find some means of making Germany feel that she cannot continue to preserve all facilities for receiving trade and supplies through neutral shipping while impeding British commerce by means the use of which by Great Britain is deprecated by the United States Government.'

In a memorandum of the 23d of August the British Embassy pointed out the danger of traveling in the North Sea and called the attention of neutral shipping to "the vital importance of touching at British ports before entering the North Sea in order to ascertain according to the latest information the routes and channels which the Admiralty are keeping swept and along which these dangers to neutrals and merchantmen are reduced as far as possible.” 2 The memorandum closes with the following statement:

The Admiralty, while reserving to themselves the utmost liberty of retaliatory action against this new form of warfare, announce that they have not so far laid any mines during the present war and that they are endeavouring to keep the sea routes open for peaceful commerce.2

On September 10, 1914, the German Ambassador notified the Secretary of State that "the assertions from England that the North Sea has been infested with mines by Germany are wrong"; that "neutral vessels bound for German ports in the North Sea must steer by day for a point ten nautical miles N.W. off Helgoland"; and that pilots were there to be found "in readiness to pilot the ships into port." 3

On September 26, 1914, the British Government delivered a carefully prepared memorandum regarding the laying of mines by Germany, which it declared to be in violation of The Hague Convention relating to the laying of submarine contact mines. It should be said, however, that Article 7 of this Convention contains the clause that its provisions only apply if all of the belligerents are contracting parties, and that Servia, with which Germany was at war, was not a contracting party. Nevertheless, it is fair to invoke the provisions of this Convention as stating the convictions of the Powers in a time of profound peace as to the conduct which should be pursued if they should be at war, and it is perhaps proper to remark in this connection that Servia, the only non-contracting Power then at war,

1 United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to Maritime Danger Zones, etc. (April 4, 1917), p. 8. * Ibid., p. 10.

2 Ibid., p. 9.

was, like Switzerland and Bolivia, an inland country without an outlet to the sea. It was felt at the Second Conference that the sowing of mines interfered seriously with the freedom of the seas, and the learned reporter of the Commission, Mr. Georges Streit, then professor of international law at the University of Athens, and later Greek Minister to Vienna and Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country, said in his report to the Conference on the matter of mines, that "even apart from any written stipulation, it can never fail to be present in the minds of all that the principle of the liberty of the seas, with the obligations which it implies on behalf of those who make use of this way of communication open to the Nations, is the indisputable prerogative of the human race." 1 The preamble to the Convention declares the contracting Powers as "inspired by the principle of the freedom of sea routes, the common highway of all Nations," and as "seeing that, although the existing position of affairs makes it impossible to forbid the employment of automatic submarine contact mines, it is nevertheless desirable to restrict and regulate their employment in order to mitigate the severity of war and to insure, as far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is entitled, despite the existence of war." After this declaration of the principles by which the delegates were guided, the Convention itself thus reads:

Article 1. It is forbidden

1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them;

2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings;

3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark.

Article 2. It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.

Article 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.

The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these mines harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as

1 Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, Actes et Documents, tome i, p. 289; Reports to The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (1917), p. 650.

military exigencies permit, by a notice addressed to ship owners, which must also be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel.'

There was perhaps no subject more hotly debated at the Second Hague Peace Conference than that of mines and the debate became the occasion of an exchange of personalities between the British and German delegates. Great Britain wished to prevent the use of mines and invoked in its behalf the freedom of the seas and the principles of humanity. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein said on behalf of Germany:

We do not intend, if I may use an expression employed by the British delegate, "to sow mines in profusion on every sea.' We do not hold the opinion that everything which is not expressly forbidden is permitted.2

In the course of the Conference the Baron Marschall further stated that:

A belligerent who lays mines assumes a very heavy responsibility toward neutrals and peaceful shipping. No one will resort to such means unless for military reasons of an absolutely urgent character. But military acts are not governed solely by principles of international law. There are other factors: conscience, good sense, and the sentiment of duty imposed by principles of humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most effective guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I emphatically affirm, will always fulfil, in the strictest fashion, the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of humanity and civilisation."

