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soil, which was become the conquered land of liberty; this court increased her armaments, and marched towards the frontiers troops, prepared to enter the Roman territory. All these extraordinary preparations she justified on futile pretences. She received the discontented at Rome with open arms, fomented the troubles which she had excited there; furnished the rebels with provisions and an asylum, and never ceased to assume towards this new. republic the most threatening attitude. While she dared not openly to declare war against France, she sought to destroy in Italy all the free states which were under her protection.

The French government might without doubt have inflicted signal vengeance for this public protection which was granted to the frequent insurrections formed at Rome against the French army, as well as for the increased number of spies with which our agent at Naples was surrounded. But far from giving way to this just sentiment, the directory did not think proper to oppose the taking possession of the duchy of Benevento. They even offered their mediation to deliver the king of Naples from the feudal pretensions which Rome had on his estates. But this was not all. They sent to Naples a new ambassador, furnished with the most amicable and conciliatory powers. At the moment in which the army conmanded by Buonaparte sailed, the executive directory were anxious to satisfy the king of Naples as to the object of this expedition. In short, they addressed to him the most repeated protestations of their unalterable desire to maintain tranquil lity in Italy; adding, it is true, a not less energetic wish, that the Roman republic, which had been placed by

the current of events under the special protection of the French republic, might be able to consolidate its political existence.

But neither friendly intercourse, nor the voice of reason, nor the necessity of peace, could inspire these sentiments in the breast of that court. Every pretence was made use of to justify her complaints, her threats, and, at length, her numerous infractions of treaty.

The French republic replied to the manifesto of Malta by the conquest of that island; at that moment the court of Naples, with the most ridiculous hauteur, dared to revive its pretensions on a country which it had neither governed by its laws nor by its arms; and the French government did not disdain to reply at length to this nonsensical pretension, as if it could have been supported by the least appearance of reason.

From the moment of signing of peace, all the acts, as well public as private, of this court, have been distinguished for perfidy and hatred towards the French. The treaty was signed, and the court delayed to publish it from motives of respect for the courts of London and Vienna. The seventh article pro mised liberty to all the French who were detained for political opinions, and all the Neapolitans suspected of having any connection with them, who were imprisoned. At the so. licitation of our agents some of the peaceful friends to the French republic were restored to liberty, but upon the most vain pretences they were loaded with fresh chains. At length the French, whom commercial affairs alone detained in the states of the king of Naples, were every day, merely because they were French, publicly insulted, attacked, and even assassinated;

and

and these attempts remained unpunished.

The third article of the treaty stipulated that "his majesty the king of the Two Sicilies shall observe the most strict neutrality towards all the belligerent powers, and he therefore engages to forbid, without distinction, the entry into his ports, of all armed vessels belonging to the hostile powers, excccding the number of four, at most, according to the known laws of neutrality. All ammunition or merchandise known as contraband, shall be refused to them."

How has this article, the sense of which is by no means ambiguous, been executed?

Forty days after the conclusion of the treaty, the English had seven frigates in the port of Naples; ou the 9th Thermidor the fourteen vessels of admiral Nelson entered, at full sail, the ports of Augusta and Syracuse, and in whatever manner this article be interpreted, it is obvious, that this was an infraction of it. The government of Naples thought themselves obliged to justi fy this preceeding, by representing that it was not in their power to resist force; a contemptible subterfuge, because it did not even attempt resistance, and because the senate of Syracuse received the English admiral with honours. About this period too, the 17th Thermidor, five Portuguese ships of war and three English ships were received with equal eagerness in the port of Naples.

With respect to the furnishing of articles forbidden by this treaty, is it not notorious that immediately after the conclusion of the peace, the French attempting to prevent the English from getting provisions, the Neapolitan government gave orders to the governor of Orbitello

