The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of LawUniversity of Michigan Press, 11 նոյ, 2009 թ. - 192 էջ Ever-more-frequent calls for the establishment of a rule of law in the developing world have been oddly paralleled by the increasing use of "exceptional" measures to deal with political crises. To untangle this apparent contradiction, The Jurisprudence of Emergency analyzes the historical uses of a range of emergency powers, such as the suspension of habeas corpus and the use of military tribunals. Nasser Hussain focuses on the relationship between "emergency" and the law to develop a subtle new theory of those moments in which the normative rule of law is suspended. The Jurisprudence of Emergency examines British colonial rule in India from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century in order to trace tensions between the ideology of liberty and government by law, which was used to justify the British presence, and the colonizing power's concurrent insistence on a regime of conquest. Hussain argues that the interaction of these competing ideologies exemplifies a conflict central to all Western legal systems—between the universal, rational operation of law on the one hand and the absolute sovereignty of the state on the other. The author uses an impressive array of historical evidence to demonstrate how questions of law and emergency shaped colonial rule, which in turn affected the development of Western legality. The pathbreaking insights developed in The Jurisprudence of Emergency reevaluate the place of colonialism in modern law by depicting the colonies as influential agents in the interpretation and delineation of Western ideas and practices. Hussain's interdisciplinary approach and subtly shaded revelations will be of interest to historians as well as scholars of legal and political theory. |
From inside the book
Արդյունքներ 24–ի 1-ից 5-ը:
... prerogative for the public good. Once the Court finds a justification for the actions of the governor-general in the law of necessity, it can move to its conclu- sion with an axiomatic force, citing an impressive list of authorities ...
... prerogative , as they did till the end of the eighteenth century , or in terms of the supremacy of the legislature ( itself part of the executive in the colonies ) , refused to concede that the exercise of such power abrogated the rule ...
... prerogatives of kings or the ritu- alistic majesty of emperors and “despots,” but it seems to have no bear- ing on understanding modern law and power. And this is equally true of those who would celebrate the normative rule-bound ...
... prerogative” that Locke defines as the “power to act according to discretion, for the pub- lick good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it,”41 as in the famed book 11 of The Spirit of the Laws, where ...
... prerogative of the Crown . ” 56 An act of Parliament was subject to the interpretation of the judges , who in turn were independent of political influence . The limitation of judicial interpretation , however , did not constitute a ...
Բովանդակություն
1 | |
Chapter 2 The Colonial Concept of Law | 35 |
Habeas Corpus and the Colonial Judiciary | 69 |
Violence and the Limit | 99 |
Conclusion A Postcolonial Postscript | 133 |
Appendix A The Administrative Structure of Justice in British India | 145 |
Appendix B The History of NineteenthCentury Legal Codification in British India | 149 |
Notes | 153 |
Bibliography | 175 |
Index | 185 |