to the present edition to know that it is a reprint of the first principal English work exclusively devoted to the subject of equity pleading and practice. Besides, a study of this work will furnish much information as to the manner in which Roman law was wrought into the English system. The work is valuable on many accounts; and there is reason to welcome its appearance among the list of the legal classics, which law publishers in this country are so worthily bringing out.

Hubbell's Legal Directory for 1874-5. New York: J. H. Hubbell & Co.

This directory is full of useful and reliable information for collecting lawyers and business men. It contains a synopsis of the collection laws of each of the States and Canada, with instructions for taking depositions, for the execution and acknowledgment of deeds, for the execution of wills, etc.; a concise synopsis of the bankrupt law, with the names of registers in bankruptcy; also, the times for holding courts throughout the United States and Territories for the year ending July 1, 1875. There is a list of some reliable attorneys and prominent bankers in the United States. The work has been prepared in parts by lawyers in different parts of the country, who would be apt to understand thoroughly the particular laws of their section or State. The principal object to be gained in such a directory, as indeed in all directories, is accuracy. This directory is certainly very complete, and so far as we have examined it is accurate. Previous issues of the work have been found satisfactory, and this of itself is a good guaranty of the satisfactory character of the present issue.

There is one use of this directory which it may not have been designed to subserve. It is valuable to the speculative legist in making a comparison of the laws of the various States on many important subjects, such as marriage, divorce, attestation of wills, rights of married women, interest and usury, exemptions. From this directory alone one could construct quite a system of comparative law. This fact illustrates how some of the most practical things may be turned to theoretical account.

The principal use of the directory is practical, however, and can be recommended to those having extended professional and business connections.

Law and Practice of Bankruptcy. By Orlando F. Bump. Seventh edition. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1874.

A new edition of Mr. Bump's work on Bankruptcy is necessitated by numerous recent decisions, but more particularly by the amendments in the bankrupt law, passed by the last congress. It is marvelous to find what an immense amount of adjudication has been evolved under the national bankrupt law. One evidence of the extent of the adjudication on this subject may be found in the fact that the present treatise has gone through seven editions, each edition being enlarged from the previous one, until the last edition contains references to over one thousand cases. The work consists of two parts-the first being a commentary on the bankrupt law, and the second the text of the law with copious notes. The work is invaluable to the practitioner in bankruptcy matters, and justifies the liberal support which the profession has accorded it. The work includes the adjudications under the amended law down to September 1, 1874. And some cases are included which were decided during the month of September. The amendment of

June 22, 1874, section 9, relating to the discharge of the bankrupt, provides that in case of involuntary or compulsory bankruptcy the provisions requiring payment of any portion of the debts or the assent of any portion of the creditors, as a condition of discharge, does not apply, and the bankrupt may be discharged in the same manner as if he had paid such percentum of the debts, or procured such assent of the creditors. In re Charles J. Francke, 1 Cent. L. J. 448, a decision by Judge Blatchford, is cited to show that this section does not apply to cases of involuntary bankruptcy commenced before the passage of the amendment. But decisions pronounced after the text of the work was written and in press hold a contrary doctrine. These decisions are, In re Perkins, 7 Chicago Leg. News, 9; 10 Alb. Law Jour. 247; In re King, 1 Cent. Law Jour. 507; 10 Alb. Law Jour. 249; and In re Griffiths, 1 Cent. Law Jour. 507; 10 Alb. Law Jour. 249. But Mr. Bump's enterprise was equal to the occasion, and he has inserted a slip in the proper place calling attention to these decisions. These later decisions are exceedingly important, as they change Judge Blatchford's view of the section relating to discharges; and show that the weight of authority is to the effect that an involuntary bankrupt may procure his discharge irrespective of the amount of the assets or the position of the creditors, even in a case commenced before the passage of the amendments. New questions are constantly arising under the amended act, and Mr. Bump's work will be of great service in elucidating these questions.

