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is in our hands, to take advantage of what the opponents even of the repeal bill must admit is among ourselves a disputed construction and interpretation of the treaty?

Notwithstanding this serious difference of opinion by our statesmen, irrespective of parties, to take advantage of such a construction, what does it signify? But to give to the most exclusive monopoly, the owners of the coastwise shipping, freedom from tolls, which all other American ships, as well as all foreign ships, are compelled to pay; or, to put it in another way, to place to that extent an additional tax upon all of our people for the maintenance of the canal and the payment of interest upon its cost. Does anyone believe that by subsidizing to that extent the monopoly known as the coastwise shipping the people at large will receive any benefit from it? The history of that monopoly in the past certainly does not justify our expecting any such generosity from their hands.

This is the domestic side of the question, which but for the treaty would be our own affair and is insignificant in relation to its international import. Not only Great Britain, but all the maritime nations of the world, including the Central and South American States, are by the terms of the treaty equally interested and materially affected, for, as you recall, article 3, section 1, of the treaty provides:

The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise.

Senator SIMMONS. You are reading now from the Hay-Pauncefote treaty? Mr. STRAUS. I am.

Senator SIMMONS. That was our agreement with_Great Britain. When we acquired our title from Panama, did not Panama require us to enter into the same substantially-in almost identically the same words-the same contract or agreement for the benefit of the balance of the world?

Mr. STRAUS. If you say so. I have not the exact terms of the Panama treaty in mind. I do not know whether those are the exact provisions or not.

The CHAIRMAN. You were only asked, Mr. Straus, to give to the committee such knowledge as you have.

Mr. STRAUS. Yes; but I have not that treaty before me.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a difference of opinion with regard to various facts, and it is not always safe to assume the premises in questions which are put to you.

Senator SIMMONS. If the chairman intends that as a rebuke for the question I asked, I desire to say-and I hope the chairman did not intend it that way-that I asked you the question whether

that was so or not.

Mr. STRAUS. I do not know.

Senator SIMMONS. I did not make a statement, but I asked the witness a question.

Mr. STRAUS. I do not know, Mr. Senator.

Senator BRANDEGEE. In connection with that, I will ask that the stenographer may insert in the record, if Mr. Straus does not object, what the provision of the Panama treaty is in relation to that.

Senator SIMMONS. Yes; let the stenographer put that in.
Senator BRANDEGEE. So that the treaty may speak for itself.
Mr. STRAUS. I have no objection.

The provision of the treaty with Panama is as follows:

ARTICLE XVIII.

The canal, when constructed, and the entrances thereto shall be neutral in perpetuity, and shall be opened upon the terms provided for by Section I of article 3 of, and in conformity with all the stipulations of, the treaty entered into by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on November 18, 1901.

Senator SIMMONS. I want to say, while I do not know the purpose of the chairman, and it does seem to me the chairman has not disavowed it, that he evidently meant by that question to rebuke me for asking a question of the witness that I had an entire right to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. My dear Senator, you would be the last man in the world I would attempt to rebuke. The fact is that there was one thought in your question that was unfounded if it was intended

Senator SIMMONS. I will ask the stenographer to read the question. The CHAIRMAN. I know the question, and I know what the Panama treaty contains, but they did not insist upon it. It was a voluntary offering by the American State Department at the time that treaty was negotiated.

Senator SIMMONS. I did not ask the question whether it was put in there by force or volition. I asked the question whether the treaty did not contain substantially the same provision with reference to the equality of treatment of ships as the Hay-Pauncefote treaty contained. I ask the stenographer to read the question which I asked. (The stenographer read the question as requested.)

The CHAIRMAN. The only point that does not agree with my recollection of the circumstances connected with the negotiation of the Panama treaty is the suggestion implied in your question that Panama required us to do these things.

Senator SIMMONS. Does the chairman hold that was an improper question for me to ask?

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all.

