Mr. WHEELER. It might. It might lead to a trade war. That is possible. I do not know what Great Britain might do, but I think the chances are that it will lead to no trade war. Senator WALSH. Can you conceive what she might do? Mr. WHEELER. I can not, Senator. I have not given that matter any thought. Senator SIMMONS. Can you conceive of anything Canada might do? Mr. WHEELER. She might close the Welland Canal to us. Senator WALSH. Yes. Senator BRISTOw. I think this treaty upon which this question of Senator Simmons is based was a separate and independent treaty, which has nothing whatever to do with the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. and was a treaty relating to two canals, one Canadian and one American, and the agreement was that the use of those canals should be upon similar terms to the citizens of both countries, and Canada violated that agreement by giving a rebate to her citizens and not to ours. Senator SIMMONS. I was coming to that, Senator Bristow. I am entirely in accord with your views on that. That is a question where it was a give and take proposition, a reciprocity, as it were. When Canada did that, which we did not like, we proceeded to retaliate, and it was our retaliation that brought about Senator WALSH. Anyway, Great Britain did not admit our contention? She did not admit the justice of our contention in regard to it? Senator BRISTOw. She never admitted it. She simply, as a matter of policy changed Senator WALSH. So if we have changed our attitude in relation to the matter Great Britain has equally changed her attitude? Senator BRISTOW. I should say so. Senator WALSH. And it is no more discreditable in us to change our attitude on it than it was for Great Britain to change her attitude, is it? Senator BRISTOW. Not at all. Senator SIMMONS. What Great Britain did was to induce Canada to repeal her order in council, and all that is proposed here is to repeal this canal act. Great Britain's order in council was of the same character and effect at least it was of the same effect if not of the same character-as our canal act. When we raised the controversy she repealed that. She did not probably by repealing that absolutely admit our contention, but she said, "I will not contest," and would not that be the character of our act in repealing the canal acti We do not necessarily admit the British contention but we say, "We will not contest this question with you at this time." Mr. WHEELER. But we do admit it when responsive to the President's appeal, wherein he states it is in plain violation of the treaty we repeal the tolls. Senator SIMMONS. Do you not understand that the President, after expressing his opinion about that, says, whether our construction is right or wrong, he thinks we ought to recede from this position i Mr. WHEELER. I think there would be very great weight given in any court of arbitration from the expressions in that document. Senator WALSH. I gather the impression from the attitude of some gentlemen in their expressions in this matter, that when Great Britain changes her attitude it is a matter of entire indifference, but when the United States changes her attitude in respect to any of these things we besmirch the national honor. Senator SIMMONS. I assume that Great Britain did not consider when she changed her attitude, and revoked her order in council, that she was besmirching her national honor in doing that. Neither do I think that we would be besmirching any national honor if we should repeal our canal act. But I think that if Great Britain had persisted in that course with America, and the balance of the world against her in her contention as to the meaning of the treaty, that she would have been taking advantage of a very narrow construction of her treaty. Mr. WHEELER. I have not understood that the balance of the world is against us in our contention. Senator WALSH. It is clear that Great Britain did hold to her view until we enacted retaliatory legislation. Senator SIMMONS. She receded. Senator WALSH. She did not recede until we had enacted retaliatory legislation. Senator SIMMONS. It is a recision just as the repeal by the order in council was a recision. Mr. WHEELER. I am sorry to disagree with you about that, but I must. In our contention that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty has nothing whatever to do with our coastwise vessels, we are fully supported by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S., 332. In this case the question whether treaties with foreign countries affected our coastwise commerce was squarely before the Supreme Court of the United States and determined adversely to the contention of our opponents. In that case the duly state-licensed pilots of Galveston, Tex., brought suit for damages against certain unlicensed pilots for piloting in that port, and prayed for an injunction restraining them from operating without a license and in violation of the State laws concerning pilotage. These laws provided a rate to be paid for licensed pilotage by vessels engaged in the foreign trade, but exempted those engaged in "the coasting trade in any part of the United States." Section 1444 of the Revised Statutes of the United States also contained a provision exempting coastwise vessels from the operation of State pilotage laws. The defendants set up several defenses, among others contending that As the vessel in question was a British vessel coming from a foreign port, the State laws concerning pilotage are in conflict with a treaty between Great Britain and the United States, providing that "No higher or other duties or charges shall be imposed in any ports of