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The property of such persons also as are exempt on account of the smaliness of their income from paying the propertytax, is of the same description. This property, though apparently trifling in the detail, will be found considerable in its aggregate amount. Perhaps no person whose property amounts to ten pounds, or even less than that sum, ought to be exempted from the operation of this measure. I have already observed, that I estimated the existing national property at 1600 millions, and the amount of the national debt at 400 millions; but suppose we add 80 mil lons for the amount of property not represented by the income-tax, and that we reckon twenty millions for what has been added since the time I wrote to the national debt; we shall then have 2100 millions of real and nominal property, (by nominal property I mean that in the funds) with which to pay a debt of 420 millions. It follows therefore, that every one would be called upon to give up 4th of his property in order to discharge the national debt. The stock bolders would as such, have to deduct from their claims on the public 84 mil lions, and the public would have to pay to the stockholders the remaining 356 millions. It may not be amiss to remark here, that any error which may be made in estimating the relative proportion which the national debt and national property bear to each other, will not affect the general question which regards the policy of discharging such a debt. In general, however, the greater the proportion which a national debt bears to the existing national property, the greater will be the benefits which will accrue to nations and individuals from discharging such debts. If it he admitted also that national creditors ought to con tribute in proportion to the amount of their claims to discharge debts due to themselves, it will follow that a nation cannot contract a debt (with its own people at least) greater than it will possess sufficient property to discharge at

This no doubt is theoretically right, but when we consider the state of the popular representation, the state of property, the manner in which the national debt has been contracted, and upon whom and for what purpose has been chiefly expended, we shall be disposed to think perhaps that an arrangement somewhat different from this, might be equitably adopted in its practical payment. On this subject I may say more hereafter.

any time. Should a national debt, for instance, be twenty times as much as all the property in a country is worth, a nation, even in such a situation, would still be able to pay its debt. The stockholders would, in this case, have to pay, or rather to give up, twenty parts in twenty-one of the debt, and the public would have to pay the remaining twentyfirst part only.

Having thus glanced at the mode of discharging national debts theoretically, I shall proceed to consider the business in a practical point of view. And the best way of doing this perhaps, will be to state the objections which have been made against the measure on account either of the supposed impracticability* of executing it, or on account of the mischiefs it appears calculated to occasion.

The Critical Review, in their account of my pamphlet, observe: "The imme. diate discharge of the national debt in this, or any other way, would cause a great quantity of superfluous capital, which the necessities of trade, of com merce, and of agriculture, could not readily absorb. Numerous annuitants on the funds, who now live on their interest, would then be obliged to live on their capital. The quantity of circulating medium would be encreased beyond all proportion to the exigencies of exchange, &c. &c." Now I would ask these gen. tlemen, how it would be possible to create, and bring suddenly into circulation, a great additional quantity of currency by the discharge of the national debt, or indeed by any other financial measure? I can conceive only two ways by which the circulating medium of a country can be suddenly augmented. First, by the discovery of new mines of the precious metals; or secondly, by the introduction of an extra quantity of paper-money: since the former of these does not appear probable, we will examine a little the practicability of the latter. It will be readily allowed, that no person can all at once issue an extraordinary quantity of, paper-money who has not the ostensible means of taking it up with negotiable value. Let us suppose, for instance, that a proprietor of land, to the value of one

*The monthly reviewers have denied the practicability of discharging the debt, in the same manner as they insinuated that it was unjust to tax the funds for the purpose. Now should I be able to shew its practicability, I suppose they will assert again, that I have said nothing but what they and every one knew before.

million,

million, were to draw bills to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds, in order to pay his share of the national debt, who would be found able or willing to discount them, especially if the Bank of England were prohibited, as it ought to be, and as indeed it is from the nature of things, from increasing its discounts? No doubt the paper-money of this country is gradually increased; and this is an evil which ought, and I believe might, be remedied by means which I may hereafter point out; but it appears utterly impossible that any considerable quantity of circulating medium can be suddenly forced into circulation without producing a depreciation in its value greater even than the amount of the extra issue. Unless therefore there be already existing a quantity of circulating medium sufficient for the purpose, it would be altogether impracticable to discharge the national debt by its direct payment in currency: and even if there were, it would be next to impossible for the great proprietors of land to procure sufficient of it for their purpose. It is in this light that the Edinburgh reviewers, in their critique on the bishop's "intended speech," consider the matter, and with this opinion I think every reflecting person must coincide.

