for a few instants; but enthusiasm soon giving place to fear, the fighting ceased, and the inhabitants submitted. This affair, which does the greatest honour to the cavalry, cost us the loss of thirty men.

There were found in the place 148 pieces of cannon of various calibres, and a great quantity of ammunition and stores of every kind. There was a train of 23 field pieces, which was on the point of being sent off to Tarra. gona. There were only twenty-five vessels in the harbour: three English ships of war which had been there, had the precaution to cause such as they wished to carry with them, to put to sea before they could be seized. The English merchandize at Malaga was put under sequestration. An inventory will be taken, and a report of the contents transmit ted.

The occupation of Malaga is, at this moment, of great importance. It completes the submission of the province of Grenada, and completely cuts off that part of the country which is contiguous to Gibraltar and Cadiz. It is, therefore, probable, that it will influence the determination of the inhabitants of the latter place. The effect produced by this event is so much the greater, as the next day the inhabitants of Velez de Malaga arressted the chiefs of this new insurrection, and delivered them over to the imperial army, with a request that they should be punished.

occurred in the course of it, it is not my intention to trouble your Majesty with any further details of the earlier parts of our operations, which, having terminated in the speedy reduction of Walcheren by your Majesty's troops, and the occupation of the adjacent islands, and of the important post of Batz, received, at the time, your Majesty's mot gracious approbation; but to confine myself principally in the narrative, which I am anxious to be permitted to bring under your Majesty's view, to the consideration of the two following points, as most immediately applying to the conduct and final result of the expedition to the Scheldt. First, The ground upon which, after the army was at length assembled near Batz, a landing in prosecution of the ulterior objects of the expedition was not deemed advisable. Secondly, Why that army was not sooner there assembled in readi ness to commence further operations.

With respect to the former proposition, I am inclined to think that it is so clear and evident, that no further operations could at that time, and in the then sickly state of the army, have been undertaken with any prospect of success, that it would be unnecessarily trespassing on your Majesty to enter into much more detail on this point than has been already brought before your Majesty in my dispatch of the 29th of August; and the chief object of this paper will be directed to show to your Majesty, that the second point, namely, Why the army was not brought up sooner to the destination from whence its ulterior operations were to commence, is purely a naval consideration, and that the delay did in no shape rest with me, or depend upon any arrangements in which the army was concern

I have the honour to request that your serene highness will be pleased to lay my report before his majesty the emperor and king, and to accept the homage of my respect.

The Marshal the Duke of DALMATIA. Seville, Feb. 10, 1810.

GREAT BRITAIN.

In consequence of an Enquiry instituted in the House of Commons to enquire into the origin and failure of the late expedition to Walcheren, the following curious document is discovered to have been laid before the king by the carl of Chatham :

In submitting to your Majesty a statement of my proceedings in the execution of the service your majesty was graciously pleased to confide to me, and of the events which

been afforded by their movements to the speedy progress of the armament.

In doing this, it will, I conceive, be necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, that I should take up the consideration of this business from its commencement.

Your Majesty will permit me here to recal to your recollection the change which took place in the original project formed for the attack of Antwerp, and of the French fleet in the West Scheldt, in consequence of the opinions of the general and staff officers to whom this question was referred; and a combined operation of the army and navy, the whole, with the exception of the force to be left for the reduction of Walcheren, to proceed up the West Scheldt, was accor dingly determined on.

being at once carried into execution, which Upon the practicability of such an operation was, however, the ground-work of the ex pedition, and which alone, in the opinion of all persons consulted, seemed to afford any prospect of success, even in the most sanguine view of the subject in all other repects, I must confess, I entertained great

doubts

doubts, till the communication of a distinct official opinion, given on this point by the lords of the Admiralty, decided in the affirmative this important question.