the United States on British vessels than those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States." Ruling on this contention of the defendants that the exemption of vessels engaged in the coastwise trade was a discrimination violative of the treaty provisions above set out, the Supreme Court of the United States held unequivocally that such exemption of vessels engaged in the coastwise trade did not concern vessels engaged in the foreign trade. The language of the decision is plain and emphatic, as announced in the opinion rendered by then Justice, now Chief Justice, White. Neither the exemption of coastwise steam vessels from pilotage, resulting from the law of the United States, nor any lawful exemption of coastwise vessels created by the State law, concerns vessels in the foreign trade and, therefore, any such exemptions do not operate to produce a discrimination against British vessels engaged in foreign trade and in favor of vessels of the United States in such trade. The syllabus statement of the rule thus announced by the Supreme Court is as follows: A State pilotage law subjecting all vessels, domestic and foreign, engaged in foreign trade to pilotage regulations, but which exempts pursuant to law coastwise steam vessels of the United States, is not in conflict with provisions in the treaty between the United States and Great Britain to the effect that British vessels shall not be subject to any higher or other charges than vessels of the United States. The ground upon which that decision rests is plain to see. It is simply that it is no concern of vessels engaged in the foreign trade what provision or exemptions are made regarding the coastwise trade. By a law reaching back to the very beginning of the Government all foreign vessels are absolutely excluded from our coastwise trade. As they can not on any terms or in any event enter the coastwise trade, it is no concern of theirs what provisions are made regarding it. A general statement in a treaty regulatory apparently of all vessels can not be held to apply to vessels engaged in trade exclusively domestic and into which foreign vessels could not enter under any circumstances because prohibited by law. For that reason any privileges or benefits granted by a nation to its own vessels engaged exclusively in trade between its own ports is not a discrimination against vessels engaged in foreign trade. The remarkable similarity of the facts and conditions in the Olsen v. Smith case and that under consideration is apparent. In that case as in this it was urged that a law of the United States granting an exception in favor of vessels engaged in coastwise trade was in violation of a treaty. The exemption in that case was from pilotage charges; in the present case it is from toll charges. Certainly it cannot be contended that there is any distinction between the cases in principle. In that case the language of the treaty bound this country not to impose any higher "duties or charges" on British vessels than on vessels of the United States in the same ports. But under the local law British vessels were required to pay pilotage charges while American vessels were completely exempt from such charges. "A plain violation of the treaty," our opponents would say, but in effect the Supreme Court said: No, for what we do or omit to do with regard to our coastwise trade is of no concern to any nation, for they can not complain with regard to a traffic in which they have no interest. No regulation, exemption, or privilege which we see fit to grant to our coastwise trade is a just subject of complaint, for it does not concern vessels engaged in the foreign trade. It will be observed the language of that treaty was as general, as broad, as all-embracing in its terms as that with which we have now to deal. It did not provide that vessels engaged in the coastwise trade were excluded from the terms of the treaty. The language was broad enough to include all American vessels; but the Supreme Court holds that coastwise vessels could not have been within the contemplation of the parties to the treaty, for the reason that one of the parties to the treaty was in nowise concerned with the coastwise trade. It is not a strained or forced or unreasonable interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty that its application to the coastwise trade was not within the contemplation of the parties, for neither Great Britain nor any other foreign nation could enter into or have any interest in our coastwise trade. This case is an authority which has never been questioned by Great Britain or any other foreign power. It is a clear cut determination of the proposition that the general terms of a treaty regarding the rights of vessels have no application to vessels engaged in the coastwise trade from which foreign vessels are excluded by law. Great Britain's contentions fall to the ground by the submission of proof of her continued discrimination in favor of her own coastwise trade, "in violation of a sacred treaty obligation." In 1815 the United States entered into a treaty with Great Britain to regulate commerce and navigation. The second article of this treaty, still in force, provides: No higher or other duties or charges shall be imposed in any of the ports of the United States on British vessels than those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States (nor in the ports of any of his Britannic Majesty's territories in Europe on the vessels of the United States that shall be payable in the same ports on British vessels). Senator SIMMONS. Let me ask you right there: You regard the two points of entrance, Panama