GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT-FOURTH DE

PARTMENT.*

AGREEMENT WHEN VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. W. having commenced an action against N. and S. for fraud, and also procured their indictment, the counsel of W. and N. duly authorized, entered into an agreement by which in consideration of N.'s testifying to all he knows, both in civil and criminal case, the judgment against him to be enforced only for a certain small amount to reimburse him for which an interest in the judgment against S. is to be placed under his control, and "N. testifying fully as above, counsel will recommend a nol. pros. against N." This contract was held void as against public policy. Nickelson v. Wilson. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

BAILMENT-PACKAGES RECEIVED BY BANK,

When a bank has been in the habit for some years of receiving packages for safe-keeping, and one of the subordinate officers receives a package, his act binds the bank, unless he is instructed not to receive such packages. The question whether or not the bailment was or was not gratuitous was one for the jury. Pattison v. Syracuse National Bank. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

DOMESTIC ANIMALS-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF DOGS.

The dogs of one McC. and defendant killed some sheep of plaintiffs. The dogs were together at the time. Plaintiff settled with McC. and sued defendant for the damage his dog did. Held, that in case of dogs doing damage jointly, the owner of each dog is only liable for the damage done by his dog.

After the damage and before the action was brought defendant killed his dog. Held, that evidence of the killing of the dog was competent on defendant's crossexamination; also, that the evidence of McC., that he saw defendant's and his dog together on one occasion in defendant's orchard, was competent to show that the dogs were known to each other, and on one occasion at least were seen together; also, that defendant not having raised the question as to the payment by McC. to plaintiff, of the damages done by his dog, being an accord and satisfaction on the trial, cannot raise it here. Carroll v. Weiler. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

HIGHWAYS-CERTIORARI.

In 1872, the commissioners of highways of the town of Niagara ordered the laying out of a road in said town. Commissioners to assess damages were appointed, and in 1873 they made their award. The certiorari to review the proceedings of the commissioners in laying out the road and the award of damages was taken in 1874. Held, that the certiorari to review the proceedings of the commissioners in laying out the road was too late; two years was an unreasonable time to wait. An appeal could have been taken from the order at the time it was made. That the fact that one of the commissioners of highways who applied for the laying out of the road was owner of part of the land through which the proposed road was to run, did not invalidate the assessment or proceedings. The People v. Landreth. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-PAROL AGREEMENT TO EXTEND THE TIME OF PAYMENT OF A MORTGAGE.

One B. mortgaged certain premises to plaintiff. Payment was due on said mortgage. B. was unable

*To appear in vol. IV, part I, New York Supreme Court Reports.

to pay and sold to defendant, and plaintiff agreed with defendant, that if he (defendant) would purchase, he could have an extension of time on the mortgage, if he would pay the following spring $200, and make the mortgage a first class one. Defendant paid the $200 and improved the property $2,000, and subsequently the whole mortgage debt became due; plaintiff then commenced to foreclose and before the time he had agreed to extend to had expired. Held, that a parol agreement to extend the time of payment was good, and that the assumption of the mortgage debt by defendant was a good consideration for such extension. Burt v. Saxton. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

PROMISSORY NOTE-ACCOMMODATION INDORSER
EVIDENCE.

The property of one P. was levied on and advertised for sale; P. procured defendant to indorse a note and plaintiff took the note with his own, had them discounted, bid in the property on the sale and still holds the same. Plaintiff now sues on the note that defendant indorsed. Defendant offered to show that plaintiff was to hold the note so indorsed and the property as security and was not to transfer it; that he had violated this agreement. This defense was not alleged in the answer. The referee refused to receive the evidence. Held, correct. It seems that the parties to accommodation paper may restrict the use that is to be made of it, and if it is diverted to a different use they will be discharged. Malcolm v. Fagan. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION OF- HEIRS."

One F. made his will and in and by it gave to his sister P. the use and profit of $2,000 for life and on her death he gave and bequeathed said $2,000 to the lawful heirs of his brother M., in equal proportions, and he then left all the rest and residue of his estate real and personal to his sister S. In May, 1865, F. died and his executor paid the use and profits of said $2,000 to said P. until her death in 1873. The bequest to the lawful heirs of said M. of the $2,000 on the death of P. was contested on the ground that a living man could not have heirs. The surrogate held the bequest to the lawful heirs void. Held, reversing the surrogate's decree, that in a bequest of personal property the words "heir" or "heirs" may be construed to mean children, or next of kin, and that the word "heir" was used by the testator in the sense of next of kin. Cushman v. Horton. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE SURPLUS -NOTICE OF

SALE.

