Companies established by them or any of them, shall pay, but shall enjoy all other the Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Exemptions in Trade, Navigation and Commerce, in passing from one part thereof to another, and in going to and from the same, from and to any Part of the World, which the said Natives or Companies enjoy."

Reciprocally it was provided that the treatment was to be extended to French commerce in the United States.

The provision was radical to an extreme. It proposed to wipe out all discrimination between citizens and foreigners. It involved not only a revolutionary change in the customary policy pursued among nations of that time, but it has failed to obtain complete realization to the present day. No wonder that it was not accepted by France, and instead a provision was substituted in article 3 of what became the treaty of 1778 (the first treaty we ever adopted as a Nation) that

"The subjects of the Most Christian King shall pay in the ports, havens, roads, countries, islands, cities or towns of the United States, or any of them, no other or greater duties or imposts, of what nature soever they may be, or by what name soever called, than those which the nations most favored are or shall be obliged to pay." In other words, France was willing to treat American commerce as favorably as that of any foreign nation, but not on a footing of equality with its own.

IMPORTANCE OF OUR EARLY SHIPPING INTERESTS.

How did the provincial pioneers, struggling in the backwoods thousands of miles away from civilization, come to take a stand so much in advance of their European contemporaries on the other side of the Atlantic? The answer is simple. It is to be found neither in the greater sagacity nor radicalism of the leaders of the American Colonies. The proposed policy was dictated by the urgent economic needs of the hour. At the time the fathers of this country were struggling for independence shipping and shipbuilding constituted one of the most important activities in the Colonies. Favored by an unlimited supply of shipbuilding material in the virgin forests, stimulated by a long coast line, and dependent on the over-sea trade for most of the necessi ties of the home as well as for the disposition of the surplus of their own labor, the colonists went into shipping and shipbuilding on a grand scale. As early as 1730 the rapid development of the merchant marine in the Colonies caused sufficient alarm among the commercial interests of England to lead to the imposition of heavy tonnago dues and other taxes upon colonial shipping.

In spite of British jealousy and unfavorable legislation the economic advantage favored continued growth of American shipping, so that on the eve of the War of Independence one-third of the fleet sailing under the British flag was of American construction. The act of 1765, prohibiting the importation of goods into and exportation from the Colonies except in British bottoms, was a desperate attempt to stem the rising tide of American shipping and shipbuilding, and, followed by the "stamp act" the same year, brought on the crisis which resulted in the War of Independence.

Having won political independence, we were not content with the opportunities open to our merchant marine in our own harbors. Our merchants were ambitiously reaching out for the carrying trade of the world. In this they were aided by the devastating wars between England and France, which wrought havoc with their own mercantile fleets. In the closing years of the eighteenth and the early years of the nineteenth centuries the American flag was conspicuous in all the ocean highways of the Atlantic, as well as the Pacific; in the ports of the civilized nations of Europe, as well as off the Barbary coasts of the Mediterranean pirates. But in all these countries our merchants felt the oppression of the restrictive measures which it took a seven-year war to abolish in our own country. The commercial laws of the European nations in the eighteenth century bristled with restrictions imposed upon merchants and their vessels calculated to make it impossible to transact business on terms of equality with the natives. In those days shipowning and trading in the goods carried in the ships went usually hand in hand, the same merchant being usually shipowner as well as trader. Especially onerous were the restrictions and discriminatory tonnage dues, port charges, fees, and special taxes on foreign shipping.

The Government of the new Republic from the very start set about the great task of removing these restrictions and doing away with discriminating taxes on shipbuilding. We saw the unsuccessful attempt made in the first treaty with a foreign nation. The failure only stimulated the powerful shipping interests which had a large share in shaping the early policy of this country to redoubled efforts. If reciprocity in freedom from discrimination would not appeal to the Europeans, perhaps retaliation would help to drive the lesson home to them. The first tariff act enacted by the United States, that of 1789, provided that merchandise brought to this country from

Europe in foreign bottoms was to pay duties 10 per cent higher than those brought in American bottoins, while goods brought from the Far East paid from 100 to 35 per cent higher duties, if carried in foreign bottoms, as against those brought in American vessels. In addition to that, other acts provided tonnage duties on foreign vessels coming to American ports much higher than those imposed on American ships. All this merely added to the economic advantages naturally enjoyed by our merchant vessels, so that on the eve of our war with England in 1812 our vessels carried from 90 to 94 per cent of all of our imports and from 84 to 90 per cent of all our exports across the sea.

OUR NAVIGATION POLICY ACCEPTED BY EUROPE.

