waters of Curaçao on the written declaration of her commander that she was a ship of war duly commissioned by the government of the Confederate States. In August she was admitted to the port of Paramaribo, in Dutch Guiana, and coaled there, remaining in port eleven days. The Government of the Netherlands subsequently issued orders that no vessel belonging to either belligerent should be allowed to take in more coal than would suffice for twenty-four hours' consumption, or to remain in port longer than forty-eight hours. Before arriving at Paramaribo the Sumter visited Puerto Cabello, in Venezuela, and the British island of Trinidad. She remained at the latter place six days and purchased from private merchants coal and provisions. Permission to purchase coal from the government stores was refused. What took place at Trinidad was brought by Mr. Adams to the attention of Earl Russell on September 30, 1861. Earl Russell replied that the law officers of the Crown had reported that the conduct of the governor of Trinidad was in conformity with Her Majesty's proclamation. The Government of the United States not only sought to have the Sumter treated as a pirate, but also complained of the length of time she was permitted to remain at Trinidad. With a view to prevent the recurrence of similar complaints, the British Government, on January 31, 1862, issued orders absolutely excluding belligerent vessels from the waters of the Bahama Islands, except in case of stress of weather, or of special leave granted by the lieutenant governor. These islands being very near to the American coast, access to them was of little importance to the armed vessels of the United States except in stress of weather, while to vessels of the Confederate States it was of great importance, the harbors of those States being generally, though not always, effectively blockaded.

The orders thus issued were, the British Case declared, more stringent and comprehensive than those of any other neutral government. The Sumter, after leaving Trinidad, entered in succession the ports of Paramaribo, in Dutch Guiana; of San Juan de Maranham, in Brazil, where she remained ten days; of Port Royal and St. Pierre, in Martinique; and of Cadiz, where she remained fourteen days. She was fourteen days in the waters of Martinique, and procured there, under the written authority of the governor of the island, a full supply of coal for a cruise across the Atlantic, together with other supplies. A few days after her arrival the Iroquois, a man-of-war of the United States, entered Port Royal

harbor, and, finding the Sumter, complained to the governor of Martinique of her receiving French protection. The gov ernor in reply offered the same hospitalities and facilities to the Iroquois as were enjoyed by the Sumter. The captain of the Iroquois was also informed that if the Sumter should leave port before him he would not be permitted to depart until twenty-four hours after her sailing. He left immediately and cruised in the offing with the design of intercepting her, till the night of November 23, 1861, when she made her escape. On January 18, 1862, she arrived at Gibraltar. The authori ties observed a neutral conduct in accordance with the Queen's proclamation. The Sumter, in accordance with the rule observed throughout the war toward vessels of both belligerents at all British ports, was refused permission to purchase coal from the government stores, and she was unable to leave Gibraltar for want of coal, the consul of the United States having induced the merchants of the place to refuse to supply her. On the 12th of February 1862 the United States man-ofwar Tuscarora arrived at Gibraltar and proceeded to coal at the neutral port of Algeciras. Two other men-of-war soon arrived, and the Sumter, being unable to escape, was sold at public auction, after having been deprived of her armament, to a British resident at Liverpool. The United States consul at Gibraltar protested against the sale on the ground that it was "for the purpose of avoiding a capture by the cruisers of the United States." Complaint as to the sale was also made by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, who replied that British naval and military officers at Gibraltar had received instructions not to give any protection to the vessel beyond territorial waters, thus leaving it open to the vessels of the United States to capture her and take her into a prize court. She sailed from Gibraltar on February 7, 1863, and reached Liverpool on the 13th. She remained there till July 3, when she sailed as a merchant vessel, without armament, and carrying as freight some heavy ordnance, which could not possibly have been used on board of her. While in port she was carefully watched, by order of the British Government, as a precaution lest she should be in any way armed or equipped for war. She was wrecked at last in attempting to enter Charleston.

The "Georgia" and the " "Nashville."

The course pursued by the British Government in this case was, said the British Case, adhered to in 1864 in the case of the Confederate ship Georgia. But it was afterward judged expedient by the government to prohibit vessels of war belonging to either

belligerent from being dismantled or sold in British ports; although, as the British Case maintained, it was not the duty of a neutral government to prohibit the sale in its territory of a ship owned by a belligerent to a neutral purchaser. Under certain circumstances, as in the case of a ship of war driven by superior force to take refuge in a neutral port, such a sale might be liable to be declared void by a prize court of the other belligerent. But this was a jurisdiction, said the British Case, exercised by prize courts alone, and the sale, until so set aside, was valid everywhere, and operated to transfer the property to the neutral purchaser.

The British Case also referred to the Nashville, which arrived at Bermuda on October 30, 1862, having sailed from Charleston on the 26th. A supply of coal from Her Majesty's dockyard was refused her. She secured a supply from a private yard, and on November 21 arrived at Southampton, having destroyed on her way an American packet ship. On November 22 she went into dock for repairs, and directions were sent from the foreign office that she "should not be allowed to equip herself more completely as a vessel of war, or to take in guns or munitions of war." This measure was the subject of an expression of satisfaction on the part of Mr. Adams.

Confederate Complaints.