EFFECT ON A MARINE POLICY OF DELAY VARYING RISK.

We cannot but regard the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench in De Wolf v. Archangel Maritime Insurance Company, 22 W. R. 801. L. R., 9 Q. B. 451, as introducing a new rule into insurance law. A voyage policy was effected "at and from" Montreal to Monte Video, no question being put or information offered as to where the ship insured then was. In fact, the ship was then on a voyage to Montreal, but did not arrive there till after a lapse of time which converted the voyage from a summer to a winter one, and therefore increased the risk and the premium. It was held that the policy did not attach. There can be no doubt that Blackburn, J., who delivered the judgment of the court, was unable to cite any case in which such a ruling had been made. But more than this, in every one of the cases cited where by reason of delay the policy was held not to attach, or was treated hypothetically as not attaching, the ground on which this was put was that the delay was "unreasonable," in the sense of unjustifiable, and the case was treated as one of deviation or abandonment. Thus in one of the earliest of these cases (Chitty". Selwyn, 2 Atk. 359), Lord Hardwicke held that "as long as the ship was preparing for the voyage," the insurer remained liable, but "if all thoughts of the voyage were laid aside" it would be otherwise. So in Grant v. King, 4 Esp. 155, Lord Ellenborough said: "The question whether there was an abandonment of the original adventure, is to be decided from a fair review of all existing circumstances at the time when the voyage might reasonably be presumed to commence: Here the extreme difficulty of procuring men is to be taken into consideration. To discharge the policy there must be a clear imputation of waste of time. Mere length of time

elapsing between the sailing of the vessel and the underwriting of the policy is not of itself sufficient to avoid the policy; it is capable of explanation. You cannot expect every act of earnest and extreme promptness; hardly [any thing] short of the institution of a new adventure shall, in my opinion, be sufficient to amount to a desertion of the policy." Again, in Phillips v. Irving, 7 M. & G. 325, Tindal, C. J., said “delay before or after the commencement of a voyage.insured is not a deviation unless it be unreasonable;" and again, in Mount v. Larkins, 8 Bing. 108, the same learned judge said, "such unreasonable and unjustifiable delay on the part of the insured, in commencing the voyage insured against, is in the nature of a deviation, and does amount to such an alteration of the risk insured against, as to discharge the liability of the underwriter upon the policy;"" and this language must be remembered when the same case is referred to by Parke, B., in Gibson v. Small, 4 H. L. 353, in these "So other conditions are equally implied, such terms: as not to deviate from the usual course of the voyage, to commence within a reasonable time (as in the case of Mount v. Larkins)." The question is also treated as one of deviation in Vallance v. Dewar and Ongier v. Jennings, 1 Camp. 503. If this delay in the commencement of the voyage must, to avoid the policy, be unreasonable in the sense of unjustifiable, if such delay is put on the same footing as deviation, it would seem that where the delay is "capable of explanation," it would not avoid the policy, any more than an involuntary departure from the ordinary course under the stress of circumstances would be a deviation avoiding it. The cases in which the question turned either upon representation or even on notice ought to be laid out of account altogther, the first for an obvious reason, the second because the use made of the notice was to prevent a delay from avoiding the policy which would, but for the notice, have amounted to the interposition of a new adventure.

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In the present case, however, although the term unreasonable" is used to describe the delay which took place, and although the jury are said to have found the delay to be unreasonable, it is obvious from the whole course of the reasoning that this did not mean unreasonable in the sense of unjustifiable, or due to the misconduct or caprice of the assured, but only meant a delay greater than might have been or would naturally be anticipated, or perhaps no more than such a delay as did, in fact, increase the risk; and the decision of the court is in truth that any delay, or more properly lapse of time, before the commencement of the risk, which makes the risk greater or the subject of a higher premium than at the time of executing the policy, is sufficient to avoid the policy. This is in effect extending the rule laid down in former cases in the same direction in which, in Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Company, 22 W. R. 79, L. R., 8 C. P. 572, the rule was extended which, under the previous decisions, liberated the party to a charter-party from his contract, where a delay due to the other contracting party was such as to make the adventure a materially different one from that contemplated. As in Jackson's case it was decided that default was unnecessary, but both parties were liberated if the delay was caused by circumstances, so here also the element of default is eliminated. The extension, however, in the present case appears less warrantable than in the other, and we are by no means confident that the decision would be sustained on appeal.- Solicitors' Journal.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. The following decisions were announced in the New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, 10th inst.:

