and easily imposed upon by Dent, between | rights or of the value of his property, or in whom and himself the relation of principal the slightest degree incompetent to compreand agent existed.

hend the terms of the contract in question, We concur fully in the position assumed or to understand the obligations of an by both the circuit justice and the district oath. Nor does a single witness testify judge, that the execution and delivery of that Dent ever falsely represented to Ferthe agreement and conveyance of May 14, guson the amount of his indebtedness, ever 1869, by Ferguson to Dent, were sufficient- underestimated to him the value of his proply proven. A careful examination of the erty, or ever exaggerated to him the danger evidence, especially that introduced in be- from creditors. Even as to who suggested half of complainants, leaves no doubt on the contract of May 14, 1869, the testimony, this point. The paper was frequently rec- slight as it is, is conflicting and uncertain. ognized and acted upon by Ferguson. He It is, however, insisted that the price received part, at least, of the money to be agreed to on the face of the instrument itpaid under it, and frequently called for self was so grossly inadequate as to create more, complaining of Dent that he had not the presumption of fraud and undue influfully paid the amount agreed to in the con-ence, aside from, and independent of, any tract. He received the two Dillard notes proof other than the single fact that the for $3,000 each, as provided for in it, in part parties thereto bore the relation to each payment, and also accepted Dillard's deed other of principal and agent. Assuming for of trust on the property conveyed to him, the present, and for present purposes only, as security therefor. He solemnly reaf- that the agreement was bona fide as refirmed it over his own signature and seal spects third persons, creditors of Ferguson on the 23d of August, 1869, in a deed intro- and Dent, and considering it with exclusive duced in evidence by complainants, in which reference to the reciprocal rights of the two deed the recital is as follows: "Whereas, parties to it, we do not think the evidence on the 14th of May, 1869, H. G. Dent and A. is such as to raise the presumption of fraud, M. Ferguson entered into an agreement of and therefore to call for or justify the interpurchase and sale by which said Dent pur-position of a court of equity for the cancelchased the equity of said Ferguson in all his lation of the contract. The fairness of the real estate in Shelby county for the sum of transaction on this point should be deter$10,000, $4,000 of which was to be paid in mined by the condition of things at the time cash, and $6,000 in notes," etc. He again the contract was made and executed, and recognized and carried out his part of it not by what occurred afterwards, except so when on the 25th of May, 1869, he made a far as subsequent developments may reflect deed to Dillard in pursuance of its terms. light upon it. What were the circumstances His petition in bankruptcy, filed on April under which this instrument was executed? 29, 1878, in which he stated on oath that he A. M. Ferguson was then possessed of a did not own any real estate, nor hold any large estate in Memphis, consisting of valinterest in any real property, except a lease-uable city lots with improvements, all estihold that would expire in less than a month, though not a technical estoppel as a defense in this suit, is at least evidence of the execution and validity of the instrument in question. In view of these facts, which appear from the proofs and pleadings of the complainants, we do not deem it necessary to review the mass of testimony offered by the complainants to sustain their charge that Dent purloined the writing from Fer-ing of his property and intimate friend for guson's papers.

mated by competent witnesses to be worth $100,000, more or less. At that time he was indebted to various persons in sums which, we believe, it is admitted amounted to as much as the value of his property. Many of these debts, perhaps the majority in amount, originated as joint promisor with, or as indorser or surety for, Henry G. Dent, who had been his agent for the rent

many years, and who was himself wholly As to the second point, we cannot assent insolvent. But, whatever the origin of his to the conclusions of the court below. The debts, they had become, as between Ferguevidence, we think, fails to show any im- son and his creditors, legal and binding upbecility, dotage, or loss of mental capacity on him; nor did the fact that they were the on the part of Ferguson in 1869, when the liabilities of an indorser lighten the burden contract was made. About fifteen wit- of them, or lessen the peril of impending innesses produced by the complainants were solvency, or abate the eagerness of pursuquestioned as to the character and condi-ing creditors. These creditors had been for tion of his mind, three, and perhaps four, some time active and pressing for payment, of whom speak of him as being weak, igno- and his real estate was heavily incumbered rant, and childish; but the general tenor of with judgments, decrees, deeds of trust, the testimony of the others, who had any sheriff's deeds, taxes, and assessments for opinions to express, was directly the re-public improvements. Several other suits, verse. The combined effect of this testi-aggregating nearly $50,000, were proceedmony, taken as a whole, putting out of ing to judgment. Some idea of his embarview the evidence on behalf of the defend-rassed condition may be found from the ants, leaves on the mind a decided impres-fact that on the 29th of March, 1869, a bill sion that Ferguson, though to a certain had been filed to reach his equitable rights extent illiterate, was a man of good, sound sense, of large experience in business, and capable of transacting his own affairs. Outside of the nature of the transaction itself, and the relation of principal and agent between him and Dent, which will be presently considered, there is very little, if any, testimony that he was ignorant of his