Mr. STRAUS. Citations of the opinions of other nations upon this subject as to their right for equal treatment have been made by several of the Senators in their arguments. In this connection I wish merely to call attention to one point of interpretation which may not have been sufficiently dwelt upon. You will observe in the letter of Secretary Hay of December 2, 1901, to the President, submitting the treaty for his consideration and for transmission to the Senate, he says:

Without impairing the general principle of neutralization established in article 8 of that convention [the Clayton-Bulwer treaty] the words "general principle" are put in quotation marks.

By referring to article 8 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty we find what is meant by the words "general principle." That section (art. 8)

reads:

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain having not only desired in entering into this convention to accomplish a particular object but also to establish a "general principle."

And that general principle is defined in the section in the following words:

* * * And that the same canals or railways being open to the citizens and subjects of the United States and Great Britain on equal terms shall also be open on like terms to the citizens and subjects of every other State which is willing to grant thereto such protection as the United States and Great Britain engage to afford.

This is emphasized by Mr. Hay not only by the use of the term "general principle" but by the fact that the words are put in quotation marks, showing that they are quoted and therefore mean the same as that term is used in article 8 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. There might have been a time in the remote past when nations were so isolated, and when the international conscience was so blunted, when might was construed as right, and when nations were guided sly by considerations of selfishness and expediency, when they did not take into consideration what was just or fair or right, but such has never been the attitude of America. "A decent respect to the opinions of mankind" was incorporated in our first state paper, the Declaration of Independence, by Thomas Jefferson, and because we have through all our history upheld this respect has made us a power for righteousness in international affairs second to no other ntion in the world. We, I think, coined the phrase "Dollar diplomacy" in order to reprove and discredit the sacrificing of principle, of justice, and of equity, in international relations for commercial gain.

Are we now to cast aside all of our high purposes which have been consecrated by uniform practices for the past century and a quarter, from the administration of Washington to the administration of Wilson for a paltry sum at most of $2,000,000 annually, which in the last analysis will be largely taken from all of our people and given to a monopolistic shipping trust? Are we to sacrifice the decent respect for the opinions of mankind for this miserable mess of pottage? This phase of the subject I wish to emphasize, as the importance of it impresses itself upon me with greater force than perhaps it does some others, who have not been charged with service for the country in foreign lands, and therefore perhaps do not appreciate as fully as they otherwise would, its international aspect and relationship.

When the subject of the repeal of the free-tolls provision of the Panama act first came up, and when it was suggested that as that provision was in conflict with the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, it was urged by several Members of Congress that it was not a subject for arbitration, notwithstanding the fact it came directly under the interpretation of a treaty, and notwithstanding the fact that we had concluded a score or more of arbitration treaties expressly providing for the arbitration of just such questions. Whether in order to strengthen that position, the Senate delayed for a year or more in confirming the renewal of the arbitration treaties, you will know better than I do, but this much I will say, that such delay, not without reason, appeared to other nations to have the purpose of enabling us to avoid arbitrating the tolls question under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be inconvenient if at this point an inquiry were addressed to you?

Mr. STRAUS. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember that Secretary Knox, in January, 1913, in his answer to the British protest, offered to have this question arbitrated at that time, and called the attention of the British Government that it had delayed up to that time in accepting the arbitration treaties which had been negotiated about a year before, and that Secretary Knox suggested that the immediate approval of that arbitration treaty by Great Britain would afford an expeditious method of arbitrating the dispute under the HayPauncefote treaty? That Secretary Knox went beyond that, and said if for any reason the British Government does not care to ratify that treaty, doubtless some other mode of arbitrating this question can be agreed upon, and that the British Government from that day to this has made no answer to the suggestion of the Secretary of State with regard to the arbitration of this question? The delay by the British Government, and its indifference to conclude a treaty of arbitration which was pending for more than two years, was one reason, and an important one, why some Members of the American Senate did not care to take up the negotiation of a new arbitration treaty. I make these statements in connection with my inquiry-are you aware that Secretary Knox at the time I speak of made such a proposal to the British Government, and that the British Government has never acted on it?

