The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of LawUniversity of Michigan Press, 11 նոյ, 2009 թ. - 192 էջ Ever-more-frequent calls for the establishment of a rule of law in the developing world have been oddly paralleled by the increasing use of "exceptional" measures to deal with political crises. To untangle this apparent contradiction, The Jurisprudence of Emergency analyzes the historical uses of a range of emergency powers, such as the suspension of habeas corpus and the use of military tribunals. Nasser Hussain focuses on the relationship between "emergency" and the law to develop a subtle new theory of those moments in which the normative rule of law is suspended. The Jurisprudence of Emergency examines British colonial rule in India from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century in order to trace tensions between the ideology of liberty and government by law, which was used to justify the British presence, and the colonizing power's concurrent insistence on a regime of conquest. Hussain argues that the interaction of these competing ideologies exemplifies a conflict central to all Western legal systems—between the universal, rational operation of law on the one hand and the absolute sovereignty of the state on the other. The author uses an impressive array of historical evidence to demonstrate how questions of law and emergency shaped colonial rule, which in turn affected the development of Western legality. The pathbreaking insights developed in The Jurisprudence of Emergency reevaluate the place of colonialism in modern law by depicting the colonies as influential agents in the interpretation and delineation of Western ideas and practices. Hussain's interdisciplinary approach and subtly shaded revelations will be of interest to historians as well as scholars of legal and political theory. |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 36–ի 1-ից 5-ը:
... insists, if the state is to survive. The maxim of Salus populi suprema lex (safety of the people is the supreme law) is invoked by the Court as sufficient and long-standing authority for the actions of necessity not covered by regular ...
... insist that “personal as opposed to territorial laws prevail here on all sorts of subjects. I think there is no country in the world from whom a claim for absolute identity of law for all persons of all races and habits comes with as ...
... insist that all authority including the need for discretionary power be allotted by and fixed in regular law. Are we ... insisting that the question was really about—indeed, had to be about—different kinds of legal administration, and ...
... insisting on the disjunction between not only the Schmitt of the early twenties and the Nazi era but also between the Schmitt of 1936 and 1943.37 Schmitt's Political Theology (1922), the main text of interest to us, belongs to the ...
... insists, there “resides the essence of the state's sovereignty, which must be juridically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide.”53 At its core, we may read it as an alternative ...
Բովանդակություն
1 | |
Chapter 2 The Colonial Concept of Law | 35 |
Habeas Corpus and the Colonial Judiciary | 69 |
Violence and the Limit | 99 |
Conclusion A Postcolonial Postscript | 133 |
Appendix A The Administrative Structure of Justice in British India | 145 |
Appendix B The History of NineteenthCentury Legal Codification in British India | 149 |
Notes | 153 |
Bibliography | 175 |
Index | 185 |