Supplemental Speech.-Volunteer Bill. ished Mr. G. of his former errors. And while I could not subscribe to all the measures of his Administration, yet, take him for all in all, I fear and think, "we ne'er shall see his like again." Let us hear what General WASHINGTON has said of the effect of short enlistments. Let us not disrespect the lessons of so much wisdom and experience. If it were practicable to organize your volunteers for one year's service under the provisions of this bill, which he believed was not the case, let us hear what his opinion of their efficacy would be, when raised-especially for the purpose of offensive war. It is to his opinions, Mr. G. said, he appealed to correct errors which might be fatal in their consequences-errors that placed a principal reliance upon troops for offensive purposes, enlisted for only one year. Mr. G. said, that when we entertained serious apprehensions of commencing a war, so extremely analogous in almost all its bearings, with one we had heretofore been engaged in, it was natural to look to the experience of the former war, to correct and avoid the errors of conducting it, in conducting the approaching war; he had done so by consulting Marshall's History of the life of Washington, to which he begged to refer for all the observations he had to make on this part of the subject. The information afforded by it will be found to be so appropriate to all the points now under consideration, that all commentary from him will be wholly unnecessary. In November, 1775, "The army was dissolved by the expiration of the time for which it had been enlisted, and men in sufficient numbers were not yet obtained to take the place of those, who, having performed the stipulated duty, insisted on returning home. The impatience to visit their friends, discovered by the soldiers entitled to a discharge, was so extensive and ungovernable as to overcome all their solicitude for keeping the enemy in a state of blockade, and many of them could not be detained in camp even for ten days, at the end of which period was expected the arrival of a body of militia, which had been ordered to supply their places; nor was it without a great difficulty, and some degree of violence, that any of them could be prevailed on to remain for that time. This fact, however, did not sufficiently impress on the Government of the United Colonies, that it was possible to rely too much on individual patriotism; and that the American cause, if defended entirely by temporary armies, must be often exposed to the most imminent hazard."-Vol. 2, pp. 269, 270. "The disadvantages," says General WASHINGTON, in a letter to Congress dated in January, 1776, “attending the limited enlistment of troops, are too apparent to those who are eye-witnesses of them, to render any animadversions necessary, but to gentlemen at a distance, whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects, the case may be otherwise. ous circumstances-(proceeding from the same cause, to wit: the disbanding of themselves before the militia could be got in) is, to me, a matter of wonder and astonishment; and proves that General Howe was either unacquainted with our situation, or restrained by his instructions from putting anything to hazard until his reinforcement should arrive. The instance of General Montgomery (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced,) proves that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances, you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration. Since 1st of December I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments; and though I am sensible that we never have, since that period, been able to act on the offensive, and at times not in a condition to defend, yet the cost of marching home one set of men and bringing in another, the havoc and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand incidental charges and inconveniences which have arisen, and which it is scarcely possible either to recollect or describe, amount to near as much as keeping up a respectable body of troops, the whole time ready for any emergency, would have done. "To this may be added, that you never can have a well disciplined army. soldier requires time. To bring them under proper "To make men well acquainted with the duties of a discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty; and in this army, where there is so little distinction between officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect then the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits, as from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did, and perhaps never will happen. "Men who are familiarized to danger, approach it without thinking; whereas, troops unused to service, apprehend danger where no danger exists. their duty in time of action-natural bravery, hope of "Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of reward, and fear of punishment. The two first are the last most obviously distinguishes one from the other. common to the untutored and the disciplined soldier; but A coward, taught to believe that if he breaks his ranks and abandons his colors, he will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy; but the man who thinks little of the one, and is fearful of the other, acts from present feelings, regardless of consequences. "Again: men of a day's standing will not look forward; and, from experience, we find, that, as the time approaches for their discharge, they grow careless of their arms, ammunition, camp utensils, &c. ; nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation, and we are laid under fresh trouble and additional expense in providing for every fresh party, at a time when we find it next to impossible to procure the articles absolutely necessary in the first instance. To this may be added the seasoning which new recruits must have to a camp, and the loss consequent thereupon." "That this cause precipitated the death of the brave and much to be lamented Gen. Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt; for, had he not been apprehensive "But this is not all. Men engaged for a short, limof the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but ited time only, have the officers too much in their powcontinued the blockade of Quebec, a capitulation, from er. To obtain a degree of popularity, in order to inthe best accounts I have been able to collect, must inev- duce a second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes itably have followed. And that we were not obliged place, which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unliat one time to dispute these lines under disadvantage-censed furloughs, and other indulgences incompatible Supplemental Speech.-Volunteer Bill. with good order and good government, by which means the latter part of the time for which the soldier was engaged, is spent in undoing what it required much labor to inculcate at the first. of whom less than one thousand, including officers, were fit for duty. Among the effectives, were three hundred entitled to a discharge, who refused to do duty, and insisted importunately on being immediately dismissed."-Vol. 2., pp. 354, 355. December, 1776.-General Washington 66 was earnest with Congress to increase the number of Continental regiments. It was admitted that those already voted, would, most probably, not be completed; but he contended that, by directing an additional number, and appointing other officers, more men would be enlisted, as every officer would recruit a few. With respect to the additional expense to be incurred by the measures he recommended, it was observed, that our funds were not the only object now to be taken into consideration. The enemy, it was found, were daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snow-ball, by rolling, would increase, unless some means could be devised to check effectually the progress of their arms. Militia might, possibly, do it for a little while; but, in a little while, also, the militia of those States, which were frequently called upon, would not turn out at all, or would turn out with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same thing. "Could anything (he asked) be more destructive of the recruiting business, than giving ten dollars for six weeks' service in the militia, who come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where; who consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment? "These, sir, (he added,) are the men I am to depend upon ten days' hence. This is the basis on which your cause will rest, and must forever depend, unless you get a large standing army sufficient to oppose the enemy."-Vol. 2, pp. 537, 538, 539. "To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced in this great change of the Army, and the expense incident to it, to say nothing of the hazard we have run, and must run, between the discharging of one army and the enlistment of another (unless an enormous expense of militia is incurred) would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter. What I have already taken the liberty of saying, will serve to convey a general idea of the matter; and, therefore, I shall, with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion that, if Congress have any reason to believe there will be occasion for troops another year, and, consequently, for another enlistment, they would save money and have infinitely better troops, if they were, even at the bounty of twenty, thirty, or more dollars, to engage the men already enlisted until January next, and such others as may be wanted to complete the establishment, for and during the war. I will not undertake to say that the men may be had on these terms, but I am satisfied that it will never do to let the matter alone as it was last year, until the time of service is near expiring. In the first place, the hazard is too great; in the next, the trouble and perplexity of disbanding one army and raising another at the same instant, and in such a critical situation as the last was, are scarcely in the power of words to describe, and such as no man who has once experienced will ever undergo again."-Vol. 2, pp. 280, 281, 282, 283, 284. Here follows the comment of the historian: "Unfortunately, Congress did not feel so sensibly as their General, the incapacity of temporary armies, to oppose those which are permanent. Nor were his 1777.-"The problem, whether a nation can be deofficers of high rank as yet impressed on this subject. fended against a permanent force by temporary armies, In a Council, held previous to the new-modelling of by occasional calls of the husbandman from his plough the Army, they had been of opinion that the enlist- to the field, was already solved; and, in its demonstraments might be only for one year."-Vol. 2, p. 284. tion, the independence of America had nearly perished "Scarcely was this first success obtained (in Novem-in its cradle. All eyes were now turned on the Army ber, 1775, by Montgomery) when the fatal consequences of short enlistments began to discover themselves. The time of service for which the troops had engaged being now nearly expired, great difficulty was experienced in prevailing on them to proceed further, and the General was under the necessity of stipulating explicit ly, that all who wished it, should be discharged at Montreal, before he could induce them even to march against that place. Having effected this compromise with them, he proceeded against Montreal, while his floating batteries, under Colonel Easton, advanced up the St. Lawrence, and not only effectually prevented the armed vessels of the enemy from making the escape they had projected to Quebec, but drove them from their anchors still higher up the river."-Vol. 2, p. 310. April, 1776.-"A considerable part of the Army having become entitled to a discharge, no inducement could prevail on them to continue longer in so severe a service. This deduction from Wooster's force was the more sensibly felt, because the present situation of the roads, the Lakes, and the St. Lawrence, unavoidably impeded, for a time, the arrival of the reinforcements destined for his aid." "Among the first who reached camp after this state of things, was General Thomas, who, after being appointed to the command in Canada, had made great exertions to join the Army. He arrived on the first of May, and on examining its force, found it to consist of a total of nineteen hundred, to be created for the ensuing campaign, as the only solid basis on which the hopes of the patriot could rest."-Vol. 2, pp. 555, 556. Mr. G. observed that, he begged to be indulged in exhibiting to the view of the Senate, the character and proceedings of the Congress of 1777— at the moment of the most alarming peril and despondency during the whole Revolutionary war; not because it has any direct bearing upon the question under discussion, but as an honorable example highly worthy of imitation at the present day: "The firmness manifested by Congress throughout the gloomy and trying period which intervened between the loss of Fort Washington and the battle of Princeton, entitles the members of that day to the admiration of the world, and the gratitude of their fellow-citizens. Unawed by the dangers which then threatened them, and regardless of personal safety, they did not for an instant admit the idea, that the independence they had declared was to be surrendered, and peace to be purchased by returning to their ancient colonial condition.-Vol. 2. p. 557. 1778.-"To recruit the Army for the next campaign was an object of which the Commander-in-Chief felt the importance, and labored to impress it on the several States, as well as on Congress. But it was an object Supplemental Speech.-Volunteer Bill. the difficulty of accomplishing which continually in- they create among the soldiery, the desertions they procreased. From the depreciation of paper money, and duce, and for other reasons which will readily occur. from other causes, no hope remained of obtaining any That, on or before the first of October annually, an abrespectable number of men by voluntary enlistments, stract or return similar to the present one be transmitand coercive means could only be employed by the re-ted, to enable them to make their requisitions on each spective States. To persuade them to apply, with the State with certainty and precision. This I would prorequisite despatch, sufficient energies to this subject, pose, as a general plan to be pursued; and I am perrequired all the influence of General Washington, and suaded that this, or one nearly similar to it, will be his letters urged them by every motive which could found the best now in our power, and will be attended operate on the human mind, to meet with sufficient with the least expense to the public, will place the sermeans the crisis of the war, which, he apprehended, vice on the footing of order and certainty, and will be was now approaching. the only one that can advance the general interest to any great extent."-Vol. 4. pp. 126, 127, 128. "He expected them to place no confidence in foreign aid, but to depend on their own internal strength and resources for the maintenance of their independence. He did not doubt but that Britain would, if not prevented by a war in Europe, make great exertions to reinforce her armies in America, and effect the objects of war. Only correspondent exertions to keep in the field a Continental Army, at least equal to that of the enemy, could prevent their success. "He enclosed to each State a return of its troops on the Continental Establishment, thereby exhibiting to each its own deficiency, which each was strongly urged to supply."-Vol. 3. November, 1779.-"In the more early stages of the contest, (said the Commander-in-Chief to Congress, in his letter of the 18th of November,) when men might have been enlisted for the war, no man, as my whole conduct and the uniform tenor of my letters will evince, was ever more opposed to short enlistments than I was ; and while there remained a prospect of obtaining recruits upon a permanent footing, in the first instance, as far as duty and regard to my station would permit, I urged my sentiments in favor of it. But the prospect of keeping up an army on voluntary enlistments being changed, or at least standing on too precarious and uncertain a footing to depend on for the exigency of our affairs, I took the liberty, in February, 1778, in a particular manner, to lay before the committee of arrangement, then with the Army at Valley Forge, a plan for the annual draught as the surest and most certain, if not the only means left us, of maintaining the Army on a proper and respectable ground. And more and more confirmed in the propriety of this opinion, by the intervention of a variety of circumstances, unnecessary to detail, I again took the freedom of urging the plan to the committee of conference in January last; and, having reviewed it in every point of light, and found it right, at least the best that has occurred to me, I hope I will be excused by Congress in offering it to them, and in time for