SERMON IV. If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin.-John, xv. 24. WHEN We consider the relation in which God stands with his rational but fallible creatures, we shall be at no loss to perceive, that if obedience has been called for on the one hand, there must have been proposed on the other, sufficient reason for believing that it was God who made the call; or, in other words, If revelation demand an entire acquiescence on the part of man, without at the same time exercising a violent restraint upon his reason and will, it must also propose something adequate to convince him that the claims thus made are irresistible. The reason of this is obvious enough. The human mind has, for one reason or other, something like a natural propensity to religion. We cannot help believing, that beings superior to ourselves somewhere exist; and, consequently, that these ought to be regarded. We also know (to use a very homely phrase), that whatever the market calls for will be supplied. And hence it is, that claims to superior information on the head of religion, have perhaps been more frequently made, than on any other subject whatsoever. Tales the most marvellous and interesting possible have been invented, in order to meet the credulity of the many; and visions, dreams, and apparitions, have been appealed to, for the purpose of giving currency and effect to the imposition; and, the consequence has been, that men have not so much differed as to the being and character of God, for most nations have been unanimous on these subjects, as to what form of religion they ought to follow. The religion, however, presented to us in the Bible, is of a character very far different from those usually proposed by these means. All we have here is simple, plain, unalluring, and in some cases actually forbidding. We have here nothing, or next to nothing, calculated to excite the imagination; and certainly nothing which pretends either to polish the manners, or to supply the arts by which the politician might thrive, or the moralist surprise and dazzle. We have here a system of the most sublime truths delivered in language the most artless possible; accompanied however by evidences which defy competition, and powers which peremptorily demand belief; and, consonant with this is the sentiment delivered in our text: "If," says our blessed Lord, “I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin." If, then, miraculous operations, such as to demand our acquiescence, have been afforded for the purpose of effectually recommending divine truth, our next question will be: How are these to be known to be such; for Scripture itself informs us, that false miracles also may be advanced, and such as may possibly deceive the very elect? I answer: The words of our text will supply us with the true criterion. Works, such as no other man can do, must be truly miraculous; - and, whenever these are publicly advanced, we may rest assured, that a just claim to belief has been made. It will be necessary here, however, to guard against misconception in the use of words. When our Lord uses the term works, we must be careful great a latitude to his meaning, for these reasons: There are works, we know, which some one man may be able to do, which no other can; or, which is the same thing in a practical point of view, to which no other man has been able to produce an equal. Such are the literary productions of some of the ancients, and of many of the moderns; feats of valour or of chivalry; works of industry or of art, which will perhaps, for ever remain matters of wonder and delight, and may probably never be equalled. Again, in the progress of science and of art, effects may hereafter be brought about, which some may be disposed at this day to pronounce not to give too utterly impossible; and which, unless duly considered, may readily enough be supposed to deserve the name of real miracles. All extraordinary works, however, or events of this sort, depend not so much on the actual extent of human power, as they do on the exertion of the human capabilities, circumscribed as they now are and must for ever remain. The man, for example, who is blessed with good natural powers, and becomes by his industry and submission to privations the most learned man of his own or perhaps of any age, the most expert philosopher, or the best mechanic,— will, nevertheless, possess no more of the power necessary to raise a man from the dead, enable himself to walk on the surface of the water, or to make a distinct and definite prediction which is to be fulfilled at the distance of a thousand years, than the merest peasant or even idiot will. These are works which confessedly exceed human power; they involve conditions which no improvement, of which either the body or mind is susceptible, can satisfy in any degree; and, therefore, we are justified in concluding, that what progress soever may hereafter be made in the arts or the sciences, the miraculous events recorded in our Revelation, being of a character which has no sort of connection with these, must for ever retain the character of real miracles: and consequently, leave all future generations without a fear