and interest in the property, the subject of this controversy, in which the complainant alleged on oath that an execution issued on a judgment at law obtained by him against Ferguson had been duly returned,

No property found whereon to levy," and that after diligent search and inquiry he could not find any property in Memphis to

which Ferguson had an unincumbered legal title subject to an execution at law.

the other witnesses for complainants, testifies that from 1871 to 1876 he paid to Ferguson from $80 to $90 a month out of the rents collected by him from a portion of the property, and that he saw Dent pay him during that period out of his own pocket about $300 a year. These sums aggregate a larger amount than $4,000.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the contract, considered apart from its bearing on other creditors, does not, in the absence of other proof, lack the essential qualities of adequacy and fairness as between the parties thereto themselves. If this be so, the point as to principal and agent, upon which so much stress has been laid, is of minor importance. The doctrine as to this fiduciary relation, applied to its full extent, is simply a rule of evidence which, under some circumstances, imposes upon an agent the burden of proving the fairness and justice of the transaction with his principal within the scope of his agency. If the contract was valid as to the creditors of Ferguson, the consideration therein expressed was sufficient to satisfy this burden. The evidence shows that for many years Dent was an agent of Ferguson for the renting of his property, with more intimate relations than with his other patrons. But the record does not show that he was ever employed to buy or sell real estate for Ferguson. On the contrary, there is positive testimony that his (Ferguson's) traffic in that business was carried on by himself alone.

Such was the condition of Ferguson's affairs when he made the agreement of May 14, 1869. The consideration of this agree ment was that Ferguson should receive $4,000 in cash, and $6,000 in notes, and that Dent should discharge the liens;" not that he should pay them in full. This discharge Dent fully procured. Ferguson was fully discharged, and all claims against him were legally canceled; not only those then existing, but also those that were impending, and which afterwards matured. This fact is thus stated in the words of complainants' bill: "The liabilities of the said A. M. Ferguson by judgments, trust-deeds, mortgages, and mortgages in the form of warranty deeds have all been settled and paid off, except as hereinafter stated; and the said complainants, as heirs at law of the said A. M. Ferguson, are entitled to have the said real property handed over to them free and discharged of all liens." If the promise to cancel the debts was a fair and valid transaction when it was made, it did not become less so because subsequent occurrences enabled Dent to effect a settlement with the creditors upon the payment of a small percentage of their respective claims; and, if the means he employed to effect such compromises were not proper, it might give the overreached creditors cause of complaint, but certainly not Ferguson. Had Dent been able to persuade the creditors to give a release of their claims without any consideration whatever, that could not re- We have considered this case, so far, upon troact and make inadequate what was an the assumption of the circuit justice that adequate consideration when the contract the agreement was executed and delivered was made. When it was made, no one by Ferguson to Dent in good faith as to knew that the debts could be compromised Ferguson's creditors. We do not concur for much less than their face value, as was in this assumption. If the voluminous recdone by Dent; for, as the district judge truly ord before us discloses a single fact tending remarks, "the astounding fact in this rec- to sustain that assumption, except a genord is that the creditors did not appropriate eral expression of opinion by some of the all this property to their debts.' And yet witnesses that he was an honest man, it it is an undeniable fact that Dent did avert has escaped our search. The instrument such an appropriation, and that Ferguson itself was executed under circumstances was fully discharged, and the claims were which would lead a court to presume fraud legally canceled, by methods not fully de- upon creditors. It was a conveyance by a veloped, but assented to and facilitated by person deeply indebted, in anticipation of Ferguson. For instance, a judgment for decrees and judgments, which, added to over $22,000 in favor of H. B. Claflin & Co., the existing incumbrances, amounted to of New York, was settled for $1,000; a claim the value of his property. We therefore in favor of Louis Selby for $12,622.11, for agree with the district judge, on this point, $1,325; and an assessment for $6,998 for the that the real contract was one between Nicholson pavement, stated in said agree- | Ferguson and Dent to defraud the creditors ment of May 14, 1869, to be a lien on the out of the property conveyed, and to so conproperty conveyed, was entirely defeated ceal and cloud the title that they could be on legal grounds. The consideration as to circumvented, hindered, and delayed, and the extinguishment of the debts was fully coerced into settlements and compromises. performed. The $6,000 of notes were re- We think the evidence shows beyond doubt ceived by Ferguson, and afterwards in- that Ferguson willingly participated for 10 dorsed to his relatives. As to how much years in carrying out this plot. Both parof the remaining $4,000 coming to him un-ties knew that $10,000 could not be saved der the agreement was paid to him in cash, for Ferguson, or any residuum out of the there is much conflict of testimony, which, property for Dent, unless creditors could owing to the lapse of time and the death of be wrought upon by some means to accept both parties to the contract, cannot be rec-less than their claims. Neither party to onciled. Apparently, $1,400 was paid soon after; for the instrument dated August 23, 1869, which the complainants introduced and rely on, states that the payment of that sum was made on that day. C. L. Morrison, a witness for complainants, whose testimony their counsel declares, in his brief, to be more important than that of any and all v.10s.c.-2

