1822. Ricard V. Williams: session, and that the jury were not authorized to presume a grant to Joseph. It is obvious, then, that neither the prayers nor instructions cover this objection, which was not made in the Court below, and therefore no opinion was given upon it. The bill of exceptions does not profess to do more than deal with the title. It did not mean to state more than was sufficient to raise the questions which were raised in respect to that title. The second answer to this objection is, that in Connecticut, the writ of entry is constantly used as an action of ejectment. The forms of actions, concerning real property, depend, in all the States, upon local usage, and no positive enactments of the legislature have been thought necessary to authorize a deviation, in this respect, from the rules of the common law. The writ of entry, in the present case, is not like an English writ of entry. If tried by the rules of English law, it could not stand a moment's examination. It does not regard and set forth the different degrees, as is required at common law : nor is it a writ of entry in the post, under the statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III. c. 30., alleging that the defendant had not entry, until after the disseisin or deforcement of the original wrong doer, passing by all the intermediate degrees. In Connecticut, on the contrary, the defendant is always alleged to be the deforciant, which, if the fact were not so, would in England be fatal. Neither is the time of the deforcement or disseisin ever stated, either in the writ or count, at common law; and in England, it would never be said that the seisin or disseisin was about such a time. This, at least, may safely be asserted to be peculiar to the practice of Connecticut. So that it becomes manifest, that the peculiar properties of writs of entry cannot be applied to this action, as it exists by the local law and practice. It is used indiscriminately with the action of ejectment, and intended to try the right of possession, which, in that State, is the right of property. 2. The title of the demandants is under an administrator's sale, by order of Court. By the local law, there is no limitation to the granting letters of administration, by the mere lapse of time." But even if there were, every question respecting it, and respecting the debts for which the lands were sold, has been decided by the competent Court, of peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction. This decision has been confirmed, in the last resort, by the Superior Court of the State, which is the only Court that has an appellate jurisdiction from the decrees of the Court of Probates. There can therefore be no objection now to the validity of these letters of administration, and the sale which was made under them, on the ground of the debts being antiquated. The appointed forum has settled these questions forever. If, then, the lands in question were, at the death of William Dudley, his lands in fee, the demandants have a good title, unless that title has been intercepted by an adverse possession or title, as is contended on the other side. 3. The next question then is upon William's title. His father died in possession, and William had exclusive possession by himself or guardian, receiving the rents and profits, from 1769 to 1785, claiming a Wales v. Willard, 2 Mass. Rep. 120. 1822. Ricard V. Williams. 1822. Ricard V. Williams. for himself only, to the exclusion of all the world. That this possession barred all strangers who, at the time, might have a right of entry, there cannot be a doubt: and the only possible question is, whether it bar:ed his brethren and sisters. His father had an estate, or he had not. We may adopt the argument used on the other side for Joseph's protection. If his father had no estate, then none descended to his children; and William's entry was, of course, for his own benefit, and gained him, with the possession which followed, an estate by possession. It is not directly found that his father had any estate which could descend. It might be a naked possession; and if it was, the entry of William, for his own exclusive benefit, he not being heir at law, was not a continuation of that possession for any person's benefit but his own. He did not come to a regular succession as heir, nor were there any duties cast on him as heir by a regular descent. He took in his own right, so as to keep out every body else. It is true, indeed, that his mother is stated to have received a third of the rents and profits, but whether as dower or how, non constat : and any inference from such a fact cannot now be made in the absence of proof. His brethren and sisters did not need to be barred, if no estate descended to them; and William's possession was not their possession unless they had right. But suppose an estate descended from Thomas, then William's exclusive possession, for himself, was sufficient to bar his brethren and sisters under the statute of Connecticut, and to gain him a title in fee. To this it is objected that he claimed only a life estate, and, therefore, can gain no more. The answer is, he could not, by an adverse possession, gain an estate for life, or any estate less than a fee. A limited estate can be given only by contract of the parties, or act of law. Wrongful possession must give a fee or nothing. And it must be so in the nature of things, since there is nothing to limit it. The effect of possession is to bar actions against the possessor by those who are entitled to bring the actions. It does not operate like a grant, or any other mode of alienation, which may be circumscribed and limited. His claim of a life estate only did not create a remainder in favour of any other, so as to give to that other, for the first time, a right of action on his death. It did not contribute to exclude actions during his life. The person entitled might as well have sued, within the time of limitations, whether William claimed a life estate or not. The restricted claim changed nothing. It did not prevent his possession from being adversary, or make it less wrongful. It is the proprietor being out of possession, and another being in possession against his title, that produces the bar: and it cannot be material whether the adversary possession excludes the rightful possession upon one pretext or another. Contract only can prevent the effect, and then the possession is not adversary. It is inconceivable that a wrongful possession can be restricted in its effects as a bar of limitation to a life estate, when the whole fee is actionable against 1822. Ricard V. Williams. 1822. Ricard V. Williams. it. Cases may, indeed, be conceived in which it would produce a limited effect; as, for example, if the heir should hold against tenant in dower, or by the curtesy. But there is nothing there to bar but the tenancy in dower or curtesy. If there was, the bar would extend to it. In our case, the whole fee is against the possession by wrong, and his possession is against the whole fee. His declarations, that he claimed only a life estate, did not give him a life estate. They gave him nothing; and if they gave nothing, and secured nothing, how could they restrain to the prejudice of the legal effect of his possession? Contract would have operated both ways. But the declarations of the party could not work the effect of contract one way, and there is no reason why it should the other. Whose rights did his declaration save? It could save none, unless it took them out of the statute by postponing their right of action. Whoever had a right of action was told by the statute: sue! or you will be barred by the adversary possession after fifteen years. And unless the declarations of the possessor suspended the right of action, so as that the proprietor could not sue by reason of it, the statute reaches the case; since, it bars all rights of action subsisting during the adversary possession, and not exerted within the time limited. A possession by a man claiming an estate tail, but having in fact no title, would bar all the proprietors having a right to sue. No matter what he claims; if he claims adversely to every body during his possession of fifteen years, he excludes every body claiming title during the time, and every |