Ejectment. Oh the 5th of October, 1769, plaintiff agreed to let to défendant a farm, to hold the arable land from the 13th of February then next, the pasture from the 5th of April, and the meadow from the 12th of May, for seven years, at a yearly rent, payable at Michaelmas and Lady Day, the first payment to be made at Michaelmas then next; and the defendant to have a way-going crop of three parts of the arable land after the expiration of the term, paying so much per acre. On the 30th of September, 1777, the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to quit the arable land on the 13th of February next, the pasture on the 5th of April, and the meadow on the 12th of May; a question arose, whether this notice was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover the whole or any part of the premises, the defendants, counsel having objected, that the notice to quit ought to have been given on the 13th of August, viz. half a year previously to the 13th of February, from which time the arable ground was holden; it was resolved by three justices (absente de Grey C. J.) that the notice to quit was sufficient; that the true construction of the agreement was, that it was a holding from Lady Day to Lady Day, the rent being payable at Michaelmas and Lady Day; and though part of the farm was to be entered on and quitted at old. Candlemas, and the other not until old May Day, yet the custom of most countries would have directed the same in a taking from old Lady Day: that in the present case, any inconvenience, which the tenant might suffer, was obviated by that part of the agreement, which provided for his having a way-going crop.

The rule of construction laid down in the preceding case of Doe v. Snowdon, was recognised and adopted in Doe v. Spence, 6 East, 120., where, under an agreement by a tenant of a farm, to enter on the tillage land at Candlemas, and on the house and other premises at Lady Day following; and that, when he left the farm, he should quit the same according to the times of entry as aforesaid, and the p Doe d. Dagget v. Snowdon, 2 Bl. R. q Recognised in Doe v. Watkins, 7 East, 551.

1224.

with reference to the time of entry on the other parts, which are only auxiliary to the principal subject of the demise. Neither is it necessary, that separate notices to quit the other parts should be given, where all the parts are demised as one entire thing. One notice, given in conformity with the rule laid down in the text, is sufficient.

rent, which was an entire rent for all the premises demised, was reserved half yearly at Michaelmas and Lady Day; it was: holden, that a notice to quit, delivered half a year before Lady Day, but less than half a year before Candlemas, was good.

In ejectment for the recovery of messuages and lands, &c. on a demise laid the 11th of June, 1805, it appeared, that the premises in question, in possession of the defendants, consisting of dwelling houses, out-houses, mills, and other manufacturing buildings, and a few acres of meadow and pasture land, and bleaching grounds, together with all water-courses, &c., were holden under a written agreement for a lease, dated the 1st of January, 1792, for a term of thirty. five years, to commence, as to the meadow ground, from the 25th of December then last past; as to the pasture ground from the 52th of March next; and as to the housing, mills, and reste of the premises, from the 1st of May next; under one entire rent, viz. a yearly rent payable at Pentecost and Martinmas, the first payment to be made at Pentecost then next. notice to quit was served on the defendants, on the 28th of September, 1804, to quit at the expiration of the then cur rent year of their holding. It was objected that the notice was insufficient, on the ground that the substantial time of entry was either the 25th of December, whence the first holding, as to the meadow ground, was to commence; or from Martinmas preceding, the rent being reserved at Pentecost, and Martinmas, and the first half year being payable at Pentecost. But the court overruled the objection, and held the notice to be sufficient; Grose J. observing, that it was right to adhere to the rule laid down in Doe v. Spence, which was founded in good sense and convenience, that the half year's notice to quit should be given with reference to the substantial time of entry of the tenant, and when that was, must depend on what was the substantial part of the thing demised, whereon the tenant enters. In the present case, the substantial part of the demise was the house and manufacturing buildings, &c. on which the tenant was to enter on the 1st of May; that, therefore, was the substan- · tial, day of entry. Le Blanc J. added, that the substantial time of entry was not necessarily to be collected from the rent days, though it happened in the case of Doe v. Spence, that the tenant entered on the substantial part of the premises on the day from which the rent was reckoned.

It' is a question of fact for the jury to decide, which is the principal and which the accessorial subject of demise.-This

r Doe v. Watkins and another, 7 East, s Doe on d. of Heapy v. Howard, 11 East, 498.

551.

being found, the judge may then determine, whether the notice to quit has been given in due time.

Requisites of Notice. With respect to the notice to quit, it may be observed, that although a parol notice is sufficient', yet it is more adviseable to give a written notice. The terms in which the notice is expressed should be clear and definite, in order to avoid any objection on this ground at the trial of the ejectment; for it has been holden", that where an irregular notice is given, it is not incumbent on the party served with it, to make an objection to it at the time of service; it is sufficient if he object to it at the trial. The courts, however, seem to listen to these objections with reluctance, and will, if possible, so construe the notice as to give effect to it. Hence, "I desire you to quit, &c. or I shall insist on double rent;" has been holden a good notice. So upon a taking from old Michaelmas to old Michaelmas, a notice to quit at Michaelmas will be sufficient, at least if it be proved, that the tenancy commenced at old Michaelmas2. So a notice delivered at Michaelmas, 1796, " to quit at Lady Day which will be in the year 1795," was adjudged to be good; for the intention is clear, and the words, " in the year 1795," may be rejected. So a notice to quit at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy, which shall expire next after the end of one half year from the date of the notice, is sufficient, although no particular day is mentioned. It is, however, essentially necessary, that the notice should be to quit at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy; that is, if the defendant hold from Michaelmas, the notice must be given half a year before Michaelmas, to quit at Michaelmas; if from Lady Day, at Lady Day, &c.; for, if a notice to quit at Midsunimer be given to a tenant holding from Michaelmas, or vice versâ, it will be insufficient; and a notice to quit at a particular day is not prima facie evidence of a holding from that day, though a contrary doctrine was formerly holden", unless it is served personally on

t Per Ellenborough C. J. in Doe d. Ld. Macartney v. Crick, 5 Esp. N. P. C. 197.

