tegrity, and for want of veracity, and several of them adding that he commonly was known by the name of the lying Higgins. They uniformly speak of him as a man unfit to be intrusted with such a vessel. All this testimony is open to one general observation, that it relates to a period ten or twelve years ago when he was employed in the command of small vessels in the coasting trade of Maine, while he was young and soon after arriving at his majority.

Some years ago, precisely when does not appear, but as I collect it from the affidavits, eight or nine years, the plaintiff left this part of the country and went to New York, has since been employed as shipmaster from that port. The defendants have produced two affidavits from New York, one of Richard P. Buck, formerly of Bucksport, and now a commission merchant and ship-owner of New York, who states that he has been acquainted with Capt. Higgins for six years, that he has been consigned to him but never employed by him, that he thinks him unfit to have the command of a ship of 1,000 tons, that he would not intrust him with the command of a ship because he believed him to be incompetent, that he considers him untrustworthy and irresponsible, that he would not trust him for a hundred dollars, and he adds that he should not have given his affidavit if he had not been called upon by a subpoena. The other is of Benj. Carver, formerly a shipmaster and now a dealer in ship chandlery. He has known Hig gins for three or four years, has but little acquaintance with him, but has formed an unfavorable opinion of his character and would be unwilling to purchase into a ship of which he was part owner. This is all the evidence which the defendants have produced from New York where the plaintiff has been employed for the last eight or nine years. That of Carver is a little and but a little more than negative. That of Buck is explicit and full as to his opinion, and it may be remarked that he is the only one of the affiants who has taken pains to inform us that he gives his affidavit from necessity, and in the same breath says that he would not trust the plaintiff for one hundred dollars. This appears to me to be pretty strong language for an unwilling witness towards a neighbor, who has shown himself able to fulfill a contract for more than $20,000.

The defendants have also produced the affidavits of Mr. Curtis, and Mr. Dimmock, each president of an insurance company in Boston, who had insured vessels commanded by the plaintiff and had had losses. They both say that after examining the statement of the losses and the circumstances under which they happened, they were so dissatisfied that they should be unwilling to insure a vessel of which he had the command. If this evidence stood alone and unexplained, and unqualified, it would appear to me to be entitled to very grave consideration. If the plaintiff has justly earned such a reputation that where his character is known a vessel under his command could not be insured at all, or not at the usual rate, it would be a decisive objection to the application that he here makes, and I should feel bound to leave him to his remedy at law. But in this connection it is proper to consider the affidavit of Zebulon Cook, formerly of Boston and now of New York, an insurance broker of great experience, and entitled to full credit as a man of integrity and as an expert in the business. He was employed by the owners of one of the vessels insured in Boston to prepare a statement of the loss, and he states that in making up the statement, his intercourse with Capt. Higgins was protracted for some weeks, and that in the information and explanation he gave, he showed so much frankness and fairness that he became favorably impressed towards him, and that he has heard nothing since to change that opinion. This was one of the cases from which the Boston insurers formed their unfavorable opinion, and perhaps it would not be unreasonable to allow one opinion to balance the other.

To meet this testimony impeaching his character, the plaintiff has produced the affidavits of five gentlemen of New York and six from Boston, belonging to reputable mercantile houses, who have been acquainted with him for the last seven or eight years, who have had transactions of business with him, all speaking in strong terms of his capacity and integrity, opinions which they have formed from their intercourse with him in business, as well as from his general reputation. One of them, Mr. Dishon, of Boston, was acquainted with the affair of the

Kanabwa, one of the insurance cases complained of by the Boston offices, and formed so favorable an opinion from his own observation and what he heard of others, that he was very desirous of selling him part of a ship as late as last August, and putting him into her as master.

On a fair consideration of the plaintiff's affidavits, I think that they more than balance and neutralize those of the defendants. These relate almost exclusively to a period ten or twelve years ago. The plaintiff was then a young man just past his majority. They undoubtedly leave on the mind an unfavorable impression of the plaintiff's character at that time. But whatever the truth may be, this has not prevented him from obtaining employment and rising in his profession, and passing from the command of small coasting vessels to those of a larger class engaged in foreign trade; and for the last nine or ten years, while he has sailed from New York, notwithstanding the opinion of Mr. Buck, I feel bound to consider him as having maintained a fair reputation as a shipmaster, and as qualified and competent for any kind of business he may be required to transact in that employment, and I must hold that the excuse which the defendants have offered for not performing their engagements be removed.

