the law of Massachusetts is to govern in expounding and enforcing
the contract, and in determining the rule of damages for a breach of
it. Mills v. Dow, 423.

3. Where a contract states that the purchasing price of its subject matter
is $15,000, and that that sum has been "this day advanced and paid
therefor, it is competent for the vendor, in a suit by him on the con-
tract, to show that only $10,000 was paid, with a view to recover the
remaining $5000. Ib.

4. The language of the contract is ambiguous and does not show actual
prior or simultaneous payment. Ib.

5. Evidence of a promise by the defendant, as a part of the consideration
of the contract, to pay certain debts mentioned in it which the plaintiff
owed, is admissible; and the refusal of the defendant to pay those
debts on demand was a breach of the contract. lb.

6. An agreement to "assume a prior contract, and to save the plaintiff
harmless from "all liability" by reason of certain other contracts, is
broken by a failure to pay the parties to whom the plaintiff was liable,
and it is not necessary to a breach that the plaintiff should show that
he had first paid those parties. Ib.

7. The agreement is not merely one to indemnify the plaintiff from dam-
age arising out of his liability, but is an agreement to assume his
contracts and to discharge him from his liability. Ib.

8. Such agreement was a personal one on the part of the defendant. Ib.
9. Where losses have been made in an illegal transaction, a person who
lends money to the loser, with which to pay the debt, can recover the
loan, notwithstanding his knowledge of the fact that the money was
to be so used. Armstrong v. American Exchange Bank, 433.

10. An obligation will be enforced, though indirectly connected with an
illegal transaction, if it is supported by an independent consideration,
so that the plaintiff does not require the aid of the illegal transaction
to make out his case. Ib.

11. It does not appear that the plaintiff had knowledge or notice that the
paper in suit was delivered to it to be used through it by K. & Co. in
connection with an attempt to corner the market. Ib.

12. In an action brought against one party to a contract by an assignee
seeking to charge him by virtue of a contract of assignment from the
other party and other facts, a complaint stating the same facts, not
under oath, and signed by attorney only, in an action by the assignee
against his assignor, is incompetent evidence of an admission by the
plaintiff that he had no cause of action against this defendant. Dela-
ware Co. Commissioners v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 473.

13. By a contract for the construction of a jail, under the statute of Indi-
ana, (which requires all such contracts to be let to the lowest responsi-
ble bidder, taking a bond from him for the faithful performance of
the work,) the contractors agreed to construct the jail and to provide
all the materials therefor within a certain time for the sum of $20,000,

which the county commissioners agreed to pay, partly in monthly pay-
ments on their architect's certificate, and the rest on the completion
and acceptance of the building; and it was agreed that the county
should not in any manner be answerable or accountable for any ma-
terial used in the work; and that, if the contractors should fail to finish
the work by the time agreed, they should pay $25 as liquidated damages
for every day it should remain unfinished. The contractors assigned
to a third person the obligation to do the iron work upon the jail, as
if it had been awarded directly to him, and the right to recover therefor
from the commissioners $7700 at the times mentioned in the original
contract. The assignee did the work to the satisfaction of the com-
missioners, and to the value of $7700, but not within the time stipu-
lated in the original contract; Held, that the assignments, though
notified to the commissioners, if not assented to by them, did not
make them liable to the assignee, or prevent them from making a set-
tlement in good faith with the original contractors. Ib.

See DEED, 1, 3.

CORPORATIONS.

1. In the absence of an enabling statute, either general or special, a rail-
road or other corporation cannot purchase and hold real estate indefi-
nitely, without regard to the uses to be made of it. Case v. Kelly, 21.
2. The rule that the limitation of the power of a corporation in a State
to receive and hold real estate concerns the State alone does not apply
when the corporation, as plaintiff, seeks to acquire real estate which
it is not authorized by law to acquire. Ib.

3. While the relations of a party towards a corporation, as a director and
officer, or as its principal stockholder, do not preclude him from enter-
ing into contracts with it, from making loans to it, and from taking
its bonds as collateral security, a court of equity will refuse to lend its
aid to their enforcement unless satisfied that the transaction was
entered into in good faith, with a view to the benefit of the company
as well as of its creditors, and not solely with a view to his own bene-
fit. Richardson's Executor v. Green, 30.
4. In the case of a corporation, as in that of a natural person, any convey-
ance of its property, without authority of law, in fraud of its credi-
tors, is void as to them.

Ib.

5. The capital stock of a corporation, when it becomes insolvent, is, in
law, part of its assets, to be appropriated to the payment of its debts,
and if any part of it has been issued without being fully paid up, a
court of equity may require it to be paid up. Ib.

6. On the dissolution of a corporation at the expiration of the term of its
corporate existence, each stockholder has the right, as a general rule,
and in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, to have the
partnership property converted into money, whether such a sale be

necessary for the payment of debts, or not. Mason v. Pewabic Mining
Co., 50.

7. Directors of a corporation, conducting its business and receiving moneys
belonging to it after the expiration of the term for which it was in-
corporated, will be held to an account on the dissolution and the
final liquidation of the affairs of the corporation in a court of equity.
Ib.