and Colon, as American ports, and you regard the waters running through the canal as American waters? Mr. WHEELER. I regard them as American waters, Senator. Senator SIMMONS. And the approaches are American ports? Mr. WHEELER. They are American ports to all intents and purposes, and I believe there is something in the treaty that explains the conditions surrounding those ports as to the police power of one and the other. It is all arranged by the treaty. Senator SIMMONS. So far as it is necessary in the use of this canal or expedient in the use of the canal, the United States has full control of those two ports? Mr. WHEELER. That is my understanding. Senator SIMMONS. And they are ports of the United States and the waters of the canal are also waters of the United States? Mr. WHEELER. I should say they were waters of the United States; yes, sir. Nor in the ports of any of his Britannic Majesty's territories in Europe on the vessels of the United States that shall be payable in the same ports on British vessels. In other words, that is a reciprocal treaty and it was under that treaty that the Olsen v. Smith case was decided, at least that treaty was referred to in the Olsen v. Smith case. It is apparent that this provision is more broad and comprehensive than the equality clause of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty in including all vessels of either country, without distinction as to whether they are engaged in coastwise trade or transoceanic commerce. If England's interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty holds. good, then it is extremely difficult to reconcile, under the section quoted above, her discrimination in tonnage duties in favor of her own coasting vessels. Discrimination as practiced at the port of London is clearly set forth in an article in the Law Magazine and Review, an English publication, for November, 1912, from which I quote as follows: Tonnage dues at the port of London are as follows: (1) For every vessel trading coastwise or entering inward or clearing outward from or to any place north of latitude 48° 30' N., and between longitude 12° W. and 65" E. of Greenwich, for every voyage, both in and out 1d. per ton; (2) for every vessel entering inward or clearing outward beyond those limits 14d. per ton; (3) for vessels under 100 tons which do not pass beyond the seaward limit of the port, a halfpenny per ton; (4) coastwise vessels not exceeding 45 tons, vessels bringing corn coastwise, fishing smacks, and lobster and oyster boats are exempt from dues. This discrimination of 1 cent a ton for entering and clearing port in favor of coastwise vessels and against trans-Atlantic vessels may on first impression seem trifling, but when on calculation it is found that on a vessel of 5,000 tons this additional 1 per cent per ton on entering and leaving port amounts to $50, it is evident that all sense of equality between ocean-going vessels and those employed in the home trade only is completely discarded. If England for a moment believed that the words "British vessels" or "vessels of the United States," as used in the treaty of 1815 included or was ever intended to include coasting vessels, she would not have established and enforced differential rates at her various ports in favor of coasting vessels, for that would then be a flagrant violation of the rights secured to vessels of the United States under the treaty. Not only this, but such an interpretation on the part of England would afford the United States to justly demand that vessels of the United States pay the same dues and charges at British ports as are exacted from British'vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, instead of those largely increased and heavier dues and charges that American vessels have to pay. But in addition to this, Great Britain, by assent and ratification under circumstances similar to those that have arisen under the Panama Canal act, is not in a position to now insist on an interpretation of the equality clause of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty different from that in accordance with the established interpretation she herself has put upon the treaty of 1815 and of like clauses in other treaties. Senator WALSH. Before you pass the Olsen v. Smith case, have you any record of the imposition of similar charges by the English Government upon our ships in her ports, to which her own ships engaged in the coastwise trade were not subject? Mr. WHEELER. That is what this establishment shows, Senators, and if you like I should be very glad Senator SIMMONS. What are you talking about-pilotage? Mr. WHEELER. Port charges, dock charges-I do not know whether pilotage is included there. Senator WALSH. What character of charges? Mr. WHEELER. Tonnage dues in various ports-Bristol. Senator WALSH. Have you got a reference to the statutes? Is it in the Knowland report? Mr. WHEELER. Yes, sir; that is what I have copied here, Senator Walsh. If, therefore, the words "British vessels" and "vessels of the United States," as used in the treaty of 1815, do not include vessels engaged in the coasting trade, it is difficult to understand how the words "vessels of commerce of all nations," as used in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, do include them. Much stress has been laid by our opponents upon the fact that while the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was being considered by the Senate in executive session Senator Bard of California offered an amendment reserving to the United States the right to discriminate in favor of vessels of its own citizens engaged in the coastwise trade, which was |