Acceptance by the mortgagor of surplus moneys under a foreclosure by advertisement does not estop him from questioning the regularity of the proceedings in a subsequent action, although restitution would be required before setting them aside in his favor. Candee v. Burke. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

Where the mortgagee's name is signed to the notice in such proceeding but is omitted in the body of it and it is in conformity to statute in all other respects, the foreclosure will not be held irregular on that account. The notice gives the public the means of ascertaining the name of the mortgagee by reference to the records and is sufficient. Ib.

Mr. Wendell Phillips has accepted the appointment of commissioner of lunacy for Massachusetts.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB

STRACT.*

(Continued.)

PRACTICE.

I. In the Supreme Court.

(a) In cases generally.

1. When, on a view of the record, it appears that from some fatal defect in the proceedings, no judgment can be entered against the defendant in the court below, on a suit there pending, this court will decline to answer a question certified to it on division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court, upon a contrary assumption. United States v. Buzzo, 125.

2. Though both in civil and criminal cases, the judgments, orders, and decrees of courts are under their control during the term at which they are made, so that they may be set aside or modified as law and justice may require, yet this power of the courts cannot be used to violate the guarantees of personal rights found in the common law, and in the constitutions of the States and of the Union, as, for example, to punish a man twice by judicial judgments for the same offense. Ex parte Lange, 163.

3. Where a case is tried by the Circuit Court under the act of March 3d, 1865, if the finding be a general one, this court will only review questions of law arising in the progress of the trial and duly presented by a bill of exceptions, or errors of law apparent on the face of the pleadings. Insurance Company v. Folsom, 237; Town of Ohio v. Marcy, 552.

4. The only remedy for surprise is a motion for new trial, and the refusal of a court below to grant one is not reviewable here. Mulhall v. Keenan, 342.

5. An assignment of error which alleges simply that the court below erred in giving the instructions which were given to the jury in lieu of the instructions asked for it not being stated in what the error consisted or in what part of the charge it is-is an insufficient assignment under the 21st rule of court. Lucas v. Brooks, 436.

(b) In admiralty.

6. When a vessel libeled for collision means to set up injury to herself and to set off damages therefor against damages claimed for injury which she has herself done, the injury done to her ought to be alleged, either by cross-libel or by answer; and if not somewhere thus set up below, the Supreme Court cannot first award damages. The Sapphire, 51.

(c) In Chancery.

7. Where a decree is entered upon an order taking a bill in equity as confessed by defendants for want of an answer, the only question for the consideration of this court on appeal is whether the allegations of the bill are sufficient to support the decree. Masterson v. Howard, 99.

II. In the Circuit Courts.

8. Evidence which may divert the attention of the jury from the real issue-that is to say, immaterial evidence should be kept from the jury. Lucas v. Brooks, 436.

9. The improper exclusion of evidence is not error when the party offering it has proved, in another way, every fact which the evidence, if it had been admitted, would prove. Ib.

10. Prayers for instruction which overlook facts of which there is evidence, or which assume as fact that

* From advanced sheets of 18 Wall.

of which there is no evidence, are properly refused. Ib.

11. Under the act of March 3d, 1865, the Circuit Court is not required to make a special finding. Insurance Company v. Folsom, 237.

12. Where the assignees of a claim on a third party have parted completely with their interest in it and, by a transfer, vested the entire title in others, they are not necessary parties in an equity proceeding by these others to enforce it. Batesville Institute v. Kauffman, 151.

III. In the District Courts.

13. What constitutes an appearance in admiralty. Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Company, 272.

PREFERENCE.

A payment by one insolvent, which would otherwise be void as a preference under sections thirty-five and thirty-nine of the bankrupt law, is not excepted out of the provisions of those sections, because it was made to a holder of his note overdue, on which there was a solvent indorser whose liability was already fixed. Bartholow v. Bean, 635; and see Cook v. Tullis, 332.

PUBLIC LAW.