such a contract could have been deceived or imposed upon about that result. Both knew the record fact that the incumbrances perfected, and the incumbrances rapidly perfecting, exceeded in amount the value of the property. * That Ferguson had that* fraudulent design when he signed his name to the instrument, and turned over the

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property to Dent, as its owner, was direct- | fraudulently dispossessed the complainly sworn to by witnesses introduced by the ants, and asserted the right of ownership complainants, and examined by them,-in himself. The prayer of the bill was to reof course, for a very different purpose. Mrs. strain the defendant from disposing of the A. G. Morrison, a witness produced to show land, and to restore it, or so much of it as that Dent had fraudulently abstracted cer- remained after paying the debt, to comtain papers from Ferguson deemed by him plainants. The court (Mr. Justice DAVIS to be important and valuable, deposes as delivering the opinion) held that the agrcefollows, in reply to the question, "What ment was a fraudulent one to defeat a was it Mr. Ferguson told you about the claim set up by other parties for a portion sale of the property?" (referring to the sale of the mortgaged lands by the covering up, now under consideration:) "He told me through the aid of the court, the real ownhe went on Mr. Dent's bond, as near as I ership of the property, and said, (page 588:) can remember. Mr. Dent went into busi- "A fraudulent agreement was entered into ness, and broke, and the property was cov- to defeat, as is charged, ‘a fraud attempted ered up some way in Mr. Dent's name to against the complainants.' * * A court keep it from being sold. I couldn't tell you of equity will not intervene to give relief how long Mr. Ferguson told me, but I am to either party from the consequences of positive he told me it was covered up in such an agreement. The maxim, in parł Dent's name, and he says: 'There is where- delicto potior est conditio defendantis, in Dent has robbed me. He would not give must prevail. It is against the policy of me those papers back."" In reply to an- the law to enable either party, in controother question, which the witness said did versies between themselves, to enforce an not repeat her previous answer accurately, agreement in fraud of the law, or which she replied: “He didn't say it in those was made to injure another;" citing Story, words. * He says he turned the Eq. Jur. § 298; Bolt v. Rogers, 3 Paige, 156; property over to Dent, put it in his name," and Wilson v. Watts, 9 Md. 356. The same etc. Again: "He said something about a principle was applied in Wheeler v. Sage, 13 receiver being appointed, and he says: 'I Wall. 518. In that case an agreement was, turned the property over to Dent to keep entered into between complainants and deit from being sold. I don't want it sold, fendant to secure the title to valuable real because the rent of my property will pay estate of an insolvent debtor, at the exthe debt,'" etc. Another witness for the pense and sacrifice of his creditors, which complainants, Robert McWilliams, testifies the defendant violated, and, in conjunction as follows concerning a conversation had with another person, secured an interest in with Ferguson in 1878: "If I remember cor- the property to himself. The bill prayed rectly, he said that he had made over his that he be declared a trustee for the comproperty to Dent, with the tacit under-plainants, and required to convey to them standing that he should have sufficient to that portion of the land to which, under live on until his discharge in bankruptcy, the agreement, they were entitled. The and then Dent would return or turn over court (Mr. Justice DAVIS delivering the the property to him again." In rely to the opinion) said, (page 529:) "Generally, when question, "What, if anything, do you know a party obtains an advantage by fraud, he concerning the arrangement of A. M. Fer- is to be regarded as the trustee of the party guson and Henry G. Dent concerning the defrauded, and compelled to account; but, Ferguson property on Beale, Hernando, if a party seeks relief in equity, he must be and De Soto streets, and elsewhere?" he able to show that on his part there has said: “I know of nothing, except that Fer- been honesty and fair dealing. If he has guson told me that he had conveyed this been engaged in an illegal business, and been property to Dent with the tacit under-cheated, equity will not help him." And standing that he (Ferguson) should have enough out of the rents of the property to live on until he had got through bankruptcy, when the property should be returned to him again."