8. When a legislature has full power to create corporations, its act recog-
nizing as valid a de facto corporation, whether private or municipal,
operates to cure all defects in steps leading up to an organization,
and makes a de jure out of what was before only a de facto corpora-
tion. Comanche County v. Lewis, 198.

See NATIONAL BANK, 1;

PLEDGE.

COSTS.

At the last term of court motions to dismiss Nelson v. Green and Nelson
et al. v. Green were argued at the same time with a motion to dismiss
this case, and the motion was granted as to those cases, and denied as
to this case. After the entry of judgment counsel in those cases
moved on behalf of the appellants that the sum of $450 which had
been deposited with the clerk for copies of the record should be re-
funded; Held, (the judgment being announced in delivering the opin-
ion and announcing the judgment in this case,) that $200 of that
amount should be refunded. Richardson's Executor v. Green, 30.

COUNSEL FEES.

See DISTRICT ATTORNEY;

RECEIVER.

COURT AND JURY.

See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 4.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of the United States, by
the laws of Idaho, and by the laws of all civilized and Christian
countries; and to call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend
the common sense of mankind. Davis v. Beason, 333.

2. A crime is none the less so, nor less odious, because sanctioned by what
any particular sect may designate as religion. Ib.

3. The second subdivision of § 504, Rev. Stats. Idaho, requiring every
person desiring to have his name registered as a voter to take an oath
that he does not belong to an order that advises a disregard of the
criminal law of the Territory, is not open to any valid legal objec-
tion.

Ib.

4. The act of Congress of March 22, 1882, 22 Stat. 31, c. 47, "to amend

section fifty-three hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes,"
does not restrict the legislation of the Territories over kindred offences
or over the means for their ascertainment and prevention. Ib.

DAMAGES.

See JURISDICTION, 11;

PATENT FOR INVENTION, 7.

DECREE.

See JUDGMENT.

DEED.

1. In a deed of real estate, "subject, however, to certain incumbrances
now resting thereon, payment of which is assumed by the grantee,"
and containing a covenant of special warranty by the grantor against
all persons claiming under him, the clause assuming payment of the
incumbrances includes existing mortgages made by the grantor, as
well as unpaid taxes assessed against him. Keller v. Ashford, 610.
2. The grantee named in a deed of real estate, by the terms of which he
assumes the payment of a mortgage thereon, is liable to the grantor
for a breach of that agreement, although he is not shown to have had
any knowledge of the deed at the time of its execution, if after being
informed of its terms he collects the rents and sells and conveys part of
the land. Ib.

3. An agreement in a deed of real estate, by which the grantee assumes
the payment of a mortgage made by the grantor, is a contract between
the grantee and the mortgagor only; and does not, unless assented to
by the mortgagee, create any direct obligation, at law or in equity,
from the grantee to the mortgagee. But the mortgagee may avail
himself in equity of the right of the mortgagor against the grantee.
And if the mortgagee, after the land has been sold under a prior
mortgage for a sum insufficient to pay that mortgage, and after he has
recovered a personal judgment against the mortgagor, execution upon
which has been returned unsatisfied, brings a suit in equity against
the grantee alone, and the omission to make the mortgagor a party is
not objected to at the hearing, it affords no ground for refusing
relief. lb.

DESCENT.

A citizen of France can take land in the District of Columbia by descent
from a citizen of the United States. Geofroy v. Riggs, 258.

DICTUM.

A mere dictum in an opinion, not essential to the decision, is not authori-
tative and binding. Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price, 496.

DIPLOMATIC SERVICE.

See SALARY.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

The amount of counsel fee to be allowed to a district attorney, under Rev.
Stat. § 824, for trial before a jury of a person indicted for crime, is
discretionary with the court, within the limits of the statute; and the
action of the court in this respect is not subject to review by the At-
torney General, or by the accounting officers of the treasury. United
States v. Waters, 208.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The District of Columbia, as a political community, is one of "the States
of the Union," within the meaning of that term as used in article 7 of
the Consular Convention of February 23, 1853, with France. Geofroy
v. Riggs, 258.

See DESCENT;

NATIONAL BANK, 2, 6.

EJECTMENT.

See BETTERMENTS.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

In exercising the right of eminent domain for the acquisition of private
property for public use, the compensation to be awarded must not
only be just to the owner, but also just to the public which is to pay
for it. Searl v. School District No. 2, 553.

EQUITY.

1. A bill in equity for the foreclosure of a mortgage of a railroad for non-
payment of overdue interest, the principal being payable at a future
day, was taken pro confesso, the company appearing but not answering.
A sale was made under the decree of the court, and, it appearing that
there was a surplus over and above what was necessary to pay the over-
due interest, costs and expenses, the court ordered it to be applied to
the reduction of the principal sum due upon the bonds, and entered a
decree that the balance of such principal sum, remaining after such ap-
plication, was due and payable from the company to the holders of the
bonds, and that the trustee recover it for them, with interest until
paid; Held, (1) That the application of the surplus was properly
made; (2) That the decree, declaring the remainder of the principal
sum due and immediately payable, was irregular and was not war-
ranted by the pleadings. Ohio Central Railroad Co. v. Central Trust

Co., 83.

2. The defendant in a bill in equity, taken pro confesso, is not precluded