Co. and Swift & Co.

Armour & Co. and Swift & Co. both operate packing houses at South St. Paul and purchase more than one-half of the livestock sold at the defendant's stockyard. The livestock so sold is sold upon a weight basis, that is to say, the price per pound is agreed upon and the total purchase price then depends upon the weight.

Prior to the passage of chapter 40, Special Session Laws of 1919, the weighing was done by employees of the defendant company. This intimate relationship between the purchasers and the weighers of livestock, the defective scales and inefficient weighing in the yards were no doubt the reasons for the enactment of the State law, which does no more than provide for the weighing by neutral bonded State weighers and for the necessary funds to meet the expenses of carrying out the requirements of the law.

The State law under consideration belongs to the class of legislation known as inspection laws. The power of the State to enact such laws is beyond question. As said by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 1)—

"They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the Federal Government."

While such laws may to some slight degree affect commerce, they do not do so to such an extent or in such a sense as to be properly designated as regulations of commerce, Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Louisiana (156 U. S. 590); Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture (171 U. S. 345). And the Supreme Court of the United States has recently held in passing upon a Missouri law, relating to the weighing of grain, which is very similar to the law under consideration, that it is not a burden upon interstate commerce. Merchants Exchange v. Missouri (248 U. S. 365).

Therefore, the court does not entertain the slightest doubt about the constitutional validity of the State laws. In that view the law can be rendered inoperative only in the event that Congress, acting within the limits of the power conferred upon it by the Constitution of the United States, has passed a law which produces that effect. The defendant claims that the State law is in conflict with the packers act of 1921 and that the State law is thereby superseded.

The test to be applied in deciding questions of this character is well established. It is stated in the case of Reid v. Colorado (187 U. S. 137), in the following language:

"It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede, or by its legislation suspend, the exercise of the police power of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested. This court has said-and the principle has been often reaffirmed-that 'in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.

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The rule is stated in the same way in the cases of Savage v. Jones (225 U. S. 501); Asbell v. Kansas (209 U. S. 251); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy (249 U. S. 427); and New York v. Miln (11 Pet. (U. S.) 103). It is distinctly pointed out in those cases that the congressional intent must be clearly manifested that the State law shall be superseded and that there must be a conflict between the laws so direct and positive that the two can not be reconciled or consistently stand together.

In regard to the controversy involved in this action the State claimsThat in the exercise of its police power reserved to it under the Federal Constitution it had the power to enact the State-weighing law.

That this act is not in conflict with any Federal law on the subject.

That the State weighing law is not operative on interstate commerce and does not in any sense interfere with or burden such commerce.

The defendant asserts the opposite view. It claims that the State law is in conflict with the packers act of 1921 and interferes with and is a burden upon interstate commerce and is therefore superseded.

It is perfectly clear from the authorities cited and the general knowledge of the profession that the State had the undoubted power to pass chapter 40. Special Session Laws 1919.

By enacting the packers act did Congress clearly manifest its intention to supersede the State law?

The Federal act in its title is limited to the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce in livestock, etc. This limitation is a recognition of the necessary restrictions upon the congressional power under the Constitution. Specifically section 311 of the act is, as was said in the case of Stafford r. Wallace, 258 U S. 495, modeled after paragraph 4. section 13. of the art to regulate commerce, in giving the Secretary of Agriculture authority over intrastate rates, which affect prejudicially interstate commerce, to the extent of permitting him to remove such conditions, "the law of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding." Then in section 309 (b) the act provides that the Secretary shall investigate complaints forwarded by the livestock commissioner, board of agriculture, or other agency of a State or Territory having jurisdiction over stockyards in such State or Territory. There is also a provision in section 407, authorizing the Secretary to cooperate with any State or Territory.

These provisions are convincing that the Federal act in question, like the United States grain standards act (39) Stat. 482): the United States warehouse act (39 Stat. 486); and the act to regulate commerce. was enacted. not with the intention of superseding all State laws upon the subject matter, but with an express recognition of the existence of a concurrent State regulation. If Congress had intended to supersede all State laws upon the same subject matter, it would not have included the above provisions, but would have expressed that intention in plain language.