At the same time it is to be remarked, that the occupation of Walcheren, which by some persons it had been thought possible to leave behind us, and the reduction of Flushing, which it had once been proposed only to mask, were deemed indispensible to the security of the fleet, in case of disaster; and accordingly a considerable separate force was allotted to this service; and, in this view, it was besides distinctly agreed upon, that a vigorous attack by the navy upon the seafront should be made at the same time that the troops, after effecting their landing, advanced to invest Flushing; it being hoped that by a powerful co-operation m the sea, at the moment the troops presented themselves before the place, the labour and delay of a regular siege might have been avoided, and a considerable portion of the force allotted to this service set at liberty to follow the army up the Scheldt. How far this expectation was fulfilled, or whether the assurance given that the whole of the armament (the part to be landed at Walcheren excepted) should be at once transported up the Scheldt, in prosecution of the ultimate objects of the expedition, was carried into effect, or was wholly disappointed, the information already before your majesty will have in a great measure shewn, and which it will be my duty to bring more particularly under your majesty's view, when I detail the subsequent course of our proceedings.

From what cause this failure ensued-whether it arose from insufficient arrangements on the part of the admiral, or was the una voidable result of difficul ies inherent in the nature of the expedition itself, it is not for me, considering it entirely as a naval question, to presume to offer any opinion upon to your majesty.

on.

It may, however, be here proper to remark, that in all the projects which have at various times been brought forward on the subject of an attack upon the Island of Walcheren and the Scheldt, the necessity of having a wind a good deal to the westward, with moderate weather, has always been insisted Without these advantages, in the one case, the passage would be difficult; in the other, the surf would prevent a landing on the points deemed most favourable in other respects. In the present instance, owing to the wind blowing strong from the westward, the surf was actually such as to prevent a landing on either of the points first fixed on for that purpose by the a miral; and the situation of the gun boats and transports at anchor in the Stone Deep becoming very critical, and the gale encreasing, he found it necessary to carry such part of the fleet as was arrived for safety into the Roompot, and by which means the division of the army desMONTHLY Mag. No. 197,

tined for the attack of Walcheren was enabled to effect its landing from a more sheltered anchorage on the Bree Sand to the westward of Fort den Haak. At this time, the divi

sion under Lieutenant-general lord Rosslyn, as well as that under Lieutenant-general Grosvenor, also the cavalry, artillery, &c. were not arrived; but they were afterwards, on their making the island, ordered by the admiral into the Veer Gat It is, however, particularly deserving of attention, that this measure, though in itself one of great advantage, as far as it applied to the division destined for the attack of Walcheren, by placing the transports, store-ships, and small craft, in security, was, if carried further, certainly not a little at variance with the leading purpose of the expedition, namely, the running with a right wing, and the ad. vance of the army at once up the West Scheldt, at the same moment that the attack upon Walcheren was proceeding. But that even this need have delayed it for more than three or four days, unless on account of naval difficulties, which it will be for the admiral, not for me, to explain, I deny, for as soon as Ter Veere and the Fort of Rammekins fell, which happened on the 3d of August, the passage of the Sloe was open to the transports and gun vessels; or they might have entered by the Durloo or by the Zoutland passages, the batteries of Dyshook, of Vygeteer, and the Nolle, having been all carried by the army early on the first of August; and on the same day the battery of Borslen, at the south-west end of South Beveland, was abandoned on the movement of a detachment from the corps under sir John Hope; and I know of nothing (but this, of course, is a point for the admiral to speak to) to have prevented the line of battle ships and frigates from coming in and passing up above Flushing, in the first instance, according to the plan originally decided upon.

Before, however, I pursue further the details of the proceedings of the army, governed as they necessarily were (until a footing should be gained on the continent) by the movements of the navy, I must for a moment refer to two separate operations; the one under Lieutenant-general lord Huntly and commodore Owen, and the other under Lieutenant-general sir John Hope and rear admiral sir Richard Keats; but both directed to assist and ensure a rapid progress up the Scheldt, had the admiral found it practicable in other respects. With respect to the former, which was destined to destroy the Cad. sand batteries, and particularly that of Breskens, had it been carried at once into effect, and that the admiral could have availed himself of it, to take the ships up the West Scheldt by the Weeling Passage, it would have been of the utmost advantage; but it was certainly rather fortunate it did not take place at a later period, as after all the transports, store-ships, &c. were ordered into the

