not the representatives of the people, but of the directory; and this pretended representation extended even to the subordinate municipal officers. Of this primary principle in democracy how much had they boasted, and how little had they realised it!

Was the expulsion of such a number of those chosen by their constituents meant to exemplify their doctrine, or to explain it? -did equality consist of such outrages on the rights and feelings of each other? and had we any reason to expect better conduct than they adopted amongst themselves? Here, therefore, his lordship said, he was pledged to the house and to the public to make no peace where -peace could neither be honourable nor lasting. It deserved consideration, whether it were not better to prosecute the war on its original ground, or, by ending the one, basely to relinquish the other? The war, it was true, had cost this country many millions; but the -taxes were paid, our resources rising, our trade increased, and our commerce flourishing. What was the situation of the enemy in this respect? All the armies they had raised, all the magazines they had 'filled, all the treasures they had expended, all that they had done, had been effected, not by any well digested plan of equal contribution, but by making the property of individuals answerable to the exigence of the state. With our reWith our revenue it was far otherwise; more money. had been offered to government than the minister had occasion for; and any sum might have been obtained to carry on a war, of which the people felt the justice and necessity. In fact, all its reSources had rather improved than diminished. Where were not our manufactures exported? in what

sea was not the British navy triumphant? and were all these instances of our glory to be surrendered for the amity of a government incapable of accepting, cementing, or realising it? Could we hope for better treatment than any of their other allies? Had they indeed been true to each other, had they been animated with as much zeal to defend, as the French to attack, this war might have been terminated happily long ago: by our own mismanagement, by mutual jealousy, we had ruined the cause we wished to have protected, and the desertion of one led to that of another; but though left in the field alone, we yet occupied such vantage ground as might enable us to hold them for a length of time in perfect defiance. Was not the emperor (the most relied-on continental bulwark!) a beacon to the people of this country? He, whose duty it was to have preserved the empire, instead of proving himself the father of his people, was actually, by the ascendancy of the French in his councils, become a jacobin: the king of Prussia might also turn such, and fall in with the schemes of this ambitious republic, which already called out for a Transrhenane republic on the borders of Austria and Prussia!

Earl Fitzwilliam concluded with exhorting their lordships, if they venerated patriotism, liberty, or laws, to resist all terms of coalescence with this regicide 'government. He reminded them of his majesty's words in a former speech, "that we fought for order, morality, and religion:" nor could we consistently submit to conditions of peace, until the old monarchy was restored in France, and an he riditary sovereign seated upon the throne of his ancestors.

Lord Grenville professed himself

to

to be entirely of opinion with his noble friend, that there was no safety for any people by being at peace with the French; and the horrible picture which he had so Eloquently drawn of the nature of their friendship was justified by the history of their conduct towards the nations whom they had ruined, The calamities they had endured were not so much occasioned by making peace, as by continuing at peace with France: they had sought safety in a temporising system; and, by ignominious compliances with bad principles, had laid themselves open to the miseries which had followed.

It was not by compromises, however humble, nor sacrifices, however extravagant, that security could be obtained against such a system; it was by a vigorous resistance of their principles, a manly disregard of their threats, and a zealous maintenance of our own constitution, that we could secure to ourselves the blessings of our established government.

The marquis of Lansdowne, in an animated speech (wherein he deplored the precipice on which we stood), entreated their lordships to surrender up their prejudices, and contemplate the danger of their situation. The declaration, he said, had made a serious impression on his mind; unaccompanied as it was with documents, he read it with a perfect confidence that the main facts stated were true; but what did they prove? That the French directory had no intention to make peace with us, but were implacably hostile to the govern ment of this country! This was a most important matter, for then the question was, what were we to do in that predicament? The noble earl says, continue the war ;but how Great Britain was not to be placed on a footing with the petty states which the drunkenness of the French revolution had disturbed; nor ought we to be diverted from the contemplation of our own case by such references. He left them, with all the predictions which had so fatally deluded their lordships, of the impossibility of the French continuing their system, We were come to that point when we were to act for ourselves; and it was needless to remind the house

of

of the principle of those who had carried on the war, which had been, that we could not make any impression on France without a continental ally. If this were true, what must we do when the French had made a jacobin of the emperor. The marquis observed, that he should not have presumed to have called his imperial majesty by this name, but he borrowed the expres sion from the noble earl.