Taking it for granted then that the national debt cannot be discharged by a direct payment in specie, I shall be asked, how is it to be discharged? I answer, It may be done in two ways: either by the owners of lands and houses making an actual transfer of such part of them (say 4th) as would be equivalent to the proportion each would have to pay of the national debt, or (which would be much better, for reasons which I shall hint at bye and bye) by charging on their whole estates an annual sum equal to the interest at 5 per cent. of the capital each would have to pay. Suppose, for. instance, a person was possessed of houses and land, which, when valued as proposed in my pamphlet, were found to be worth ten thousand pounds. Now 4th of this, or 2000l. would be the sum he would have to pay towards discharging the national debt, and the interest of it at 5 per cent. would be 1001.; with this sum therefore, such an estate should be charged annually to what might be called the debt-tax, instead of being levied upon at once for the capital, it would have been liable to contribute for its proportion to the national debt. This annual sum, or debt-tax, should be paid

in quarterly or half-yearly instalments to the Bank of England, and be by them paid in the usual way to the stock. holders. This example will be sufficient to explain my meaning with respect to the mode of transferring that part of the debt which would fall to the share of the land and houses,

Let us next inquire what would be the general effect of the adoption of such a plan. If we suppose the landed buildings to be equal in value to 4ths of all the existing property in the country, which perhaps is not an extravagant estimate, we shall, by an arrangement of this kind, get rid of nearly 269 millions, or ths of all which the public would have to pay to the stockholder without the transfer of a single shilling, without making the least change in the relative situation of any individual, and without the fabrication of a single pound note. There would remain therefore only about 66 millions to be settled by a transfer of specie, and this might be effected without much difficulty in the course of five years, by twenty quarterly payments of 3 millions each, charging to each person the regular interest which fell to his share, till the whole of his debt was paid off.

In order to render the transfer of specie as small as possible, it should be provided that lands and houses under mortgage should be reckoned at their full value, and pay to the debt-tax in the same proportion as those not under mortgage. But the owners would be authorised to deduct from the annual interest due to the mortgagee a sum equal to the interest of that which he (the mortgagee) would have had to pay to the stockholder on account of such money, as his proportionate part for discharging the national debt. Money therefore on mortgage would not be directly liable to the debt-tax, but indirectly through the medium of the real property on the security of which it was put to interest. By this means we should provide, that the whole rental of the land and houses would be charged to the debt-tax, which would not be the case if mortgaged property were exempted from it for the amount of the money for which it was under mortgage; if this exemption took place, it is evident that a greater transfer of specie (a thing which ought as much as possible to be avoided) would be required to complete the payment of the national debt. When mo ney was paid in which had been lent on mortgage,

mortgage, the borrower, it is evident, would have a right to deduct from it a sum (suppose th) equal to that which the lender would have had to pay on account of such sum, towards discharging the debt.

It will be observed, that in my estimate of the amount of the national debt, I supposed that 3 per cent, would be paid off at 60, whereas the Edinburgh reviewers have asserted, in their critique on the bishop of Llandaff, that they would, and ought to be, paid off at 100. On this supposition it is evident that the stockholder would receive back almost twice as much as he had lent to government, the equity of which, to say the least of it, is certainly not very apparent. It would make a very material difference also in the proportion which would be required of every person's property to discharge the debt. This difficulty how ever would be done away, at least with respect to ths of the sum due to the stock holder, by securing to him on the land and houses, the same annual interest which he receives at present. The pub lic would, by the method I have proposed, (as far as ths of his property goes at least) fulfil their engagements with hiin to the very letter, for if it is now worth while to give nearly 701. to receive an annual interest of 31. without having any other than the vague undefined security on which the funds rest at present, it would surely be worth as much to receive the same annual interest when the principal was secured on the best of all possible funds that of all the lands and houses in the nation. In short, I am per suaded, that after a measure of the kind I have pointed out was put in execution, 3 per cent stock would soon get up to 80, and probably more than that sum, so that if the stockholder had only 4ths of his real claim secured to him in this manner, it would be worth as much to him as the whole is at present. When his security was changed so much for the bet ter, and ths of it were rendered so much more valuable, the stockholder would not have much reason to complain, even though 4th of his capital, which is now worth 68, were paid off at 60; neither indeed would it make much dif ference to the public, were they to pay the remaining 4th or 66 millions at 68 or 70, the present price of stock instead of 60, the price I have calculated upon.