2N

Veera

Veere Gat, and the plan of running at once up the West Scheldt by the Weeling Channel seemed abandoned, the object of destroying the Cadsand batteries ceased, and a landing there would only have been an unnecessary risk, and a very inconvenient separation of our force, and, of course, cecasion great delay in collecting it for ulterior operations. It must not, however, be forgotten, that the difficulties here turned out to be much greater than had been at all foreseen before we sailed. In the first place, the beach was so exposed, that in blowing weather it was found impossible to land; and from what cause I know not, the marquis of Iluntly's division could not be taken up, in the first instance, high enough to attack the Breskens battery, the only one, from its situation, of much importance. In addition to this, the enemy, who had been represented by all the intelligence communicated to me to be very weak, almost actually with out troops in that quarter, appeared to be well prepared, and in considerable force. Under these circumstances, according to lord Huntly's report, commodore Owen appears to have experienced great disappointment in not having the support of lord Gardner's fleet and of his boats: but his lordship, as I believe, could never enter the Weeling Channel at all; nor indeed was I ever acquainted with what instructions were given to him on this head.

When it was found that lord Huntly's division could neither land nor proceed by the Weeling Passage up the Scheldt, as I had intended they should, it was determined to withdraw them; but from the boisterous state of the weather, it was some days before this could be effected. As soon as it was accomplished, they were passed over to South Beveland.

With respect to sir John Hope's operation, it was more prosperous. The object of it was this: In the original arrangement for carrying the army at once up the West Scheldt, sir John Hope's division was included; but just before we sailed, the admiral received intelligence that the French fleet was come down abreast of Flushing, and seemed to threaten to oppose our passage up the Scheldt.

In this view, it was conceived that, by landing on the north side of South Beveland, the island might be possessed, and all the batteries taken in reverse, and thereby the position of the French fleet, if they ventured to remain near Flushing, would be, as it were, turned, and their retreat rendered more difficult, while the attack on them by our ships would have been much facilitated; and, for this object, the division of sir John Hope rather preceded, in sailing from the Downs, the rest of the fleet.

The navigation of the East Scheldt was found most difficult; but by the skill and perseverance of sir Richard Keats, this pur

pose was happily and early accomplished, though the troops were carried a great way in schuyts and boats; and this division was landed near Ter Goes, from whence they swept all the batteries in the island that could impede the progress of our ships up the West Scheldt, and possessed themselves on the 2d of August of the important post of Batz, to which it had been promised the army should at once have been brought

up.

Sir John He remained in possession of this post, though not without being twice attacked by the enemy's flotilla, for nine days before any of the gun-boats under capt. sir Home Popham were moved up the Scheldt to his support

But it will be recollected, that both these operations tensed directly to forward the ori ginal purpose of a rapid progress up the Scheldt; the former by opening the Cadsand Channel, could the landing of lord Huntly's division have been effected; the secord, by covering the progress of our fleet along the coast of South Beveland, while the division under sir John Hope was at the same time so far advanced towards the destination at which the rest of the armament was to be assembled.

It will now only be necessary for me to bring before your majesty the dates at which the several parts of the armament were enabled, according to the arrangement of s'r Richard Strachan, to pursue their progress up the Scheldt. In this place, however, it may be proper that I should previously advert to the grounds on which the 3d division, under lieutenant general Grosvenor, as well as the two light battalions of the King's German Legion (composing part of the force detained in the first instance to proceed against Antwerp), were landed at Walcheren, and employed before Flushing.

Your majesty will be pleased to recollect, that the troops which sailed from Portsmouth, under lieutenant-general sir Eyre Coote, were destined for the service of Walcheren, and had been considered as sufficient for that

object, according to the intelligente received, and the supposed strength of the enemy; though, at the same time, certainly relying, for the first efforts against Flushing, on the promised co-operation of the navy, and on their establishing, as was held out, in the first instance, a naval blockade, except on the side of Veer and Ranimekins. Unfortunately, however, this did not take place, and for several nights after the army was before Flushing, the enemy succeeded in throwing from the opposite coast, probably from the canal of Glient, considerable reinforcements into the place, which enabled him constantly to annoy our out posts and working parties, and finally to attempt a sally in force, though, happily, from the valour of your majesty's troops, without success. This proving very harassing, particu

larly

larly from the great difficulty of communication between the several parts of our line, I determined, in order to relieve the troops, and press forward the siege with as much vigour as possible, to avail myself for the time of the services of these corps; but it is to be remembered, that this was only done because I saw no movement making to push forward a single vessel up the West Scheldt, and it therefore seemed more advisable to have their assistance before Flushing, than that they should le inactive in the Veer Gat; and they might at any time be re-embarked from Rammekins in a few hours, whenever their transports could be brought up from Veer, and there was the least chance of our proceeding to our ulterior destination.

