the statutes in question, the power of sale did not cease at Marietta, until after the 12th of May, 804, the date of the plaintiffs' purchase. (2.) That such was the practical construction given to those laws by executive officers, which ought in the present case to be conclusive, because it fulfils every object of the law, preserves the private rights of individuals, and if set aside by a mere technical objection, would open a door for the most extensive litigation and disturbance of titles acquired under the land laws of the United States. (3.) That supposing the act of March 30, 1803, had in express terms, or by necessary and inevitable implication, taken away the power of sale at Marietta, yet it could not begin to have that effect, until duly promulgated at that place, it not having in fact been transmitted to the officers at Marietta, until after the plaintiff's entry.

The land laws must certainly be considered as forming a part of the contract between the Government, and each individual who wishes to become a purchaser of the public domain. If contracts between the public and individuals are to be considered in the same light as contracts between individuals, then the principle applies that a bona fide and innocent purchaser, from an agent who has not received due notice that his authority is superceded, shall not be injured by the negligence of the principal, in not giving notice The rules of interpretation applicable to the present case, are laid down by the ele

a 4 Hall's Law Journal, 16. 2 Dall. 320

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mentary writers on the construction of statutes, and
will be found in the common abridgments of the
law. All these rules necessarily resolve themselves
into the intention of the law maker, which is some-
times to be collected from the cause or necessity of
making the statute, and at other times from other
circumstances of equal weight. Sir William Jones
has asserted the true principles on this subject.
"Such is the imperfection of human language,"
says he," that few written laws are free from ambi-
guity; and it rarely happens that many minds are
united in the same interpretation of them."
then, after relating an anecdote of Lord Coke, adds:
"I will here only set down a few rules of interpreta-
tion, which the wisdom of ages has established,
when the sense of the words is at all ambiguous-
1st. The intention of the writer must be sought,
and prevail over the literal sense of terms; but penal
laws must be strictly expounded against offenders,
and liberally against the offence.

And

"2. All clauses, preceding or subsequent, must be taken together to explain any one doubtful clause.

"3. When a case is expressed to remove any doubt whether it was included or not, the extent of the clause, with regard to cases not so expressed, is by no means restrained.

"4. The conclusion of a phrase is not confined to

a 6 Bac. Abr. tit. Statute. (I.) (C.)

b Vere v. Thon.pson, Hardr. 208.

c Ld. Teignmouth's Life of Sir W. Jones, 267.

the words immediately preceding, but usually extended to the whole antecedent phrase.

"These are copious maxims, and, with half a dozen more, are the stars by which we steer, in the construction of all public and private writings."

So, also, this Court has laid it down as "a well established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true, that when great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, unless the meaning of the legislature be plain, in which case it must be obeyed."

1. In enforcing the construction we contend for, the further considerations which present themselves under the first point are-That all the land laws passed previous to the act of May 10th, 1800, merged in that act; and by it, the system of selling the public lands in districts, through agents called registers and receivers, was settled: so that at the passage of the act of March 3, 1803, that system, in all its relations, was the law; and to all the provisions of the act of May 10th, 1800, and the rights established thereby, that of March 3, 1803, expressly refers, and for its operative capacity necessarily depends.

The whole system is laid in two important objects -public policy, and the rights of the community generally and individually; both terminating in

a Letter to J. Macpherson, Esq. Governor-General of Bengal, Sir W. Jones' Life, 267.

b U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Crunch, 286.

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the sale of the public lands. The public policy is twofold-first, revenue; second, national growth and prosperity, by the extension of population and improvement. The right of every individual is, to appropriate to himself any tract of land within the provisions of the system. Words are not necessary to show the importance of the public policy in both its branches; and the interest felt by the community, in the right to appropriate, is of equal extent, and as strong-as distinctly marked, too, as the policy itself; and, though a right peculiar to the American people, is, nevertheless, a general right; requiring, indeed, to be regulated by law; but none will saythat the government might, or could wholly repress its exercise, any more than wholly to repress the exercise of the general right to carry on trade and commerce.

The second branch of the public policy-also the right to acquire and improve new lands-did not commence with the land laws of the United States; both existed under, and the latter was exercised through, the regulations of colonial and State government, are coeval with the settlement of America; and when the same policy and right fell within the jurisdiction of the national government, laws were immediately passed to regulate them, and have been continued from time to time, until they all merged in the act of May 10th, 1800; so that the right of every individual in the community to purchase and settle any part of the lands within the provisions of that act, may emphatically be called an existing right.

The first branch of the public policy, revenue, en

gaged the attention of the national government immediately after the termination of the revolutionary war, and has been pursued by it ever since, with an undeviating aim; and it may be here observed. that one condition in the cession from Virginia is, that the lands ceded shall be sold, and the proceeds go in discharge of the public debt. It is not denied that Congress may suspend the sale of the whole or any part of the public lands; but doubtless, in such case, there would appear some distinct and good reason for doing it, as in the act of May 10, 1800, in order to attain, more effectually, the objects of the whole system; and then the intention was expressed with irresistible clearness in the repealing clause. But where nothing of this kind is pretended, where no object or motive can be perceived leading to suspension, the implication must be strong indeed to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to depart from every principle of the law in the case.

The constitution and the law show, that the President had no power to establish the Zanesville offices until after the next meeting of Congress; for those offices were not vacancies to be filled during the recess; and it will not be contended, that he was bound to summon a special meeting of the Senate for that purpose. Furthermore, the President had no power to cause sales to commence at Zanesville, until, in some act subsequent to that of March 3, 1803, the time for opening sales should be appointed; and we shall now endeavour to show the correctness of that position. The words of the act of March 3, 1803, (sections 5. and 6.) refer, generally, to the act

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