But a question here occurs, Would not the price of stocks, even in this case, be subject to the same fluctuation as at

present? Would not the funds, when placed even upon this footing, be liable to be raised or depressed by any acci dental difference in the foreign or domestic relations of the country? in short, would not the French government in the probable future relative situation of the two countries, still have it in their power to raise and lower stocks at their pleasure in a time of peace, and take advantage of such changes of price, to put considerable sums in their own pockets? I must confess, that I think not, especially if it were enacted, that the stockholder should have a right, in case of the nonpayment of his interest, or on the probability of an invasion, to be considered joint proprietor with whatsoever land holder he pleased, and be authorised to distrain for his dividends in the same manner as is done for rent. In this case, property in the (new) funds would be just as secure as property in land; it would be the same at least as a mortgage on land, and as little liable to be affected in value by any difference in the situation of the country with respect to foreign powers. In both cases, (that of the funds and a mortgage) a permissory right to receive the rents would be vested in the hands of a second person, who would be answerable with his whole property for his fidelity in discharging his trust.

If it should still be found however, that funded property was liable to be affected by foreign influence, its annis hilation might be easily effected, and the mischief done away at once by the actual transfer of th of the land and houses from the present proprietors to the stocks holders. But in this case, the public would be in danger of losing the vast ad vantages which they derive from life and fire-insurance offices. These institutions, valuable as they are, could scarcely exist if it were not for the facility which the funds afford of safely investing their capital and occasional receipts, and as easily obtaining the occasional sums which they may be liable to be called upon to pay at a short notice. These institutions are, on the whole, so advantageous to a country, that it might be worth while to run some little risk of being injured by our neighbors, for the sake of retaining them. This risk however might be diminished, were we to make a transfer of part (say 1) of the funded property; by this means the floating debt would be reduced to about 140 millions, which perhaps is no more than is necessary to render the

Tunds

Funds competent to produce all the advantages which they do at present. Were we, however, to place the debt on the footing I have proposed, and wisely make a radical change both in our foreign and domestic policy, a thing which we shall ere long be obliged to do, our financial arrangement of whatever description would not be liable to be in the least affected by any external or foreign influence whatsoever. I shail now proceed to examine for a moment, how people engaged in trade would be affected by the discharging of the natiunal debt in the manner I have proposed. We have seen, that more than thirteen millions, a sum considerably greater than the whole amount of the income-tax, would have to be raised annually from somewhat less than 4th of the property of the country, and although taxes would be taken off to the amount of more than twenty millions annually in consequence of this measure, still this part of the public would be but little benefited by it. They would have to pay to the stockholder for the first year, as much in interest as they now pay in taxes. The charge of interest indeed, would decrease in proportion as they advanced in discharging the capital of their debt. We are to consider therefore, a portion less than 4th of the national property, as being levied upon for the first year at least, to the amount of near 14 millions, and for the amount of all the present taxes besides, except the income tax; and it is to be considered too, that this will have for the most part to be paid by people engaged in trade. It would seem at the first blush, that to take so much (th of their whole property) annually, for five successive years, from commercial people, would be productive of great inconvenience to them; but if we reflect a little, we shall see reason to think that this will be by no means the case. Every man's capital would be levied upon in the same proportion, and therefore every man would stand exactly in the same relative situation after, as he did before, the money was paid. Trade at least, as carried on at present, is a sort of warfare; it is a struggle who can get the greatest share of the good things, and amass the greatest quantity of wealth. As in contests of a different nature, he that has the longest sword, so in this he that has the longest purse, usually gets the victory; but if all the swords, as well as all the purses, are equally curtailed, it is evident that the

combatants will stand in the same relative situation after, as they did before their weapons were shortened. Neither would the diminution of individual ca pital tend to diminish the spirit of commercial enterprise. It is not so much the absolute as the relative accumulation of capital, which creates and invigorates commercial speculation. It is evident indeed, that the national capital would not on the whole be diminished; it would only be divided amongst a greater number of hands, and would therefore, in all probability, be productive of greater be nent to the country. The diminution of the price of goods, consequent on the diminution of duties and taxes, would render our present circulating medium more than adequate to carry on the commercial intercourse of the country. This superfluous currency would be the same as an accession of fresh capital, and might be turned to the greatest national advantage, by being employed in the culture of the waste lands, under a general inclosure act.

For the Monthly Magazine.

On the PRACTICE exercised by the Two
HOUSES of PARLIAMENT of construing
LIBEL into CONTEMPI, and PUNISHING
it by their own ORDER.