then, after a review of the evidence in that case, the opinion concluded in these words: "A proceeding like this is against good conscience and good morals, and cannot receive the sanction of a court of equity. The principle is too plain to need a citation of authorities to confirm it. It is against the policy of the law to help either party in such controversies. The maxim, in pari delicto" etc. Page 530.

The question arises, if a person conveys his property for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding his creditors, and for 11 years acquiesces and concurs in the devices, collusive suits, and impositions upon the court in furtherance of this pur- We cannot assent to the opinion of the pose, without taking a single legal step to district judge that this maxim has no apannul said conveyance or to stop such pro- plication to the case at bar. In the views ceedings, will a court of equity aid him or prepared by him at the request of Mr. Jushis heirs to recover the property from the tice MATTHEWS, and which were adopted grantee or his heirs after the fraud is ac- by the latter, he says, in speaking of the complished? This court has answered that contract of May 14, 1869, that it is only "in question in the negative in Randall v. form a contract for the sale of property," Howard, 2 Black, 585. In that case the and proceeds: "The real contract was one complainants and defendant had made an to defraud the creditors of Ferguson and agreement to defeat the claims of third per- Dent out of this property, and it was calcusons to certain lands which the complain-lated that this could be done on a basis of ants had mortgaged to the defendant to secure a debt, so as to cloak the ownership by means of a foreclosure sale at which the defendant should purcnase and hold the mal title. After obtaining the title, he

$10,000 to Ferguson, to be realized out of the property itself, and all the balance to Dent, whatever that might be. But this was an unequal, unconscionable, and unfair division, particularly in view of actual

