fund by the debtor, out of which the creditor is to be paid, the debtor
cannot set up the statute of limitations to an action on the bonds and
coupons, without showing that the fund has been provided. Lincoln
County v. Luning, 529.
See MORTGAGE, (9).

1. In this case, which was an action against a railroad company, by one
of its employés, to recover damages for a personal injury, it was Held,
that it was proper for the Circuit Court to direct the jury to find a
verdict for the defendant. Coyne v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 370.
2. The plaintiff was a laborer or construction hand, under a construction
boss or foreman of the defendant. He was injured by the fall of a
steel rail, which he and other laborers were trying to load from the
ground upon a flat car, and which struck the side of the car and fell
back. The negligence alleged was, that the foreman moved out the
construction train to which the flat car belonged, in the face of an
approaching regular freight train, to avoid which the laborers were
hurrying to load the rails; and that he failed to give the customary
word of command to lift the rail in concert, but, with the approaching
freight train in sight, and with oaths and imprecations, ordered the
men to get the rail on in any way they could, and they lifted it with-
out concert; Held, that whatever negligence there was, was that of
either the plaintiff himself or of his fellow-servants who with him had
hold of the rail. Ib.

3. The stewardess of a steam-vessel belonging to a corporation sued it to
recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her. She came
out of the cabin, which was on deck, to throw the contents of a pail
over the side of the vessel, at a gangway facing the door of the cabin,
and leaned over a railing at the gangway, composed of four horizon-

tal rods, which gave way, because not properly secured, and she fell
into the water, probably striking the side of a boat. The rods were
movable, to make a gangway, and had been recently opened to take
off some baggage of passengers, and not properly replaced. The por-
ter and the carpenter had attempted to replace them, but left the
work, knowing that it was unfinished. The persons composing the
ship's company were divided into three classes of servants, called three
departments the deck department, containing the first and second
officers, the purser, the carpenter and the sailors; the engineer's de-
partment, containing the engineers, the firemen and the coal-passers,
and the steward's department, containing the steward, the waiters,
the cooks, the porter and the stewardess. Every one on board, in-
cluding the plaintiff, had signed the shipping articles, and she had
participated in salvage given to the vessel. The master was in
command of the whole vessel; Held, that the porter and the car-
penter were fellow-servants with the plaintiff, and that the corpora
tion was not liable to her for any damages. Quebec Steamship Co...
v. Merchant, 375.

4. The Circuit Court left it to t'e jury to determine, if they found
there was negligence, whether the injury was occasioned by the care-
less act of a servant not employed in the same department with the
plaintiff; Held, error, and that the court ought to have directed the
jury, as requested, to find for the defendant, on the ground that the
negligence was that of a fellow-servant, either the porter or the car-
penter. Ib.

MORTGAGE.

S. gave two deeds of trust of a lot of land in the District of Columbia to
secure loans made by P. Afterwards he gave a deed of trust of the
same lot to secure a loan made by C., that deed covering also a lot in
the rear of the first lot, and fronting on a side street. At the time all
the deeds were given, there was a dwelling-house on the premises, the
main part of which was on the first lot, but some of which was on
the rear lot. P., on an allegation that B., a trustee in each of the first
two deeds, had refused to sell the property covered by them, filed a
bill asking the appointment of a trustee in place of those appointed by
the first two deeds. The suit resulted in a decree appointing a new
trustee in place of B., "in the deed of trust," but not identifying
which one.
The new trustee and the remaining old one then sold the
land at auction to P., under the first trust deed. S. then filed a bill to
set aside the sale, and P. filed a cross bill to confirm it. The bill was
dismissed. P. then filed this bill against S. and C., and all necessary
parties, to have a trustee appointed to sell the land covered by the
three trust deeds, and the improvements on it, to have a receiver of
the rents appointed, and to have the rents and the proceeds of sale
applied first to pay P. A receiver was appointed, and a decrec made

for the sale of the entire property, as a whole, by trustees whom the
decree appointed, and for the ascertainment by the trustees of the
relative values of the land covered by the first two trust deeds
and the improvements thereon, and of the rear piece of land and the
improvements thereon, and for the payment to P. of the net proceeds
of sale representing the value of the land and improvements covered
by the first two trust deeds, less the expenses chargeable thereto, and
of the residue to C., and, out of the rents, to P., what he had paid for
taxes and insurance premiums, and for a personal decree against S., in
favor of P., for any deficiency in the proceeds of sale to pay the claims
of P.; Held, (1) It was the intention of both S. and P. that the first
two deeds of trust should include the rear land as well as the front
lot; (2) The decree in the first suit by P. was so uncertain as to be
practically void, and there was no effective appointment of a trustee
and no effective sale to P.; (3) P. was not estopped by that sale from
having the property sold again; (4) P. was not required, as a condi-
tion of the sale of the rear lot, to pay the whole of the debt due to C.;
and the case was a proper one for selling the property as an entirety;
(5) It was, also, a proper one for the appointment of a receiver of the
rents, and those rents in the hands of the receiver, after paying
charges, ought to go to make up any deficiency in the proceeds of sale
to satisfy the corpus of all the secured debts, and ought to be first
applied to pay any balance due to P.; (6) Under § 808 of the Revised
Statutes relating to the District of Columbia a decree in personam for
a deficiency is a necessary incident of a foreclosure suit in equity; (7)
As the notes secured by the deeds of trust bore interest at the rate of
nine per cent per annum, until paid, it was proper to allow that rate
of interest on the principal until paid, and not to limit the rate to six
per cent after decree, because the contracts were not merged in the
decree; (8) The rate of interest on the decree for deficiency is
properly six per cent, under §§ 713 and 829 of said Revised Statutes.
(9) The statute of limitation not having been pleaded as to any part
of the principal or interest, the defendant cannot avail himself of it.
Shepherd v. Pepper, 626.