Could we go on without an ally, for any purpose of offence? We could not hope to recover the king of Prussia; he might become a jaco. bin also; he long ago had wisdom to quit the scene, and now we found that even the emperor had withdrawn. He hoped, however, that we should find him a man of honour in his engagements; and that the money advanced in this country, which our ministers had constantly declared was not a subsidy, but a solemn loan, would be paid with punctuality and honour. But the consideration which he particularly wished to impress, was, that we were called upon to persevere in the contest, without the means so frequently stated as essential to its success. Our resources were affirmed to be rising; but were they actually so? The papers which he had read respecting the trade with Portugal, and the wine trade, afforded proof of a lamentable decay; it was not merely that they were not productive, but that they were deficient. It was not then because our sailors had conquered, because we had demonstrated to all the world the character of our natural strength, that therefore we had the means of carrying on an offensive war against France without a continental ally. Our sailors, indeed, had shown the true pis animi of the British marine; they had shown that the country

could rise, in spite of the misma nagement of ministers, like the natural strength of youth, which in a casual sickness resists all the blunders of physicians. But what could our naval exploits avail in such a contest? They made us masters of the sea indeed, but where should we land? If we had the seas, France had its ports; it was necessary to the circuit of commerce that the markets should be open. What then was our relative situation? We had ships that traversed and commanded the ocean; the French had armies that traversed and commanded the shores: we could ship our manufactures, but where could we expose them to sale? What sea was there between Paris and Hamburgh, or Paris and Hanover, or Paris and Lisbon ? The French occupied, and they would occupy, every point of contact with the main land of Europe, We had talked of a counter-revolution; were we yet weak enough to cherish this puerile expectation? if so, he begged leave to refer their lordships to a most able pamphlet, written by a late comptroller-general of France. Mons. de Calonne asserted (and his authority was of weight), that the assignats and mandats had produced the contrary effect to what was expected; that it was quite ridiculous to talk about the property of a nation, where all its property was afloat. Its very paper, when we idly supposed the source of ruin, was not merely a genuine resource for the time it lasted, but by our attacks upon it became the principle of salvation to France; it worked out its own cure; and that country, from having more paper than all the world put together, had now less than ours.

The marquis declared solemnly he was himself no jacobin; he

came

came not to the house to give his opinion in the spirit of a French man-but in this dreadful crisis he knew but one means, but one chance for safety, but one power ful resource left to the nation change of ministers. He yet had confidence it would be tried; for the chief magistrate of our government it was not great talents which were required, so much as that plain integrity and humane attention to the good of the people, which rejects all personal considerations, and seeks only their happiness. In this view he did not despair of the public zeal, if his majesty would enter into a serious inquiry concerning the most likely methods to restore peace; and every honest man would tell him that a change of ministers was the most likely method. Let us suppose in what manner the directory of France would reason on this subject; might it not be in this strain? We have convinced the powers on the continent of Europe of the folly of the crusade they undertook against us; we have sent armies into the field whose victories have surpassed those of ancient Rome at its pinnacle of glory; we have magnified the power of our country upon the basis which gave rise to the war; we are young in the enjoyment of our liberties, and all the means of a vigorous government are in our bands; one obstinate nation only, under hot-headed councils, persists in its attack upon us, and charging us with every species of atrocity, denounces us to all the world as the authors of the war which has so long deluged Europe with blood. We, who only wanted liberty, have conquered the powers which wanted plunder, and have aggrandized ourselves at the expence of our assailants. This power, which thus perseveres against us, is brought to

embarrassments which it can neither palliate nor conceal; it stands upon a tottering base; the very shadow of a descent on Ireland convulsed its bank; and at the very moment that it threatens to pour forth vengeance upon us, it is ready to sink under the efforts it has already made. Shall we yield to this insulated foe, who has no armies with which it can wound us? Even in asking for peace they mean hostility-they seek an armistice which shall give them time to take breath, and attack us to more advantage again--they are insincere they are our only enemy, and now is the moment to save France from their designs."

