Opinion of the Court.

party to whom the law has assigned them, they cannot be subsequently reached and recovered by the offender.

So also if the proceeds have been paid into the treasury, the right to them has so far become vested in the United States that they can only be secured to the former owner of the property through an act of Congress. Where,

however, property condemned, or its proceeds, have not thus vested, but remain under control of the Executive, or of officers subject to his orders, or are in the custody of the judicial tribunals, the property will be restored or its proceeds delivered to the original owner, upon his full pardon."

The last portion of the above extract was justified by the decision in the case of Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766, where a pardon was received by Armstrong after his foundry had been seized, and whilst proceedings were pending for its confiscation. He was even allowed to plead the full pardon as new matter in this court whilst the case was pending on appeal; and the court held, and decided, that this pardon relieved him of so much of the penalty as accrued to the United States, without any expression of opinion as to the rights of the informer.

The citations now made are sufficient to show the true bearing and effect of the pardon granted to Bosworth, and of the general proclamation of amnesty as applied to him. The property in question had never vested in any person when these acts of grace were performed. It had not even been forfeited. Nothing but the life interest had been forfeited. His power to enjoy or dispose of it was simply suspended by his disability as an offender against the government of the United States. This disability was a part of his punishment. It seems to be perfectly clear, therefore, in the light of the authorities referred to, that when his guilt and the punishment therefor were expunged by his pardon this disability was removed; in being restored to all his rights, privileges and immunities, he was restored to the control of so much of his property and estate as had not become vested either in the government or in any other person; - especially that part or quality of his estate which had never been for

Opinion of the Court.

feited, namely, the naked residuary ownership of the property, subject to the usufruct of the purchaser under the confiscation proceedings.

This result, however, does not depend upon the hypothesis that the dead fee remained in Bosworth after the confiscation proceedings took place; it is equally attained if we suppose that the fee was in nubibus, or that it devolved to the gov ernment for the benefit of whom it might concern. We are not trammelled by any technical rule of the common or the civil law on the subject. The statute and the inferences derivable therefrom make the law that controls it. Regarding the substance of things and not their form, the truth is simply this a portion of the estate, limited in time, was forfeited; the residue, expectant upon the expiration of that time, remained untouched, undisposed of; out of the owner's power and control, it is true, but not subject to any other person's power or control. It was somewhere, or possibly nowhere. But if it had not an actual, it had a potential, existence, ready to devolve to the heirs of the owner upon his death, or to be revived by any other cause that should call it into renewed vitality or enjoyment. The removal of the guilty party's disabilities, the restoration of all his rights, powers and privileges, not absolutely lost or vested in another, was such a cause. Those disabilities were all that stood in the way of his control and disposition of the naked ownership of the property. Being removed, it necessarily follows that he was restored to that control and power of disposition.

It follows from these views, that the act of sale executed by A. W. Bosworth and his wife in September, 1871, was effectual to transfer and convey the property in dispute, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court in favor of the plaintiffs below (the defendants in error) was erroneous. That judgment is, therefore,

Reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants below, the now plaintiffs in

error.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD did not sit in this case, or take any part in its decision.

Statement of the Case.

COLE v. CUNNINGHAM.

ERROR ΤΟ THE SUPREME

JUDICIAL COURT OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

No. 74. Submitted November 6, 1889. — Decided January 20, 1890.

The Constitution of the United States, in proper cases, permits equity courts of one State to control persons within their jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in another State.

It is no violation of that provision of the Constitution of the United States which requires that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State, if a court in one State, (in which proceedings have been begun, under a general insolvent law of the State, to distribute the estate of an insolvent debtor among his creditors,) enjoins a creditor of the insolvent, (who is a citizen of the same State, and subject to the jurisdiction of the court,) from proceeding to judgment and execution in a suit against the insolvent in another State, begun by an attachment of his property there, after knowledge of his embarrassment and actual insolvency, which property the insolvent law of the State of the debtor's residence requires him to convey to his assignee in insolvency, for distribution with his other assets there being nothing in the law or policy of the state in which the attachment is made, opposed to those of the State of the creditor and of the insolvent debtor.

