amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few. It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,-for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other. 2. JOINT RESOLUTION DECLARING THAT A STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MAKING PROVISION TO PROSECUTE THE SAME. Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Speaker of the House of Representatives. Vice President of the United States and Approved, April 6, 1917, WOODROW WILSON. 3. GERMAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE, INTERNATIONAL POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Because the good old rule Sufficeth them,-the simple plan, That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can. (a) Frederick the Great (1712-1786) To keep up the rôle of an honest man with knaves is very perilous; to play a sharp game in the company of cheats is desperate. Success in such an attempt is very doubtful. What, then, is to be done? Either war or negotiation, just as your very humble servant and his minister are now doing. If there is anything to be gained by it, we will be honest; if deception is necessary, let us be cheats.' Since it has been agreed upon among men that cheating one's fellowmen is a cowardly act, an expression has been sought for which might soften this act and the word Politics has been chosen to that end. This word has most certainly been employed only in favor of sovereigns, because in decency we cannot be treated as rogues and rascals. But be that as it may, here is what I think of politics. My dear nephew, by the word Politics I understand that we must seek to deceive others; it is a means of having the advantage, or at least 1 Frederick the Great to Minister de Podewils, dated the Camp at Mollwitz, May 12, 1741. (Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen [Berlin, 1879], vol. 1, pp. 244-245.) of being on a par with the rest of mankind; for you may be absolutely certain that all the states of the world run the same career and that it is the hidden goal at which the high and the lowly of the world aim. This principle having been stated, never blush for making alliances with a view to your being the only one to draw advantage from them. Do not commit the stupid mistake of not abandoning them whenever you believe that your interests are at stake, and especially maintain vigorously this maxim, that to despoil your neighbors is to take away from them the means of doing you injury. Properly speaking, it is politics which founds and preserves kingdoms. Therefore, my dear nephew, you must understand politics thoroughly and conceive of it in the clearest light. To this end I shall divide it into Politics of the State and into Private Politics. The former concerns only the great interests of the kingdom; the latter concerns the particular interests of the Prince.' Politics of the State reduces itself to three principles: the first, to preserve, and, according to circumstances, to aggrandize one's self; the second, not to make any alliance except for one's own advantage; 1 1 Les Matinées Royales, ou l'Art de Régner. Opuscule inédit de Frédéric II, dit le Grand, roi de Prusse. London, Williams and Norgate, 1863, pp. 18-19. General Savary, Duke of Rovigo, who accompanied Napoleon in his visit to Sans Souci in 1806, purloined from Frederick's desk a copy of the Matinées Royales, said to be in Frederick's own handwriting. A copy of this was made in 1816 by one C. Whittall, with the Duke's permission and was published in 1901 by the copyist's grandson, Sir James William Whittall, in a book entitled Frederick the Great on Kingcraft. From the original MS. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1901), pp. 15-16. The French text of Les Matinées Royales, ou l'Art de Régner, to which references are made, was edited in 1863 by the late Lord Acton from a copy made at Sans Souci in 1806 by Baron de Méneval, Private Secretary to Napoleon. It contains five of the seven Matinées and fills the thirty-five pages of this little volume. In 1870 an English translation of Lord Acton's edition was issued in Boston in a pamphlet of fifty-two pages, under the highly significant and accurate title of "Origin of the Bismarck policy; or, The Hohenzollern doctrine and maxims described and defined by Frederick the Great; his opinions on religion, justice, morals, politics, diplomacy, statesmanship, the German people, etc., etc. Written by himself expressly for the use of his successor to the throne." Carefully translated from an authentic copy of the original manuscript by M. C. L. Boston; Crosby & Damrell, 1870. For the origin, nature, and authenticity of the Matinées Royales, see an article entitled The Confessions of Frederick the Great, and a review of Buffon; sa famille, ses collaborateurs et ses familiers. Mémoires par M. HumbertBazile, son Secrétaire; mis en ordre, annotés et augmentés de documents inédits par M. Henri Nadault de Buffon. Paris: Renouard (1863), in Home and Foreign Review for 1863, vol. 2, pp. 152-171; vol. 3, pp. 704-711, both written by Lord Acton, the most critical and painstaking of historians, commonly called "the most erudite man of his generation." (See A Bibliography of the Historical Works of Dr. Creighton, Dr. Stubbs, Dr. S. K. Gardiner, and the Late Lord Acton. Edited