of imposition, on the one hand, or any possible excuse for withholding their assent to its declarations, on the other. An objection may, however, here be raised. It may be said, that we occasionally read, even in the Scriptures themselves, of instances of demoniacal exertions having been made, such as manifestly to exceed human powers; and, that these, according to the doctrine here proposed, must be sufficient *If the apparently miraculous powers of the wise men of Egypt, exerted in opposition to Moses, be referred to this cause, it may be suggested, that we have no reason whatever for supposing that any thing truly miraculous was performed by them on that occasion: all they did might have been done by juggling; but, when something was advanced by Moses which could not to recommend what was manifestly erroneous, to general regard and acceptance. I answer: The accounts given of these demoniacal exertions do not seem to warrant the conclusion that they were superhuman. That they possessed an amazing influence on popular belief, there can be no doubt; and hence, perhaps, resulted all their potency. My own belief is, that they went no farther than similar pretensions made in more modern times have gone; and, that they consisted of nothing more than artifices, which every moderately informed person could easily detect. Omitting, however, what may have happened in those early times, of which we need not speak very positively, or even be anxious, we may safely affirm, that no such influences are now exerted. The spread of knowledge has, since the times of the Reformation, effectually superannuated the office of the exorcist, and divested every sort of magic of all its force throughout Europe; and, what is still more to our purpose, such things are now no where else to be found as realities. The plains of Hindustan, the wilds of Tartary, the recesses of Ceylon or of China, the hut of the cannibal, whether of Africa, New Zealand, or elsewhere, will not furnish us now with one well-attested story of any thing in the shape of miracle, wrought by demoniacal agency. I am inclined to believe, therefore, (whatever may be advanced on this subject by Mohammedans † or others), that those works which man, as such, cannot perform, are really and truly miraculous; and, that they could not have been brought about, without the co-operating will and power of the Deity. Great practical difficulties may, however, occasionally present themselves, as to whether certain given operations or events be truly miraculous or not; and, for the sake of meeting these the more effectually, it may be thus be done by them, they confessed at once that their powers went no further. Demoniacal possessions seem to have taken place in the days of our Lord; but in these cases no miracle was attempted, as far as we know, by the persons possessed. + See my Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mohammedanism. : advisable to introduce a few other restrictions into our definition of a miracle; and here we cannot do better than to avail ourselves of the instruction offered for this purpose in the Scriptures themselves.* If, then, we construct our definition thus namely, A miracle is an event such as to exceed the power of man to effect, and is brought about either for the purpose of fulfilling something predicted in a former revelation, or for furthering its objects and ends in one way or other; we shall have all we can possibly want; or, at least, all upon which any reliance can be placed.+ These additional restrictions have been given for the following reasons: first, Miracles do not appear to have been afforded, except in cases where they were absolutely wanted, that is to say, either for the purpose of furnishing man with a revelation at the first, or of fulfilling such parts of it as consisted of predictions, and stood in need of such fulfilment, and thus to make it binding upon all. For this latter purpose were the miracles of our Saviour apparently wrought; not, as it might seem, to supply an independent authority to the declarations of the New Testament, but only to insure the conviction, that Jesus was the CHRIST promised to the Fathers. The Revelation is, in these respects, now perfect in all its parts; and hence it is, perhaps, that miracles have altogether ceased: and, unless we are greatly mistaken, they ceased just at the period at which their further exhibition * Deut. chap. xiii. Is. xli. 21-23. These conditions in the definition of a miracle were first proposed in my Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mohammedanism, Camb. 1824, p. 535, and were afterwards, with some variation, taken up and applied by the Rev. Mr. Penrose, in his valuable work on Miracles. If it be said, however, that by this view of the subject too much is taken for granted, I answer: The miraculous acts or events so taken for granted, are such as to admit of no doubt as to their being truly miraculous according to our shorter definition: upon these therefore we may rely; and, as the definition has been thus augmented only for the sake of facilitating our inquiries in later times, no objection, of which I am aware, can be offered to its form. |