results, in the accomplishment of which | new and subsequent contracts arising out Dent has risked nothing but his time and of the accomplishment of the illegal object, labor. Ferguson has agreed to give too is not the subject of inquiry here. The presmuch for Dent's services in that behalf. ent case does not involve any question of a ***One of the objects of the bill is to subsequent and distinct contract, but seeks prevent the defendants from reaping the relief directly from the original fraud, to lion's share of the benefits of this confessed which the person under whom complainfraud; and the maxim, in pari delicto potior ants claim was a contracting party, fully est conditio defendentis, has no sharing in the fraudulent intent. application whatever to a case like this." We do not think that complainants' counFrom this view we dissent. We find no au- sel gives an explanation of the testimony thority for the idea that it is the province of McWilliams which strengthens their of a court of equity to make a fraudulent claim to relief. That claim, stated in his debtor the special object of its favor because own language, is "that Ferguson placed he has not received a large enough consid- his property in Dent's hands, to be used in eration for his "confessed fraud." That liquidating his debts, and, when this was court is not a divider of the inheritance of done, the property, or so much of it as had iniquity between the respective heirs of two not been consumed in the payment of debts, confederates in fraud. Mr. Justice BALD- was to be restored to Ferguson, and that WIN, delivering the opinion of the court in in the mean time Ferguson was to have Bartle v. Coleman, 4 Pet. 184, 189, uses the enough of the rents to live on." Such an following language: "The law leaves the arrangement, so entirely inconsistent with parties to such a contract as it found them. the absolute conveyance of the property as If either has sustained a loss by the bad executed between the parties, has all the 'aith of a particeps criminis, it is but a just features of a fraud upon creditors. It renfliction for premeditated and deeply prac- serves to the grantor the enjoyment of the iced fraud, which, when detected, deprives rents and profits of the property conveyed, him of anticipated profits, or subjects him to which the creditors have a right of imto unexpected losses. He must not expect mediate appropriation to their debts, and that a judicial tribunal will degrade itself involves a secret trust for the return to by an exertion of its powers, by shifting the himself of property of which such creditors loss from the one to the other, or to equal- have the immediate right of sale. The law ize the benefits or burdens which may have does not countenance any such transacresulted by the violation of every principletion, but leaves both parties in the position of morals and of laws." Or, as Chancellor where they have placed themselves. LuWALWORTH states it: "Wherever two or kins v. Aird, 6 Wall. 78. The district judge more persons are engaged in a fraudulent is mistaken when he says that "one of the transaction to injure another, neither law objects of the bill is to prevent the defendnor equity will interfere to relieve either of ants from reaping the lion's share of the those persons, as against the other, from benefits of this confessed fraud." The obthe consequences of their own misconduct."ject of the suit, as clearly and explicitly Bolt v. Rogers, 3 Paige, 157. The cases re-stated in the bill, is to secure to the comlied upon by the court below to sustain its plainants the entire benefit of the confessed position do not shake the authorities we fraud by having all the property, with all have cited to show that courts of equity re- the intermediate rents and profits added, fuse to annul, and also to enforce, contracts free from all liens and liabilities, returned to in fraud of the rights of others, when called them. The real complaint is that Dent, the to act as between the parties; for there is a fraudulent vendee, refused to perform his distinct class of decisions affecting subse- part of the fraudulent understanding with quent and collateral contracts not partak- Ferguson, the fraudulent vendor; and the ing of the fraud which infects the main trans- avowed purpose of the suit is to compel the action. The principles established by those defendants to perform it. The prayer candecisions in diversified forms, according to not be granted without overturning estabthe varying cases, is that a new contract, lished principles of equity. The decree of founded on a new and independent consid- the circuit court should therefore be reeration, although in*relation to property versed, and the case be remanded to that respecting which there had been unlawful court, with a direction to dismiss the bill, or fraudulent transactions between the par- with costs. So ordered. ties, will be dealt with by the courts on its own merits. If the new contract be fair and lawful, and the new consideration be METROPOLITAN R. Co. v. DISTRICT OF COvalid and adequate, it will be enforced. If, however, it be unfair or fraudulent, or the new consideration so inadequate as to import fraud, imposition, or undue influence, It will be rescinded, and justice done to the parties. Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 How. 232; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70; Bank v. Bank, 16 Wall. 483; Railroad Co. v. Durant, 95 U. S. 576. But in all of those cases the court was careful to distinguish and sever the new contract from the original illegal contract. Whether, in the application of this principle, some of them do not trench upon the line which separates the cases of contracts invalid in consequence of their illegality from

LUMBIA.
(October 21, 1889.)

(132 U. S. 1)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-FORM of Government—

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.

tuted the District of Columbia "a body corporate 1. Act Cong. Feb. 21, 1871, (16 St. 419,) constifor municipal purposes," with power to make contracts, and sue and be sued. A governor and legislature were created, and a board of public works, to consist of the governor and four persons appointed by the president and senate. Prior to that time the government had been strictly municipal, and the United States government did not participate therein, in local matters. Act June 20, 1874, (18 St. 116,) abolished the government created by the act of 1871, and authorized the president and senate to appoint a commission to exercise the functions

of the board of public works. Act June 11, 1878, (20 St. 102,) provided that the District should "remain and continue a municipal corporation," and preserved all rights of action by and against it, in statu quo. Held, that the District is a municipal corporation, with a right to sue and be sued, and not a department of the United States government, or a sovereignty.

2. The statute of limitations in force in the District of Columbia being enacted "for the peace and tranquillity" of the public, and providing that all actions "sued or brought by any person or persons" shall be commenced within a certain time, is applicable to municipal corporations.