Mr. STRAUS. I am not aware, with all due deference to your statement. If you make it positively, of course I do not question it. But my recollection is not that. My recollection is this: That what we call our short arbitration treaty, for the arbitration of questions. of the interpretation of treaties and juridical questions, had expired, the five-year term had expired, and a new treaty of the same tenure had been negotiated and was unratified by the Senate. And my recollection is that when Sir Edward Grey said in his instruction to his ambassador here in regard to the Panama act suggested that as there was great difference of opinion in this country that the matter might be adjusted by arbitration. Secretary Knox in his reply did not offer arbitration, but made a special plea that the time had not arrived, or something like that, as the tolls provision had as yet not gone into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you permit me to read from Secretary Knox's letter to the British Covernment under date of January 17, 1913?

Mr. STRAUS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of the propriety of examining into the controversy, he said:

If it should be found as a result of such an examination on the part of Great Britain that a difference of opinion exists between the two Governments on any of the important questions of fact involved in this discussion, then a situation will have arisen which, in the opinion of this Government, could with advantage be dealt with by referring the controversy to a commission of inquiry for examination and report, in the manner provided for in the unratified arbitration treaty of August 3, 1911, between the United States and Great Britain.

The necessity for inquiring into questions of fact in their relation to controversies under diplomatic discussion was contemplated by both parties in negotiating that treaty, which provides for the institution, as occasion arises, of a joint high commission of inquiry, to which, upon the request of either party, might be referred for impartial and conscientious investigation any controversy between them, the commission being authorized upon such reference "to examine into and report upon the particular questions or matters referred to it, for the purpose of facilitating the solution of dis

putes by elucidating the facts, and to define the issues presented by such questions, amd also to include in its report such recommendations and conclusions as may be appropriate."

This proposal might be carried out, should occasion arise for adopting it, either under a special agreement, or under the unratified arbitrarion treaty above mentioned, if Great Britain is prepared to join in ratifying that treaty, which the United States is prepared to do.

The British Government has never replied to that offer.

Mr. STRAUS. I understand that that was what we called the allinclusive arbitration treaties, which included all questions between nations, which we had negotiated with Great Britain, and with France. I think they were generally called the Taft treaties. The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. STRAUS. And that treaty, after it was negotiated, was not ratified by the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. It was amended by the Senate.

Mr. STRAUS. I know it was not ratified. It was amended by the Senate, and that thereafter-if I am mistaken of course I am speaking with all deference to you Senators who have this subject more clearly in mind than I have and that after the treaty had been amended by the Senate the negotiations were practically suspended. Is not that correct, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. For a time until the proposition was made in January, 1913, by Mr. Knox, on behalf of this Government, that this Government was prepared to conclude that treaty and to ratify it if the British Government would do so.

Mr. STRAUS. Yes. I understand, however, that President Taft had practically not taken up the treaty again after it was amended because he regarded those treaties as entirely emasculated.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that Secretary Knox would have made such a proposal to the British Government if the administration of which he was a part thought that the treaties were emasculated?

Mr. STRAUS. Well, there was something left in it

Senator O'GORMAN. Everything was left in the treaty, Mr. Secretary, excepting that when special agreements were from time to time to be made pursuant to the treaty it would be necessary to have those special agreements ratified by the Senate, which was a feature which was omitted from the original treaty. In other words, they were substantially the same.

Mr. STRAUS. I understand that President Taft stated that practically nullified the treaties because it required that every particular arbitration which came up under the treaty had again to go before the Senate to be ratified, and consequently it really amounted to nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. But you will observe that the Secretary of State of that administration offers to ratify it if the British Government will do so, and he calls attention to a feature of it, lacking in every other treaty which exists between us, in that it provides for an investigation by an impartial tribunal of the merits of a controversy before it will be actually arbitrated. Indeed, it contains the very proposition which Secretary Bryan has made the feature of his new proposed treaties, that there shall be a suspension of activities for 12 months, or thereabouts, after a dispute arises until its merits may be inquired into.

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