On October 2, 1914, the British Government decided to lay mines, alleging that this was necessary on military grounds to counteract "the German policy of mine laying combined with their submarine activities." In a telegram of this date, Sir Edward Grey said that:

His Majesty's Government have therefore authorized a minelaying policy in certain areas and a system of minefields has been established and is being developed upon a considerable scale. In order to reduce risks to noncombatants the Admiralty announce that it is dangerous henceforward for ships to cross area between Latitude 51 degrees 15 minutes north and 51 degrees.

1 The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, pp. 151-152. 2 United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to Maritime Danger Zones, etc. (April 4, 1917), p. 11.

40 minutes north and Longitude 1 degree 35 minutes east and 3 degrees east. In this connection it must be remembered that the southern limit of the German minefield is latitude 52 degrees north. Although these limits are assigned to the danger area it must not be supposed that navigation is safe in any part of the southern waters of the North Sea. Instructions have been issued to His Majesty's ships to warn east-going vessels of the presence of this new minefield.1

On November 3, 1914, alleging still further activity on the part of the Germans in the matter of mines, the British Government gave notice that "the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft." It should be said in connection with this notice that the British Government advised all neutral shipping destined to or from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland to enter the English Channel by the Straits of Dover, where they would be given sailing instructions which, if followed, "would pass them safely so far as Great Britain is concerned."

On November 7th Germany delivered a memorandum to the American Ambassador to be transmitted to the United States, in reply to the protest of the British Government against the laying of German mines. In the opening paragraphs of this memorandum Germany calls attention to the fact that the mine Convention was not applicable, but that Germany nevertheless had held itself bound by its provisions. It does not deny that it has laid mines, but claims that they were laid in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, that neutral trade routes had not been blocked, that no German mines had been laid in a trade route from the high seas to a neutral port, and that it gave notice to the neutral Powers. The German reply, however, has two paragraphs in the nature of an admission. Thus:

3. The British protest maintains further that in numerous cases German mines were found adrift without having become harmless. The anchoring of mines by Germany has been carried out with all possible precaution. If some have drifted from their moorings in consequence of currents or storms their number is certainly much smaller than that of mines laid by England,

1 United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to Maritime Danger Zones, etc. (April 4, 1917), p. 12.

2 Ibid., p. 15.

which have drifted ashore on the Belgian and Dutch coasts and have caused damage there through their undiminished explosive

power.

4. The obligation of keeping mines under surveillance which the British Government complains has been violated can naturally be enjoined upon a belligerent only as long as he retains command over that part of the seat of war where he has laid mines in a manner permitted by international law. As a rule therefore this obligation will apply only to defensive mines, but not to offensive mines. When a belligerent has properly laid offensive mines and has duly notified their laying he is relieved of all further responsibility.1

The German proclamation of February 4, 1915, declared "the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland including the whole English Channel . . to be war zone. 2 The proclamation, to go into effect on February 18, 1915, was to apply primarily to British ships, public or private, found within the proscribed zone, and to neutral ships, their passengers, crews, and cargoes, unless they could be distinguished from enemy ships by the submarine, which was declared to be the means of rendering this proclamation effective. This is a blockade in effect, although the proclamation does not specifically term it a blockade.

Hitherto portions of a coast have been blockaded. The largest blockade rendered effective appears to have been the blockade of the coast of the Confederate States, extending from Delaware to Mexico, a distance of some 2,200 miles. To render this blockade effective, surface ships, the known and tried agencies, were used. It was not effective to begin with; it became more and more effective with time and it ended by bottling up the Confederacy. The blockade of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was to be made effective by a new weapon, the submarine.

It was anticipated that the submarine would cause damage to neutrals, a fact pointed out in the proclamation of February 4, 1915, and admitted to have been the case in the memorandum received by the Department of State March 8, 1916, after a very considerable experience with the new weapon. The memorandum stated:

The use of the submarine naturally necessitated a restriction of the free movements of neutrals and constituted a danger for them which Germany intended to ward off by a special warning United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to Maritime Danger Zones, etc. (April 4, 1917), p. 17.

2 Official text, American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, July, 1915, p. 83.