In the ordinary course of things there is a regular payment of gold to England from the whole world, affording undoubted evidence that the bills drawn in foreign countries are not equal to those drawn there. England seems to be the loadstone which attracts gold from all parts of the globe.

I may farther observe on this part of my subject, that under the general head of foreign exchange, are comprised nominal exchange, real exchange, and computed exchange. The first has reference to the comparative value of the currencies of different countries, which depend upon the relative value of bullion in those countries, and on the quantity for which their coin or paper money will exchange. If the bullion, coin, or paper money of two countries are so adjusted, that a given quantity of the one will exchange for a proportionate equal amount of the other, the nominal exchange between those countries will be at par or equal. In whatever respects the currency of either country fails to measure an equal value of the currency of the other, the nominal exchange will accordingly be so much above or below par; so much in favor of or against the one or the other. Real exchange is that which relates to the interchange of commodities without reference to the precious metals. When two nations trading together purchase the one from the other, commodities of exactly the same value, their claims upon each other are of course equal, and the real exchange is said to be at par. If, however, the amount purchased by the one nation is greater than that purchased by the other, the real exchange will be in favor of the one and against the other to the extent of the difference between their mutual purchases. The balance is then settled by a remittance of bills, or an adequate amount of commodities or of bullion, whichever of these means the debtor finds most advantageous or economical, in order to discharge his liabilities. It may happen that the nominal exchange may be against a country, while the real exchange is in its favor. This is adjusted in the computed exchange, which makes allowance for the one and takes credit for the other, and thus shows the actual state or position of the exchange between any two or more countries, and is, in fact, the ultimate condition into which all differences must be resolved. It is the object of the mercantile system to create a favorable balance of payments, or in other words, a favorable real exchange, by giving every facility to our exports and restricting our imports. But, according to M'Culloch, so far from an excess of exports over imports being any crite rion of an advantageous Commerce, it is quite the reverse; and the truth is, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, that unless the value of the imports exceeded that of the exports, foreign trade could not be carried on.

The foreign exchanges have always a tendency to correct themselves, and their fluctuations can never for any lengthened period exceed the expense of transmitting bullion from one country to another. The transactions of the exchange brokers facilitate this tendency of the exchanges to correct themselves. They buy bills where they are cheapest, and sell them where they are dearest. Similar operations are carried on by merchants and dealers in bullion. So that while there are always circumstances which produce more or less an oscillation of the exchanges, there are at the same time operations going on to adjust and equalize them.

Art. V.-COMMERCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

TRADE OF SMYRNA IN 1853.

By the following statistics, it will be seen that the trade of Smyrna in 1853 amounted to piasters of the Grand Sequin, 335,858,000; that is to say, the imports to 131,168,890 piasters, and the exports to 204,689,770 —thus leaving a balance in favor of the Province of Smyrna.

The following tables will show, also, the navigation of the port of Smyrna during 1853

In the preceding list are included all the vessels sailing under Samian and Wallachian colors. The smaller vessels, being in the coast trade, are not included. These latter form no insignificant portion of the trade of Smyrna, and in 1853 amounted to 1,836 boats, zerniks, goelettes, &c., varying from 5 to 29 tons each, giving a total of 22,874 tons, under Ottoman, Samian, Wallachian, and Greek colors.

The Spanish dollar values in Smyrna about twenty-four piasters of the Sultan.

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 21, 1854.

JOURNAL OF MERCANTILE LAW.

DEMURRAGE-LAY DAYS IN LIVERPOOL-CHARTER PARTY, ETC., ETC. In Admiralty, United States District Court, New York, 1854. Before Judge INGERSOLL. Jonathan Pierson, et al., vs. David Ogden.