THE case, as stated by the court, was as follows:

Daniel C. Bird, a citizen and inhabitant of Massachusetts, unable to meet his bills at maturity, suspended payment March 2, 1885, being at the time indebted to Butler, Hayden & Co., a copartnership composed of Charles S. Butler and N. F. T. Hayden, citizens and residents of Massachusetts, doing business in that State. On the night of the 4th or 5th of March, 1885, Butler, Hayden & Co. were informed by Bird that he had stopped payment, and that the firm of Aaron Claflin & Co., of New York, were indebted to him in a considerable sum for goods consigned by him to that firm to be sold on his account, and upon which Claflin & Co. had made advances but not to their full value. March 6th, Butler, Hayden & Co. executed an assignment of their claims against Bird to one Fayerweather, a resident of the State of New York, which assignment was made without consideration, and without previous communication with Fayerweather. March 11th and March 25th two

Statement of the Case.

actions were commenced in New York in the name of Fayerweather on the claims of Butler, Hayden & Co. against Bird as defendant, and the firm of Claflin & Co. were summoned as garnishees. March 13, 1885, a meeting of Bird's creditors was held, and a committee appointed to investigate his affairs and make a report. On the 20th of March a second meeting of Bird's creditors was held, at which a report was submitted by the committee. April 23, 1885, a proposal for composition under the statutes of Massachusetts in that behalf was filed by Bird, returnable May 4th. May 20th, the composition proposal having been withdrawn, regular proceedings in insolvency were continued therein, and June 1, 1885, Richard Cunningham and Henry Tolman, Jr., were duly appointed assignees in insolvency of the estate of said Bird by the court of insolvency for the county of Plymouth, Massachusetts. Hayden, of Butler, Hayden & Co., was present at one of these creditors' meetings. The suits in New York were brought in a court of competent jurisdiction, and the attachments and proceedings were regular and in conformity with the laws of New York; they are still pending, and no judgment has yet been obtained therein.

On the 19th of June the assignees in insolvency brought a bill in equity in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, in the State of Massachusetts, against Butler and Hayden, copartners as Butler, Hayden & Co., praying that Butler, Hayden & Co., their agents, servants, attorneys, and solicitors, might be enjoined and restrained from proceeding to further continue the suits against Bird, begun by them in the name of Fayerweather, and from attempting to collect by suit or otherwise, in the name of Fayerweather or any other person, for their own benefit, from Claflin & Co., any money or other thing on account of the claim against Bird; that they be ordered to refrain from further prosecuting the suits in New York, in which Claflin & Co. were summoned as garnishees; or that they be ordered to transfer to the assignees all their right, title and interest by, or under, or on account of their claim pretended to have been assigned to Fayerweather, so that the assignees may have, as the effect of said order, full

Statement of the Case.

right to receive all money due from Claflin & Co. without any hindrance or interference upon the part of Butler, Hayden & Co. therewith; and a prayer for general relief.

Butler, Hayden & Co. answered the bill, denying any knowl edge of Bird's insolvency, and claiming that the assignment to Fayerweather was made in good faith, and that the rights of Fayerweather, as a citizen of New York, under said assignment cannot be in any way affected by the insolvency of Bird; and afterwards amended the answer, and claimed that even if the assignment to Fayerweather was invalid, the attachment proceedings in New York were regular, and gave a valid lien on the property attached; and that, by the Constitution of the United States, the rights and interests gained by the attachments in New York cannot be taken away by the courts of Massachusetts without violating the provision that full faith and credit must be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State.

The case was heard by a single judge upon certain agreed facts and additional evidence, and reserved by him for the consideration of the full court. It was stipulated “that either party may refer to the statutes of the United States, the statutes of the State of New York, and the several decisions of the State of New York, with the same effect as if the same were regularly introduced in evidence." The Supreme Judicial Court found, in addition to the matters herein before stated, that it was fairly proven from the evidence "that the defendants, with full knowledge that Bird was insolvent, anticipating that there might be proceedings in insolvency in this State, and intending to secure to themselves, to the exclusion of other creditors, the avails of the debt owing to Bird by Claflin & Co., made the transfer of their claims to Fayerweather, and that the suits in New York now carried on in his name are subject to their control and conducted for their benefit. The attachments made in New York by process of garnishment are to be treated, so far as the defendants are concerned, as made by them." The court concluded its opinion, which is certified as a part of this record, and is reported in 142 Mass. 47, thus: