was undoubtedly the choice of Jefferson Davis, who as the leading Southern member of President Pierce's Cabinet exerted large influence, if not absolute control, over appointments from the slaveholding States. The personal and political associations of Judge Campbell led him to resign his position on the Supreme Bench, and to give the weight of his name and his learning to the Confederate

cause.

Judge Wayne was appointed by President Jackson in 1835, and Judge Catron by President Van Buren immediately after his inauguration in 1837, under a bill enlarging the Court, which had been approved by General Jackson. Judge Catron had long been a favorite of General Jackson in Tennessee, and it was understood that in appointing him to the Bench Mr. Van Buren was carrying out the expressed wishes of his predecessor. Both judges came from that earlier and better school of Southern Democracy which resisted the injurious heresies of State-rights and Nullification, sustained the Force Bill under President Jackson, and stood loyally by the Union of the States. They were allied to the South by birth, by education, and by the associations of a lifetime. Their friends, their kindred, even members of their own families, joined in the Rebellion. But these patriotic men, one of whom was born during the Revolutionary war and the other during the first term of Washington's Presidency, maintained their judicial positions and were unshaken in their loyalty to the Union. Their example was followed by few officials from the States that seceded, but the steadfastness of their faith was a striking illustration of the difference between the South of Jefferson and Jackson and the South of Calhoun and Davis. They sat on the Bench throughout the entire civil struggle, — Judge Catron dying in May, 1865, in the eighty-seventh year of his age, and Judge Wayne in July, 1867, in his seventy-eighth year.

The conduct of these venerable judges is all the more to be praised because they did not personally sympathize in any degree with the Republican leaders. They did not believe in the creed or the policies of the party, and feared the result of its administration of the National Government. Their views in regard to the Constitutional rights of the slave-holders were the same as those held by the Confederate chieftains. They had both concurred with Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott decision. But it was enough for them now to know that Mr. Lincoln had been Constitutionally chosen President of the United States, and had been Constitutionally installed in his great

office.

It was not for them as Justices of the Supreme Court to know any thing of his Executive acts, except as they might properly come for review before their high tribunal. They illustrated the honorable line of duty for a Judge under the Government of the United States. Off the Bench, his right to political opinions is no more to be questioned than that of any other citizen. On the Bench, he falls short of the full measure of his exalted duty if by any act or any expression he discloses his sympathy with one political party or his prejudice against another.

It is a tribute of honor to the Supreme Court that through all the mutations of its existence only a single Justice has proved unfaithful to the Union of the States; and prior to the war three-fifths of all the Justices were appointed from the South. Southern men in all other departments of the Public Service - those eminent in our Congressional annals, in the Army, in the Navy, in the field of Diplomacy, and even one who had occupied the Presidential chair- followed the lead of their States in rebellion against the Union; or rather it may with truth be said, they led their States into rebellion against the Union. Judge Campbell, in furnishing the sole exception to the record of judicial loyalty, did not yield without a struggle. He was surrounded with peculiar embarrassments, and was not strong enough to overcome them. He realized his position, and did what he could to avert war; but when war was inevitable, he upheld the Confederate cause and became one of its directing minds. In contrast with the fall from his high estate and over against all the evil influences which forced Judge Campbell to his fate, the names of Catron and Wayne will shine in history as examples of the just judge and the incorruptible patriot.

CHAPTER XIII.

GOVERNMENT FINANCES AFTER THE WAR. — DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION.-INTREPIDITY OF CONGRESS.-ITS GREAT TASK.-$600,000,000 BILL.- SUMMARY OF PUBLIC DEBT, DECEMBER, 1865.-FUNDED AND FLOATING OBLIGATIONS. — AGGREGATE DEBT JANUARY 1, 1866, $2,739,491,745.- $1,600,000,000 FLOATING OBLIGATIONS. MR. MCCULLOCH'S ESTIMATES. HIS FINANCIAL POLICY.-CONTRACTION the Leading FEATURE.-WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT A FUNDING BILL. HOUSE DEBATE THEREON.-SENATE DEBATE. - FINAL PASSAGE. REVENUE LAWS IN CONGRESS.CONTRASTED WITH BRITISH PARLIAMENT. -Large REDUCTION OF INTERNAL TAXES.-SECOND REDUCTION OF INTERNAL TAXES. — CONTRACTION POLICY OPPRESSIVE. - INDIRECT RELIEF.- HOSTILITY RAPIDLY INCREASES. - PROGRESS OF FUNDING BILL. REPEAL OF CONTRACTION BILL. ITS EVIL EFFECTS. FURTHER REDUCTION OF INTERNAL TAXES. FINANCIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. - LARGE REDUCTION OF NATIONAL DEBT. VALUABLE TREASURY OFFICIALS. PURCHASE OF ALASKA.- PRICE, $7,200,000 IN GOLD COIN. - PURCHASE AT FIRST UNPOPULAR.-RESISTANCE IN THE HOUSE. - MR. Washburne and General BUTLER OPPOSE.-TREATY ABLY SUSTAINED BY GENERAL BANKS.-INTERESTING DEBATE. MANY PARTICIPANTS. - POWER OF THE HOUSE RESPECTING TREATIES. - CHRONIC CONTROVERSY.-THE BILL PASSED. OPINION OF JUDGE MCLEAN. - OF MR. JEFFERSON. — EXTENT OF ALASKA. VALUE OF IT. ITS ELEMENTS OF WEALTH. FIRST NORTHERN TERRITORY ACQUIRED BY THE UNITED STATES. NEGOTIATION ABLY CONDUCTED BY MR. Seward.

THE

HE financial experience of the Government of the United States in the years following the war is without precedent among nations. When Congress first met after the close of hostilities (December, 1865), it was as a ship sailing into dangerous and unknown seas without chart of possible channels. The Reconstruction problem before the country seemed at the time to be less difficult than the financial problem. Other nations had incurred great expenditures for war purposes, but had always left them in chief part as a heritage for the future. Great Britain will probably never pay the total principal of her public debt. France will be burdened perhaps as long as her nationality endures by the debts heaped upon her through the ambition of her sovereigns, and in her own struggles to enlarge the liberty of her people. But in this country the purpose was early formed, not simply to provide for the interest upon the debt incurred in the war for the Union, but to begin its payment at

once, and to arrange for its rapid liquidation. In view of the magnitude of the sum involved this was a new undertaking in the administration of Government finances.

The difficulties of the situation were undoubtedly aggravated and complicated by the questions which arose from the condition of the Southern States. Could Congress expect at once that the population in those States would begin to contribute to the revenue, would cease to require large expenditures for the maintenance of the National authority, would again add to the volume of our exports, to our commerce, and our general prosperity? Serious re-action had in other lands followed the financial expansion created by great wars, even without complications similar to those which the disturbed condition of the South seemed to render unavoidable. Ought Congress to accept such a re-action as the necessary condition of the restoration of our currency, of return to a normal situation, of adjustment of expenditure to revenue on a peace footing? Could the possibility be entertained of such a return and such an adjustment, without panic, without paralysis of industry, without temporary interruption and prostration of commerce? Grave apprehensions were felt as to the possible effect upon production and trade of the legislation required to maintain the National credit. These apprehensions derived force and peculiar seriousness from the growing conflict between President Johnson and Congress upon measures of Reconstruction and upon removals from office.

In spite however of all suggested fears and doubts, a feeling of confidence pervaded the country, and was fully shared by Congress, that the power which had saved the Union could re-establish its credit without panic and without dangerous and prolonged depression. Faith in the resources which had equipped and supported the National armies, now embraced the plainer and less exciting duties of funding and paying the debt and of protecting the notes of the United States. The loans had been placed, the money borrowed, under the excitement of war, -sometimes under the pressure of defeat, sometimes in the exaltation of victory. Without this pressure, without this exaltation, could money be secured for longer time at lower interest, could taxes be continued at a rate adequate to build up a National credit worthy to be compared with that of the older and richer nations beyond the Atlantic?

The intrepidity with which Congress met its task will always compel the admiration of the student of American history. While

the war lasted, the contributions by taxes and by loans had been on a munificent scale. The measures adopted at the close of the Thirtyeighth Congress, after four years of desperate struggle and on the very eve of National victory, showed as great readiness to make sacrifices, as little disposition to count the cost of saving the Union, as had marked previous legislation. Less than six weeks before the surrender of Lee the internal taxes were increased, the duties on imports were adjusted to that increase, and a new Loan Bill was enacted. The bill provided for borrowing, in addition to the authority given by previous Acts, any sum not exceeding $600,000,000, in bonds, or treasury notes convertible into bonds, at six per cent interest in coin or seven and three-tenths per cent interest in currency. This provision was found to be so comprehensive that it not only provided a strong instrumentality for meeting the immense demands incident to the disbanding of the armies and the final settlement of claims connected with that momentous change in our affairs, but also laid the foundation for the policy of funding the debt at a reduced rate of interest. These results testify to the magnificent proportions of the financial legislation during the period of hostilities.

When the Thirty-ninth Congress met in December, 1865, gold stood at 1477 @ 148. A month later, on the 1st of January, 1866, the legal-tender notes and fractional currency amounted to $452,231,810; notes bearing 716 per cent interest, to $830,000,000; compound-interest notes payable three years from date (a considerable proportion of which time had elapsed), to $188,549,041; certificates of indebtedness, payable at various dates within the current year, to $50,667,000; and the temporary loan, practically payable on demand, had reached the large sum of $97,257,194. These might all be called floating and pressing obligations, and their grand aggregate was $1,618,705,045. At the same time the amount represented by bonds (6's of 1861, 5-20's, and 10-40's) was $1,120,786,700,- showing a total National debt on New-Year's Day, 1866, of $2,739,491,745. If the National credit was to be maintained these sixteen hundred millions of floating obligations must be promptly placed on a basis that would give time to the Government to provide means for their ultimate redemption. President Johnson, in his message at the opening of the session, spoke of the debt not as a public blessing, but as a heavy burden on the industry of the country, to be discharged without unnecessary delay. This was the popular sentiment in all