lutely final and conclusive upon each of such claims, decided upon by him or them respectively, and to give full effect to such decision without any objection or delay whatsoever.

It is agreed that-no- claim arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the 26th of July, 1853, the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the convention of the 8th of February, 1853, shall be admissible under this convention.

Article III.

Every claim shall be presented to the commissioners within six months from the day of their first meeting, unless in any case where reasons for delay shall be established to the satisfaction of the commissioners, or of the arbitrator or umpire in the event of the commissioners differing in opinion thereupon; and then, and in any such case, the period for presenting the claim maybe extended to anytime not exceeding three months longer.

The commissioners shall be.bound to examine and decide upon every claim within two years from the day of their first meeting. It shall be competent for the commissioners, or for the arbitrator or umpire if they differ, to decide in each case whether any claim has or has not been duly made, preferred, or laid before them, either wholly, or to any and what extent, according to the true intent and meaning of this convention.

Article IV.

All sums of money which maybe awarded by the commissioners, or by the arbitrator or umpire, on account of any claim, shall be paid in coin or its equivalent by the ©ne Government to the other, as the case may be, within eighteen months after the date of the decision,-without interest.

Article V.

The high contracting parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of this commission as a full and final settlement of every claim upon either Government arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the present convention; and further engage that every

such claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred, or laid before the said commission, shall, from and after the conclusion of the proceedings of the said commission, be considered and treated as finally settled and barred, and thenceforth inadmissible. Article VI.

The commissioners and the arbitrator or umpire appointed by them shall keep an accurate record and correct minutes or notes of all their proceedings, with thedates thereof, and shall appoint and employ clerks or other persons to assist them in the transaction of the business which may come before them.

The secretary shall be appointed by the Secretary of State of the United States and by her Britannic Majesty's representative at Washington jointly.

Each Government shall pay the salaries of its own commissioners. All other expenses, and the contingent expenses of the commission, including the salary of the secretary, shall be defrayed in moieties by the two parties.

Article VII.

The present convention shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate' thereof, and by her Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as may be within twelve months from the date hereof.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

Done at London, the fourteenth dayof January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine. [seal.] Reverdy Johnson-,

[seal.] Clarendon.

[note.—Although the seal of secrecy has not been removed from the proceedings of the Senate upon this treaty, it is understood that but one vote—that of Mr. Thomas C. McCreery, of Kentucky—was ,given in favor of its ratification.—E. McP.l

Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

1871, January 30—Mr. Bingham, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, made the following report; which was recommitted and ordered printed:

The memorialist asks the enactment of a law by Congress which shall secure to citizens of the United States in the several States the right to vote "without regard to sex." Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution there is no longer any rea

son to doubt that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside; for that is the express declaration of the amendment.

The clause of the fourteenth amendment, "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those privileges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article four, section two. The fourteenth'amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities before mentioned, but was deem eel necesvsary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon the powers of the States, it had been judicially determined that the first eight articles of amendment ofthe Constitution were not limitations on the power of the States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of the provision of the second section, fourth article.

To remedy this defect of the Constitution, the express limitations upon the States contained in the first section of the fourteenth amendment, together with the grant of power in Congress to enforce them by legislation, were incorporated in the Constitution. The words li citizens of the United States," and "citizens of the States," as employed in the fourteenth amendment, did not change or modify the relations of citizens of the State and nation as they existed under the original Constitution.

Attorney General Bates gave the opinion that the Constitution uses the word ''citizen" only to express the political quality of the individual in his relation to the nation; to declare that he is a member of the body-politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the one side and protection„on the other. "The phrase 'acitizen ofthe United States,' without addition or qualification, means neither more nor less than a member of the nation." (Opinion of Attorney General Bates on citizenship.)

The Supreme Court ofthe Unites States has ruled that, according to the express words and clear meaning of the second section, fourth article of the Constitution, no privileges are secured by it except those which belong to citizenship. (Conner et al. vs. Elliott et al.» 18 Howard, 593.)

In Corfield vs. Coryell, (4 Washington Circuit Court Reports, 380,) the court say:

"The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free Governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole; the right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State for the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise j to

claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to. take, hold, and dispose of property either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State-ni'iy be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which m;->y be added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised." * * # *

'•But we cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel, that under this provision of the Constitution (section two, article four) the -citizens of the several States are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens ot any other particular Srate."

