led. Pleasure an indefinite term very apt to be misunderstood.
-Ruskin's protest against Pleasure as the end of Art may be
considered here, Pleasure being regarded as immoral, and there-
fore unprofitable—answered by reference to Lord Chesterfield's
saying about Wit.-III. The Spanish school of Criticism not
very original, but still authoritative-it held to the one doctrine
-but it had its own special view-that Art is for the people.
-How this doctrine showed itself in Berceo, in Cervantes, and
in Lope de Vega.-How Cervantes discussed it in Don Quixote.
-Lope de Vega.-The same view expressed by Terence-by
Molière-by Johnson.-A difficult question here involved.—An
opposite doctrine supposed to have been held by Milton-and
certainly held by Wordsworth.-On the fit and few as judges
of Art.-Does a printed, as distinguished from a written, Litera-
ture make any difference?-The democratic doctrine of Art will
be displeasing to some-expressed by saying that all great Art
is gregarious.-IV. The French school of Criticism-accepts the
universal doctrine.-The peculiarity of French Criticism-began
to show itself in the early days of the Bourbons.-Picture of
France on the death of Henry IV.-The utter want of refine-
ment-illustrated by reference to the preceding century.-At
Henry's death the worst behaved nation in Europe-but sound
at heart, and ripe for reform.-Reform came from Italy.-
Catherine de Vivonne-her education-and how she became
mistress of the Hôtel Rambouillet.-Origin of the Précieuses.-
On mistakes committed about them.-Molière, and his real
object with regard to them.-The false Précieuses whom Molière
ridiculed. The real Précieuses made the French taste-and
live to this day.-The clue to French Art and Criticism.—
French purism, its origin and singularity-Hugo's revolt
against it.-La Mesnardière-a great man with the Précieuses
-his criticism-absurd, but not to be despised.-On varieties of
taste and critical questions thence arising.-How La Mesnar-
dière urged these questions-and in the present day M. Cousin.
-These objections legitimate.-Statement of the question-but
an objection to be urged to M. Cousin's form of it.-Answer to
M. Cousin drawn from his own opinion regarding Science.-
The objection, however, deserves a more direct reply.-Our
sense of delight is distinct from our estimate of it.-An example
drawn from the sense of taste-another from the pleasure of
sadness.-Application of these examples to the argument.-The
ideal of Pleasure as distinct from the reality.-V. The German
school of Criticism-what is peculiar to its view of Art.-That
Art comes of Pleasure as well as goes to it but German
thinkers confine the pleasure of Art to the beautiful.-How
this bias was given to German philosophy by Wolf-and by his
disciple Baumgarten; and how their conclusion remained in
force long after the premiss from which they started was
rejected. How the Germans are bewitched with the notion of
beauty-their raptures.-They are called back to reason by
Richter. Richter's own deficiency.-On the German notion of
beauty-what it is.-Here again they owe their bias to Wolf.
-How succeeding thinkers rung the changes upon Wolf.-
What view came gradually into sight.-Goethe's final view of
the beautiful in Art, and summary of the German doctrine of
Pleasure. The German doctrine needs to be balanced by a
counter-statement of the sorrows of Art.—The modern sense of
enjoyment as compared with the ancient-is it less enjoyment?
-The existence of delicious sorrow a great fact.-But the
suffering of the artist is not inconsistent with the fact that his
Art emerges from Pleasure.-The power of expression implies
recovery. VI. The English school of Criticism beginning with
Bacon, and the Elizabethans-but our best Criticism dates from
Dryden. A new spirit breathed into Criticism at the end of
last century-but ever the same doctrine as to the end of Art
is taught and Lord Kames even draws in a faint way the
inference that Criticism must be the Science of Pleasure.—
What is peculiar in the English view of Art ?—It dwells chiefly
on the power of the imagination in Art.-Bacon it was that
first taught us to treat of Art as the creature of imagination.-
A word of Shakespeare's assisted-and since then it has been
the favourite dogma of English Criticism.-Criticism cannot
advance a step without first understanding what Imagination is.
-The relation of Imagination to Pleasure.-Imagination to be
largely identified with the source of Pleasure-limits, however,
to that view of it.-Re-statement of the English contribution to
Criticism, and its deficiency.-Although Imagination is magni-
fied and everywhere asserted, it is nowhere explained.-Imagi-
nation an unknown quantity--but the continual recognition of
that unknown something of immense importance.---Summary
of this chapter..
Page 97
A general description of Imagination and its manifestations.—Has
Imagination a character of its own?-What most strikes one
when we approach the inquiry into the nature of this power-
the acknowledged potency of Imagination.-But notwithstanding
its potency, the philosophers do not tell us what it is, and indeed
assure us that it is nought.-The current opinions may be sum-
marised in the Parable of Proteus.-These current opinions may
be examined under four heads.-(1) Imagination is sometimes
identified with Memory.-Generally in this way it is regarded
as a loose Memory-yet from their manner of treating it, many
of those who identify Imagination with Memory show that they
really regard it as more than Memory.—(2) Imagination is some-
times identified with Passion.—(3) Imagination identified with
Reason from the days of the Schoolmen downwards to Dugald
Stewart and others. Even those who treat of Imagination as a
power by itself are struck by its rationality; and at last work
up to the conclusion that there is an Imagination for every
faculty of the Mind.-All these views of Imagination are com-
patible-and we arrive at the view of Imagination as the Proteus
of the Mind with which we started-but the question still recurs,
(4) Has Imagination no character of its own?-Those who'declare
that Imagination has a character of its own, either fail to explain
what it is, or, like Mr. Ruskin, they say frankly that it is in-
scrutable.-Imagination therefore demands a new analysis, and
we must define it for ourselves.—It is not a special faculty, but
a special function.-The Hidden Soul.-Importance of the facts
which we have now to study.-Statement of the problem to be
solved ..