The question then fairly arises, and to my mind free and disembarrassed, whether the plaintiff, on the principles upon which the courts of equity exercise this discretionary jurisdiction, is entitled to the relief, by way of injunction, for which he asks. As to the first prayer of the bill, that is an injunction against the transfer of the five-eighths of the vessel without notice of his contract and whatever rights he has under it, I can see no objection to it. If the contract gives him any right in the nature of a privilege and preference to the command of the ship, an obligation, charge, liens or nexus, which follows and adheres to the thing and qualifies the right of ownership, it is what he has bargained and paid for, and whatever it may amount to he is on every principle of justice entitled to. If it is a right of any value, he might lose it by a transfer to a bona fide purchaser without notice. But, if with notice he might have the same right, whether it is to a specific performance or only to a compensation in damages against the assignees, or against the original owners.

As to the second prayer for an injunction against the appointment of any other person to the command, there is certainly much more difficulty; nor do I pretend, after the best consideration I have been able to give to the subject, to hold an opinion far from doubt. It appears to me that this injunction ought not to be granted, unless on the ground that the contract is a proper one for a decree of specific performance, and this is only to be determined at the final hearing. I am aware that it is not unusual in cases admitting of doubt, for the court to grant a preliminary injunction, to preserve all matters unchanged till the hearing, but it is usually in cases where things may remain in statu quo without sacrifice to either party. In this case the effect may be to keep the vessel unemployed at the wharf till the hearing, to the injury of all interests.

Without undertaking to anticipate what may be the opinion of the court on a final hearing, it may not be out of place here to remark that the grounds on which the courts of equity take jurisdiction to decree a specific performance of contracts, is that a court of law can give for the breach of a contract no other remedy than damages; that in the particular case damages are an imperfect and inadequate remedy; that it is against conscience to leave to a party his election, either to pay damages for a voluntary breach of his engagements, or faithfully to perform them; and that it is unequal and unjust to the claimant to leave him to recover by a suit at law such damages as a jury may think proper to give him, in a case where the damages are uncertain and conjectural, instead of having the full benefit for which he has bargained by a specific execution of his contract.-2 Story's Equity, secs. 717-718.

It cannot be denied that this reasoning of courts of equity applies in its full form to the present case. It is sufficiently apparent in this case that the principal object of the plaintiff in this purchase was not a mere investment of money. It was to provide for himself some lucrative and honorable employment in his profession. If he had purchased only as an investment, there would be no par

ticular hardship in leaving him to an action of law for damages. A jury would have a clear and intelligible rule by which to ascertain the damages. But by what rule is a jury to calculate the damage to the plaintiff, of the disappointment in being thrown out of employment with all his available means locked up in their vessel. It is plain that the damage is altogether uncertain and conjectural.

The counsel for the defendants have urged several objections to the granting an injunction, in a line of argument tending to show that this is not a case for specific performance. By what process, it is asked, will the court enforce a specific performance, and if it is enforced of what avail will it be for the plaintiff? The force of this argument presses on the prayer for an injunction against appointing any other person as master. It is said if the plaintiff is placed in the command, that the defendants, being the major owners, may immediately displace him and appoint a new master, and that a decree for a specific performance would be nugatory. What the plaintiff asks for, and what he has bargained and paid for, is that the ship shall be finished and made ready for sea with all convenient speed, and he placed in the command. He has performed, or tendered the performance of all his part of the contract in its precise terms, and he claims a like performance on the part of the defendants. When the contract is carried into execution they may exercise all the rights the law allows them. Whether they, as major owners, can immediately remove him from the command, will be the subject of after consideration. It is certain in ordinary cases the major owners have this right. They may displace a master without assigning any

reason.

But if the master is a part owner, a court of admiralty, by which this jurisdiction is exercised, according to Lord Stowell, requires some justifying cause to be shown by the major owners beyond their own pleasure, before it will interfere to displace him.-The New Draper, 4 Rob. 290. By the common law as a tenant in common, he has equal right to the possession with any other owner, and the admiralty pays so much respect to his common law right, that it will not interfere to disturb his possession without some cause shown, and would, I think, be reluctant to do it without a sufficient cause, when the master was in possession under such a contract as this.