[Opinion of lord Erskine, on the right of

Summary Attachment, even by the courts of law, given so long back as 1785, on the 'occasion of an Attachment issued by the Court of King's Bench of Ireland against the magistrates of Leitrim, for being enga ged in holding a meeting for a reform in the representation of the people in parliament. It is applicable to the case of Mr. Gale Jones, because the proceeding against him is for an act that might clearly, safely, and effectually, have been brought before the ordinary courts of law.]

SIR,

IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND. Bath, Jan. 13, 1785. FEEL myself very much honoured by your application to me on un occasion so important to the public freedom; and I only lament that neither my age nor experience are such as to give my opinion any authority with the Court in which you practice: but whereever I have no doubt, I am always ready to say what I think; and you are, there fore, very welcome to my most public sentiments, if any use can be made of them.

You have very properly confined your questious to the particular case, farnished

me by the affidavit which you have transmitted to me; and my answers therefore need involve in them no general discus. sions upon the principles of civil government, which in the mere abstract are not often useful, nor always intelligible. The propositions to which any answers are meant strictly to apply, are

First, Whether the facts charged by the affidavit, on which your Court of King's Bench is proceeding against the magistrates of Leitrim, are sufficient to warrant any criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor whatsoever?

Secondly, Whether, supposing them sufficient to warrant a prosecution by information or indictment, the court has any jurisdiction to proceed by attachment?

As you are pushed, in point of time, I can venture to answer both these questions at Bath, without the assistance of my books, because they would throw no light upon the first from its singularity, and the last is much too clear to require any from them.

As to the first: the facts charged by the affidavit do of themselves neither establish nor exclude guilt in the defendants. In one state of society such proceedings might be highly criminal; and, in another, truly virtuous and legal.

To create a national delegation amongst a free people, already governed by representation, can never be, under all circumstances, a crime: the objects of such delegation, and the purposes of those who seek to effect it, can alone determine the quality of the act, and the guilt or innocence of the actors.

If it points (no matter upon what necessity) to supersede or to controul the existing government, it is self-evident that it cannot be tolerated by its laws. It may be a glorious revolution; but it is rebellion against the government which it changes.

If, on the other hand, it extends no further than, to speak with certainty the united voice of the nation to its representatives, without any derogation of their legislative authority and discretion, it is a legal proceeding, which ought not indeed to be lightly entertained, but which many national conjunctures may render wise and necessary.

The attorney-general might, undoubt. edly, convert the facts contained in the affidavit into a legal charge of a high misdemeanor; which, when properly put into the form of an information, the defendants could not demur to: but he MONTHLY MAG. No. 199,

could not accomplish this without putting upon the record averments of their criminal purposes and intentions; the truth of which averments, are facts which he must establish at the trial, or fail in his prosecution. It is the province of the jury, who are the best judges of the state of the nation, and the most deeply interested in the preservation of its tranquillity, to say, by their verdict, whether the defendants acted from principles of public spirit, and for the support of good government, or sought seditiously to disCurb it. The one or the other of these objects would be collected at the trial, from the conduct of the defendants in summoning the meeting, and the purposes of it when met.

If the jury saw reason, from the evidence, to think that its objects, however coloured by expressions the most guarded and legal, were, in effect, and intended to be, subversive of government and order, or calculated to stir up discontent, without adequate objects to vindicate the active attention of the public, they would be bound in conscience and in law to convict them; but if, on the other hand, their conduct appeared to be vindicated by public danger or necessity, directed to legal objects of reformation, and animated by a laudable zeal for the honour and prosperity of the nation, then no departure from accustomed forms in the manner of assembling, nor any incorrect expressions in the description of their object, would bind, or even justify, a jury to convict them as libellers of the government, or disturbers of the

pcace.

To constitute a legal charge of either of these offences, the crown (as I before observed) must aver the criminal intention, which is the essence of every crine; and these averments must be either pro ved at the trial, or, if to be inferred prima facie from the facts themselves, may be rebuted by evidence of the de fendant's innocent purposes. If the criminal intent charged by the information be not established to the satisfaction of the jury, the information which charges it is not true; and they are bound to say so by a verdict of acquittal,

I am therefore of opinion (in answer to the first question), that the defendants are liable to be prosecuted by information; but that the success of such prosecution ought to depend upon the opi nion which the people of Ireland, form ing a jury, shall entertain of their intention in summoning the meeting, and the

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