While the existence of war closes the courts of each belligerent to the citizens of the other, it does not prevent the citizens of one belligerent from taking proceedings for the protection of their own property in their own courts, against the citizens of the other, whenever the latter can be reached by process. Masterson v. Howard, 99.

QUARTERMASTER.

His office distinguished from that of a commissary of subsistence. Shrewsbury v. United States, 664.

RATIFICATION.

The ratification by one of the unauthorized act of another operates upon the act ratified precisely as though authority to do the act had been previously given, except where the rights of third parties have intervened between the act and the ratification. Cook v. Tullis, 332.

REBELLION, THE.

1. A sale of real estate made under a power contained in a deed of trust executed before the late civil war is valid, notwithstanding the grantors in the deed, which was made to secure the payment of promissory notes, were citizens and residents of one of the States declared to be in insurrection at the time of the sale, made while the war was flagrant. University v. Finch, 106.

2. This court has never gone further in protecting the property of citizens residing in such insurrectionary States from judicial sale than to declare that where such citizen has been driven from his home by a special military order, and forbidden to return, judicial proceedings against him were void. Ib.

3. The property of such citizens found in a loyal State is liable to seizure and sale for debts contracted before the outbreak of the war, as in the case of other non-residents. Ib.

4. The civil war was flagrant in Arkansas from April, 1861, to April, 1866, and during this time the operation of the statute which limited the duration of liens to three years was suspended. Batesville Institute v. Kauffman, 151.

5. The act of March 3d, 1863, entitled "An act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceed

ings in certain cases," and the act of March 2d, 1867, entitled "An act to declare valid and conclusive certain proclamations of the President, and acts done in pursuance thereof, or of his orders in the suppression of the late rebellion against the United States," do not change the rules of pleading, when the defense is set up in a special plea, or dispense with the exhibition of the order or authority upon which a party relies. Nor do they cover all acts done by officers in the military service of the United States simply because they are acting under the general authority of the President as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Assuming that they are not liable to any constitutional objection, they only cover acts done under orders or proclamations issued by the President, or by his authority. Bean v. Beckwith, 510.

REVIVAL OF DISCHARGED DEBT.

Is not made except by clear, distinct, and unequivocal promise to pay. Allen & Co. v. Ferguson, 1.

SET-OFF.

Is enforced in equity only where there are mutual debts or mutual credits, or where there exists some equitable consideration or agreement between the parties which would render it unjust not to allow a setoff. Gray v. Rollo, 620.

SLAVE CONTRACTS.

1. It is no defense to a suit brought on a promissory note executed in Louisiana, in February, 1861, by the holder against the maker, to allege and prove that such note was given as the price of slaves sold to the maker. Boyce v. Tabb, 546.

2. That such sale was at the time lawful in the said State was a sufficient consideration for a note, and the obligation could not be impaired by laws of the State passed subsequently to the date thereof. Ib.

3. No law of the United States has impaired such obligation. Ib.

SPECIAL FINDING.

Circuit courts are not required under the act of March 3d, 1865, to make such finding. Insurance Co. v. Folsom, 237.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

1. The civil war was flagrant in Arkansas from April, 1861, to April, 1866; and during this time the operation of the statute which limited the duration of liens to three years was suspended. Batesville Institute v. Kauffman, 151.

2. When a trustee has closed his trust relation to

the property and to the cestui que trust, and parted with all control of the property, the statute of limitations runs in his favor, notwithstanding it is an express trust. Clarke v. Boorman's Executors, 493. STATUTORY PENALTY.

The action of debt lies for a. Chaffee & Co. v. United States, 516.

STOCK IN NATIONAL BANKS.

Not subject to lien for debts due the bank. Bullard v. Bank, 589.

TAXATION.

1. Where an exemption of particular property, or parcels of property, or a limitation of the general rate is set up, the intent of the legislature to exempt or to limit must be made clear beyond reasonable doubt. The Delaware Railroad Tax, 206; Trask v. Maguire, 391.

2. Accordingly, a provision in an act allowing one railroad corporation to unite itself with another railroad corporation, and so make a new corporation, that the new corporation should pay annually a quarter of one per cent upon its capital, was held to be only a designation of the tax payable annually until a different rate should be established, and not a restraint upon the legislature from imposing a further tax. The Delaware Railroad Tax, 206.