to hinder them from passing, while he suffered a considerable corps of emigrants, who were in the service of England, to be disembarked? Is it not notorious that the fleet of admiral Nelson was first victualled in the port of Sicily; that on its return afterwards to Naples, it received, from the arsenal of the king, the stores of which it stood in need? Is it not notorious that long before this epoch, on the 29th Prairial, the whole of the English fleet having appeared before Naples, a brig was detached which auchored in the port, and two officers who came from on board it had a conversation with general Acton and the queen, in order to secure whatever might be necessary to the success of the attack upon the French fleet; that in addition to the assistance and the assurances they received from them, pilots were also furnished to clear the streights of Messina, a passage which no squadron, without such assistance, would have dared to attempt, and in consequence of which they boped to be able to cut off the French fleet, which were supposed to be yet at Malta? In a word, is it not clear that nothing that could be injurious to France has been refused, by the court of Naples, to our implacable enemies? If in addition to this the conduct which Naples has directly manifested towards us be considered, if it be recollected that in spite of the fourth article of the treaty, which stipulates "that the King of Naples shall be bound to grant in all his roads and ports surety and protection to all French merchant ships, however numerous, and to all ships of war, which shall not exceed four;" several of the convoy of the French fleet having been obliged to anchor in the roads of Sicily, commotions, evidently ex

tuted

ted by the government of Naples, broke out at Trapani, at Gergenti, and at Messina, in which several of the French soldiers who went on shore were assassinated; if it be recollected, that, since Malta bas been in the hands of the French, the Maltese boats which came as usual to take in provisions in Sicily were prevented, the gates shut against them, and they were repulsed with fire-arms; that the plan of surprising Malta while it remained in the hands of the French, was not even dissembled by the Neapolitan government; and that a Maltese bark which was carrying French commissaries sent to the viceroy of Sicily, having been forced by an English shalop to take refuge at Iciata, the crew having landed, were immediately pursued with musketry by the Sicilians, and forced to reembark, when the bark was immediately taken by the English, with out the Neapolitan government making the smallest representation to cause the neutrality to be respected. If too it be added, that on another occasion one of our corsairs having been carried off by force in the port of Baratto, the governor of that place did not condescend to take any measures to prevent such an attack upon the sovereignty of the king of the Two Sicilies,and in short, that such is the hostile delirium and hatred of the king of Naples towards the French and their allies, that, in contempt of all the ties which should bind him to the king of Spain, he has had the impudence to receive in his ports a Spanish prize taken by the English.

If too we recollect the inconceivable joy which was manifested at Naples on the sight of the English fleet, the public honours which the court itself lavished on admiral Nelson, in going out to welcome

him; his triumphal entry, the large reward granted to the messengerwho brought the first account of his victory, and the illuminations and rejoicings which took place on the occasion:

If it be remembered, that from the time of this victory the audacity of the Neapolitan government has kn wu no bounds; that lately an unrestrained populace broke the windows of our consul at Naples, without the Neapolitan government having taken any measures to repress such an insult; that the late sedition at Malta was openly protected in the Neapolitan states; that the markets and all the public places resounded with the inost terrible invectives against us; that all who were inclined to encourage, peace with France, were persecuted with the most acrimonious rage; that at length a barbarous order was issued by the king of Naples, menacing with death whoever should carry provisions to the French at Malta-If all these circumstances are considered, it must be allowed that more hostile sentiments never were manifested than on one side, nor more patience shewn than on the other.

The executive directory, however, put off as long as possible the moment in which it was to wreak the vengeance of the nation. It was made clear to demonstration to them that the court of Naples did not confine its hostility against the republic to complaints, menaces, or fury; that after having for a long time after the conclusion of the peace shewn the most hostile disposition, it had for a long time been at open hostility, and had lavished succours of all kinds on our most cruel enemy; that in short she was become the ally of Great Britain, and as useful to that power as she

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was prejudicial to us; and yet the French government faithful to its desire of preserving peace even with Naples, was willing to hope that there was yet a possibility of repentance. This honourable illusion has been, however, dissipated by the Neapolitan government, which has brought its long train of perjuries to the height. It has dare to attack suddenly the French army, and to accompany this aggression with the most insolent menaces. The republican energy, long confined, will now break forth with the strength of thunder; and this court, too long time spared, which, imitating the illegal conduct of the British government, has dared to be guilty of breaking the laws of peace, without having the courage to declare war, will at length receive the reward of its demerits.

