largely augmented his organization and under the direction of Von Papen, Boy-Ed, and Albert carried on secret work for the German Government. He secured and sent spies to Canada to gather information concerning the Welland Canal, the movements of Canadian troops to England, bribed an employee of a bank for information concerning shipments to the allies, sent spies to Europe on American passports to secure military information, and was involved with Captain von Papen in plans to place bombs on ships of the allies leaving New York Harbor, etc. Von Papen, Boy-Ed, and Albert had frequent conferences with Koenig in his office, at theirs, and at outside places. Koenig and certain of his associates are under indictment.

16. Captain von Papen, Captain Hans Tauscher, Wolf von Igel, and a number of German reservists organized an expedition to go into Canada, destroy the Welland Canal, and endeavor to terrorize Canadians in order to delay the sending of troops from Canada to Europe. Indictments have been returned against these persons. Wolf von Igel furnished Fritzen, one of the conspirators in this case, money on which to flee from New York City. Fritzen is now in jail in New York City.

17. With money furnished by official German representatives in this country, a cargo of arms and ammunition was purchased and shipped on board the schooner Annie Larsen. Through the activities of German official representatives in this country and other Germans a number of Indians were procured to form an expedition to go on the steamship Maverick, meet the Annie Larsen, take over her cargo, and endeavor to bring about a revolution in India. This plan involved the sending of a German officer to drill Indian recruits and the entire plan was managed and directed by Captain von Papen, Captain Hanz Tauscher, and other official German representatives in this country.

18. Gustav Stahl, a German reservist, made an affidavit which he admitted was false, regarding the armament of The Lusitania, which affidavit was forwarded to the State Department by Ambassador Bernstorff. He pleaded guilty to an indictment charging perjury, and was sentenced to the penitentiary. Koenig, herein mentioned, was active in securing this affidavit.

19. The German Embassy organized, directed, and financed the Hans Libeau Employment Agency, through which extended efforts were made to induce employees of manufacturers engaged in supplying various kinds of material to the allies to give up their positions in an effort to interfere with the output of such manufacturers. Von Papen indorsed this organization as a military measure, and it was hoped through its propaganda to cripple munition factories.

20. The German Government has assisted financially a number of newspapers in this country in return for pro-German propaganda.

21. Many facts have been secured indicating that Germans

have aided and encouraged financially and otherwise the activities of one or the other factions in Mexico, the purpose being to keep the United States occupied along its borders and to prevent the exportation of munitions of war to the allies; see, in this connection, the activities of Rintelen, Stallforth, Kopf, the German consul at Chihuahua, Krum-Hellen, Felix Somerfeld (Villa's representative at New York), Carl Heynen, Gustav Steinberg, and many others.1

It will be observed that these interferences with the domestic economy of the United States were at a time when this country was neutral, when the Imperial German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs abounded in expressions of friendship and consideration, and when the Imperial German Ambassador enjoyed the hospitality of the country.

It is hard to believe that these things are so. But they are not all. On the 1st of March, 1917 (after the President's address of February 26th and before his address to the Congress on the 2d of April the American people were astounded, to speak only of our own country, by the publication, with Secretary of State Lansing's assurance as to its genuineness,2 of an instruction of the Imperial German Secretary of State, Dr. Zimmermann, to the Imperial German Ambassador in Washington, Count von Bernstorff, directing him to transmit the text of the message which he had received to the German Minister in Mexico. The text of this note, which is so extraordinary as to

1 Congressional Record, vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 192-193.

66

2 In response to a resolution of the Senate, Secretary Lansing on March 1, 1917, informed the President, who transmitted the statement to the Senate, that the Government is in possession of evidence which establishes the fact that the note referred to is authentic, and that it is in possession of the Government of the United States." Any remaining doubt as to the authenticity of the note was removed by the following statement of Dr. Zimmermann on March 29, 1917, in reply to a criticism directed against him by Hugo Haase, leader of the Socialist minority in the Reichstag:

I wrote no letter to General Carranza. I was not so naïve. I merely addressed, by a route that appeared to me to be a safe one, instructions to our representative in Mexico. It is being investigated how these instructions fell into the hands of the American authorities. I instructed the Minister to Mexico, in the event of war with the United States, to propose a German alliance to Mexico, and simultaneously to suggest that Japan join the alliance. I declared expressly that, despite the submarine war, we hoped that America would maintain neutrality.

When I thought of this alliance with Mexico and Japan I allowed myself to be guided by the consideration that our brave troops already have to fight against a superior force of enemies, and my duty is, as far as possible, to keep further enemies away from them. Thus, I considered it a patriotic duty to release those instructions, and I hold to the standpoint that I acted rightly. (Reuter dispatch from Amsterdam, New York Times "Current History," May, 1917, pp. 236-237.)

require no commentary, and may become as famous in the annals of diplomacy as the telegram of Ems, reads as follows:

BERLIN, January 19, 1917.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico on his own initiative should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

(Signed) ZIMMERMANN.1

It was therefore under the eyes of Congress, as it was in the mind of the President and in the heart of the American people. Without it there were causes of war; with it there was slight chance that war could be avoided. It is doubtful whether it would have produced war if there had not been other and impelling reasons for the resort to arms. It is doubtful if it can properly be included among the causes of the war. Certainly it was not a distinct cause; it was the culmination of a series of unfriendly acts, and it showed the spirit and purpose with which those acts had been com. mitted. It was rather a matter of aggravation, throwing fuel on the flames, than creating of itself a conflagration.

