very severely. Her favorite branches of philosophy were morals and politics, and upon these she reasons through all her writings with great freedom and ability.

In morals she embraced and supported, with singular zeal, the system which places the essence of virtue in the benevolent motive of the agent, and not in the useful tendency of the action. She treats with undisguised contempt the idea, that calculation can have any connexion with moral goodness; and regards feeling as the only elevated and really correct guide of conduct. Considered as a specimen of logical inquiry, there is a want of closeness and precision in her reasoning upon this, as upon most other points of philosophy. It is a part of the sublime and beautiful order of the universe, that good feelings tend to produce good consequences; and both these theories of virtue, abstractly considered, are therefore equally true. To deny that it is possible ever to do good by calculation, would be either to deny that good feelings tend to useful results, or to deny that we can perceive the connexion between them; neither of which points is at all tenable. There is, therefore, something of passion and even party in the ardor with which Madame de Stael supports the doctrine of sympathy, and attacks that of utility. But considering the state of moral philosophy in France at the time when she began to write, she is entitled to great credit for adopting these opinions. The French philosophers of the last century, in their analysis of the mind, almost wholly overlooked the existence of sympathetic feelings, or, as they are called by a writer in the Edinburgh Review, with happy technical precision, felt relations, and resolved all sentiments into self-love. On this system, the promotion of our own advantage is the only natural motive of action; and as it does not seem to have been intended that we should act upon large views of distant consequences, it would on this supposition be natural, and of course right, that we should sacrifice the happiness of others to our own. Thus, these philosophers neglected the most beautiful feature in the order of Providence, which has provided for the general good, by giving to each individual a natural desire to promote the happiness of others, as well as his own, and has neutralised by a contrary principle, at least as strong, the malignant operation of pure self-love. This selfish philosophy had become universal in France, and had been brought into view in combination with the grossest and

most revolting materialism, to which it does not necessarily lead, but with which it may be easily connected. No modern French writer had espoused the contrary doctrine, at least in a dogmatical form, previously to Madame de Stael. Hence, although there was no real novelty in the doctrine of sympathy, she had something of the merit of philosophical discovery, in reviving it with so much zeal and vigor in a country where it had fallen into discredit. Her manner of explaining the doctrine is somewhat vague and incorrect, as we have observed above. Instead of contenting herself with reinstating the principle of sympathy in its rights, as co-operating with that of utility to produce the moral harmony of the universe, she denies with a sort of passion, that there can be any community between utility and goodness. Nor is she perfectly exact in her view of the value of sympathetic feelings. She seems very much disposed to give the character of virtue exclusively to acts that involve a sacrifice of our own interest to that of others, which is one step beyond the doctrine of pure disinterestedness, as a man may act without any view to his own interest, when he does not absolutely sacrifice it. This idea can hardly be admitted, although the promotion of the happiness of others, at the expense of our own, may well be considered as the highest act of virtue, since it is the most difficult. But these terms are used with very little precision by most other writers, and it was not the particular object of Madame de Stael to reform or fix the nomenclature of moral science, but to recommend a particular view of it to the public. By supporting the general doctrine of sympathy as she understood it, with her ardent and enthusiastic eloquence, she has done far more good, than would have been effected by a cold logical analysis, had it even been more exact in the details.

Although the speculations of Madame de Stael on this subject are somewhat deficient in precision, they are more profound and scientific than in any other department of philosophy. Metaphysics, as we have already seen, she has treated in a light and superficial way; and the critical remarks on various ancient and modern writers interspersed in her different works, though often very just and ingenious, and always indicative of a highly cultivated mind, do not seem to be the result of a philosophical investigation of the principles of taste. In politics her observations are almost wholly practi

cal; and she has made no effort to improve in theory the science of government. It would be difficult, however, to cite any political writings of modern times, which display a more truly liberal and philosophical spirit. Whatever errors there may be in her judgments respecting persons or things, they are never tinctured with malignity or vitiated by narrow and partial views. Her point of observation is uniformly elevated, and her scope of vision is consequently large and expansive. She rises above the bewildering and poisonous atmosphere of vulgar party spirit, and is ready to allow, that the mistakes of her adversaries and her own juster views are alike the results of the ordinary motives that influence opinion and conduct. A false judgment is not, with her, the necessary consequence of a bitter malignant spirit, but an accidental effect of the frailty of human nature. Though strongly attached to liberal institutions and representative government, she can still, at times, discover merit in a monarch, or even in a minister and what is still more extraordinary, though warmly French in her sentiments, she is an enthusiastic admirer of England and every thing English. The only two points in which she exhibits strong prejudice are her partiality for her father and her hatred of Bonaparte. The first of these feelings is too natural and amiable to be excepted against, though it gives unquestionably a false coloring to the early part of her work on the revolution. The other has so much foundation in justice, that it is rather difficult to say where honest indignation ends and personal hostility begins. In her judgments of other characters, she uniformly displays the most amiable feelings. She is candid and charitable in her notices of acknowledged errors, generous in her construction of doubtful passages, and unreservedly liberal in her commendation of excellence, intellectual and moral. We rise from the perusal of her works, even such as treat of those topics that are ordinarily employed to excite the worst and most malignant passions, with warmer benevolence and higher ideas of the nature and destiny of man. The writer who can produce these effects has little need to be ambitious of higher excellence.

