1822.

see

less they show that it was conditional, and that the Blight's Les condition is broken, they cannot, in the very act of disregarding it themselves, insist that it binds the deRochester. fendant in good faith to acknowledge a title which has no real existence.

V.

Upon reason, then, we should think that the de fendant in this case, under all its circumstances, is at liberty to controvert the title of the plaintiffs.

But it is contended that this question is settled in Kentucky by authority. There are also several cases quoted from the decisions in New-York, which we have not had an opportunity of examining fully. Those we have considered are, we think, distinguishable from this in some of their circumstances, especially in this ma erial one, that the vendor gave possession to the vendee. But the decisions of one State, though highly to be respected, are not authority in another, especially with respect to land titles. In Phillips v. Rothwell, in 4 Bibb, 33. the defendant claimed under a conveyance from the tenant of the plaintiff. That case, therefore, was decided on the doctrine applicable to lessor or lessee.

The case in 2 Marshall, 242. was the case of a purchaser who had not received a conveyance, and who was not allowed to set up an outstanding title in a third person. The report gives us only the opinion of the Court, not accompanied by a statement of the case, or the points made at the bar. We therefore cannot tell whether, in asserting his title, the vendor acted in opposition to his contract. We cannot say that the condition on which the sale might depend had not been broken. There is, too, a difference between set

1822.

The

ting up an adverse title in a third person, to controvert an actual existing title, and resisting a claim made by a person having no title whatever. In the Irresistible. case last mentioned it would appear that the plaintiff had a title which was in itself sufficient to maintain his action; but there was another, and perhaps a superior title, in a third person, with which the defendant was not connected. The rejection of all evidence of this title does not, we think, prove that the same Court would have compelled the defendant to acknowledge a title of which no evidence was given, or have rejected proof of any title in himself; especially when the vendee received nothing-not even possession from the vendor.

Judgment affirmed with costs.

(INSTANCE COURT.)

The IRRESISTIBLE. Daniels, Claimant,

An offence against a temporary statute cannot be punished after the
expiration of the act, unless a particular provision be made by law
for that purpose.

The proviso in the repealing clause of the Neutrality Act of the 20th of
April, 1818, did not authorize a forfeiture under the act of the 3d of
March, 1817, (which was included in the repeal,) after the time when
that act would have expired by its own limitation.

THIS cause was submitted without argument.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion March 2017 of the Court.

1822.

The

This is an appeal from a sentence of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of MaryIrresistible. land, dismissing an information filed in that Court against the brig La Irresistible, as forfeited under the acts of Congress, made for the preservation of the neutrality of the United States. The offence charged in the information, was committed under the act of 1817, and the only question is, whether the information can be sustained after the time when that act word have expired by its own limitation.

The act was to continue in force two years after the 3d of March, 1817.

On the 20th of April, 1818, Congress passed an act making farther provision on the same subject, which repealed all former acts on that subject, and among these the act of 1817, and annexed to the repealing clause the following proviso, "Provided, nevertheless, that persons having offended against any of the acts aforesaid may be prosecuted, convicted, and punished, as if the same were not repealed, and no forfeiture heretofore incurred by a violation of any of the acts aforesaid shall be affected by such repeal."

The obvious construction of this clause is, that the power to prosecute, convict, and punish offenders against either of the repealed acts, remains as if the repealing act had never been passed. It does not create a power to punish, but preserves that which before existed. Now, it is well settled, that an offence against a temporary act cannot be punished after the expiration of the act, unless a particular provision be made by law for the purpose.

Sentence affirmed.

(LOCAL LAW.)

HOLBROOK et al. v. THE UNION BANK OF ALEX

ANDRIA.

1822.

Holbrook

V.

Union Bank of Alexandria.

The turnpike road stock, paid in as a part of the capital of the Union Bank of Alexandria, before its incorporation, became the common property of the association, so as to be subject to be sold and distributed among the members, after the charter, which directed, that the capital stock should consist of money only, was accepted; and those who subscribed the road stock, or their assignees, are not entitled to have the same returned specifically to them.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.

This was a suit in Chancery, instituted in the Court below, by Holbrook and Alexander, against the Union Bank, to recover from the Bank certain shares of road stock, which had been originally subscribed to that Bank by them, and to have an account of the profits of that stock, and a payment of whatever should be found to be due to them. The cause was set down

for hearing upon the bill, answer, and exhibits, from which it appeared, that a number of persons formed themselves into an association, for the purpose of carrying on the banking business, for the term of

years, in the town of Alexandria, under the name of "The Union Bank of Alexandria." That the association adopted certain articles as the basis of their union; by which articles, it was, among other things, agreed, that the subscribers to the Bank

1822.

Holbrook

V.

Union Bank

dria.

should be permitted to pay one tenth of their subscription in the stock of certain incorporated road companies, and the other nine tenths in money, at of Alexan- certain periods prescribed in the said articles. That, in pursuance of these articles, the subscriptions to the Bank were filled up, and the stocks of various road companies were subscribed, which stocks were different in their respective values. The articles of association authorized the immediate commencement of the banking business. But they provided for, and contemplated an application to Congress for a charter. The Bank commenced its business without a charter, and carried on its business until the year 1817, when an act of Congress was obtained, incorporating the Bank. This act directed, that the capital stock of the Bank should consist of $500,000, to be paid entirely in money. When this act was passed, a question was raised among the stockholders, whether the road stock was to be returned specifically to the subscribers, or whether it was to be blended together into one general mass, and divided among the subscribers, without regard to the value of the respective stocks. The Little River Turnpike stock was the most valuable at the time it was subscribed, and is now much the most valuable stock; and the plaintiffs, Holbrook and Alexander, having subscribed this stock, insisted that the same should be specifically returned to them. The Court below decided, that they were not entitled to a specific return of this stock, but that it was to be considered the common property of the stockholders, subject to be divided among