1 Congressional Record, vol. 55, No. 4, p. 194.

CHAPTER XVIII

WHY NOT ARBITRATION?

SECTION 1. THE ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION

It would be fair to ask why the United States did not arbitrate its difficulties with Germany, and although this question has not been raised or put in such a way as to become an issue between the two countries, it seems advisable to consider the attitude of Prussia and of the Imperial German Government to arbitration before the outbreak of the present war; for if it should appear that the Imperial Government was constantly and consistently opposed to arbitration, the proposal of arbitration made during the war would naturally be looked upon and considered from a different standpoint than if the attitude of the Imperial Government before the war had been favorable to this method of settling international disputes. Therefore, the question is material to the matter in hand and will be considered at some length.

While it would be too great a digression to stop to inquire why arbitration, which had disappeared from the memory of Nations, if we are to judge by their practice, was adopted by the Englishspeaking peoples in the midst of a world at war, it is nevertheless within the scope of this narrative to say in passing that the then Prime Minister of Great Britain, the younger Pitt, whose mind was open to suggestion, had had his attention drawn to arbitration,1 and 1 William Pulteney wrote to Pitt on September 14, 1786, "in terms that," as Mr. Rose properly says, 66 deserve to be remembered." Thus:

It is to be considered whether this is not a good opportunity to ingraft upon this treaty some arrangement that may effectually tend to prevent future wars, at least for a considerable time. Why may not two nations adopt, what individuals often adopt who have dealings that may lead to disputes, the measure of agreeing beforehand that in case any differences shall happen which they cannot settle amicably, the question shall be referred to arbitration? The matter in dispute is seldom of much real consequence, but the point of honour prevents either party from yielding, but if it is decided by third parties, each may be contented. The arbitrators should not be sovereign princes; but might not each nation name three judges, either of their own courts of law, or of any other country, out of whom the opposite nation should choose one, and these two hear the question and

1

had, some eight years before the treaty with the United States, proposed the limitation of armament to his powerful neighbor across the Channel; that Jay had mastered the immortal treatise of Grotius on the law of Nations before he began to read law, that on graduating from Kings College (now Columbia University) he delivered an address on the blessings of peace; that as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he had, in 1785, proposed to the Congress of the Confederation the settlement of the boundary disputes with the mother country by a mixed commission, that as Acting Secretary of State in Washington's cabinet, before the return of Jefferson from France to assume the Secretaryship of State, he again proposed the arbitral settlement of the same disputes with Great Britain, and that Washington sent Jay's original proposal and report to the First Congress under the Constitution, with a statement that "it is desirable that all questions between this and any other nation be speedily and amicably settled." It should be said, in this connection, that Lord Liverpool was at this time Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in Pitt's cabinet, that he was one of his familiars and had great influence with him, and that he was a professed partisan of arbitration. It was natural, therefore, that Pitt's ministry should agree to Jay's proposal to arbitrate the outstanding differences between the two countries, and that Great Britain and the United States should conclude at a later date the first treaty of disarmament of modern times, when the first Lord Liverpool's son was Prime Minister.

2

either determine it or name an umpire-the whole proceedings to be in writing? This would occasion the matter to be better discussed than is commonly done, and would give time for the parties to cool and most probably reconcile them to the decision, whatever it might be.

It has frequently occurred to my mind that, if France and England understood each other, the world might be kept in peace from one end of the globe to the other. And why may they not understand each other? I allow that France is the most intriguing nation upon earth; that they are restless and faithless; but is it impossible to show them that every object of their intrigue may be better assured by good faith and a proper intelligence with us, and might we not arrange everything together now so as completely to satisfy both? (Pitt MSS., p. 169.)

Quoted from J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and National Revival (London, 1911), p. 340.

1 On this point Mr. Rose says: "Pitt, we may note, had sought to take a first step towards the limitation of armaments, by suggesting that the two Powers should lessen their squadrons in the East Indies; but to this Vergennes, on 1st April, 1786, refused his assent." (Rose, ibid., pp. 340-341.)

2 The treaty referred to is the so-called Rush-Bagot agreement, concluded just a century ago (April 28-29, 1817), and whose terms have been faithfully kept, limiting the armament to be kept upon the Great Lakes. For the text of this very important and, we may yet hope, epoch-making document see Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between the U. S. and Other Powers, p. 628.

For the origin, nature, and history of the Rush-Bagot agreement see ex-Secre