I have already stated that Rammekins surrendered on the evening of the 3d of August.

Immediately upon this event, feeling as I did great uneasiness at the delay which had already taken place, and at the depar. ture from the original plan, I wrote a letter to the admiral, then at Ter Veere, expressing my hope that the ships would now be able to enter the West Scheldt by the Sloe Passage, and that no time should be lost in pressing forward as speedily as possible our further operations; and I requested, at the same time, that he would communicate to me the extent of naval co-operation he could afford, as well for the future blockade of Flushing, as with a view to protecting the coasts of South Beveland, and watching the passa es from the Meuse to the East Scheldt, as this consideration would govern very much the extent of force I must leave in South Beveland, when the army advanced. To this letter he did not reply fully till the 8th of August; but I had a note from him on the 5th, assuring me the transports should be brought forward without delay; and I had also a very long conversation with him on the morning of the 6th, on the arrangements to be taken for our further operations, when I urged, in the stongest manner, the neces sity of not losing a moment in bringing up the cavalry and ordnance ships, transports, store-ships, victuallers, &c. in order that the armament might proceed without delay to its destination; and I added my hopes, that they would receive the protection of the ships of war, none of which had yet

entered the West Scheldt.

To all this, and to the several arrangements explained to him in detail, he fully assented.

In his reply to my letter of the 4th, on the 8th of August, he acquaints me, that several of the smaller vessels of different descriptions had passed through the intricate passage of the Sloe, and that he had ordered the frigates to pass up the West Scheldt, to be followed by the line of battle ships; and he gave hopes that he should be able to go up the river with the flotilla on the 10th of A

gust at furthest, and that the frigates and line of battle ships should follow as they came in succession.

The frigates, however, did not pass Flushing till the evening of the 14th, and the line of battle ships only passed to the anchorage above Flushing on the 14th, the second day of the bombardment.

These ships began to proceed up the river on the 18th, and arrived on the 19th; one division as high as the bay below Waerden, the other off the Hanswent, where they remained; the Courageux passed above Batz; the cavalry ships only get through the Sloe Passage into the West Scheldt from the 20th to the 23d, and arrived off Batz on the 29d and 24th; the ordnance ships and store ships passed through from the 224 to the 23d, and arrived at their destination off Batz on the 24th and 25th; the transports for lieutenant-general Grosvenor's division only came up to receive them on the 19th on which day they embarked; and those for major-general Graham's division on the 20th and 21st; and they arrived off Batz on the 24th. The corps of brigadier-general Rotten hurgh, and the light battalions of the German Legion, preceded to join the earl of Rosslyn's division in South Beveland.

From this statement, your majesty will see that notwithstanding every effort on my part with the admiral, the armament was not assembled at the point of its destination til! the 25th, and of course that the means of commencing operations sooner against Antwerp were never in my power.

It now became at this advanced period, my duty to consider very seriously the expediency of landing the army on the continent. On comparing all the intelligence obtained as to the strength of the enemy, it appeared to be such as to leave (as stated in my dispatch of the 29th of August) no reasonable prospect of the force under my command, after accomplishing the preliminary operations of reducing Fort Lillo as well as Liefkensnoeck, on the opposite side of Antwerp, without the pos session of which the destruction of the ships and arsenals of the enemy could not be effected; and in addition to this, the sickness which had begun to attack the army about the 20th, and which was hourly increasing to an alarming extent, created the most serious apprehensions in the minds of the medical men, as to its further progress, at that unhealthy season, and which fatal experience has since shown to have been but to well founded.