3. The State may impose taxes upon the corporation as an entity existing under its laws, as well as upon the capital stock of the corporation or its separate corporate property. And the manner in which its value shall be assessed and the rate of taxation, however arbitrary or capricious, are mere matters of legislative discretion. Ib.

4. A tax upon a corporation may be proportioned to the income received as well as to the value of the franchise granted or the property possessed. Ib.

5. The fact that taxation increases the expenses attendant upon the use or possession of the thing taxed, of itself constitutes no objection to its constitutionality. Ib.

6. The exercise of the authority which every State possesses to tax its corporations and all their property, real and personal, and their franchises, and to graduate the tax upon the corporations according to their business or income, or the value of their property, when this is not done by discriminating against rights held in other States, and the tax is not on imports or tonnage, or transportation to other States, cannot be regarded as conflicting with any constitutional power of Congress. Ib.

7. How far a State may tax an agency created by the Federal government. The question considered in the case of a State taxing a railroad company chartered by Congress. Railroad Company v. Peniston, 5.

8. Unorganized territory attached by statute to a particular county in it, for revenue purposes, gives power to such county to levy taxes on taxable property in it. Ib.

9. Where a legislature exempted the property of a particular corporation from taxation and afterward bought the property at judicial sale, and so, itself, became owner of the same, the previously granted immunity from taxation ceased of necessity. And on a subsequent grant by the State, the immunity from taxation was not renewed; a constitution of the State made between the date of the first grant and the last having ordained that no special laws should be made exempting the property of any person or corporation from taxation. Trask v. Maguire, 391.

ENGLISH NOTES.

At a

Edwin James, the deposed barrister, will, it is said, be a candidate for member of parliament from Northampton. -Mr. Jones, for many years governor of Newgate prison, in London, has just resigned. Mr. S. Smith has been selected to fill the position.public meeting recently held at Leeds, it was resolved to petition parliament for the release of Orton the unsuccessful Tichborne claimant, and for a new trial. Mr. Guilford Onslow was one of the speakers. The Chichele professorship of international law at Oxford University, made vacant by the resignation of the Right Hon. Montague Bernard, one of the Washington commissioners, has been conferred on Mr. Thomas Erskine Holland, of Lincoln's Inn, bar

rister at law, and of All Souls' College, Oxford. The Brussels World says that the reason why the United States was invited to the congress on international war usages in Europe, held in that city, is that that government was the first to establish a code for the regulation of its armies during the war.—' -The queen in her message proroguing parliament, explains that England is represented in the Brussels conference, but has stipulated that there shall be no change in the recognized rules of international law, and that no restrictions shall be placed upon the conduct of naval operations, and reserves the right to accept or reject the recommendations of the conference. -The Benchers of Gray's Inn held another conference on the 1st inst., to consider the case of Dr. Keneally upon the issues arising out of the late Tichborne trial, and for articles published in the Englishman. It was decided to deprive Dr. Keneally of his benchership, and to hereafter consider the question of expelling him from the bar if the publications in the Englishman are continued.- - The parliamentary committee intrusted last session with the consideration of the prohibitory liquor law question, having embodied in their report a resolution recommending that steps be taken to procure fuller and more satisfactory information regarding the operation of the law of such States of the neighboring Union as have adopted and enforced it, the government, in pursuance of the terms of that recommendation, has appointed Frederick Davis and the Rev. John Manning a commission to make the necessary inquiries and report. A deputation from the Council of the British Social Science Association has waited upon the Earl of Derby to present a memorial to his lordship urging the necessity of providing better security for the property of British subjects in foreign countries, than at present exists. Mr. E. Jenkins, M. P., introduced the deputation, and made some observations on the present unsatisfactory state of the law, and was followed by Mr. T. Webster, Q. C., F. R. S., and Mr. H. D. Jencken. His lordship having admitted the great importance of the subject, promised to give it his best attention. Arrangements are being carried out with the view of convoking a meeting at the Mansion House, London, shortly, when resolutions will be submitted-first, on the desirability of the congress of Brussels confining itself to questions of humanity, instead of discussing questions treating of the conduct of naval warfare; and secondly, to support the endeavor of the alliance to obtain the convocation of a diplomatic congress, with the view of renewing the declarations of the congresses of Vienna and Verona, relative to the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, including the traffic in coolies and similar barbarous practices.