The learned Justice Story declared that the intention of the clause (''the citizens of each State shall be entitled io ail the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States") was to confer on the citizens of each State a general citizenship, and communicated all the privileges and immunities which a citizen of the same State would be entitled to under the same circumstances. (Story on the Constitution, volume two, page 605.)

In the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Primrose, in the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Webster said:

a That this article in the Constitution (article four, section two) does not, confer on the citizens of each State political rights in every other State, is admitted. A citizen of Pennsylvania cannot go into Virginia and vote at any election in that State, though when he has acquired a residence in Virginia, and is otherwise qualified as is required by the constitution (of Virginia) he becomes, without formal adoption as a citizen of Virginia, a citizen of that State politically. (Webster's Works, volume six, page 112.)

It must be obvious that Mr. Webster was of opinion that the privileges and immunities of citizens, guarantied to them in the several States, did not include the privilege of the elective franchise otherwise than as secured by the State constitution. For, after making the statement above quoted, that a citizen of Pennsylvania cannot go into Virginia and vote, Mr. Webster adds, "but for the purposes of trade, commerce, buying and selling, it is evidently not in the power of any State to impose any hinderance or embarrassment, &c.:, upon citizens of other States, or to place them, going there, upon a different footing from her own citizens." {Ibid.)

The proposition is clear that no citizen of the United States can rightfully vote in any State of this Union who has not the qualifications required by the constitution of the State in which the right is claimed to be exercised, except as to such conditions in the constitution of such States as deny the right to vote to citizens resident therein "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

The adoption of the fifteenth amendment of the Constitution, imposing these three limitations upon the power of the several States, was, by necessary implication, a declaration that the States had the power to regulate by a uniform rule the conditions upon which the elective franchise should be exercised by citizens of the United States resident therein. The limitations specified in the fifteenth amendment exclude the conclusion that a State of this Union, having a government republican in form, may not prescribe conditions upon which alone citizens may vote other than those prohibited. It can hardly be said that a State lav/ which excludes from voting women citizens, minor citizens, and non-resident citizens of the United States, on account of sex, minority, or domicile, is a denial of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

It may be fun her added that the second section of the fourteenth amendment, by the provision that "when the right to vote at any eletrtion^foT the choice of electors of President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, or executive and judicial officers of the State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State," implies that the several States may restrict the elective franchise as to other than^male citTzens. In disposing of this question effect must be given, if possible, to every provision of the Constitution. Article one, section two, of the Constitution provides:

"That the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature."

This provision has always been construed to vest in the several States the exclusive right to prescribe the qualifications of electors for the most numerous branch of the State Legislature, and therefore for members of Congress. And this interpretation is supported by section four, article one, of the Constitution, which provides—

"That the time, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at anytime by law make or alter such regulations except as to the place of choosing Senators."

Now, it is submitted, if it had been intended that Congress should prescribe the qualification of electors, that the grant would have read: the Congress may at anytime bylaw make or alter such regulations, and also prescribe the qualificationpf„.Bie^to^s^&c. The powerf oh the contrary, is limited exclusively to the time, place,.anjdananner^ and does not

extend to the qualification of the electors. This power to prescribe the qualification of electors in the several States has always been exercised, and is to-day, by the several States of the Union; and we apprehend, until the Constitution shall be changed, will continue to be so exercised, subject only to the express limitations imposed by the Constitution upon the several States, betore noticed. We are of opinion, therefore, that it is not competent for the Congress of the United States to establish by law the right to vote without regard to sex iu^he^'several States of this Union without the consent of the people of such States and against their constitutions and laws; and that such legislation would be, in our judgment, a violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the rights reserved to the States respectively by the Constitution. It is undoubtedly the right of the people of the several States so to reform their constitutions and laws as to secure the equal exercise of the right of suffrage at all elections held therein, under the Constitution of the United States, to all citizens, without regard to sex; and as public opinion creates constitutions and governments in the several States, it is not to be doubted that whenever, in any State, the people are of opinion that such a reform is advisable, it will be made.

If, however, as is claimed in the memorial referred to, the right to vote ** is vested by the Constitution in the citizens of the United States without regard to sex," that right can be established in the courts without further legislation.