Your majesty will not be surprised if, under these circumstances, I paused in requiring the admiral to put the army, on share. that a landing might have been made and that any force that had been opposed to us in the field would have yielded to the superior valour of british troops, I have no doubt, but then, any such success could have been of ne avail towards the attainment

tainment of the ultimate object, and there was still less chance that the enemy would have given us the opportunity. Secure in his fortresses, he had a surer game to play; for if ever the army, divided as it must necessarily have been in order to occupy both banks of the river, exposed to the effects of inundation on every side, and with all its communications liable to be cut off, while the force of the enemy was daily and hourly increasing, had once sat down before Antwerp, it is unnecessary for me to point out to your majesty how critical must in a short time have been their situation. But when, added to this, sickness to an alarming ex tent had begun to spread itself among the troops, and the certain and fatal progress of which, at that season, was hut too well ascertained, it appeared to me that all further advance could only tend to commit irretrievably the safety of the army which your majesty had confided to me, and which every principle of military duty as well as the direct tenor of my instructions alike forbade.

1

In this state of things, I considered that there was left me no alternative, but to pursue the course I have already stated, for your majesty's information, in my dispatch of the 29th of August; and that conduct I now must humbly, but at the same time with perfect confidence, submit to your majesty's judgment.

I shall here close this report; which has, I fear, already detained your majesty but too long; by observing, that wherever it has been necessary for me to advert to the disappointments experienced, through the arrangements of the admiral, in the naval co operation i had been taught to expect, I have confined myself to stating the facts; abstaining, as it became me, from all comment, and leaving it to the admiral, in such report as he may make of his proceedings, to bring under your majesty's view the circumstances which may have occasioned them, and, above all, to account for the difficulties which prevented the investment of Flushing (a point never even doubted of before) as well as to show the obstacles which presented themselves to the early progress of the armament up the West Scheldt, which operation I had always looked upon as the primary object of his instructions, and on the accomplishment of which our best hopes of success, in any of the ulterior objects of the expedition princi pally, if not wholly, depended. (Signed)

CHATHAM, Lieut. Gen. [Presented to the King, Oct. 15, 1809. 14th Feb. 1810.]

This narrative, as appears by the king's answer to an address from the House of Commons, was originally presented to his majesty on the 15th of January, with a request that his majesty would not communicate it for the present. On the 10th of February, in consequence of a wish having been expressed by

the earl of Chatham to correct the same, his majesty returned it to him. The report, as altered, was again tendered to his majesty by the earl of Chatham on the 14th of February, when his majesty directed it to be delivered to the secretary of state. In consequence of these circumstances becoming known the House of Commons have passed a resolution declaring, that they "saw with regret that any suca communication as the narrative or lord Chatham should have been made to his majesty without any knowledge of the other ministers; that such conduct is highly reprehensible, and deserves the censure of the House " The effect of this has been, that lord Chatham has resigned all the offices and appointments that he held, and is of course no longer a minister.

Su Richard Strachan, has, in reply, presented a report to the Admiralty; and in the letter which served for the transmission of it, he observes: "Feeling periectly conscious that every exertion had been made by me in forwarding the objects of the expedition, and that no blame could be justly imputed to myself or the navy, I could not possibly suspect that lord Chatham, to the irregularity of presenting immediately to his majesty such a paper as that which I have rece ved, had added the impropriety (to use no stronger term) of endeavouring to exculpate himself by private insinuations against the conduct of others; but to assume the privilege of conveying private insinuations to the prejudice of others, from whose knowledge they are studiously con cealed, must prove utterly destructive of all mutual confidence in joint operations of the army and navy. Their lordships will now to be able judge whether there is any foundation for the impurations, that the delays originated with myself, or with any others in the naval service; or whether, during my com mand on the late expedition, any proceeding on my part has in any respect justified the line of conduct which lord Chatham has thought fit to adopt towards me "

The narrative itself contains many pointed observations, general charges of inaccuracy, and a refutation of the insinuations both against the galiant admiral and the navy, contained in his lordship's statement. In one part sir Richard says: When lord Chatham contends in his statementthat the second point, namely, why the army was not brought up sooner to the destination from whence all its operations were to commence, is purely a naval consideration,' his position is certainly true in words, but as certainly incorrect in its implied meaning." The gallant admiral totally denies the assertion that an agreement was entered into for a simultaneous attack by sea and land upon Flushing, for the purpose of avoiding the delay of a regular siege: it was impossible, he says, for such an agreement to have been made; as under the well-ascertained circumstances of the garrison, it was too desperate an enterprize to be entertained. Sir Richard