production. Why, then, is Spanish America, to be precluded from consulting her own safety, and promoting her own welfare, in a way not only conformable to the laws and precedents, but also, sanctioned by most recent example? The existing Regency, was no more than a committee of the Central Junta; this had decreed Spanish America to be equal, in rights, with the Peninsula; and, now, the former, by its decree, again, publicly, divests them of this right. Whence, then, this palpable contradiction? The small island of Majorca, was allowed to assemble a Junta, for its own local administration, and no complaint was ever uttered. Why, then all this partiality? To the fact. The government had now been removed from Seville to Cadiz, and in their plans and of reform, the Americans sought to rend asunder their trammels on trade. The Cadiz merchants, trembled for their monopolies, and the Regency, by this time, had become the tool of their extravagant pretensions, and the instrument of their injustice.

As a specious pretext to this public outrage, and in order to gloss over their arbitrary conduct, the Regents declare, that the people of Caracas, had made themselves independent of the mother-country, and created a governing Junta, to exercise a supposed independent authority; when, at the same time, nothing of the kind had either been attempted or manifested. But it was necessary, to give some plea for so flagrant an act of injustice, and such an abuse of power; and the Cadiz monopolists, and the ravings of a mercenary war faction, were, not long, in defining the nature of the colouring, that was to be given to so intemperate a measure. If the self constituted Regents of Spain, then, charged their

distant fellow-subjects, with rebellion, treason, and ingratitude, the only motives which could authorize a war; they ought to have been confronted and heard, and the illegality of their views, ought to have been made known, by strong and deliberative evidence. Before one half of the nation, declared war against the other, the reasons ought to have been explained, the circumstances cleared up, and above all, unwise and dangerous self-delusion, ought never to have been the motive of so important a rupture. The cold blooded fury, and the mercenary malice of faction, ought never to have influenced or guided the actions of a government, that pretended, not 'only, to render the Spanish monarchy powerful and effective, but, also, to regener ate its abject subjects; nor should it ever have been guilty of an injustice, which involved a direct contradiction to the promises made to the suffering inhabitants of a country, that had given such long, and sincere proofs of attatchment and recent loyalty. It was that political power, these Regents, then, arrogated to themselves, beyond the limits of their authority, which first disturbed the just equipoise of the state, and shook that ancient fraternity, which, by length of time, had grown into a degree of habitual dependence, between European Spain, and Spanish America.

§ By an unfortunate combination of circumstances, if the policy of Spain in this particular, was improvident, illiberal, and unjust, that of the British government, also, does not appear to have been, sufficiently, firm, decided, or enlightened. From the very moment, we entered into our treaty with European Spain, of which sincerity was the acknowledged basis, we lost sight of

Spanish America, whom we seemed no longer to regard, as soon as we were easy on the score of the French. Mutual sincerity had been pledged, yet the ingredient of mutual confidence,seemed entirely excluded. We appear to have been afraid, of convincing Spain, of the error she was then committing, or of reminding her, of the heavy consequences, she was about to bring down,on her own guilty head. If a rupture, with a large transatlantic population, was a case novel in the Spanish historical annals, it was not in our own; was there, then, no advice that the experienced ministers of an allied nation, could, at their most important juncture, have given; nay, was there no good, which England might, not then, have derived, out of the great and ponderous mass of evils, thence about to result to Spain? Was this not the most suitable moment to have stifled an increasing calamity, which, we now see has, for upwards of four years, germinated into a wide growth of public and private misery, and has spread its poisonous influence over the whole monarchy ?

What sound policy, would, at that time, have dictated, was plain and easy; for the dispositions of the Spanish Americans, were avowed and public, and appearances could not be mistaken. They demanded redress, not as a favour, but as a right to which they were entitled; and in case of refusal, every thing announced, that the movements would not be slight or temporary. The general and animated features of the insurrections, made it manifest, that palliatives could, no longer, be employed with success; and the stages and probable consequences of the events, were too alarming, to be looked upon with indifference. If delicacy and prudence

made the British government, then, abstain from fomenting the insurrections in question; no motive of policy, whatever, could authorize it, to suffer the Regency of Cadiz, without the wishes of the nation being, previously, known, to declare war against one half of the monarchy, equally bound by a solemn treaty, particularly in moments so pressing; nor could the British government have been unaware, that it was a war, unjust in its nature, and fraught with the most fatal consequences to all parties. What renders this circumstance the more astonishing, is, that this same Regency, avowedly, owed its existence, protection, and support, to the influence of the governmental agents of England. Both in European and American Spain, the creation of this ephemeral government, after the dispersions of the Central Junta, is known under the appellation of hechura Ingleza (British make) the influencing or counteracting of its acts, when unjust, was therefore, in a particular manner, expected from a mutual ally; and beyond: doubt, in those moments, dexterous and energetic remonstrance, would have been successful. The triumph of probity, good sense, and moderation, on this occasion, would have redounded, more to the solid advantage of England, and have produced more real benefits to the entire Spanish monarchy, than any of the other military or political transactions, in which we have been engaged for its welfare.

It was the two undivided halves of the Spanish empire, and constituting the whole nation, who were the allies of England, and not the Regency of Cadiz, which had been engendered, amidst the terror and dismay that succeeded the flight of the Central Junta from Seville;

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and if five persons, illegally constituted, were on the eve of committing an unjust, and impolitic act, against ; one half of the nation whose sovereignty they had usurped; if they were about to declare an unwarrantable war against it, and which would deluge it in blood, and dry up those resources, that were to give efficacy to the exertions of the whole; who so well as England, their mutual ally, and with equally as much at stake, could with propriety step in between the irritated parties, and insist on being their umpire? It is honourable in a nation, as it is in an individual, to be misled by the impulse of expanded philanthropy, but to merit the opposite charge, each ought, equally, to avoid, The immense havoc, that has ensued from the unfortunate measure here alluded to, might, then, have been easily calculated on and foreseen; but it would almost appear, as if both Spain and England, were envious of the profound' peace enjoyed in all the transmarine provinces; and as if Spain, in flames by the hand of a deadly enemy, had likewise hastened, to hurl on the quiet shores of Columbia, the same conflagration, by which she herself, was fast consuming.

Had England, then, only used energy, talent, and address; had she held out to Spain, the example of dignity, and true wisdom, and had she by sound and firm reasoning, only silenced the ravings of a boisterous war faction, according to the united testimony of both Spaniards and Americans, she would not, only, have been successful, and averted this storm from bursting on her ally, but she would, besides, have derived considerable advantages to herself. She would, moreover, have, then, really, maintained the integrity of the entire Spa