TENTH PERIOD.

Of Maritime International Law during the period from the General Peace of 1815 to the present time.

SINCE the peace of 1815, happily no maritime war has occurred, in which the principles of Maritime international law were required to be applied, or received farther illustration or development, or were subjected to any material change in practice. And this was one of the reasons for giving so detailed an abridgement, if the expression may be used, of the work of M. Tetens, as exhibiting in its most important branches the principles on which the present Maritime international law of Europe, as actually administered, is founded, as developed by, and resting upon, not only the British authorities of Lord Stowell in the court of admiralty, and of the court of appeal in prize causes, for a long time guided by that most acute and sound lawyer, Sir Wm. Grant, which authorities, as being British, may be considered liable to national bias and consequent partiality, but also upon the authorities of such recent able and learned foreigners, as Lampredi and Tetens, who were at least free from any British bias, and the interest or supposed interest of whose native countries, if they had allowed themselves to be influenced by such a motive,

would have led them to expound different doctrines from those which, in the sound exercise of acute and impartial intellect, they actually did.

In giving the abridgement of the truly valuable work of M. Tetens, the most philosophical, perhaps, on international law, since the days of Grotius, we have to apologise for the inelegance of the language, arising in a great measure, from anxiety to represent exactly the original in his own dress, without attempting a more liberal translation, or to adapt the expressions more to the English idiom.

The only at all important discussion, since 1815, of any of the rules of Maritime international law, has been the recent one respecting the right of visitation, and its extent, under the conventional treaties, between Great Britain on the one side, and France and the United States of America on the other, for the more effectual suppression of the African slave trade. But this discussion regarded the right of visitation and search during peace, not during war; and as resting on special convention, not on general legal principle, or consuetude. It therefore does not immediately fall under our inquiries into the right of search during war. And the positive consuetudinary law of past ages, does not afford any direct illustration of this point comparatively new. But it can scarcely be disputed that all nations, who have any claim to be deemed or called civilized, are morally, if not legally, bound to concur in the requisite measures, for the suppression of this odious traffic in human kind, to the degradation of the species. And if this obligation has been recognized by conventional treaties, there do not appear to be any sound or valid reasons, why the right of visitation and search should not be recognized by convention, and resorted to, as the chief, if not the only farther measure, which can be adopted, for the

suppression of that abominable traffic-a measure, which has for centuries been recognized in Europe, as indispensable for the ascertainment of hostile from neutral vessels, and for the discovery of hostile and contraband goods at sea, during war. All depends upon the nature of the offence, or injurious act, to be prevented, or punished and suppressed. If the prevention, or punishment and suppression of the act be just and generally expedient, the chief, if not the only practicable means of effecting that end, it should seem, must be conceded as a necessary consequence.

From the more recently disputed important questions of the common consuetudinary maritime law of nations during war, not having become the subject of actual contest, or conventional arrangement, since the general peace in 1815, we have few treaties to mention, later than those already noticed. In the course of this period, no doubt, a considerable number of treaties of commerce and navigation have been concluded among the different maritime powers, if not between every one of these powers, and other states; such as Britain, France, the United States of America, the Low Countries, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia. But almost all, if not all of these treaties, agreeably to the uniform practice in such cases, were for short definite periods, such as ten or twelve years, and consequently, many of these have expired during the intervening period, when not renewed. And it is therefore to be wished, that Baron Charles de Martens, would undertake the task of continuing the work of his uncle, G. F. de Martens, published in 1801, in three volumes, 8vo., entitled, Cours Diplomatique, and divided into the Guide Diplomatique and Tableau Diplomatique, downward from the end of the eighteenth century to the present time; exhibiting distinctly such treaties as are now actually in force. From

the limited nature, however, of our present researches, we do not feel the want of such a view of the actual and real conventional law of civilized nations. For the treaties of commerce and navigation since 1815, are almost entirely occupied with stipulations and provisions for the regulation of maritime commerce during peace. And such of them, as contain any stipulations relative to a contingent state of war, appear to be confined, to the allowance for a definite period for foreigners to depart, with their goods, upon a rupture, a recognition of the common law of blockade, as maintained by an adequate naval force, and a special enumeration of the articles to be held by the parties, as contraband of war. We have not observed that any of these treaties, which, of course, are detailed in the continuation of the Récueil des Traités, by G. F. de Martens, attempt even between the contracting parties, any revival of the theories of Hübner, Totze, and Rayneval, or to resuscitate the other doctrines of the armed neutrality of 1780 and 1800. And we are not aware that any of the treaties here alluded to, either renew, as between the contracting parties, any of these doctrines, or make any attempt, or express any desire to do so, except the treaty between Prussia and the United States of America of March 1829, by which,1 in Article XII., these two governments renewed part of their treaty of 1799, and declared their continued desire, to provide by treaty, either between themselves, or in conjunction with other maritime states, for ulterior stipulations, which might serve to secure a just protection and liberty to the commerce and navigation of neutrals, and to aid the cause of civilization and humanity. Of the continued desire of these two wise governments, to aid the cause of civilization and humanity, we cannot entertain any doubt. But it is equally im

1 Martens' Nouveau Recueil, VII. 615.