Page 179
The object of this chapter is to show that there is a Hidden Soul, and
what it means.-The character of the facts to be studied.-The
interest of the subject.-The romance of the Mind.--The exist-
ence of Hidden Thought only recently acknowledged.—The
Cartesian Doctrine opposed to it.-Leibnitz first suggested the
Modern Doctrine, which is also allowed in our time by Hamil-
ton, Mill, and Spencer.-But in one form or another the
view has been of old standing.-It is the foundation of
Mysticism, and it is often suggested by the Poets.--General
description of the facts with which we have now to deal.-These
facts are to be divided into three groups, and statement of the
argument to be followed.-I. On Memory and its Hidden Work,
a constant marvel.-Contradictions of Memory.-The clue to it
in the Hidden Life.-Story of the Countess of Laval and others.
-Captain Marryat.-De Quincey.-Two things to be chiefly
noticed in Memory.-The first, that Understanding is not essen-
tial to it. Story of the Maid of Saxony.-Memory absolute as
a photograph.-Other illustrations given by Abercrombie.-
Conclusion, that the Memory lets nothing go by.-The second
point to be noticed, that the Memory of things not understood
may be vital within us.-Knowledge active within us of which
we know nothing.-Examples in illustration.-Showing how
what we attribute to Imagination is but a surrender of Hid-
den Memory.-Plato maintained in view of these facts the
theory of Pre-existence.-The same view suggested by Words-
worth. Summary of the facts relating to Memory.—II.
On the Hidden Life of Reason.-The complexity of Thought.
-We do a great number of things at once, but are not con-
scious of all. Further examples, showing how the mind
pursues several distinct actions at once.-Several of these
distinct actions become quite unconscious.-The Mind in secret
broods over its work.-That the mind calculates, invents, judges,
digests for us without our knowing it.-The story of Avicenna.
-There are many things which we cannot do if we are con-
scious, but can do easily if we become unconscious.-Action of
the Mind in sleep.-There is no act of waking life which we
cannot carry on in our sleep.-Similar facts perceived in
drunkenness.-Though many of these facts have a ludicrous
side, they are deserving of serious attention.-Account of some
of the actions performed in sleep.-Somnambulism and its won-
ders. The double life of the Somnambulist seen in a fainter
degree in our waking states.-III. The Hidden Life of Passion
and Instinct.-Passion notoriously a blind force.-The mystery
of Love.-And Passion because blind is not therefore untrust-
worthy.-Sympathy and its unconscious action; and how Bacon
accounted for it.-Instinct, and Cuvier's definition of it as akin
to Somnambulism.—The immense variety of instinctive actions.
-The instinctive action of our Muscles.-Madame Mara and
her singing. What Mr. Ruskin says of the subtle Instinct of
the hand. The secret power which the Brain exerts over the
whole Body.—On the effect of Imagination in Pregnancy.—But
why call this particular class of Hidden Mental Actions Imagi-
nations?-On those Hidden Movements which we call Intui-
tion.—What is true in Mysticism.-And how powerfully the
creed of the Mystic bears on the existence of Hidden Soul.
-On the Hidden Life of the Believer.-Especially recognised
by Platonist and Puritan Divines.—It must be remembered that
we are speaking in metaphors chiefly when we have to describe
the Hidden Life.—Summary of the evidence of a Hidden Life or
Soul within us-stated in the words of Prospero.-Position of
the argument..
That the action of Hidden Thought accounts for all the facts of
Imagination. The spontaneousness of Imagination an acknow-
ledged fact.-A compulsory Imagination a contradiction.—The
errors of Imagination due to its involuntary and unconscious
character. If Imagination is nothing but the free play of
Thought, why is it called Imagination?—The clue to the name
contained in the definition of the faculty.-In the free play of
Thought we dwell most on images of Sight.—The definition of
Imagination as free play explains many opinions with regard to
it which are otherwise inexplicable-as the opinion of D'Alem-
bert and Hamilton.-On Imagery.-Imagery not to be treated
as a mere question of Language.-The absurdities of Criticism
in regard to Imagery.-The most obvious fact about Imagery is
that it always contains a comparison.-But all Thought implies
comparison.-What is the peculiarity of the comparisons attri-
buted to Imagination?-Locke's answer.-But does Locke's
answer give any sanction to the notion that in the comparisons
of Imagination there is anything special?-The peculiarity of
imaginative comparisons, as thus far stated, to be explained by
the fact of Imagination being free play.-But Locke's state-
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