1. Full control over the matter of the organization of new counties in the
State of Kansas is, by its constitution, article 9, § 1, given to the
legislature of the State, which has power, not only to organizė a
county in any manner it sees fit, but also to validate by recognition
any organization already existing, no matter how fraudulent the pro-
ceedings therefor were. Comanche County v. Lewis, 198.

2. When both the executive and legislative departments of the State have

given notice to the world that a county within the territorial limits of
the State of Kansas has been duly organized, and exists, with full
power of contracting, it is not open to the county to dispute those
facts in an action brought against it by a holder of its bonds, who
bought them in good faith in open market. Ib.

3. The debts of a county, contracted during a valid organization, remain
the obligations of the county, although, for a time, the organization
be abandoned, and there are no officers to be reached by the process of
the court.

Ib.

4. A recital in the bond of a municipal corporation in Kansas that it was
issued in accordance with authority conferred by the act of March 2,
1872, Kansas Laws of 1872, 110, c. 68, and in accordance with a vote
of a majority of the qualified voters, is sufficient to validate the bonds
in the hands of a bona fide holder; and the certificate of the auditor
of the State thereon that the bond was regularly issued, that the sig-
natures were genuine, and that the bond had been duly registered, is
conclusive upon the municipality. Ib.

5. A recital in a bond issued by a county in Kansas for the purpose of
building a bridge, need not necessarily refer to the particular bridge
for the construction of which it was issued.

Ib.

6. In Kansas a county has power to borrow money for the erection of
county buildings, and to issue its bonds therefor. Ib.

7. The organization of townships and the number, character, and duties
of their various officers are matters of legislative control. Bernards
Township v. Morrison, 523.

8. Officers duly appointed under statute authority represent a municipality
as fully as officers elected. lb.

9. When the legislature has declared how an officer is to be selected, and
the officer is selected in accordance with that declaration, his acts,
within the scope of the powers given him by the legislature, bind the
municipality. Ib.

See CASES AFFIRMED, 2, 3;

EQUITY, 7;
LIMITATION, Statutes of.

CONTRACT, 1;

NATIONAL

BANK.

1. A national bank went into voluntary liquidation in September, 1873.
Before that it had become liable to a state bank, as guarantor on sun-
dry notes, made by a third person, and which were discounted for it
by the state bank. In August, 1874, transactions took place between
the maker of the notes and the state bank, and the person who acted
as the president of the national bank, whereby the maker was released
from further liability on the notes, but such acting president attempted
to continue, by agreement, the liability of the national bank as guar-
antor. In a suit begun in October, 1876, a judgment on the guaranty
was obtained in May, 1880, by the state bank against the national
bank. In a suit brought by a creditor against the national bank and

its stockholders to enforce their statutory liability for its debts, the
court on an application made in June, 1887, enquired into the liability
of the stockholders to have the claim of the state bank enforced as
against them, in view of the transactions of August, 1874, and dis-
allowed that claim; Held, (1) It was proper to reexamine the claim;
(2) The judgment against the bank was not binding on the stock-
holders in the sense that it could not be reëxamined; (3) The guar-
anty of the bank was released as to the stockholders by the release
of the maker of the notes; (4) The rights of the stockholders could
not be affected by the acts of the president done after the bank had
gone into liquidation. Schrader v. Manufacturers' Bank, 67.
2. After the passage of the act of June 30, 1876, 19 Stat. 63, savings banks
organized in the District of Columbia under an act of Congress, and
having a capital stock paid up in whole or in part, were entitled to
become national banking associations in the mode prescribed by Rev.
Stat. § 5154. Keyser v. Hitz, 138.

3. A certificate signed by the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency as
"Acting Comptroller of the Currency," is a sufficient certificate by
the Comptroller of the Currency within the requirements of Rev. Stat.
§ 5154. Ib.

4. A transfer of stock in a bank to a person without his or her knowledge
or consent, does not of itself impose upon the transferee the liability
attached by law to the position of a shareholder in the association;
but if, after the transfer, the transferee approves or acquiesces in it,
or in any way ratifies it, (as, for instance, by joining in an application
to convert the bank into a national bank,) or accepts any benefit aris-
ing from the ownership of such stock, he or she becomes liable to be
treated as a shareholder, with such responsibility as the law imposes
in such case; and this liability is the same whether new certificates
have or have not been issued to the transferee after the transfer. Ib.
5. The endorsement, by the payee, of a check which appears on its face
to be drawn by the cashier of a bank in payment of a dividend due
the payee as a stockholder, estops him from denying knowledge of its
contents or ownership of the shares. Ib.

6. A married woman in the District of Columbia may become a holder of
stock in a national banking association, and assume all the liabilities
of such a shareholder, although the consideration may have proceeded
wholly from the husband. Ib.

7. The coverture of a married woman, who is a shareholder in a national
bank, does not prevent the receiver of the bank from recovering judg-
ment against her for the amount of an assessment. levied upon the
shareholders equally and ratably under the statute; but no opinion is
expressed as to what property may be reached in the enforcement of
such judgment. lb.

8. When the previous proceedings looking to an increase in the capital
stock of a national bank have been regular and all that are requisite,