carrying it into execution for the next year, if they should conceive it necessary for the States to complete their quotas of troops. Mr. GILES said, the inefficiency of the volunteer and the practical inconveniences of short enlistforce, especially for the purpose of offensive war, ments having been so irresistibly demonstrated by the extracts he had just had the honor of reading; and having been presented under the sanction of the opinions of one, who was eminently qualified to judge upon this particular subject, and the just and merited influence of whose opinions could not receive any aid from anything Mr. G. might offer in that respect; he should therefore decline all further commentaries upon this part of the subject. He should only express the pride and pleasure he felt in concurring in opinion with so high an authority upon this occasion. Mr. G. said, after the reflections naturally produced by these considerations, he was at a loss to conceive the principle which could give a preference to volunteer forces, enlisted for short periods, for the purposes of offensive war, unless it was the danger apprehended from what are called "standing armies." to the liberties of the country, &c. He said he had heard fears of this kind expressed by gentlemen of the highest consideration, and of the best intentions, and it seemed to have been a cardinal point in the debates of the other House. He therefore begged to be indulged with only a few remarks upon this formidable and influential suggestion. It is to be remarked, that there is no vestige of any fears from standing armies to be found in the Constitution; nor do we find General Washington, in any acts of his whole life, influenced by any apprehensions of danger to our liberties from that source. Mr. G. said he did not mean, in the discussion of this question, to avail himself of the obvious difference between the essential character of the regular force now proposed to be en"The plan I would propose is, that each State be listed, "for five years, unless sooner discharged," informed by Congress annually of the real deficiency for the purposes of war; and a standing army in of its troops, and called upon to make it up, or such time of peace. He meant to show that there was less specific number as Congress may think proper, by no danger to the liberties of this nation, from any a draught. That the men draughted join the Army kind of standing armies which could be kept in by the first of January, and serve until the first of January in the succeeding year: that from the time the pay by the revenues of this country. All the apprehensions from standing armies to the liberties draughts join the Army, the officers of the States from of this nation, which he had heard expressed, which they come, be authorized and directed to use their endeavors to enlist them for the war, under the seemed to have had their origin in historical facts bounties granted to the officers themselves, and the re-in the fate of other nations, ancient as well as cruits, by the act of the 23d of January last, viz: ten dollars to the officers for each recruit, and two hundred to the recruits themselves. That all State, county and town bounties to draughts, if practicable, be entirely bolished, on account of the uneasinesss and disorders modern. He said, before we came to any conclusions as to the dangers to this nation from the fate of others, we ought to be satisfied that there exists a strict analogy between the state of their population and political institutions and ours. This Supplemental Speech.-Volunteer Bill. he believed it to be very difficult to do. He be- nation? What difficulties would he have to surlieved, on the contrary, nothing would be more mount, to enable him to effect his object? Your dissimilar, nothing more opposite in their politi- militia returns present an armed population of cal effects and consequences, than the circumstan- above six hundred thousand men, enrolled and ces producing this dissimilarity. He said that trained to military exercises; and, upon an emerin reasoning from analogy, there was always dan-gency like this, could probably be increased to ger of error in recollecting the points of resem- nearly one million. Could an army of thirty-five blance in the things suggested to be analogous, thousand men subdue, or even make an impresand overlooking the points of difference. He sion upon an armed population like this? A thought this observation applied as evidently and population detesting despotism, and devoted to forcibly in the present case, as in any that ever freedom, acting under one common impulse, would was presented to his consideration. direct their whole energies against their foes, and would destroy them in one instant. He said, without explaining very minutely the state of the population of the ancient Republics, he believed it might be assumed as a principle common to them, as well as to the population of the modern Governments of Europe, that it was divided into two great descriptions or classes, of the armed and the unarmed. In that state of society, it is not at all to be wondered at, that the armed should govern and tyrannize over the unarmed part of the people. That this is the case of the population under the modern Governments of Europe, we do know, and it is the real cause of the military despotisms which have been at various times established at different portions in that quarter. The great mass of the people under the European Governments may be considered as laboring machines, almost destitute of every political impulse-of all preference for one species of government over another. Is this the situation-is it the character of the population of the