From the beginning to the end of the war, said the British Case, Her Majesty's government scrupulously observed in respect to vessels entering British ports or waters under the flag of either belligerent the duties of a neutral power. The United States cruisers entered the ports and waters of Her Majesty's dominions for coaling and other purposes more frequently than the vessels of the Confederate States. The impartial neutrality maintained in these respects by Her Majesty's government was nevertheless a frequent subject of complaint by the Government of the United States, which continued to insist that Confederate vessels ought to have been treated as piratical, or at least excluded altogether; while the Confederate States complained that the regulations enforced were unequal in operation, and unduly disadvantageous to a belligerent whose ports and coasts were under blockade.

International Rights

and Duties.

The third part of the British Case related to international rights and duties,” and to “the powers which were possessed by Her Britannic Majesty's government of preventing unlawful equipments, and

the manner and circumstances in and under which these powers were exercised during the war." Under this head the British Case laid down the following general propositions:

"1. A neutral government is bound to exercise due diligence, to the intent that no place within its territory be made use of by either belligerent as a base or point of departure for a military or naval expedition, or for hostilities by land or sea.

"2. A neutral government is not, by force of the abovementioned obligation or otherwise, bound to prevent or restrain the sale within its territory, to a belligerent, of articles contraband of war, or the manufacture within its territory of such articles to the order of a belligerent, or the delivery thereof within its territory to a belligerent purchaser, or the exportation of such articles from its territory for sale to, or for the use of, a belligerent.

"3. Nor is a neutral government bound, by force of the abovementioned obligation or otherwise, to prohibit or prevent vessels of war in the service of a belligerent from entering or remaining in its ports or waters, or from purchasing provisions, coal, or other supplies, or undergoing repairs therein; provided that the same facilities be accorded to both belligerents indifferently; and provided also that such vessels be not permitted to augment their military force, or increase or renew their supplies of arms or munitions of war, or of men, within the neutral territory.

"4. The unlawful equipment, or augmentation of force, of a belligerent vessel within neutral waters being an offense against the neutral power, it is the right of the neutral power to release prizes taken by means or by the aid of such equipment or augmentation of force, if found within its jurisdiction.

"5. It has been the practice of maritime powers, when at war, to treat as contraband of war vessels specially adapted for warlike use and found at sea under a neutral flag in course of transportation to a place possessed or occupied by a bellig. erent. Such vessels have been held liable to capture and condemnation as contraband on proof in each case that the destination of the ship was an enemy's port, and provided there. were reasonable grounds for believing that she was intended to be sold or delivered to or for the use of the enemy.

“6. Public ships of war in the service of a belligerent entering the ports or waters of a neutral are, by the practice of nations, exempt from the jurisdiction of a neutral power. To withdraw or retuse to recognize this exemption without previous notice, or without such notice to exert, or attempt to exert, jurisdiction over any such vessel, would be a violation of a common understanding, which all nations are bound by good faith to respect.

"7. A vessel becomes a public ship of war by being armed and commissioned-that is to say, formally invested by order or under the authority of a government with the character of a

ship employed in its naval service and forming part of its marine for purposes of war. There are no general rules which prescribe how, where, or in what form the commissioning must be effected so as to impress on the vessel the character of a public ship of war. What is essential is that the appointment of a designated officer to the charge and command of a ship likewise designated be made by the government, or the proper department of it, or under authority delegated by the govern ment or department, and that the charge and command of the ship be taken by the officer so appointed. Customarily a ship is held to be commissioned when a commissioned officer appointed to her has gone on board of her and hoisted the colors appropriated to the military marine. A neutral power may indeed refuse to admit into its own ports or waters as a public ship of war any belligerent vessel not commissioned in a specified form or manner, as it may impose on such admission any other conditions at its pleasure, provided the refusal be applied to both belligerents indifferently; but this should not be done without reasonable notice.

"8. The act of commissioning, by which a ship is invested with the character of a public ship of war, is, for that purpose, valid and conclusive, notwithstanding that the ship may have been at the time registered in a foreign country as a ship of that country, or may have been liable to process at the suit of a private claimant, or to arrest or forfeiture under the law of a foreign state. The commissioning power, by commissioning her, incorporates her into its naval force; and by the same act which withdraws her from the operation of ordinary legal process assumes the responsibility for all existing claims which could otherwise have been enforced against her.

"9. Due diligence on the part of a sovereign government signifies that measure of care which the government is under an international obligation to use for a given purpose. This measure, where it has not been defined by international usage or agreement, is to be deduced from the nature of the obligation itself, and from those considerations of justice, equity, and general expediency on which the law of nations is founded.

"10. The measure of care which a government is bound to use in order to prevent within its jurisdiction certain classes of acts, from which harm might accrue to foreign states or their citizens, must always (unless specifically determined by usage or agreement) be dependent, more or less, on the surrounding circumstances, and can not be defined with precision in the form of a general rule. It would commonly, however, be unreasonable and impracticable to require that it should exceed that which the governments of civilized states are accustomed to employ in matters concerning their own security or that of their own citizens. That even this measure of obligation has not been recognized in practice might be clearly shown by reference to the laws in force in the principal countries of Europe and America. It would be enough, indeed, to refer to the history of some of these countries during recent