On the 28th of April, 1851, the respondent chartered the ship Hemisphere, then in this port, of the libelants, her owners, for a voyage from Liverpool to the port of New York. By the charter party it was agreed that the ship should receive on board at Liverpool a full cargo of general merchandise, and not exceeding 513 passengers; and that the ship should not be obliged to take on board an amount of iron exceeding her registered tonnage. The respondent was to provide water, provisions, and berths, and all other expenses connected with the passengers, and to pay hospital and commutation fees in New York, and quarantine expenses. If the ship provided berths, the respondent was to pay the usual price for them, and he was to buy the passenger-stores then on board at their value in Liverpool. The lay-days for loading at Liverpool were to be as follows: "Commencing from the time the captain reports himself ready to receive cargo, fifteen running lay-days; and for each and every day's detention, by default of the respondent or agent, one hundred silver dollars per day to be paid by respondent."

The libelants now sue to recover the charter money which was agreed upon at £1,500, the value of the passengers' stores on board, and seven days' demurrage at Liverpool. The respondent denies that they are entitled to demurrage, and objects to paying the charter money, on the ground that the ship did not bring a full cargo.

By the act of 3 and 4 Wm. IV., c. 52, entitled "An act for the general regu lation of the customs,” it is provided, among other things, that no goods shall be shipped, or water-borne to be shipped, on board any ship in any port or place in

the United Kingdom, to be carried beyond seas, before due entry outwards of such ship, and due entry of such goods, shall be made and cocket granted, nor before such goods shall be duly cleared for shipment, in manner therein directed, under pain of forfeiture.

It is also provided that before any goods be taken on board any outwardbound ship, the master shall deliver to the collector or controller a certificate from the proper officer of the clearance inwards of such ship on her last voyage, and also an account, signed by the master or his agent, of the entry outwards of such ship for the outward voyage, &c.

If, however, it becomes necessary to lade any heavy goods before the whole of the inward cargo is discharged, in order to stiffen or ballast the ship, it is lawful for the collector or controller to issue to the master what is called a "stiffening note," being a permit to receive such goods for that purpose. After the whole of the inward cargo is discharged, the collector issues to the master what is called a" jerk note," being a permit which authorizes him to receive on board goods for his outward cargo.

The Hemisphere set sail from this port soon after the execution of the charter party. She arrived at Liverpool in June, and soon after commenced discharging, On the 24th of June, having discharged a part of her cargo, her master obtained from the collector a "stiffening note," authorizing him to receive on board railroad iron only. On the 28th of June all her cargo was discharged, but the " jerk note," authorizing him to receive his outward cargo, was not obtained till the 30th. Some railroad iron was furnished previous to this, and before July 15 the whole cargo was furnished, consisting of railroad and other iron, crates, boxes of dry goods, &c., making up a cargo of general merchandise. The captain, on the 23d day of June, reported to the agent of the respondents that he was ready to receive cargo.

The libelants allege that the lay-days commenced on the receipt of the "stiffening note," on the 24th of June, which would give them seven days' demurrage; while the respondent claims that they did not commence until the receipt of the “jerk note,” on the 30th, in which case they would be entitled to no demurrage. The expression in the charter party is, that the lay-days commenced “from the time the master reports himself ready to receive cargo." They do not commence, however, until he has a right to report himself ready, and he has no such right until the ship is actually ready; and she is not ready as long as she is prohibited by law from receiving cargo, in consequence of the nor-performance of certain things to be done on her part, and there can be no delay on the part of the charterer until she has been so made ready.

The construction of that part of the charter party relating to lay-days is, that the charterer shall have the right to detain the ship, in order to put on board a cargo of general merchandise, fifteen days after she shall have been placed at his disposal, and not detained on business of the owner or prior charterer, and after she shall have been put in such a condition that he can put on board such a cargo. She was not detained by the charterer before June 30th, but by the owner for the purpose of discharging her inward cargo. Till that time no goods could have been put on board of her except railroad iron. The respondent was not bound to put any railroad or other iron on board under the charter party. He could put on board a cargo of general merchandise without putting on board any iron. Till the 30th of June, then, she was not ready to receive a cargo of general merchandise, and the lay-days do not commence till that time.