The War of 1812 with England, like the War of Independence, was a culmination of the shipping rivalry between the two countries, in which the young Republic stood for untrammeled commerce, free from legal restrictions and discriminatory taxation, while the mother country stood for the old order of legal monopolies, favoritism through special grants, and artificial restraints through taxation and other legal restrictions. The new order won, and we emerged from the war with fresh laurels, and with the convention of commerce and navigation of 1815 containing the revolutionary innovation already quoted.

The example of the most powerful maritime nation of Europe could not go long without imitation among its less fortunate, though no less eager, rivals. No country wishing to trade with the United States could afford to endure the heavy discriminating taxes and duties upon foreign shipping in the United States while England enjoyed the same freedom in this regard as if it owned this country. In 1816 Sweden and Norway followed suit with a treaty containing a provision similar to that in the treaty with Great Britain of 1815. Algiers followed the same year. By 1824 the Netherlands, Prussia, the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, Sardinia, and Russia joined the procession. The same year Congress passed an act authorizing the President to extend the exemption from discriminative duties on tonnage to any country reciprocating in kind. To-day most of our treaties contain a reciprocal provision for the treatment of our vessels in foreign countries on the same basis as their own, and the principle has been extended to cover the relation of those nations among themselves.

It is now proposed to sweep aside with one stroke the one principle that has come to be considered as the corner stone in the commercial relations among modern nations and of which we as a nation have the right to be proud of being the author.

But not only is it a reversal of a time-honored policy; it is a plain violation of both the spirit and the letter of most of our existing treaties of commerce and navigation, and therefore ought not to be put in effect without first abrogating those treaties upon due notice. This is the more necessary, since we have always insisted ourselves on a strict compliance with the spirit of these treaties by other nations.

OUR TOLL WAR WITH CANADA.

In this connection our conflict with Canada to which Senator Burton referred in his speech in the Senate may well be recalled. It arose over an attempt on the part of Canada to levy higher tolls on American ships passing through the Welland Canal than on Canadian. We thought this was a violation of our treaty of 1871 with Great Britain which contained a provision in Article XXVII to this effect:

"The Government of Her Britannic Majesty engages to urge upon the Government of the Dominion of Canada to secure to the citizens of the United States the use of the Welland, St. Lawrence, and other canals in the Dominion on terms of equality with the inhabitants of the Dominion; and the Government of the United States engages that the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall enjoy the use of the St. Clair Flats Canal on terms of equality with the inhabitants of the United States *

* +

The Canadian Government, desirous to promote Canadian shipping, issued an order in council providing for a rebate of 18 cents from the regular tolls of 20 cents per ton on eastbound freight passing through the Welland Canal on goods going direct to Montreal. This meant that goods passing through the Welland Canal paid a toll of 20 cents, if their destination was New York or some other American port, and only 2 cents a ton if shipped via Montreal. Now, the treaty of 1871 did not expressly bind Canada to give us equal treatment in her waters; it merely stated that "the Govern ment of Her Britannic Majesty engages to urge upon the Government of the Dominion of Canada to secure to the citizens of the United States," etc. Nevertheless, we took great exception to Canada's policy of discrimination against our shipping, and Presi dent Cleveland, in his message to Congress, August 23, 1891, clearly stated our case, when he said:

PANAMA CANAL TOLLS.

613

e equality with the inhabitants of the Dominion which we were promised in
e of the canals of Canada did not secure to us freedom from tolls in their naviga-
but we had a right to expect that we, being Americans and interested in American
erce, would be no more burdened in regard to the same than Canadians engaged
ir own trade; and the whole spirit of the concession made was, or would have
that merchandise and property transported to an American market through
canals should not be enhanced in its cost by tolls many times higher than such as
arried to an adjoining Canadian market. All our citizens, producers and con
s, as well as vessel owners, were to enjoy the equality promised."

en repeated protests on our part failed to bring about a redress of our grievance
d recourse to retaliation by an act passed July 26, 1892, by virtue of which
ent Harrison imposed a toll of 20 cents a ton "on all freight of whatever kind or
ption passing through the Ste. Marie Falls Canal in transit to any port of Canada."
esult of this toll war was a retraction of the Canadian discrimination and a
tion of the policy of equal treatment of the vessels of the two nations in each
waters.

e had a right to expect a foreign nation to give us equal treatment, when not
tter, but only, to use President Cleveland's language, "the spirit of the conces
ade was or should have been" in favor of that principle, with how much greater
ation may the European nations expect us to observe both the letter and spiri
obligation which we not only voluntarily assumed on our part, but forced upon
ant nations a century ago and have maintained since as a distinct American
bution to the law of nations?

