the governor of the State of South Carolina. Mr. Bunch at once put himself and his French colleague in communication with a gentleman who was well qualified to serve that purpose, but who was not the governor of South Carolina. This gentleman proceeded to Richmond, with Lord Lyons's letters and Lord Russell's dispatch, and while there secured the passage in the insurgent congress of resolutions, partly drafted by Mr. Jefferson Davis, which declared a purpose to observe the second and third rules of the Declaration of Paris, but to maintain the right of privateering, which had been abolished by the first rule. In communicating this result to Lord Lyons Mr. Bunch said that the wishes of Her Majesty's government "would seem to have been fully met," as no proposal was made that the Confederate government should abolish privateering. It could not fail to be observed, said the Case of the United States, that the practical effect of this diplomatic effort to secure the assent of the United States to all the rules of the Declaration of Paris, which the parties to that declaration had agreed to maintain as a whole and indivisible, while the insurgent privateers were to be protected and their devastation legalized would, if it had been successful, have been the destruction of the commerce of the United States or its transfer to the British flag, and the disarming of a principal weapon of the United States on the ocean, should a continuation of this course unhappily force the United States into a war with Great Britain.

Trent Case.

The partial purpose disclosed in the first official act of the British Government after the issuance of the proclamation of neutrality was, continued the Case of the United States, also shown in the conduct of that government a few months later in its peremptory demands and its ostentatious warlike preparations in the case of Mason and Slidell, even after Her Majesty's gov ernment had received the assurance, promptly given by the United States, that the act of its naval officer was unauthorized. Such conduct formed a signal contrast with the course of Earl Russell in respect to Confederate cruisers, contracted for and fitted out in British ports, even after overwhelming proof of their complicity was laid before him.

Expressions of Public
Men.

The feeling of personal unfriendliness toward the United States in the leading members of the British Government was shown, said the American Case, by their public utterances during a large part,

or the whole, of the period covered by the commission or omission of the acts complained of. Thus, in a public speech made at Newcastle on October 14, 1861, and printed in the London Times of October 16, Earl Russell declared that the contest in the United States was not upon the question of slavery, but between parties who were contending, the one for empire and the other for independence. As late as February 5, 1863, he declared, in the House of Lords, that there would be one end of the war that would prove a calamity to the United States and to the world, and especially to the negro race, and "that would be the subjugation of the South by the North." Mr. Gladstone, then chancellor of the exchequer, in a speech at Newcastle on the 7th of October 1862, declared that the success of the Southern States, so far as regarded their separation from the North, might be anticipated with certainty. In a debate in the House of Commons on the 27th of March 1863, Mr. Laird, the builder of the Alabama, declared, amid prolonged cheering by a large portion of the House, that he would rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen Alabamas than as a man who (referring to Mr. Bright) applied himself to "cry up the institutions of another country" (meaning the United States), which, when they came to be tested, were "of no value whatever, and which reduced liberty to an utter absurdity." Various other expressions, some of Lord Palmerston and of other members of Her Majesty's government, were cited as showing feelings which could not but have influenced the course of that government, and induced it to look with disfavor upon efforts to repress the attempts of British subjects and other persons to violate the neutrality of British soil and waters in favor of the Confederates. Lord Westbury, who was appointed Lord High Chancellor on the death of Lord Campbell in June 1861, declared in the House of Lords in 1868, in regard to the claims of the United States, that "the animus with which the neutral powers acted was the only true criterion." "Such is the use," said the American Case, “which the United States ask this tribunal to make of the foregoing evidence of the unfriendliness and insincere neutrality of the British cabinet of that day. When the leading members of that cabinet are thus found counseling in advance with France to secure a joint action of the two governments, and assenting to the declaration of a state of war between the United States and the insurgents before they could possibly have received

intelligence of the purposes of the government of the United States; when it is seen that the British secretary of state for foreign affairs advises the representatives of the insurgents as to the course to be pursued to obtain the recognition of their independence, and at the same time refuses to await the arrival of the trusted representative of the United States before deciding to recognize them as belligerents; when he is found opening negotiations through Her Majesty's diplomatic representative at Washington with persons in rebellion against the United States; when various members of the British cabinet are seen to comment upon the efforts of the Government of the United States to suppress the rebellion in terms that indicate a strong desire that those efforts should not succeed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, when called upon to do acts which might bring about results in conflict with their wishes and convictions, they would hesitate, discuss, delay, and refrain-in fact, that they would do exactly what in the subsequent pages of this paper it will appear that they did do."