Allied with the foregoing and one of the problems upon which the parties are divided, is the question whether the State and Federal laws contain conflicting provisions so direct and positive that the two can not be reconciled or consistently stand together. The contention of the defendant that they do is based upon the provisions of section 301 (a), (b), and (e), and section 304, and Regulation No. 14. issued by the Secretary of Agriculture.

It is the contention of the defendant that these sections and that regulation require the defendant itself to do the weighing and that this conflicts with the State law under which the weighing is done by the State weighers.

In the judgment of the court this contention is founded upon too narrow a conception of the Federal act and its purposes. Obviously, the purpose of the act is to impose regulations, not to relieve stockyards of salutary regulations, which would be the result if its contention was sustained. The particular provisions mentioned do not more than express in statutory form a duty resting upon all public service and quasi-public service corporations under the common law. to furnish reasonable services. As the court construes them, those provisions were directed to the requirement that reasonable services be furnished. but without the intention of necessarily imposing the requirement upon one person in preference to another. This is evidenced by the very uncertainty upon that feature in the provisions themselves, for the market agencies are as much required thereunder to furnish the weighing service as the stockyard owner.

It must be borne in mind that when the packers' act was passed by Congress, the State of Minnesota had established a system of weighing in all respects efficient and satisfactory. It was wholly unnecessary to provide for weighing. since that was already provided for in a legal way by the State "having jurisdiction over stockyards.” Reasonable regulations would not require any other weighing. Furthermore, as found by this court, the State weighers do not weigh stock in interstate commerce.

The court, therefore, has reached the conclusion that the State law but insures the fulfillment of the purposes of the Federal act in respect to weighing, is in complete harmony therewith, and in no respect conflicts with it. The two laws can thus be easily reconciled and consistently stand together.

The same observations apply with nearly the same force to the regulations of the Secretary. It could not have been the purpose of the regulation to extend the scope of the Federal act and thus to create a conflict with the State law which the Federal act did not itself create. If such was its purpose. it was, in our judgment, ineffective. It then amounts to an attempt to legislate upon the part of the Secreary. It fails to meet the tests mentioned in the case of Reid v. Colorado, supra.

The defendant lays great stress upon the case of Stafford r. Wallace, supra. as sustaining its contention that the Federal act supersedes all State laws, upon the subject matter of stockyards, including the State weighing law.

In an analysis of that case it will be noted that an attack was made upon the constitutionality of the Federal act, while all that has been said herein

assumes its constitutionality. It will be noted also that the question there before the court was whether Congress could regulate the business of commission men and dealers, inasmuch as their business was claimed to be intrastate. The provisions concerning commission men and dealers are not involved herein. It will be observed that the Stafford case involved the business of commission men and dealers at Chicago, where the court said: "It was conceded that of all the livestock coming into the Chicago stockyards and going out only a small percentage, less than 10 per cent, is shipped from or to Illinois. In the case at bar the evidence showed that approximately 60 per cent of the livestock comes from Minnesota points. Further the evidence in this case does not disclose the continuity of movement into, through, or out of the stockyards, either as livestock or as products of livestock, which was spoken of in the Stafford case and the Swift case (196 U. S. 375), as constituting a "current of commerce among the States.

Obviously the decision in a case involving only the question of whether or not the provisions of the law applicable to commission men and dealers at the Chcago market were constitutional has no bearing upon the question of whether or not the Federal act conflicts with a Minnesota law providing for State weighing.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in deciding the Stafford case, did not depart from its former decision in the case of Hopkins v. United States (171 U. S. 578), that the business of commission men, taking place as it did after the transportation had ended, was intrastate. It, however, sustained the right of Congress to impose regulations upon the same upon the principle that "whatever amounts to a more or less constant practice and threatens to obstruct or unduly burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause." In the case of Hill v. Wallace (259 U. S. 44) the court again takes occasion to say that it was upon that principle that the Stafford case was decided. As has been above stated, the same court, in the case of Merchants Exchange v. Missouri (248 U. S. 365), held that a State weighing law similar to the one now under consideration, was not a burden upon interstate commerce.

