to join Denikin who has succeeded Alexeev at the head of the Volunteer Army and that General Milne, heretofore commanding British forces at Saloniki, has been ordered to take command at Odessa. Lindley adds that his civil propaganda and intelligence personnel has been ordered to leave Archangel for Odessa. POOLE File No. 861.00/3241 The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] ARCHANGEL, November 19, 1918, 7 p. m. [Received 4.55 p. m.] 588. With reference to my No. 585, November 18, 6 p. m., Lindley now informs me that Milne is not ordered to Odessa but to Batum to see to Turkish evacuation of Caucasus. From a personal telegram to Ironside for [from?] headquarters London it appears that British do not contemplate important operations in the south of Russia at present but will support Denikin with money and material. POOLE File No. 861.00/3406 The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PARIS, December 11, 1918, 11 p. m. [Received December 12, 8.59 a. m.] 6238. Following telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 14: Mr. Poklevski, Russian Minister, was accredited to us in the quality of representative of the army of volunteers formed by Alexeev and at present under the orders of General Denikin. We confirm that according to concordant reports from all the Allied agents this army constitutes the only national following [force?] which could serve as a basis for the reconstitution of Russia with such assistance of the Allies. Mr. Poklevski handed us a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Neratov, [former assistant?] at the Russian Foreign Office, who is temporarily replacing Mr. Sazonov assigned as a member of the political council formed and assigned to the army of Denikin and which appears destined to be the nucleus of the future provisional government. We transmit in plain language this document under the number [omission]. The final phrase of Article 3 concerning the evacuation of Poland should, according to Mr. Poklevski, be interpreted as meaning that this demand for evacuation emanates from the Polish group of the Denikin army and does not imply any Russian claim to the former Polish provinces. As for Article 4 on the occupation of Russian strategical points "by Russian forces or provisionally by those of the Allies," this [article?] calculated to avoid giving offense to the nation. Pride does not lessen the impatience with which all the elements of order are awaiting Allied intervention. By reason of the importance of the assistance which the Denikin army can offer to the action of the Allies we have asked the Rumanian Government to facilitate the furnishing of munitions to it from the Russian depots still existing in Rumania until such time as the commander of the armies of the Orient can assure same. We again insist on the urgency of sending to Russia the first contingent of Allied troops available so as to reduce to a minimum the interval between German evacuation and inter-Allied occupation. In Ukraine the population terrorized by the Bolsheviks asks that the Germans may receive from the Entehte the instruction to maintain order while awaiting the arrival of the Allies. SHARP File No. 861.00/3461 The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PARIS, December 18, 1918, 10 a. m. 6346. Following joint telegram marked urgent received from Allied Ministers dated Jassy via Saloniki, December 12: [The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Governmental Commission attached to the Volunteer Army (Neratov) to the Allied Ministers in Rumania] In view of the present international situation which has arisen following upon the action of the Central powers regarding the question of peace, one must reckon on the possibility that the international negotiations will commence; as the negotiations progress they will doubtless treat Russian questions so that it is necessary to avoid the possibility of decisions being taken which are not desirable for Russia. It would therefore be highly desirable for an agreement to be reached by the Allies aspiring to the restoration of Russia on the basis of the integrity of her territory and the formation [of a government?] which would be most apt to reestablish internal order and to guarantee Russia situation worthy of a great power. Perhaps the French representative at Jassy would not refuse to transmit as soon as possible the following to his government. A governmental commission has been assigned to the Volunteer Army consisting of General Denikin, commander in chief of the army; General Dragomirov, chairman of the commission; General Lukomski, chief of the military section; Shulgin and Stepanov, members of the Duma; Mr. I. Neratov, former assistant to Minister for Foreign Affairs; etc. Messrs. Sazonov, Astrov, Bernatski, and others have been invited to take part therein. According to the firm conviction of this commission the aims pursued by the Volunteer Army correspond entirely with the views of the Allied powers. The Volunteer Army is the sole organized force which since the beginning of the internal crisis has defended, by great efforts and innumerable sacrifices, the aims followed in the struggle against the Germanophile currents and for union with the Allied powers. At present this army has increased in numbers and is concentrated in the regions of northern Caucasus; on the part of the local and neighboring populations a tendency is already being manifested to enter into contact with this army so as to struggle against the Bolsheviks and the German invasion. In this way it does not seem unrealizable that southern Russia will shortly place herself under the protection of the Volunteer Army; the latter possesses sufficient funds and having accomplished [has accumulated?] considerable quantity of munitions. The governmental commission hopes that the Allied powers will come to the assistance of the army; in this connection the Volunteer Army would greatly appreciate the sending of Allied naval forces to the Black Sea with some military forces so as to create a base of support at Novorossiisk. Such a measure would have the result desired on the elements which are still hesitating. As regards the general plan for an advance of the army towards the north, it would have also a favorable influence on the state of mind of he masses in the Ukraine and the Czechs; or otherwise in the event of the dep. ture of the Austro-Germans one may expect a new outbreak of Bolshevism. The present Ukrainian government, which relies on the German armies, is very uneasy concerning its fate, in view