United States? Certainly not. The knowledge of liberty, the love of liberty, the hatred of despotism of every kind, especially of military despotism, are, with the American people, almost intuitive passions and propensities. The Army itself would be composed of individuals influenced by these habitual feelings and predilections; and some reliance might be placed on their influence, even in the Army itself, against at least an universal disposition and preference for military despotism. But, let us disregard this consideration, and suppose the whole Army actuated by one impulse for subverting the liberties of their country; let us see how it could be effected in the present state of the population and political institutions of this country. The people of the United States have a greater security against military despotism in the peculiar organization of their Governments, than any people upon earth, if their administrators continue wise enough to administer them with all their original spirit and energy. The armed population presents a bulwark of the most perfect security. How would it be possible for any regular army, which all our revenues could raise, to subdue and tyrannize over such a population, protected by such admirable political institutions? Let us, for example, take the whole number of troops now proposed to be raised-thirtyfive thousand men, and place them at the devotion of an ambitious, enterprising chief, who was resolved upon subverting the liberties of this nation-let him also be in possession of the City of Washington, of your President and Congress; how would he be able to fix his despotism upon the But let us suppose that one million of men would be afraid of attacking 35,000 in mass; in what way could such an army levy contributions for its support? In what way would it supply itself with provisions? In a hostile country, it must detach foraging parties for its supplies; and it is no extravagant supposition to conclude that there would be courage enough in the country to attack and destroy them. It is not a little remarkable, that the gentlemen who profess to place the greatest confidence in, and boast most of the powers of the militia, are those who express most fears from the influence of standing armies-as if the militia could not form as solid a bulwark against domestic, as against foreign, enemies. But, sir, you have a perfect security in the peculiar organization of your political institutions. The people are protected by eighteen different governments-one general, and seventeen State governments. These State governments are founded in the confidence and affections of the people, and are competent to the most unlimited efforts for self-preservation. If, therefore, a rebellious standing army were in actual possession of your President and Congress, the loss would scarcely be felt by the nation. The State governments would be competent to levy troops, order out the militia, &c., and would destroy the rebels in a moment. From these peculiarly fortunate circumstances, the people of the United States have less real causes of fear from standing armies than any people upon earth. When Bonaparte took possession of the Government of France, it was done under circumstances peculiarly favorable to the daring enterprise; but even then, if there had been established in France seventeen governments, possessing the affections and confidence of the people, with arms in their hands, besides the Government at Paris, it is probable he never would have undertaken the project; or, if he had, it would have been a miracle if he had succeeded. It is an extremely difficult thing to establish a despotism and enforce municipal regulations upon an armed people, who are determined on resistance. Spain, at this moment, exhibits the most striking example of the truth of this position. Bonaparte has found more difficulties in subduing the armed population of Spain than in conquering all the regular armies in Europe, &c. When a whole population, with arms in their hands, are determined to be free, they cannot be enslaved. For these, and many other reasons, which might be adduced, he felt Supplemental Speech.-Volunteer Bill. none of the apprehensions which seem to have been so influential in giving a preference to the volunteer force. He had, in the present crisis, as he had always done before, voted for such regular forces as the exigencies of the country required, perfectly exempt from all apprehensions of danger to the liberties of this country in consequence of doing SO. Mr. GILES, in conclusion, observed, that although he felt disposed to yield much to union and harmony in our measures respecting foreign nations, and entertained the highest respect for the opinions of gentlemen from whom he differed on this occasion, yet even if the number of men should be reduced, and the sum appropriated lessened, which he deemed of the most importance, according to the report of the committee, he should find some difficulties in voting for the bill, and should reserve his determination in that respect for further reflection; because he disliked to vote for nominal, when the situation of the country required actual measures. He felt, also, some considerable difficulty in voting for a law, in principle the copy of a former one, which had been seen in so unfavorable a light by the Virginia Legislature as to induce it to pass a law for the express purpose of preventing its execution in that State. The high respect he felt for that Legislature furnished a formidable obstacle to his giving his vote in favor of the law under any circumstances. He should, however, finally act in this respect, from the convictions of further consideration. |