On the whole, I shall grant both parts of the injunction asked for. And I do it with less reluctance, as the injunction is only until the further order of the court. If I am wrong, no irreparable injury will be done to the defendants, as they may at any time apply to the circuit judge to have the injunction removed.

LIABILITY OF RAILROAD COMPANIES FOR THE DELIVERY OF GOODS, ETC.

In the March term of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, was tried the case of Nathaniel Stevens, et al., vs. the Boston and Maine Railroad Co. This was an action brought to recover the value of twelve bales of flannel, which were sent by the plaintiffs from Andover over the defendants' road to Boston, on Saturday, November 2, 1850. The goods arrived, and were unloaded on the afternoon of that day. On Monday, November 4, the agent of the plaintiffs called for the goods, but the delivery agent of the defendants replied that they had been taken away by some other team. The agent of the plaintiff's owned several teams. The goods at this time were in the freight depot of the defendants, not having been taken away; but the delivery agent had made a mistake, owing, as he said, to the fact that the goods were not removed on Saturday, the day of arrival. The goods were destroyed by fire with the depot, on the night of the 4th of November. Previous to the fire no notice of the mistake was given to the plaintiffs or their agent.

Shaw, C. J. The defendants are liable as bailees. The plaintiffs called for the goods, and did not receive them, owing to the mistake of the defendants' agent. The delivery agent has a way bill, which affords him the necessary infor mation to enable him to deliver the right goods to the right person, and it is his duty to deliver when called upon. His failure to deliver, upon request, is negligence, for which the defendants are liable to the full value of the goods.

SHIP-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF-NO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-REGISTRY ACT.

According to the proper construction to be on the 34th section of the 8th and 9th Victoria, c. 89, (the Ship Registry Act,) a court of equity will not enforce specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a ship, although such contract does not affect to make a present transfer of the ship, but is merely executory; the property in a registered ship can be transferred only by a bill of sale, containing a recital of the certificate of registry of such ship. Hughes vs. Morris, 19 Law Times Rep., 210.) This point turned upon the construction to be put on the eighty-fourth section of the last Ship Registry Act, (8th and 9th Victoria, c. 89,) which, in some degree varying from the previous acts, enacts, “That when and so often as the property in any ship or vessel, or any part thereof, belonging to any of her majesty's subjects, shall, after registry thereof, be sold to any other or others of her majesty's subjects, the same shall be transferred by bill of sale or other instrument, in writing, containing a recital of the certificate of registry of such ship or vessel, or the principal contents thereof; otherwise such transfer shall not be valid or effectual for any purpose whatever, either in law or in equity; provided always that no bill of sale shall be deemed void by reason of any error in such recital, or by the recital of any former certificate of registry, instead of the existing certificate, provided the identity of the ship or vessel intended in the recital be effectually proved thereby." Lord Justice Cranworth, in reference to the above section, observed :--" The language in this statute is altogether very informal; thus we have property in a ship to be sold;' the proper expression would be,' the ship sold;' then the statute goes on 'that so often as any property in any ship or vessel, or any part thereof belonging to any of her majesty's subjects, shall be sold, the same shall be transferred by bill of sale,' containing such and such particulars, otherwise such transfer shall not be valid for any purpose whatsoever.' What is said by the counsel for the plaintiff is, that a contract, although not valid to transfer the property, may make the party the owner in equity. That would be to get rid of the whole policy of the statute, which is, (whether a sound policy or not we need not inquire,) that there should be the means of seeing conclusively, by tracing from the original grand bill of sale, as it is called, from owner to owner, the ownership for all time. But if this doctrine that is contended for be right, there never need anything appear in any document from the very first sale, because it may well be a sale in equity, which would be just as good, and handed from party to party, and I do not see why the whole policy of the statute may not be got rid of entirely and effectually, even supposing there be an alteration in the law by the omission in the last registry statute, which is merely an alteration with respect to a right of action, and not an alteration that can affect the question of equity."

COUNTERFEITING TRADE MARKS.

A decision of some importance to manufacturers was recently rendered in the Superior Court of Connecticut, whereby it is shown that manufacturers are liable for imitating or approaching the imitation of the tra le marks and labels of other manufacturers. This point has been similarly held in previous cases in the United States.