of the interior and exterior difficulties which Germany is experiencing, but it goes without saying that all attempts of this government to establish a unity of action with the Volunteer Army have been neglected on account of the position of the Ukraine. The Volunteer Army is treating in the same way the centrifugal tendencies of the other regions situated on the borders of Russia. Special consideration is being given to the question of the Siberian government which, so it appears, has received a certain support from the Allies and whose aims are practically similar to those pursued by the Volunteer Army. As the Volunteer Army is only in irregular communication with Siberia it does not consider it possible to define from now its attitude vis-à-vis the government of Omsk, but so as to avoid disseminating the forces the commission hopes that the Volunteer Army [will] receive the preference as regards the support of the Allies, who certainly have estimated at its correct value the wisdom of the firm attitude adopted by the army. As regards the peace question, the governmental commission considers that it would be essential for the Allies, if they intend meeting the demands of the Volunteer Army, to give their consent to the following preliminary points: (1) Unity of representation for Russia at the peace conference with nonadmission of the Bolshevik delegates and delegates from the territorial formations which in principle deviate from the aims pursued by the Volunteer Army. (2) Cancellation of the political and economic treaties concluded with Germany and her allies as well as the unilateral acts concerning the introduction in the occupied provinces of certain systems of administration, the reestablishment of the rights violated by these treaties or acts, indemnity for the damage caused in this way, the restitution of the gold, of the military and commercial fleet, the Russian Government stock, etc., and the suspension of the exportation from Russia of foodstuffs and material. This request certainly does not apply to the treaties concluded with the Allied powers. (3) The evacuation by Germany and her allies of Russian territory within the limits of the frontiers of 1914 including Finland. It is also desirable to address a similar request regarding Poland. (4) The occupation by Russian forces or provisionally by those of the Allies until the formation of sufficiently strong Russian detachments of the principal junctions of the railways and other points having a strategical importance in Russian territory at present occupied by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies. (5) The immediate execution of the exchange of prisoners. (6) The engagement on the part of Germany and her allies not to hinder in any way the reestablishment of the solid and indissoluble state organization of Russia. The governmental commission considers it extremely necessary, in order that the activity of the Volunteer Army may conform to the points of view and decisions of the Allied powers, to establish an exchange of telegrams at once between the army and Paris, all the more so as one can foresee the possibility of the [a] delegate being detached from this army to be attached to the Allied powers with full powers concerning political questions so as to collaborate with the Russian Ambassador in Paris. It is not necessary again to mention the firm conviction of the Volunteer Army that the Allied powers will not allow the entry into their territory of representatives of the Bolsheviks and of the state organizations which have based their policy on the support of Germany. NERATOV File No. 861.00/3531 The Russian Chargé (Ughet) to the Acting Secretary of State WASHINGTON, December 26, 1918. [Received December 27.] MY DEAR MR. POLK: I have the honor to transmit to you paraphrase of a cable received by the Russian Embassy from Mr. Maklakov, giving the text of a message that has been sent by S Sazonov, at present at Ekaterinodar, to Admiral Kolchak. With renewed assurances [etc.] [Enclosure-Paraphrase-Telegram] S.UGHET The Russian Ambassador in France (Maklakov) to the Russian Embassy at Washington Complying with the request of S. Sazonov,' who is at Ekaterinodar, I have transmitted the following message from him to Admiral Kolchak: We recognize the supreme power exercised by you, being confident that you are in accord with the fundamental principles of the political and military program of the Volunteer Army. These principles are as follows: Reconstitution of a single and indivisible Russia without defining in advance the ultimate form of its government, admitting, however, the principle of extensive autonomy for those parts of Russia which could be entitled thereto by reasons of ethnographical or historical character. Continuance of the struggle against Bolshevik organizations until they are absolutely destroyed. The military activities of the Siberian armies should be coordinated with the general plans of campaign of the chief command of the Volunteer Army as well as with the Allies with whom we are in direct contact and who entirely share our views concerning the above questions and are rendering us extensive assistance. 1S. D. Sazonov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-1916. CHAPTER IV THE UKRAINE AND THE CRIMEA Establishment of a Ukrainian Government-Relations with the Soviet Government, the Central Powers, and the Allies-The Treaty of Brest Litovsk with the Central Powers, February 9, 1918 File No. 861.00/421 The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State 1519. [Telegram-Extract 1] PETROGRAD, July 16, 1917, 8 p. m. [Received July 18, 9.05 a. m.] Cause [of the resignation of the Cadet Ministers] attributed is that Minister of War, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had granted that province concessions with which Cadet Party unable to agree. File No. 861.00/698 FRANCIS The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] ODESSA, November 14, 1917, 3 p. m. [Received November 20, 9.30 p. m.] In view of the situation in Petrograd the revolutionary committees of Odessa, representing conflicting national policies, have agreed to cooperate to maintain order locally with the result that normal life in the city continues undisturbed. Outlook uncertain. RAY File No. 861.00/712 The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] ODESSA, November 20, 1917, 2 p. m. [Received November 24, 6.42 a. m.] The arrangement between revolutionary committees broken by Ukrainian troops who proclaimed the annexation of Odessa to 'Printed in full in vol. I, p. 159. |