death, do not pretend that the authority of the Decalogue, simply considered, is sufficient to warrant capital punishment. For in fact the Decalogue prescribes no punishment; it only commands.

4th, The penalties annexed to several precepts of the Decalogue, are found in other parts of the law; but our tribunals do not infer their right to put to death from the fact, that God expressly commanded the Hebrews to punish, with death, the transgression of seven precepts of the Decalogue, for they dispense with six of those penalties.

5th, Therefore, most certainly, our tribunals do not punish murder with death, because God commanded Moses to do so; for God commanded Moses also to put to death for idolatry, blasphemy, breach of sabbath, adultery, &c. Nor, 6th,-Do our laws punish with death, because a warrant can be found for it in the gospel; for no such warrant can be found on the contrary, the precepts of the gospel are incompatible with taking the life of any man.

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7th,—In a word, the power to take life, argued from the law of Moses, was a power interwoven with a frame of government and system of civil and religious policy, instituted by God, and given to a particular nation for a time, but has long since passed away. The moral principles and precepts of that ancient code are fully recognized by the gospel, and the 'violation of them as sins against God, but in no manner as civil crimes.

The gospel, Sir, makes no provision for the organization and constitution of civil government; nor does it make any more allusion to this subject than to any other human art, science, or enterprise. Nor was it at all necessary it should, since the Supreme Christian Ruler came not upon earth to interfere with earthly kingdoms, but to set up a moral and spiritual kingdom, whose laws, sanctions, rewards, and punishments, were to correspond with the nature of that kingdom.

Though the gospel makes no direct provision for organizing civil governments, yet it throws a glorious and refulgent light upon the councils and deliberations of those who may assemble for the purpose of framing civil states and commonwealths. With divine and benignant smile, it cherishes every human enterprise evidently tending to promote man's felicity. It fully recognizes the natural freedom and equality of all men, and leaves them to adopt such civil and municipal regulations as may conduce to social happiness.

And, Sir, if our legislatures and tribunals would turn their eyes towards the laws of Christ, and regard his gospel as the

fountain of light and wisdom, I think they would leave the work of shedding human blood to the murderer, and the as sassin, who delight in blood.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER V.

Retaliation, and the motives to it, unjustifiable.

SIR, If it shall appear, upon due examination, that taking away life has no other foundation than the penalties of the Jewish law; some of which are repealed in express terms, and all of which except one,* by the abolition of the civil state upon which, they were imposed, are rendered unobligatory, as the practice of our tribunals concedes; it must be granted that the doctrine of capital punishment cannot be supported from the law of Moses.

In reply to this it will be said, that the punishing of murder by death, rests on a more ancient law than that of Moses, but equally divine. The declaration of God to Noah, Gen. ix. 6, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, is supposed to be a sufficient reason for distinguishing one precept of the Decalogue by retaining its penalty, while that of the other precepts is acknowledged to be cancelled in the change of dispensations.

I am sorry, Sir, to be compelled to say, that such is the eagerness of men to shed blood, and their consequent avidity to call up and improve to the most effectual purpose every ray of evidence which seems to favour the practice, that they are scarcely willing to hear with patience and weigh with candour the immense body of evidence which goes to abolish this sanguinary practice.

The declaration of God to Noah, above cited, is generally considered not only as a full warrant for putting a murderer to death, but of the force of a divine law from which there can be no release. Whatever might have been the intention of this declaration, one would suppose that a believer in the New Testament could not fail to perceive, that it followed the course and shared the fate of the other precepts of the Jew

*I here refer to the Decalogue.

ish dispensation, whose penalties incurred death. Some suppose this declaration, "He that sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," is to be received rather in the light of a prediction than a law: rather as a general indication of the views and consequent conduct of society, relative to murder, than as imposing a divine obligation to put a murderer to death.

If this precept be attentively considered, it will, I am persuaded, Sir, in your own estimation, want several characteristics indispensable to a criminal law. Here was no legal tribunal; no part of the modus operandi laid down; nothing definite: and, to say the most, it must have remained among the leges non scripta, probably till the time of Moses. Grotius, Lib. De jure Pacis et Belli, 1st, 2nd, is of the opinion, that this declaration of God to Noah, was simply a recognition of the lex talionis, to which express allusion is made so early as the history of Cain. When Cain was pleading with God for a mitigation of his punishment, he says, Gen. iv. 14, And every one that findeth me shall slay me: i. e. because he had killed his brother Abel.

Of the declaration of God to Noah, "Therefore," says Grotius," Naturale jus talionis, hîc indicatur ;" i. e. the natural right of retaliation is here indicated. As it is the first rule of philosophising, that we are to look for no more causes of a thing than are sufficient to account for its phenomena; and as the law or principle of retaliation of injuries. was known among men long before the flood; and as this declaration to Noah, does in fact involve no other principle than simply that of retaliation in kind: as eye for eye, tooth for tooth, limb for limb, and blood for blood; the exposition of this passage, given by Grotius, seems to be correct.