3. An action arising out of defendant's failure to perform a certain duty, in consequence of which plaintiff was compelled to perform it, is based on an implied assumpsit, to which the statute of limitations concerning actions on simple contracts is applicable, and is not based on the statute, though the duty which defendant failed to perform was statutory.

avenues along and adjoining the tracks of the defendant, and which, it is averred, should have been done by the defendant under the provisions of its charter, but which the defendant neglected and refused to do. The defendant filed 12 several pleas to the action, the eleventh and twelfth being pleas of the statute of limitations. Issue was taken upon all the pleas except these two, and they were demurred to. The court sustried on the other issues, and a verdict tained the demurrer, and the cause was found for the plaintiff. The case is brought here by writ of error, which brings up for consideration a bill of exceptions taken at the trial, and the ruling upon the demurrer to the pleas of the statute of limitations. It is conceded that if the court below erred in sustaining that demurrer, the judgment must be reversed. That question will there

In error to the supreme court of the Dis-fore be first considered. trict of Columbia.

Nathaniel Wilson and Walter D. Davidge, for plaintiff in error. A. G. Riddle and H. E. Davis, for defendant in error.

It is contended by the plaintiff that it (the District of Columbia) is not amenable to the statute of limitations, for three reasons -First, because of its dignity as partaking of the sovereign power of government; secBRADLEY, J. This was an action brought ondly, because it is not embraced in the by the District of Columbia in November, terms of the statute of limitations in force 1880, to recover from the Metropolitan Rail-in the District; and, thirdly, because if the road Company the sum of $161,622.52. The general words of the statute are sufficiently alleged cause of action was work done and broad to include the District, still municipal materials furnished by the plaintiff in pav-corporations, unless specially mentioned, ing certain streets and avenues in the city are not subject to the statute. of Washington at various times in the 1. The first question, therefore, will be years 1871, 1872, 1873, 1874, and 1875, upon whether the District of Columbia is or is not and in consequence of the neglect of the de- a municipal body merely, or whether it has fendant to do said work and furnish said such a sovereign character, or is so identimaterials in accordance with its duty, as fied with or representative of the soverprescribed by its charter. The defendant eignty of the United States as to be entitled was chartered by an act of congress dated to the prerogatives and exemptions of sovJuly 1, 1864, and amended March 3, 1865. ereignity. In order to a better understandBy these acts it was authorized to con- ing of the subject under consideration it struct and operate lines or routes of double- will be proper to take a brief survey of the track railways in designated streets and government of the District and the changes avenues in Washington and Georgetown. it has undergone since its first organization. The first section of the charter contains the Prior to 1871 the local government of the following proviso: "Provided, that the District of Columbia, on the east side of the use and maintenance of the said road shall Potomac, had been divided between the be subject to the municipal regulations of corporations of Washington and Georgethe city of Washington within its corpo- town and the levy court of the county of rate limits." Of course, this provision re- Washington. Georgetown had been incorserves police control over the road and its porated by the legislature of Maryland as operations on the part of the authorities of early as 1789, (Davis, Laws D. C. 478,) as the city. The fourth section of the charter Alexandria had been, by the legislature of declares that the said corporation hereby Virginia, as early as 1748 and 1779, (Id. 533, created shall be bound to keep said tracks, 541;) and those towns or cities were clearly and for the space of two feet beyond the nothing more than ordinary municipal corouter rail thereof, and also the space be-porations, with the usual powers of such tween the tracks, at all times well paved corporations. When the government of and in good order, without expense to the the United States took possession of the DisUnited States or to the city of Washing-trict in December, 1800, it was divided by ton." The fifth section declares "that congress into two counties, that of Alexannothing in this act shall prevent the govern-dria on the west side of the Potomac, and ment at any time, at their option, from altering the grade or otherwise improving all avenues and streets occupied by said roads, or the city of Washington from so altering or improving such streets and avenues, and the sewerage thereof, as may be under their respective authority and control; and in such event it shall be the duty of said company to change their said railroad so as to conform to such grade and pavement." It is on these provisions that the claim of the city is based. The amended declaration sets out in great detail the grading and paving which were done in various streets and

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that of Washington on the east side; and the laws of Virginia were continued over the former, and the laws of Maryland over the latter, and a court called the "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia," was established, with general jurisdiction, civil and criminal, to hold sessions alternately in each county; but the corporate rights of the cities of Alexandria and Georgetown, and of all other corporate bodies, were expressly left unimpaired, except as related to judicial powers. See Act Feb. 27, 1801, (2 St. 103.) A supplementary act, passed a few days later, gave to the circuit court