But it is necessary too, that those who have shewn themselves its accomplices, should also share the same fate. The Sardinian government has been the associate of its perfidies, and a similar fate awaits it. Its guilt, as an accomplice with 'Naples, is manifest from a thousand circumstances; its sentiments, its language, and even its actions, in proportion to its means, have been the same, and its artifice and hypocrisy exactly resemble that of Naples. It would be difficult to account for its recent conduct towards France, if history did not, in all ages, make manifest the cunning and versatile politics of this court, constantly occupied in fomenting war among its neighbours, in taking a part in all the wars of Italy, and in shamlessly deserting its allies, in constantly joining that side which appeared most strong, in order to oppress the weak, and in gratifying its revenge, its ambition,

and in offering its support for sale, to whoever was inclined to purchase it.

Independently of every other cause of complaint, who would believe that the treaty which we deigned to conclude with the court of Turin, and which they ought to have considered as a signal favour, has not yet been published in all the states of the king of Sardinia. The agents of the republic have in vain requested that this might be done; their resistance has been invincible, and the most futile reasons have been assigned as a pretence for this delay, or rather for this refusal. In fact, they have never ceased to make war in every way which their imbecility and their cowardice suffered them to put into execution. Our most cruel enemies, the emigrants and refractory priests, have constantly met with a welcome reception in his dominions: there they have been suffered to give free vent to their hatred, and to the expressions of their barbarous wishes against the republic. They have even been able to excite the people against the French, by the most atrocious calumnies. This is not all

from the moment in which peace was sigued, the French, almost under the eyes of their ambassadors, have been assassinated in cold blood, and that chiefly by the regular troops. These assassinations have been committed almost daily, and the number of them is dreadful when the total amount shall be known. Some of them have fallen by the stiletto, some have been mutilated in the most dreadful manner. A volunteer, of the 68th demi-brigade, was buried alive, after having been barbarously wounded. He was seen coming alive out of the grave in which he had been buried.

He

He was destined to escape, in order to offer a proof of this dreadful cruelty.

The agents of the French republic have expressed, in the name of the republic, the most energetic indignation; but they have been unable to prevent these crimes from going unnoticed or unpunished. Some banditti, enrolled under the name of Barbets, whose business it is to rob and pillage, but whose amusement it is to kill republicans, far from being dissipated by public authority, appear to be encouraged by it. Their thefts on the Piedmontese were forgiven, in consideration of their murder of the French. On this subject a long negotiation was entered into, which was considered by the Sardinian government as a public calamity, the abject of which was not to obtain the suppression of, but the mere promise to repress these banditti. On this condition the support of our arms was promised to them. But the Sardinian government was unwilling to obtain tranquillity at this price, and after all would not consent to issue a law against stilettos and concealed arms, so fearful were they that the French should by any means be secure in their states; and during the course of the negotiation, and in spite of the formal promise to suspend a proceeding in which the most furious passions were manifested, several Frenchmen who were implicated in an unhappy affair were shot without pity.

Besides these enrolled banditti, besides judiciary banditti, the Duc d'Aost, a monster, the brother of the king, and the heir to the throne, like another Old Man of the Mountain, never ceased to keep under his orders, and in his pay, a band of cutthroats, to whom he issued orders to

assassinate such and such a Frenchman, and these orders were but too faithfully executed.

It is in vain to suppose that all these crimes were not imputable to the Sardinian government, since the whole of its conduct has proved that it was privy to every one of them. The principal places in Piedmont were occupied by French troops; for those no provisions were to be obtained. The friends of the republic were constantly thrown into prison, the Frenchmen insulted, and even their dress turned into derision; the emigrants were encouraged in their audacity; those public officers who were most distinguished for their hatred towards the French,chiefly promoted; the Barbets protected, even openly by their first magistrates; poniards forged and distributed to a vast number; in short, the most dreadful plots against the French were planned and ready to be carried into execution. From an interrogatory exhibited to one of the chiefs of the Barbets, it appears that a person who was employed in the custom-house at Turin, and who was commissioned to pay these banditti, had received from the Sardinian government orders to distribute among the chiefs of them boxes of poison, to be thrown into the wells which lay nearest to the French camp.

It is evident that there exists the most intimate connection between the conduct of such a government as this and that of the court of Naples, in their hostility to the French republic; this connection, maintained and supported by so many crimes, would alone be sufficient to implicate the court of Turin in the guilt of the other: but a stronger proof is added, in the circumstance

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