This also agrees with the custom of the port of Liverpool, as shown by the weight of the evidence in the cause.

No delay was occasioned to the ship in consequence of the passengers. The weight of testimony is, that she was fully and properly loaded, and the respondent has no ground for claiming that she did not bring a full cargo.

Nor has he any ground of complaint as to the number of passengers. The charter party did not require that 513 passengers should be brought at all events. A portion of the cargo was so placed between decks that so many could not have been brought without violating the act of Congress on that subject. Only 350

berths were provided by the ship, and none by the charterer; and only 350 passengers were tendered to the ship, and these she brought. The agent of the respondent did not claim that more berths should be furnished, and thereby assented that no more passengers should be brought.

The respondent is also, by the terms of the charter party, liable for the hos pital and commutation fees in New York, for quarantine expenses, and for the passenger-stores furnished by the libelant.

Decree, therefore, that the libelants recover the charter money, less what they have been paid, besides the hospital money, &c., and the price of the stores, and reference to a commissioner to ascertain the amount.

For libelant, Mr. Donohue and Mr. Parsons; for respondent, Mr. Owen.

LIABILITY OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES TO TAXATION.

In the Supreme Court (New York) General Term, July, 1834. Before Judges Mitchell, Roosevelt, and Clerke. The Mutual Insurance Company of New York vs. Joseph Jenkins.

The plaintiffs insist that they are not liable to taxation; and have brought this action against the tax collector for wrongfully--as they contend--levying on their property. Corporations, it is admitted, are liable to taxation on their capital, but mutual insurance companies, like the plaintiffs, it is argued have no capital. This position seems to me, is not maintainable either in principle or in the letter of the law. The word capital, in its general acceptation, and where not otherwise specially defined, means the stock or fund on which an individual, or firm, or corporation, trades or carries on business. Where a fixed sum, in a given instance, is especially declared to be the capital, that sum, whether increased by profits or diminished by losses, is taken as the measure of taxation, not from any principle, but because such happens to be the wording of the particular act or charter. Such was the case of the Bank of Utica. All moneyed or stock corporations deriving an income or profit are liable to taxation on their capital, and, of course, if that capital be not otherwise limited, on the fund upon which they do business. A corporation authorized by law to make insurances, whether on fires or on lives, is a moneyed corporation, and may make profits, although eo nomine, it makes no periodical dividends. In the Mutual Life Insu rance Company, who are the plaintiffs in this case, every customer, in proportion to the business he brings to the concern, is a stockholder. His shares, instead of being, as in ordinary corporations, exact aliquot parts of the common fund, are graduated by the premiums he may see fit to contribute; and the common fund or capital, instead of being confined to a fixed invariable sum, grows with the growth of those premiums, the interest being in the first instance, resorted to for the payment of losses. The mere circumstance that a portion of the common fund is liable to be withdrawn on the happening of a death, does not destroy its character as capital; the same result follows from death in the case of a partnership between individuals, and from fire or shipwreck, in the case of an ordinary insurance company. The company themselves, in their invitations to the public, obviously contemplate their moneys and securities as capital. They speak of the "stability and perpetuity" of their business, as founded on an accumulated fund of a million of dollars, securely invested in bonds and mortgages," &c. And in the act of incorporation, when directing the investment of the premiums received for insurance," it is provided that the real property to secure such "investment of capital shall in every case be worth twice the amount loaned thereon." The conclusion then is, "that the accumulated fund," by whatever name it may be designated, is the corporate property of the plaintiffs, and not the individual property of the stockholders or contrib utors, except in the same sense, and with the same qualifications, as the capital of any moneyed corporation not founded on the mutual principle; and that the plaintiffs, therefore, are liable to taxation in respect of such fund, in the same manner as any other corporation in respect of its capital.

66

Judgment of Special Term, for the reasons assigned by the judge who pro nounced the same, affirmed, with costs.