Neutral Duties.

In the third chapter the Case of the United States discussed "the duties which Great Britain, as a neutral, should have observed toward the United States." Great Britain had herself acknowledged, by her foreign-enlistment act of 1819, as well as by other governmental acts, her obligation to discharge the duties of neutrality. The acts which, if committed within the territory of a neutral, were to be regarded as violations of its international duties were enumerated in sections 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of that statute, which, said the Case, recognized the following as acts that ought to be prevented in neutral territory in time of war:

"1. The recruitment of subjects or citzens of the neutral, to be employed in the military or naval service of a foreign government or of persons assuming to exercise the powers of government over any part of foreign territory; or the acceptance of a commission, warrant, or appointment for such service by such persons; or the enlisting or agreeing to enlist in such service; the act in each case being done without the leave or license of the sovereign.

"2. The receiving on board a vessel, for the purpose of transporting from a neutral port, persons who may have been so recruited or commissioned; or the transporting such persons from a neutral port. Authority is given to seize the vessels violating these provisions.

"3. The equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming a vessel,

with intent or in order that it may be employed in the service of such foreign government, or of persons assuming to exercise the powers of government over any part of a foreign country, as a transport or storeship, or to cruise or carry on war against a power with which che neutral is at peace; or the delivering a commission for such vessel, the act in each case being done without the leave or license of the sovereign.

"4. The augmenting the warlike force of such a vessel of war by adding to the number of guns, by changing those on board for other guns, or by the addition of any equipment of war, if such vessel at the time of its arrival in the dominions of the neutral was a vessel of war in the service of such foreign government, or of such persons, the act being done without the leave or license of the sovereign."1

Royal Commission of 1867.

This statute was, said the Case of the United States, by the construction of the English courts stripped of its effective power during the insurrection. The United States repeatedly, but in vain, invited Her Majesty's government to amend it. After the war, however, the appalling magnitude of the injury inflicted by

1 For purposes of comparison, the Case of the United States at this point reproduced in a footnote the enumeration made in President Grant's neutrality proclamation of October 8, 1870, in the Franco-German war, of the acts forbidden by the neutrality laws of the United States. This enumeration was as follows:

"1. Accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents by land or by sea against the other belligerent.

"2. Enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

"3. Hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

"4. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

"5. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with the intent to be entered into service as aforesaid.

"6. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

"7. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid. (But the said act is not to be construed to extend to a citizen or subject of either belligerent who, being transiently within the United States, shall, on board of any vessel of war, which, at the time of its arrival within the United States, was fitted and equipped as such vessel of war, enlist, or enter himself, or hire, or retain another subject or citizen of the same belligerent, who is transiently within the United States, to enlist, or enter himself to serve

British-built and British-manned cruisers on the commerce of the United States seemed to have led the government to change its course; and in January 1867 a royal commission of British judges and lawyers was appointed which, after twenty-four sittings, reported that the act might be improved by the enactment of several provisions set forth in the report. Among these, the commission recommended that it be made a statutory offense to "fit out, arm, dispatch, or cause to be dispatched, any ship, with intent or knowledge that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign power in any war then being waged by such power against the subjects or property of any foreign belligerent power with whom Her Majesty shall not then be at war." It was also proposed to make it a statutory offense to "build or equip any ship with the intent that the same shall, after being fitted out and armed, either within or beyond Her Majesty's dominions, be employed as aforesaid;" and it was proposed that the executive should be armed with summary powers similar to those conferred upon such belligerent on board such vessel of war, if the United States shall then be at peace with such belligerent.)

"8. Fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel, with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents. "9. Issuing or delivering a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for any ship or vessel to the intent that she may be employed as aforesaid.

"10. Increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or angmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel, which at the time of her arrival within the United States was a ship of war, cruiser, or armed. vessel in the service of either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects or citizens of either, by adding to the number of guns of such vessels, or by changing those on board of her for guns of a larger caliber, or by the addition thereto of any equipment solely applicable to war.

"11. Beginning or setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from the territory or jurisdiction of the United States against the territories or dominions of either of the said belligerents."

After reproducing this enumeration the Case of the United States said: "The Tribunal of Arbitration will also observe that the most important part of the American act is omitted in the British act, namely, the power conferred by the eighth section on the Executive to take possession of and detain a ship without judicial process, and to use the military and naval forces of the Government for that purpose, if necessary."