legally blockaded, neutral vessels may still carry their cargoes to enemy ports, subject to capture and confiscation of the cargoes if they fall within the category of contraband; and that neutral vessels may, by the law of Nations, trade with all neutral ports, unless the cargoes fall within the category of contraband and the neutral ports are interposed to conceal ultimate destination to the enemy. But, excepting men-of-war, which may be sunk without warning, neither merchant vessels of the enemy nor neutral vessels can lawfully be destroyed and sunk without first removing crew and passengers to places of safety and without taking possession of the ships' papers, in order that the validity of the action may be tested and decided by the prize courts of the captor's country, where, indeed, every presumption is in favor of the capture but where, nevertheless, the law of Nations regulating such a matter is presumed to be administered. When the Imperial German Government proclaims the freedom of the seas in its correspondence with the United States, it means the liberation of Nations from the alleged unlawful interference of Great Britain with the rights of neutrals to trade with Great Britain's enemies; when Great Britain mentions the freedom of the seas in its correspondence with the United States, it means the alleged unlawful interference of Germany with the rights of neutrals to trade with Germany's enemies; and when the United States advocates the freedom of the seas in its correspondence with the Imperial German Government and Great Britain, it means the rights of neutrals to trade indifferently with both without interference from one or the other, according to the principles of international law generally recognized on the first day of August, 1914. Each of these three countries appeals to the freedom of the seas in the sense in which belligerents on the one hand and neutrals on the other understand that term. The rights of the many must prevail over the claims of the few and of the one; by reason, if possible, by force, if necessary. In the thirteenth and last chapter of the Mare Liberum, Grotius declares that his countrymen must maintain their right of trade by peace, by treaty, or by war, saying: Wherefore since both law and equity demand that trade with the East Indies be as free to us as to anyone else, it follows that we are to maintain at all hazards that freedom which is ours by nature, either by coming to a peace agreement with the Spaniards, or by concluding a treaty, or by continuing the war. So far as peace is concerned, it is well known that there are two kinds of peace, one made on terms of equality, the other on unequal terms. The Greeks call the former kind a compact between equals, the latter an enjoined truce; the former is meant for high souled men, the latter for servile spirits. Demosthenes in his speech on the liberty of the Rhodians says that it was necessary for those who wished to be free to keep away from treaties which were imposed upon them, because such treaties were almost the same as slavery. Such conditions are all those by which one party is lessened in its own right, according to the definition of Isocrates. For if, as Cicero says, wars must be undertaken in order that people may live in peace unharmed, it follows that peace must be called not a pact which entails slavery, but an undisturbed liberty, especially as peace and justice according to the opinion of many philosophers and theologians differ more in name than in fact, and as peace is a harmonious agreement based not on individual whim, but on well ordered regulations. . But if we are driven into war by the injustice of our enemies, the justice of our cause ought to bring hope and confidence in a happy outcome. Therefore, if it be necessary, arise, O nation unconquered on the sea, and fight boldly, not only for your own liberty, but for that of the human race. "Nor let it fright thee that their fleet is winged, each ship, with an hundred oars. The sea whereon it sails will have none of it."1 So Hugo Grotius in 1608; so Woodrow Wilson in 1917. CONCLUSION The President properly stated in his address of April 2d to the Congress that he was assuming a grave responsibility in recommending a declaration of the existence of a state of war against the Imperial German Government, for the day has long since passed, at least in democratic countries, where the head of a State, whether he be monarch or president, can go to war as the king went a-hunting. War may be an imperial, it is no longer a royal, sport, and it never has been and it never will be, it is to be hoped, a presidential one. War is ordinarily declared in a moment of excitement and reason is likely to be swayed by enthusiasm, but we cannot today in democracies justify a declaration of war unless the cause be just, and, however we may deceive ourselves, we cannot deceive posterity, which passes alike upon the acts of autocrat, constitutional monarch, president, and people. We must decide according to our knowledge of present conditions and according to these conditions our actions are to be judged in first instance; but the future must finally decide the question. The President has stated the case of the United States against the Imperial German Government clearly and in detail. He has enumerated the special reasons which, in his opinion, would be a proper cause of armed action. He has searched his own heart and the conscience of the American people, that the motives and objects of the war may not only justify but require in the circumstances and conditions the declaration of a state of war. It is indeed a grave responsibility which the President assumed in recommending the war, which the Congress assumed in declaring its existence, and which the people of the United States assume in carrying it on. We believe that the reasons given are causes, not pretexts, that the motives and purposes are sincere and sufficient; but on all these matters posterity has the final word. For whether we will or no, "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht."'1 WASHINGTON, D. C. September 16, 1917. JAMES BROWN SCOTT. "The history of the world is the world's court of judgment." From: Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated by S. W. Dyde (London, Geo. Bell & Sons, 1896), p. 341. |