The suggestion is made that Congress by a mere declaratory act shall say that the construction claimed in the memorial is the true construction of the Constitution, or, in other words, that by the Constitution of the United States the right to vote is vested in citizens of the United States u without regard to sex," anything in the constitution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. In the opinion of the committee such declaratory act is not authorized by the Constitution nor within the legislative power of Congress. We therefore recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

Besolved, That the prayer of the petitioner be not granted ; that the memorial be laid on the table, and that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from the further consideration of the subject.

February 1—Mr. Loughridge, from the same committee, submitted the following minority report, (which, from its extreme length, it becomes necessary to condense,) signed by himself and Mr. B. F. Butler:

'-* 7r ■■■¥■ •:;- A- x -x- *

The question presented is one of exceeding interest and importance, involving as it does the constitutional rights not only of the memorialist but of more than one half of the citizens of the United States—a question of constitutional law in which the civil and the natural rights of the citizen are involved. Questions of propriety or of expediency have nothing to do with it. The question is not "Would it be expedient to extend the right of suffrage to women?" but" Have women citizens that right by the Constitution as it is?" * * * * The question is to be decided by the Constitution and the fundamental principles of our Government, and not by the usage and dogmas of the past. " *' . * * * * . *

The people of the United States determined this question by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, which declares that—

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or ^enforce iany law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."

This amendment, after declaring who are citizens of the United States, and thus fixing but one grade of citizenship, which insures to all citizens alike all the privileges, immunities, and rights which accrue to that condition, goes on in the same section and prohibits these privileges and immunities from abridgment by the States.

^ Whatever these "privileges and immunities" are, they attach to the female citizen equally with the male. It is implied by this amendment that they are inherent, that they belong to citizenship as such, for they are not therein specified or enumerated.

The majority of the committee hold that the privileges guarantied by the fourteenth amendment do not refer to any other than the privileges embraced in section two of article four of the,original text. * * *

Section two of article four provides for the privileges of "citizens of the States," while the first section of the fourteenth amendment protects the privileges of "citizens of the. United States." The terms "citizens of the States "and "citizens of the United States'' are by no means convertible.

A circuit court of the United States seems to hold a different view of this question from that stated by the committee.

In the case of the Live Stock Association vs. Crescent City, (1 Abbott, 396.) Justice Bradley, of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivering the opinion, uses the following language in relation to the first clause of the fourteenth amendment:

"The new prohibition that* no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the^privileges orimmunities of citizens of the United States' is not identical with the clause in the Constitution which declared that'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' It embraces much more. . ''It is possible that those who framed the article were not themselves aware of the farreaching character of its terms, yet if the amendment does in fact bear a broader meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never thought of when it was

conceived and put in form, and does reach social evils which were never before prohibited by constitutional enactment, it is to be presumed that the American people in giving it their imprimatur understood what they were doing, and meant to decree what in fact they have decreed.

"The 'privileges and immunities' secured by the original Constitution were only such as each State gave to its own citizens," *

* * * "but the fourteenth amendment prohibits any State from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, whether itsown citizens or any others. It not merely requires equality of privileges, but it demands that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged and unimpaired."

In the sameopinion, after enumerating some of the "privileges" of the citizens, such as were pertinent to the case on trial, but declining to enumerate all, the court further says:

"These privileges cannot be invaded without sapping the very foundation of republican government. A republican government is not merely a government of the people, but it is a free government." * * * * ■

"It was very ably contended on the part of the defendants that the fourteenth amendment was intended only to secure to all citizens equal capacities before the law. That was at first our view of it. But it does not so read. The language is, 'No State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States? Are they capacities merely? Are they not also rights?"

The court in this case seems to intimate very strongly that the amendment was intended to secure the natural rights of cilizens, as well as their equal capacities before the law.

In a case in the supreme court of Georgia, in 1869, the question was before the court whether a negro was competent to hold office in the State of Georgia. The case was ably argued on both sides, Mr. Akerman, the present Attorney General of the United States, being of counsel for the petitioner. Although the point was made and argued fully that the right to vote and hold office were both included in the privileges and immunities of citizens, and were thus guarantied by the fourteenth amendment, yet that point was not directly passed upon by the court, the court holding that under the laws and constitution of Georgia the negro citizen had the right claimed. In delivering the opinion, Chief Justice Brown said:

"It is not necessary to the decision of this case to inquire what are the 'privileges and immunities' of a citizen which are guarantied by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Whatever they may be, they are protected against all abridgment by legislation." * • * * * * "Whether the 'privileges and immunities' of the citizen embrace rjoliticjlrights, including the right to hold office,! heedfnot holvlnqfuire. If they do, that right is guarantied alike 6y the Constitution of the United States and of Georgia, and is beyond the control of the Legislature."