Judgment affirmed with costs - People ex rel. Hagen v. Morgan; McKechnie v. Ward; Carpenter v. O'Dougherty; Kendall v. The Holland Purchase Ins. Co.; Blewett v. Baker; Roberts v. Johnson; Phillips v. Conkling; Parker v. Arctic Fire Ins. Co.; Amory v. Amory; Amory v. Amory; Murray v. Clark.― Judgment affirmed - Wenzler v. People; Coleman v. People.- -Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event The People v. Fields; Hinckley v. Kreitz; Smith v. Isaacs; Thornall v. Pitt; Dutcher v. Importers and Traders' National Bank.- Order affirmed with costs-Genet v. Davenport.-Order granting new trial reversed and judgment for plaintiff on verdict affirmed with costs-Wills v. Weaver. Order granting new trial affirmed and judgment absolute for defendant on stipulation with costs Allen v. Fourth National Bank of New York; Kilbourne v. St. John.- Motion denied without costs-Tiffany v. Farr.- - Judgment modified so as to allow claim against receiver in favor of the respondent for $3,000 and interest from November 5, 1866, without costs to either party in this court - McCullough v. Norwood. Order of Supreme Court reversed and judgment on report of referee affirmed with costs-The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. v. Bowers.- Order granting new trial af

firmed and judgment absolute for defendant with costs -Prindle v. Beveridge; Lytle v. Beveridge.-Order of General Term reversed and case remitted for hearing upon the merits without costs as to either party in this court-Brown v. Brown.- Ordered that all proceedings be suspended on this motion and appeal, so that plaintiffs may bring an action to set aside agreement of Fellows and Hermans to discontinue, etc., without costs - Hill v. Heermans.

FOREIGN NOTES.

Mr. John Marshall, advocate, son of the late Lord Currishill, has been appointed one of the judges of the Court of Sessions, at Edinburgh, in the room of the late Lord Benholme. When the new judge takes his seat, Lord Gifford will go to the Second Division, and Lord Mackenzie will become senior Lord Ordinary.

The German government has entered an action in the ecclesiastic court against the Bishop of Paderborn and lodged an application for his deposal. The bishop has refused to make a defense or take any notice of the proceedings. In the case of one of the persons summoned to serve upon the grand jury at the Middlesex Sessions (England), a very novel excuse was set up. The summoning officer stated that he had received a letter from this person expressing his regret at being unable to serve, but giving as his reason the excuse that at the present time he was a prisoner in Holloway jail.—Mr. Maurice Barnard Byles, barrister, of the Norfolk Circuit (England), has been appointed a revising barrister, in the place of Mr. Charles George Merewether, disqualified by his election as M. P. for Northampton. Mr. Byles is the second son of the Right Hon. Sir John Barnard Byles, late judge of the Court of Common Pleas, and author of Byles on Bills.

when invisible to the common eye, is the measure of our daily life, it covers us with its shield, restrains us by its power, and so far as mortal fear can make it omnipotent and omnipresent, it goes with us whereever we go, by the side of every carriage on the loneliest road, on the deck of every ship even to the farthest sea.

No wonder that an old author writes: "For the knowledge of the law, as Doderidge saith, is most truly styled, Rerum divinarum humanarumque scientia, and worthily imputed to be the science of sciences, for therein lies hid the knowledge of every other learned science."

