judicial purposes. It was foreseen that they would, in course of time, become occupied, and that provision must be made for their organization as political subdivisions of the State. So, by the constitu Opinion of the Court. tion, in section 1 of article 9, power was given to the legislature in these words: "The legislature shall provide for organizing new counties, locating county-seats, and changing county lines." The first legislature, on the fourth day of June, 1861, passed an act entitled, "An act relating to the organization of new counties." This was amended in 1872, and under the act as so amended the county of Comanche was organized. Section 1 of this chapter prescribes the proceedings, and is as follows: "SECTION 1. Section 1 of an act relating to the organization of new counties is hereby amended so as to read; Section 1. When there shall be presented to the governor a memorial, signed by forty householders who are legal electors of the State, of any unorganized county, showing that there are six hundred inhabitants in such county, and praying that such county may be organized, accompanied by an affidavit attached to such memorial, of at least three householders of such county, showing that the signatures to such memorial are the genuine signatures of householders of such unorganized county, and that the affiants have reason to and do believe that there are six hundred inhabitants in such county as stated in the memorial, it shall be the duty of the governor to appoint some competent person, who is a bona fide resident of the county, to take the census and ascertain the number of bona fide inhabitants of such unorganized county, who shall, after being duly sworn to faithfully discharge the duties of his office, proceed to take the census of such county, by ascertaining the name and age of each of the bona fide inhabitants of such unorganized county, who shall receive for services rendered under this section pay at the rate of three dollars per day, from the state treasurer, upon an itemized account, verified by affidavit. The person who shall take the census as required, shall return to the governor, upon appropriate schedules, the census authorized to be taken herein, certified to be correct and true, and if it appear by such return that there are in such unorganized county at least six hundred bona fide inhabitants, he shall appoint three persons, who shall be recommended in the memorial hereinbefore provided for, to act as county commissioners, and a proper person to act as county clerk, to be recommended in |