BOOK NOTICES.

The History of the Common Law of Great Britain and Gaul. By John Pym Yeatman, Barrister-at-law. Part I. London: Stevens & Sons, 1874.

66

The appearance of a genuine history of the common law" marks an epoch in legal literature, and may be justly regarded as the outcome of a period which is witnessing the revival of the philosophy of law and the initiation of the historical study of the law. A history of the law of any people can hardly be less than the historical philosophy of that law. True history involves historical philosophy, or the philosophy of the succession of events. Mr. Yeatman in the first chapter of his "History of the Common Law of Great Britain'

and Gaul," properly remarks, that "the history of the common law of England has yet to be written. No writer has attempted to give a full account of it. And very few have done more than point with an uncertain finger to a possible origin." This was true before Mr. Yeatman began the present work. Part I is now issued, and we are promised three additional parts. The present part contains chapters on "The Pedigree of the Common Law," "The Influence of Roman Law and Customs upon British Institutions,' ""The Rise of Power,' ," "The Saxon Codes-The Dooms of Kent," "The Codes promulgated by the Danes or by the Saxons, whilst under their vassalage," etc., etc.

The author states it to be the object of the work "to give a clear and succinct view of the whole system without very minutely tracing each portion to its original source." It is also a conspicuous design of the work to show that English law is not an exotic or au outgrowth of Roman law; while admitting that English law has been considerably modified by Roman law. In the preparation of this work, Mr. Yeatman has undoubtedly made use of all available materials and has gone deeper into the mysteries of the origin of the common law than any other writer. It is a remarkable fact that the Welsh people have done an immense service to legal history by preserving fragments of early law. The direct proof of the ancient common law would have been lost, but for the Welsh, who in their Triads and Codes, have preserved considerable portions of it. The author has pursued the true scientific method in the construction of his work-he has gone directly to the sources of information. If any thing, however, he seems to be filled with a patriotism which turns every fact to account in the glorification and justification of his own country. The style, too, is rather that of the advocate than of the historical judge. As an example of the vigorous attacks which he makes on a people from which the English have long been supposed to have drawn much of their language and law, we quote the following: "It is sufficient for the history of the common law, if the Saxons are dislodged from the positions which have been so unjustifiably awarded to them; and it must be left to their admirers, if they desire it, to find them a proper home. In summing up the evidence we may safely conclude that the Saxon codes are only scraps of British or English law, dishonestly selected and intermixed with error and lies; that the Saxon charter and other documents are a mass of forgeries; that Saxon literature is represented alone by the Saxon charter and Asser's life of Alfred, and that these works are shocking impositions; and that, indeed, the Saxons had neither law nor literature." It must be admitted that this is strong language and will subject the author to severe criticism; but if his position can be maintained by the requisite proof he will have done the English people a good service in exposing historical impositions and traditional falsehood.

There is, without doubt, another advantage which will be derived from the present work, i. e., a reactionary tendency from the disposition to treat every thing of value which has come down to us as having gone through Roman channels. The "History of the Common Law" will throw the origin of that law back into pre-historic periods, and will reveal the fact, that the evolution of law is dependent upon a variety of causes, including climate, race, language, geographical position, intercourse, and all that combination of conditions called circumstances. We await with inter

est the forthcoming parts of this valuable contribution to legal history.

Commentaries of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian, translated with notes, by J. T. Abdy, LL. D., and Bryan Walker, M. A., LL. D. New edition, Cambridge: The University Press, 1874.

The republication of this valuable legal classic and embodiment of Roman law will be of service to those who wish to read the original written law of the Romans, either for information or for the purposes of comparative legal science. In the present volume the text of the original is preserved, and the translation runs upon the same page with the original. For the average classical scholar, the form in which this work is published is of advantage, as it saves the trouble of "translating," while it affords opportunity of verifying a doubtful passage or obtaining light upon an obscure one. It is unnecessary to comment at length upon the character of the works of the eminent Roman jurists, Gaius and Ulpian, any more than upon the works of Livy or Tacitus, of Horace or Virgil. The ancient Roman law, as expounded by Gaius, Papinian, Modestinus, Paulus, Ulpian and others, has been studied for centuries and has modified more or less the law of all continental Europe, and even of England. To say that the study of Roman law is still valuable, and even essential, would be only expressing the common opinion of all intelligent jurists and legal scholars. We hope to see a still wider dissemination of the class of legal literature which is represented by the works of Gaius and Ulpian.