H

DANGERS OF RETALIATION AGAINST AMERICAN COMMERCE.

if appeals to the sense of justice are not sufficient to induce us to keep our ed faith, ought not a prudent regard for possible consequences of our action us from taking such a dangerous step? What about the possiblity of retaliation part of foreign nations? We did not hesitate to resort to it when we regarded ves aggrieved by Canada under a treaty far less specific in our favor than our ous treaties with foreign nations. Canada would be in the best position strateto give us a dose of our medicine by imposing retaliatory rates at the Sault Ste. and Welland Canals. England might try to settle her accounts with us at the Canal. The damage which other nations could inflict upon us would be limited y the extent of our shipping in their waters, which is a no mean quantity, hstanding the lamentations so often heard over the disappearance of the Amerag among the merchant vessels of the world, for nearly one-fourth of the total ge engaged in our import and export trade is now American, according to the figures of the Bureau of Statistics, and the American tonnage is steadily growing. eover, the provision as to equal treatment of ships is in every instance a part of ost favored nation treaties with the respective countries, and a violation of any on of the treaty would open the way to retaliation by those nations under any provision, notably the one relating to customs duties. We are thus laying the tion for a first-class customs war with the world in which untold damage can icted upon the commerce and well-being of many nations, our own included. only way to escape our obligations would be to repeal practically all of our ercial treaties. But this step would deprive us of all the rights and privileges al treatment of our own commerce and navigation in foreign waters, at the same hat it freed us from obligations to other nations. Reciprocity works both ways; st give if we would take; we must choose between following the golden rule of unto others as we would have others do unto us, and the colloquial rule of the day pirate who does others as he expects others to do him; but we can not other nations to apply the golden rule to us, while we follow a selfish policy them.

im up:

CONCLUSION.

he Hay-Pauncefote treaty, in the light of our general treaties of commerce and
tion, clearly meant to provide for the imposition of tolls on foreign vessels
through the Panama Canal no higher than those imposed upon our own.
the treaty is no longer operative, as a result of the territory having passed under
vereignty, then our general treaties of commerce are applicable, and, in that
o claim can be successfully maintained that foreign ships may be discriminated
for the benefit of our own.

3. The formal repeal of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, even if it were possible under its terms, would likewise place the navigation through the canal under the operation of our general treaties of commerce and navigation, with the results just stated.

4. The only escape from a clear obligation on our part to treat foreign vessels on a par with our own lies through the repeal of all of our most-favored-nation treaties which secure to us reciprocal benefits in foreign waters.

5. The imposition of discriminative dues on foreign shipping, whether done in violation of existing treaties or upon their repeal, would expose our own commerce to retaliatory discrimination in foreign countries and would work irretrievable harm to the prestige and honor of the United States among the nations of the world.

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 1914-Continued.

COMMITTEE ON INTEROCEANIC CANALS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,

AFTER RECESS.

Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 2.30 p. m., after recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Cockran, you may submit your views now.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. BOURKE COCKRAN, 31 NASSAU STREET, NEW YORK CITY.

Mr. COCKRAN. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I appear before this committee as an American citizen-one of the 95,000,000 citizens of this Republic who until quite recently believed we were owners of the Panama Canal-to submit reasons for apprehending that the measure now pending before you may cast a very grave doubt upon our title to the territory of which the canal is a part, and which, therefore, in the future may very seriously endanger our possession of it.

I protest against this measure not merely because it affects injuriously our interests by imperilling our ownership of the canal, but because it embodies a confession that affects injuriously our honor as a nation. And the seriousness of the situation thus created has been, in my judgment, greatly aggravated by the events of the last few days. I hope this committee will forgive me if I say that this measure so prejudicial, in my judgment, to our interests and so discreditable to our fame, strikingly illustrates a certain tendency in our public discussions pointed out to me some years ago by a then very eminent member of the government with which this treaty was negotiated. Under our political system-our constitutional system-he said the validity of laws being judicial questions to be decided in the course of ordinary litigations, it follows almost inevitably that all public measures in this country are considered ultimately in the light of attorneyship rather than of statesmanship. And by this he did not mean at all to say that attorneyship was necessarily inferior to statesmanship. He only meant that it had a different theater for its operation. Attorneyship, I suppose, may be defined as the presentation by a subject of an application-through a person peculiarly qualified to present it effectively-to the sovereign for an exercise of the sovereign power, compelling another subject to obey a law of the sovereign which the complaining subject charges has been violated to his injury. Statesmanship, on the other hand, deals with some exercise of sovereignty by the sovereign toward subjects or other sovereigns.