u Oakapple d. Green v. Copous, 4 T. R. 361. But see Doe d. Leicester, 2 Taunt. 109.

x Doe d. Matthews v. Jackson, Doug. 175.

y Per Heath J. Gloucester Sum. Ass. 1800. Woodf. Land. & Ten. p. 224. gd ed.

z Doe d. Hinde v. Vince, 2 Camp. N. P. C. 256. per Sr. A. Mc. Dowald, C. B. and S. P. per Ld. Ellen

borough C J. in Doe v. Brookes, 2 Camp. N. P. C. 257. n.

a Doe d. D. of Bedford v. Kightley, 7 T. R. 63.

b 2 Esp. N. P. C. 589.

c Oakapple d. Green v. Copous, 4 T. R. 361.

d2 Camp. N. P. C. 258. n. Doe d. Ash v. Calvert, 2 Camp. N. P. C.

389.

e Doe d. Puddicombe v. Harris, per Eyre Baron, Dorset Sum. Ass. 1794, 1 T. R. 101.

the tenant, who makes no objection at the time. In a case where the notice (which was delivered on the 29th of September) was to quit on the 25th of March, or the 8th day of April, next ensuing, defendant having objected to it on the ground that it did not express with sufficient accuracy the end of the tenancy, and the time when the defendant was to quit, and that at all events it was incumbent on the lessor of the plaintiff to shew that the defendant's tenancy commenced either on the 25th of March or 8th of April, Lord Kenyon C. J. ruled the notice to be sufficient, and that the onus of proving the commencement of his tenancy lay on the defendants. N. In this case the demise was laid on a day subsequent to the 8th of April. It will be proper to remark, that where the tenant, being applied to by his landlord respecting the commencement of his holding, informs him that it began on a certain day, and the landlord gives the tenant a notice to quit agreeably to the information received", the tenant will be precluded from contending that his tenancy commenced on a different day, even though he can prove that the information which he gave his landlord proceeded on a mistake, and not from an intention to deceive.

A receipt for rent up to a particular day is prima facie evidence of the commencement of the tenancy at that day.

It is not essentially necessary that the notice should be directed to the defendant, if the terms of it shew that the defendant is tenant to the plaintiff, and if it is proved to have been served on the defendant at the proper time. Neither is it necessary for a landlord to give notice to any one but his own tenant', although such tenant may have underlet part of the demised premises. A. tenant from year to yearm to B., from Michaelmas, 1801, underlet part of the premises to C. A. without receiving any regular notice to quit, from B., agreed to give him up possession at Michaelmas, 1810, and B. then took possession of all that A. had continued to occupy; but C. having before refused to deliver his part, was served in the February preceding, with a notice to quit at Michaelmas, 1810, from B., to whom he had never paid rent, or otherwise acknowledged as his immediate landlord, but had paid his rent to A. up to Michaelmas, 1808, and had

tendered him the rent which had accrued since that time, which A. had refused to receive. B. brought an ejectment against C.; it was holden, that the notice was insufficient, B. not having given any regular notice to A. his immediate tenant; and A. not having given any such notice to C.; for without one or other of such notices, C.'s interest in the part underlet continued. Lord Ellenborough observed, "that a tenancy from year to year was determinable either by a regular notice to quit; or, he might say, for the purpose of this case, by a surrender of a part of the premises in the name of the whole: but A. had not done even that; for he merely ceased to reside on the part which he had retained in his own possession, without making a surrender in the name of the whole. But while he was tenant from year to year of the whole, he let off a part to the defendant; and nothing has been done to put an end to the tenancy as to that part." Evidence that the notice was delivered and explained to the servant of the tenant at his dwelling house, though such dwelling house be not situated on the demised premises, is presumptive evidence that the notice came to the hands of the tenant", the servant not being called. But evidence of the notice having been left at the tenant's house, without farther proof of its having been delivered to a servant, who is not called, or that it came to the tenant's hands, is not sufficient. Evidence of the notice being served on the premises, on one of two joint tenants, who resided on the premises, is presumptive evidence that the notice. reached the other joint tenant, who resided elsewhere.

Waver of Notice.-Where a notice to quit has been given, the lessor must be careful not to do any act which may be construed as an affirmance of the tenancy and a waver of the notice. A distress for rent, which accrued after the expiration of the time, at which, by the notice, the tenant is to quit, is an acknowledgment of the tenancy; so is the acceptance of rent so due'; but it shall be left to the jury to say whether the money received were received as rent; for whether it shall be a waver of the notice depends on the intention of the parties, which is a matter of fact to be left to the jury (15).

(15) In the case of a tenancy from year to year, if at the expi