The Law of Extradition, by Edward Clarke, Barrister at Law. Second edition. London: Stevens & Haynes, 1874. One of the most interesting and valuable contributions to legal literature which it has been our province to notice for a long time is Clarke's "Treatise on the Law of Extradition." The extradition of criminals fugitive from justice is one of the amenities growing out of the better-defined international relations of modern times. The subject is a politico-legal one, and the laws thereon have been made rather to suit the demands of statesmanship than of jurisprudence. The courts, as a general rule, have regarded the extradition of criminals as a matter not within their ordinary jurisdiction; and governments have, in their capacity as such, deemed themselves alone competent to exercise the power of extradition. Of course there have been all sorts of opinions expressed upon the theory of extradition, and the ablest jurists of Europe'and America have disagreed as to the nature of the extraditional function. But it is now well-settled that independent of treaty or statute there can be no extradition of criminals.

Mr. Clarke's work comprises chapters upon the Duty of Extradition; Early Treaties and Cases; History of the Law in the United States; History of the Law in Canada; History of the Law in England; History of the Law in France, etc., with an appendix containing the conventions existing between England and foreign nations, and the cases decided thereon. From the chapter relating to the History of the Law in the United States we make following extract: "For various reasons, the records of the acts passed and the cases decided in the United States is entitled to the first place in a history of the modern law and practice of extradition. At the formation of the Union, the question of the rendition of criminals who fled from one State to another to escape the vengeance of the laws they had transgressed, was one of the difficulties

with which the founders of the great republic had to deal. The proximity to Canada, and the length of boundary line which made the flight of the criminal so difficult to intercept, soon raised the question from one of local administration to one of national policy. Men were found equal to deal with either. The American judicial bench has been adorned by men who added the lawyer's knowledge to the statesman's thought, and who, bringing both to bear on the questions of public law, have left us works of enduring value. In the matter of extradition the American law was, until 1870, better than that of any country in the world; and the decisions of the American judges are the best existing expositions of the duty of extradition, in its relations at once to the judicial rights of nations and the general interests of the civilization of the world." The author then gives an excellent review of the adjudication in this country. Referring to Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540, and Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 630, he says that "after this judgment, it was clear that foreign governments could not, in the absence of treaty stipulations, obtain from the United States the extradition of a fugitive criminal." This view of the case of Holmes has been sustained in the case of Vogt, by a judgment of the New York Court of Appeals, pronounced in 1872. This case is also referred to by the author. The work is ably prepared throughout, and should form a part of the library of every lawyer interested in great constitutional or international questions.

LEGAL NEWS.

It is said that ex-Postmaster General Creswell has been retained on behalf of the Government under the Geneva Award act, and will represent the interests of the United States in all cases to be considered.

Brady, the salvor in the Pennsylvania steamship case, has concluded not to appeal from the decision of Judge Cadwallader in his case, and accepts the $4,000 and costs allowed him.

The suit long pending between the heirs of Stephen A. Douglas and the executors of his estate was decided on Monday, in Chicago, giving the heirs of Robert and Stephen A. Douglas, about a quarter of a million of dollars.

"The life of Chief Justice Chase," written by Mr. J. W. Shuckers, Mr. Chase's private secretary for ten years, is shortly to appear from the Appleton press. Among the specially interesting portions of the work is a chapter relating to the secret history of the reversion of the legal tender decision, and another giving for the first time various details in the Jefferson Davis case. It will also contain the eulogy of Chief Justice Chase, pronounced by Hon. William M. Evarts before the Dartmouth Alumni at their last commencement.

The special commission on taxation authorized by the last legislature of Massachusetts, consisting of Thomas Hills of Boston, James M. Barker of Pittsfield, and Prof. Julius H. Seelye of Amherst, met at Boston, Monday, and organized by the appointment of Mr. Hills as chairman, and Mr. Baker, secretary. They will at once proceed to their important work, which, besides the question of whether any, and, if any, what property should be exempt from taxation, contemplates a review of the entire system of taxation in operation in the State.