But great and wonderful as is this learning, it lies with us, scattered in thousands of books, with countless anomalies, and endless contradictions, difficult of access, a shapeless mass of precedents and statutes. This is not creditable to our civilization. Give us, I say, a written code of all our laws, that he who runs may read, and may be able to understand.

Here, at this table, are representatives of the federal and the State governments, the second magistrave of the former and the first magistrate elect of the latter, and to them I beg leave to say. In your efforts to cure the disorders of the times, which I grant are many, do not forget to help us to that which we most sorely need, a consistent and intelligible body of law.

Having thus spoken of the law in one of its senses, let me speak of it in the other; that is the profession of the law, in both its departments of judges and lawyers, for these are parts, inseparable parts, of one great profession. Without the law in this latter sense, that of which I have spoken will be either a deadletter or an instrument of intolerable oppression. It is the profession which gives to the doctrines their life and vigor, holding them as a shield before the weak and a sword against the strong.

Looking at other countries you will see the same system of legal science working out different results as it is worked out by different hands. The law of Rome, the civil law as it is called, which, beginning with the twelve tables spread out from the Tiber, invaded province after province and took so firm a hold of the habits, the sentiments and the reason of men, that now after the Roman empire has been broken in pieces like a potter's vessel, it continues to rule the greater portion of christendom, that law practically is one thing in one country and another thing in another. The careful student will not fail to read, in political annals, this lesson, that in proportion as men are safe in their homes, in the same proportion the lawyer and the judge are respected and powerful. Whichever be the cause and which the consequence the fact remains to which all history bears witness, that the law and the lawyer are inseparable concomitants, and the power of the one rises and falls with the power of the other. This fact, one out of many

teaching the same lessons, shows us the value to be set upon the learning, the uprightness and the independence of the legal profession. Those three qualities are the conditions, each and all of safety to the citizen and of honor and success to the lawyer; learning, that he may not mistake and so misinterpret the law, which it is his province to administer; uprightness, that he may act according to his conscience, not the conscience of another man, but his own, or in other words, that he may be true to his convictions and independence; that he may have neither will nor motive, to pervert his judgment or sway his conduct; independence, I say, for both departments of the profession, that which occupies the bench and that which occupies the bar, independence each of the other and both of the rest of the world. When I see a judge caring for, or worse, pandering to the prejudices or passions of the many or the few; when I see him courting popularity; when I see him regardful of any thing on the earth, but the law and the testimony in the case before him, I look upon him as a betrayer of his trust and I would paint upon his forehead and sew upon his garments, so that all men might read those two words (never were words so well yoked together), which in conjunction a Burns has made immortal, "traitor knave ;" and when I see a lawyer considering what men will say of him, if he takes up this cause, or rejects that, I think of him, remembering other words in the same poem, that he will at his latter end "fill a coward's grave." My ideal of a judge is of one who comes into his high office with a rich store of learning, with a conscience void of offense, with a patient judgment, without prejudice and without passion, with a love of the truth, whatever it may be, as he hears it from the lips of lawful witnesses, or reads it in the books of law, rejecting all other advice or influence as unlawful intrusion and disdaining every attempt to intimidate or lead him in whatever shape and from whatever quarter it comes, whether by private solicitations or public discussions, whether from the street or the market, the pulpit or the press; and my ideal of a lawyer, is of one who, rich in the same learning, feels the same disdain of intimidation, consults only his own convictions, and stands ready, at all times, to assert the rights of any man, according to the law of the land.

In short, this is my conclusion of the whole matter. The need of civilized society, and the higher the civilization the greater the need, is neither good laws badly administered nor bad laws well administered, for good laws badly administered are good for nothing after all, and bad laws well administered are bad laws after all, but the need is good laws well administered, or which comes to the same thing, a written code of all useful law which all may read and be able to understand, together with a learned and conscientious bench and bar that nobody can frighten.