It was possible (the marquis said) that the directory would hold such language; which, though it could not be wholly justified, had too much truth on its side. They had too much reason to doubt our sincerity, even in our professions of peace; for in all the instances where commissioners had been appointed to negotiate, a dark game had been played, which contradicted the public profession of the British cabinet. Thus when a commissioner was sent to Switzerland, and Mr. Wickham opened a correspondence with the French, they discovered it was only for the purpose of negotiating a loan. Again, when lord Malmes bury was sent to Paris, whilst we were making professions of peace there, we were negotiating a hostile treaty with Russia, for such it was now known was the fact, and the treaty was ready for signing when the empress died. And last of all, our negotiation at Lisle was accompanied by that counter-revolutionary insurrection in the interior in France, which produced the convulsion of the 4th of September, and in which they said that they discovered the hand of the English minister.

minister. The marquis disclaimed having any personal knowledge upon the subject; but remarked, that people must be wilfully blind who did not perceive that the French had charged our ministry with the fact, and that our declaration was shy of disproving the charge. What then would an honest adviser of his majesty say? but that ministers who had thus conducted them selves, and thus exasperated the enemy, were less likely than other men to procure peace for the country. They would entreat his ma jesty, at least, to try the experiment; they would deprive the enemy of the advantage of asserting with probability, that the war was continued only because the British cabinet was insincere. But it might be asked, upon what basis peace ought to be concluded? It was his opinion, that if it was concluded in a total abandonment of every idea of promoting internal insurrection in France, he should not be very anxious in specifying the conditions. Neither East nor West Indian colonies, no, nor Trincomale itself, was sufficient argument for the continuance of the war. As to West-India settlements, the recent events had materially changed our policy with regard to them. When we enjoy ed all their consumption it was far different; but now that it was in a great measure transferred to America, which would one day take those islands to itself, and when the enlightened spirit of humanity had done so much towards the emancipation of the negroes, and the French revolution had introduced principles of insubordination, he would not contend a day about any object in the West Indies. Respecting the Cape of Good Hope, about which so many lofty expectations were formed, the whole was found to be a dream.

The whole was then reduced to Trincomale; and though he must acknowledge that it was of enormous value to the defence of the eastern empire, and the thing for which we ought to negotiate, and to procure if possible, yet it was not worth further slaughter: we had gained the East without it; we had taken it before now, and given it up; nor was it worth another campaign, which would cost us 30 millions.

Let us engage the European powers (those on whom we could prevail) in a defensive league; in fact, our system ought to be purely defensive; nor was a defensive war a great evil to this country, compared with that which we had been doomed to suffer. Our means for such a system were large; our nautical skill, and our nautical capital, would maintain to us the true sovereignty of the seas, for it would secure to us the empire of its commerce: let us regain the opinion of Europe, which we had lost by our pride and rapacity, let us proclaim freedom to neutral nations (for in the end we should be forced to do it, and with an ill grace), and by thus recognising the commercial liberty of the world, we should be the first to profit from it.-His lordship then touched upon the state of Ireland; the representation of its grievances, he said, if true, de manded instant redress; and if it were delayed, there remained but one alternative, a feudal union, or separation. People who were to be governed by us, had a right to the security of their property and quiet; and there was no means of restoring both, but by making peace with this mighty nation, who, to the enthusiasm of liberty, had all the resources of a country before them. They were not exhausted as we were; they had not run through all the classes of taxation;

the