This analysis demonstrates that the decision in the Stafford case not only fails to support defendant's contention but is rather in harmony with the conclusion reached by the court.

In passing upon a situation similar to that existing at bar the court used language which is peculiarly appropriate here. In the case of Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe (2 Wall. 450) it said:

"The act does not purport to establish regulations for port pilotage; and we can not suppose that, in a measure intended to give greater security in life, Congress would have swept away all the safeguards in this respect provided by State legislation without substituting anything in their place."

The defendant in this case is in no way injured or damaged by the enforcement of the State law. It is relieved of the very considerable financial burden of paying the weighers and providing the certificates of weight, which it would have to bear if its contentions were sustained.

The court has given thought and consideration to the claims of the defendant and the States alike. From a careful analysis of the evidence, the law cited, and the arguments of able counsel the unbiased judgment of the court is that the defendant is not in its own behalf as a corporation seriously or materially interested in opposing the State's demands; that the weighing of livestock at the defendant's stockyard is a purely intrastate transaction; that the State law providing for such weighing is a valid exercise of its police power; that such weighing under the State law does not interfere with nor burden interstate commerce; that there is no such direct and positive conflict between the State law and the Federal law and regulations that they can not be reconciled and consistently stand together.

Statesmen and patriots stand in awe as they behold the fast receding lines of States rights. It is with fear and trembling that thinking men and women view the aggression of Federal power at the behest of special interests. The encroachment by the central government upon the guaranted powers of the State particularly noticeable in recent years spells danger to, if not destruction of the much loved and hallowed democracy of the United States. Is it somnolence, indifference or culpability on the part of our otherwise splendid men in the House and Senate that permits legislation which enables or requires courts to hand down decisions that send tremors of alarm thru the rank and file of our citizenship, the citizenship that so dearly love the Stars and Stripes planted upon the foundation rock of our republic-the Constitution?

Alongside of the other cogent reasons referred to for injunctive relief, the farmers, the producers and the shippers who are so vitally interested in accurate weights at the markets and for whose benefit and protection chapter 40 was enacted into law by the Minnesota Legislature, have, as it seems to this court, an absolute right to demand the enforcement of the State law.

This court is not in sympathy with the effort made to ignore and nullify a beneficial State law passed wholly within the powers reserved to the State in the Federal Constitution providing reasonable police regulations. From the facts found in regard to which there is very little dispute and the law as this court understands it the State is clearly entitled to the permanent injunetion sought in this case.

PROVISIONS OF THE PACKERS AND STOCK-
YARDS ACT, 1921, RELATING TO SIMILAR
MATTERS.

Section 301 contains definitions. There is no similar general provision in the act.

Section 309 (c) recognizes existing State supervision by authorizing the Secretary to investigate complaints of the "livestock commissioner, board of agriculture, or other agency of a State or Territory having jurisdiction over stockyards in such State or Territory."

Section 304 requires every stockyard owner to furnish upon reasonable request, without discrimination, reasonable stockyard service.

Section 305 provides that all rates for stockyard services shall be just and reasonable, and any unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory rate or charge is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.

Section 306 (a) requires schedules of rates and charges to be filed with the Secretary and kept open for public inspection.

Section 306 (b) relates to the form and manner in which the schedules are to be prepared, arranged, and posted.

Section 306 (c) prohibits changes in rates except upon two days' notice and authorizes the Secretary to make exceptions.

Section 306 (d) authorizes the Secretary to reject schedules where notice is insufficient.

Section 306 (e) authorizes the Secretary to suspend any new rate or regulation filed. to hold hearings thereon and make proper order.

Section 310 authorizes the Secretary after a hearing, when any rate, charge, regulation, or practice is found to be unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory to determine and prescribe the just and reasonable rate, or the just. reasonable, and discriminatory praetice and order compliance therewith.