The retaliation of injuries in kind, was certainly a prominent trait in the law of Moses, and was expressly recognized by Divine Authority. Will it then be thought wonderful; and what triumph does it afford the argument for shedding blood, when it is discovered, that it was admitted as early as the time of Noah? From ages of darkness we are surely not to look back into ages of still more palpable gloom for greater light. When the practice of taking life for life, or of killing one man because he had killed another, commenced, we cannot certainly tell: but probably not much later than when a good man was murdered for his supereminent virtue. In whatever state of society a good man was liable to be killed for nothing but his goodness, it cannot be presumed that the bloody passion for revenge would long slumber. Therefore

Cain, it seems, was tormented by fear for his own life, as well as by a consciousness of his guilt: he feared, to use his own words, "lest every one who found him should slay him."

I would ask those who are so zealous in tracing up the practice of taking life for life, to God's immediate order or inspiration, and of course to a divine institution, which discovery is most suitable to the genius of man; whether the art of killing a good man merely for his goodness sake, or that of killing a man by way of revenge, because he had killed some innocent person? I think, in the latter case, we need be at no great pains to discover any supernatural inspiration; unless we were inclined to ascribe it to the inspiration of him "who was a murderer from the beginning ;" and who by way of eminence is called the destroyer, or Apollyon.

Though the retaliation of injuries, extending even to the ultimate act of life for life, must have been prevalent in the antediluvian world; it is not very probable that there were any regular, or what we should term legal, tribunals. It might have been, and probably was, in those rude times, as it now is among some tribes of savages, where the murderer must be slain by the nearest kinsman of the murdered man: and this opinion seems confirmed by the fears expressed by Cain. Or perhaps, resting on a still looser principle, it was considered that any person, the very next he should meet, had a right to kill the murderer.

Let us, Sir, if you please, look more attentively at the boasted right of retaliation, which Grotius, in the above passage, has styled, jus naturale talionis, i. e. the natural right of retaliation. Let us endeavour to see what are its true lineaments, and what its aspect and influence on Society. It is generally considered as inseparably connected with, and justified by, the law of self-preservation: and is contended for as taught by nature, and approbated by God. Cicero, than whom no writer speaks of it with more eloquence and force, says, Orat. pro. Mil. p. 316. "Hoc et ratio doctis, et necessitas barbaris, et mos gentibus, et feris naturæ ipsæ præscripsit, ut omnem semper vim, quacunque ope possent, a corpore, a capite, a vita sua propulsarent."" Reason has taught this to the learned, necessity to the barbarian, custom to all nations, and nature itself to the wild beasts, that they should always repel all violence, by all means in their power, from their body, their head, and their life."

If to offer violence to an innocent person without provocation, may be considered as a dictate of a nature fallen and depraved, we surely need ascend no higher to look for motives

för repelling injury and taking revenge. And we shall at once perceive, that a world filled with violence and outrage, must also inevitably abound with retaliation and vengeance that aggression and retaliation in a race of creatures naturally unjust, cruel, and passionate, must go hand in hand. Sir, it will not be contended that retaliation is a crime of equal atrocity with that of original aggression. Wanton malice and mischief unprovoked, incur greater guilt than the desire of vengeance carried into act. Yet the motive which leads to retaliation is in itself not founded in the best reason; the disposition with which it is effected, is generally if not always wrong; and its general consequences are always bad. And for these reasons it is, I presume, Sir, repealed by our Saviour, as a rule of action. For,

1. The motives to retaliation are not founded in good reason. They They are threefold. First, self-defence; secondly, to prevent a repetition of the injury; and, thirdly, to punish or chastise the aggressor.

A state of rebellion against God, and ignorance of, or hostility to his almighty and universal providence, is the sole reason why men have cast off all reliance on him, and have with so much parade and vain confidence assumed their own preservation as their own care, and to be secured by their own wisdom and bravery. But it will be said in reply to this, that we are not to expect God will work miracles for our defence. Whoever believes the wisdom, and goodness, and power of God to be infinite; and at the same time remembers that he has said, that all things work together for good to them that love him, will feel no other concern about his own safety, provided he love God, than to yield unlimited obedience to his authority. Such a man will know that the Almighty Ruler can defend him without a miracle, or if need be by a miracle.

It is, Sir, this vain and haughty principle of self-defence, which has filled the world with blood and slaughter. It induces preparation, carries hostility on its front, provokes aggression, and after all, generally fails to accomplish its object; for it affords no safety. Individuals or nations, the quickest to resent and the most resolute to retaliate injuries, never fail to receive the most injuries. Could I dwell on this point, I might show from actual details, that the genuine operation and tendency of the lex talionis, so much contended for by kings and priests, and statesmen, and heroes, is to destroy men it is the gulph of destruction. Whereas, the meek and humble, the pacific and magnanimous principle of