for the Royal Historical Society by U. A. Shaw, London, 1903, pp. 45, 47, 53.) and the third, to make one's self feared and respected in the most untoward times. When I ascended the throne I visited the coffers of my father; his great economy enabled me to form great projects. Some time afterwards I reviewed my troops, and I found them superb. After this review, I returned to my coffers and found the wherewith to double my military force. As I had just doubled my power, it was natural that I should not limit myself to preserving what I already had. Thus I had soon resolved to profit by the first opportunity that should offer. Meanwhile I thoroughly trained my troops and made every effort to keep the eyes of all Europe riveted upon my manœuvers. I renewed them every year, in order to appear the more thoroughly versed in the art, and finally I attained my purpose. I turned the head of all the Powers. Everyone considered himself lost, if he could not move arms, feet and head in the Prussian style. All my soldiers came to think that they were twice the men they had been before when they saw that they were everywhere aped. When my troops had thus acquired an advantage over all other troops, I was busy only with examining what pretensions I could lay to various provinces. Four principal points offered themselves to my view, Silesia, Polish Prussia, Dutch Gueldre, and Swedish Pomerania. I limited myself to Silesia, because that object deserved more of my attention than all the others, and also because the circumstances were more favorable to me. I left to time the care of the execution of my projects upon the other points, and I shall not undertake to prove to you the validity of my pretensions upon that province. I have had these pretensions established by my orators; the Empress opposed them with her own and the case was ended by cannon, sabre and rifle. From all this there results that we must always be attempting something, and be thoroughly persuaded that all available means are proper to our purpose. But it is good policy to be careful not to announce one's pretensions with too much vanity, and especially to maintain at your court two or three eloquent men, and to leave it with them to justify your acts.' Posterity will perhaps be surprised to find in these memoirs 1 Les Matinées Royales, pp. 29-32. "The matter of right is the business of the ministers; it is your business; it is time to work it up in secret, for the troops have received their orders." (Frederick the Great to Minister de Podewils, November 7, 1740; Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen [Berlin, 1879], vol. 1, p. 91.) accounts of treaties entered into and broken; although such examples are common in history, the author of this work could not justify himself, if he had no better reasons for excusing his conduct. The interest of the State must serve as the rule for the conduct of sovereigns. Cases when alliances must be broken are the following: (1) When the ally fails to fulfill his engagements; (2) when the ally plans to deceive one, and when one has no other means to prevent him; (3) when force majeure hangs over one and compels one to break one's treaties; (4) finally, when one lacks the means for continuing the war. By a sort of fatality, which I cannot explain, wealth of resources exercises an influence upon everything, and princes are the slaves of their means; the interest of the State is a law unto them, and this law is inviolable. If the prince is under obligation to sacrifice his very self for the salvation of his subjects, he must a fortiori sacrifice engagements, the continuation of which might become harmful to them. Examples of treaties of this nature which have been broken are commonly met with in history; it is not our intention to justify all such cases; I venture, however, to affirm that there are such treaties which necessity, wisdom, prudence, or the welfare of the people compel sovereigns to break, because there is no other means left by which to avoid ruin. It appears to me clear and obvious that a private individual must scrupulously observe his pledged word, even if he should have inconsiderately made such a pledge: if another private individual fails to observe his given word, the person against whom such violation is committed can have recourse to the protection of the laws, and, whatever may be the result of such an act, it is only an individual who suffers; but to what tribunals can a sovereign have recourse if another prince violates engagements entered into with him? The word of a private individual involves but the misfortune of one man; the word of sovereigns may lead to calamities involving entire nations. This matter may, therefore, be stated as follows: Is it better that a people should perish, or that a prince should break his treaty? Where would one find the imbecile who would hesitate in answering this question?' In this work you will meet with treaties entered into and broken; and I must tell you, in regard to this matter, that we are subordinated to our means and to our capacities: when our interests change, we must change our actions accordingly. We are employed to watch 1 Histoire de mon temps, tome i, avant-propos (1775), pp. xxvi-xxvii; Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand, tome ii. |