In the opinion of Justice McKay, among other propositions he lays down the following:

"2. The rights of the people of this State, white and black, are not granted to them by the constitution thereof; the object and effect of that instrument is not to give, but to restrain, deny, regulate, and guarantee rights, and all persons recognized by that constitution as citizens of the State have equal legal and political rights, except as otherwise expressly declared.

"3. It is the settled and uniform sense of the word 'citizen,' when used in reference to the citizens of the separate States of the United States, and to their rights as such citizens, that it describes a person entitled to every right, legal and political, enjoyed by any person in that State, unless there be some express exception made by positive law covering the particular person or class of persons whose rights are in question."

In the course of the argument of this case Mr. Akerman used the following language upon the point as to whether citizenship carried with it the right to hold office:

"It may be profitable to inquire how the term (citizen) has been understood in Georgia." * * *■ * "It will be seen that men whom Georgians have been accustomed to revere believed that citizenship in Georgia carried with it the right to hold office in the absence of positive restrictions."

The majority of the committee having started out with the erroneous hypothesis that the term "privileges of citizens of the United States,'' as used in the fourteenth amendment, means no more than the term "privileges of citizens" as used in section two of article four, discuss the question thus:

"The right of suffrage was not included in the privileges of citizens as used in section two, article four, therefore that right is not included in the privileges of citizens of the United States as used in the fourteenth amendment."

Their premise being erroneous, their whole argument fails. But if they were correct in their premise, we yet claim that their second position is not sustained by the authorities, and is shown to be fallacious by a consideration of the principles of free government.

We claim that from the very nature of our Government the right of suffrage is a fundamental right of citizenship, not only included in the term "privileges of citizens of the United States" as used in the fourteenth amendment, but also included in the term as used in section two of article four, and in this we claim we are sustained both by the authorities and by reason.

In Abbott 'vs. Bayley, (6 Pick., 92,) the supreme court of Massachusetts say:

'"The privileges and immunities' secured to the people of each State in every other Statejan be applied^onlj^Joj^ft^ea^j^a removaTlronl <)he^^"B By

such removal they become citizens of the adopted State without naturalization, and have a right to sue and be sued as citizens; and yet this privilege is qualified and not absolute, for they cannot enjoy the right of suffrage or eligibility to office without such term of resi■"tience as shall be prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State into which they shall remove."

This case fully recognizes the right of suffrage as one of the "privileges of the citizen," subject to the right of the State to regulate as to the term of residence. The same principle was laid down in Corfield vs. Coryell.

In the case of Corfield vs. Coryell, in the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Washington, in delivering the opinion of the court, used the following language:

"'Theprivileges and immunities conceded by the Constitution of the United States to citizens in the several States,' are to be confined to those which are in their nature funda?mental, and belong of right to the citizens of all free Governments. Such are the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to acquire and enjoy property, and to pay no higher impositions than other citizens, and to pass through and reside in the State at pleasure, and to enjoy the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised."

And this is cited approvingly by Chancellor Kent, (2 Kent, section 72.)

This case is cited by the majority of the committee as sustaining their view of the law, but we are unable so to understand it. It is for them an exceedingly unfortunate citation.

In that case the court enumerated some of the "privileges of citizens," such as are "in their nature fundamental and belong of right to the citizens of all free Governments," (mark the language,) and among those rights place the "right of the elective franchise" in the same category with those great rights of life, liberty, and property. And yet the committee cite this case to show that this right is not a fundamental right of the citizen 1

But it is added by the court that the right of the elective franchise "is to be enjoyed as regulated and established by the State in which it is to be exercised."

These words are supposed to qualify the right, or rather take it out of the list of fundamental rights, where the court had just placed it. The court is made to say by this attempt in the same sentence, "The elective franchise is a fundamental right of the citizen, and it is not a fundamental right." It is a "fundamental right," provided the State sees fit to grant the right. It is a "fundamental right of the citizen," but it does not exist unless the laws of the State give it. A singular species of "fundamental rights!" Is there not a clear distinction between the regulation of a right and its destruction? The State may regulate the right, but it may not destroy it.

What is the meaning of "regulate" and "establish?" Webster says: "Regulate—to put in good order." "Establish—to make stable or firm."