At this last appearance of Madame de Stael before the critical tribunal, we have thought it not unprofitable to take this general survey of her literary character, without entering into a detailed examination of her particular works, the most important of which have been noticed, as they appeared, in this

journal. It will be seen by the tone of our remarks, that in the deductions we have made from her merit we have not been moved by a wish to depreciate her reputation. It is due to justice to say, that she was unsuccessful alike in poetical invention and execution, to both which qualities she made pretensions; that she has no claim to the praise of discovery in her philosophical researches; and is far from being remarkable for developing the truths made known by others with logical correctness and precision. But after these exceptions are made, there will remain for Madame de Stael praise enough to satisfy the ambition of more than common minds. She thinks freely and writes with power and elegance upon the most important subjects. This union of merits is itself extremely rare and remarkable. Experience shows, that even in an age of refinement, there are not more than three or four individuals in a generation who can fairly make pretensions to it. When we add to this the exhibition of high moral enthusiasm, and all the most exalted and amiable feelings, that appears in her works, we may well conclude that there are few literary reputations, though belonging technically to a higher class, of which the daughter of Necker had reason to be envious. One of the strongest proofs of her real merit is the fact, that her writings are uniformly criticised and judged without regard to the sex of the author. No attempt is made to palliate their deficiencies or exalt their excellence by suggesting that the praise or the blame must attach to a lady. This consent of the public, which has not been shown in any other case, sufficiently proves that Madame de Stael was not an extraordinary female writer, but an extraordinary writer. With all the merit of the present race of female authors in England, no one of them that we recollect has a right to claim an equality with her in this particular, far less to contest her superiority. Of these writers Miss More has the least femality (to use a coarse word, manufactured by Richardson,) in her mode of thinking and writing; but her style, though pure and manly, has no grace and little power, and her reach of mind. is limited. Though remarkable as a female writer, she is quite secondary in the general literary scale. In the works of Miss Edgeworth, however interesting and valuable, we catch not unfrequently, a glimpse of the petticoat. She is much more at home in the boudoir and the ball room than in the cabinet or the court of justice, and manages Mrs Falconer far

more gracefully than the commissioner or his dignified and somewhat dull master. She knits up and unravels the ladylike network of a love intrigue with good success, though fable is, after all, not her strong point; but the specimens she has given us in Patronage of her diplomatic and professional address are at best of equivocal merit. To our taste, and we say it without meaning to disparage but rather to exalt her reputation, she is, most of all happy and engaging in the citizen's workshop and parlor and the Irish cottage. These are her fields of triumph and thrones of glory. Indeed as we feel the tears stealing to our eyes at the mere recollection of some of these scenes, and think of the true poetical talent with which she has hit off many of her characters, as for instance the charming Geraldine, we are half tempted to return upon our decision, and award her the preference over Madame de Stael. Let the palm rest between them, as it does in almost every thing, between the two illustrious nations to which they belong.

The posthumous works of Madame de Stael, to which our attention is now particularly called, will add nothing to the literary reputation of their author. They are made up of her unsuccessful attempts at poetry, whether in verse or prose, already adverted to, and of a fragment, entitled Ten years in Exile, which, had it been completed, would have given the history of an interesting period in her own life. In its In its present shape, it is of very little value as a literary composition. It is not only an unfinished fragment, but a great part of it had already been employed as materials for the composition of the work on the revolution. Under these circumstances, the expediency of publishing it may perhaps be looked on as doubtful; but on the whole, we cannot regret the determination which has given us, though in an imperfect and mutilated form, the autobiography of so fine a writer. There are also a few passages of great interest, and which will serve as contributions to the political history of the period. Neither this work, nor that of Madame de Necker, nor both together, furnish a satisfactory account of the life of Madame de Stael; so that a biography of her is still a desideratum. The work of Madame de Necker is indifferently executed. It is almost wholly made up of speculations upon the value of the writings of her heroine-speculations which are hardly of the first order, and which, if they were better, are not what is expected from the writer of her biograNew Series, No. 9

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