The present suit was brought at the instance of Messrs. J. & P. Coats, manufacturers and sellers of spool cotton, of Paisley, Scotland, against the Wellington Thread Company of Connecticut, for an infringement of the labels used on the spools.

They show that the Wellington Thread Company, at Wellington, Tolland County, Connecticut, manufacture spool cotton also; but imitate the mark of Messrs. Coats & Co., so as to make it appear as "Coats' best six cord, 200 yards;" and that the article is really inferior, and contains only 150 yards.

An injunction has been granted by the Superior Court against the Wellington Thread Co., to prevent the further use of the "false and simulated labels and wrappers on their thread," under the penalty of ten thousand dollars. The Company was also taxed for the costs of suit.

CARRIERS BY SEA-BILLS OF LADING-ROBBERS-DANGERS OF THE ROAD.

The following decision of the Court of Exchequer, as to the liability of shipowners undertaking the carriage of goods, will be of some interest to mercantile men. The plaintiff sought to recover from the defendants the value of a box of gold dust, part of 11 received by them from Panama, to be carried to the Bank of England. The defendants carried the goods from Panama across the Isthmus, by land, shipped at Chagres, and brought them by steam-vessels to Southampton, and thence carried them by the London and Southwestern Railway to London. The bill of lading was given for them at Panama, acknowledging the receipt of 11 packages, said to contain 7,000 and odd ounces of gold dust, to be carried to the Bank of England, "the act of God, the Queen's enemies, robbers, fire, accidents from machinery, boilers, steam, dangers of the sea, roads, and rivers, of whatsoever nature or kind, excepted."

All the packages arrived safely at Southampton, and were placed on the railroad to be carried to London; but one of them was stolen secretly from the railroad truck before their arrival there, and the jury found that the defendants were guilty of negligence in the conveyance of them to London, which caused the loss. The defendants pleaded the exceptions in the bill of lading, in two different pleas, one stating that the loss was occasioned by robbers, the other by dangers of the roads. At the trial both pleas were found for the defendants, but with a reservation of liberty to enter a verdict on both for the plaintiff. A rule nisi for the purpose having been granted, the case on behalf of the defendants was elaborately and fully argued. The Court of Exchequer decided that where, as in this case, the property was pilfered, or taken by stealth, the defendants were liable for the loss, although they would not have been so liable had it been taken by a vis major which they could not resist; the word "robbers" meaning persons thieving with violence; and that the exception, "dangers of the roads," meant marine roads in which vessels lie at anchor, or dangers caused by the overturning of carriages in ruts or precipitous places. (De Rothschild vs. the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, 19, Law Times Rep., 229.)

SHIP-OWNERS-INSURANCE.

The following important decision to ship-owners, in the case of Dean vs. Hornby, is from an English paper.

In this case the facts had been turned into a special case for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench. The plaintiff was the owner of a vessel called the Eliza Cornish, on which he had effected, with the defendant, a time policy from April, 1851, to 1852. In November, 1851, the vessel sailed from Valparaiso to Liverpool, and on the 1st of December in that year, while passing through the Straits of Magellan, it was seized by pirates, who appeared to be men in rebellion against the Chilian government. The fact of its seizure was communicated to the commander of her majesty's ship the Virago, who was stationed in those seas, and he recaptured it, put some men on board, and sent it to England to be adjudicated on in the admirality court there. In the course of the voyage it sustained some damage, and was taken into the port of Fayal for repairs. While there it was repaired by the purchaser, and finally came, abandoned and sold, to England. On intelligence of the capture by the pirates reaching England, the plaintiff sent in a formal claim for a total loss, stating the capture as a total loss; but also stating in his notice that the ship had been taken back to and condemned at Valparaiso. This statement of condemnation was erroneous. The underwriters declined to receive the notice of abandonment, on the ground that the vessel having been in fact brought to England, no total loss had occurred, but the owner might recover possession of it under the 13th and 14th Vic., c. 26. It was found as a fact that none of the crew or any one on the part of the plaintiff had any control over the vessel from the time of the capture, and the question under these circumstance was, whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover for a total loss. The court was of opinion that on the true principles of insurance law, and according to decided cases, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.