operation with Spain, has therein constantly been opposed, by avowed enemies and insidious friends, and those numerous wounding suspicions, and irritating charges which, so frequently, circulated, exhibit ample evidence of this fact.

§ Whilst it was her earnest wish and fondest hope, to give every energy to European Spain, in order to make her equal to the great struggle in which she was engaged, England, at the same time, sought, by means feeble, though sincere, to produce harmony and consequent good to the community at large, by offering herself to mediate, between the former and her American provinces. On the part of England, a desire had been early manifested, to adjust the subjects of controversy, and proposals for a mediation, were made by her minister in Cadiz. They were brought on the floor of the Cortes, in April 1811, and were accepted by them on conditions, which nearly involved all the points in dispute. The Cortes exacted, that the insurgent provinces, should acknowledge them as their sovereign, swear obedience to them, and send their deputies to be incorporated with those of Spain; which if they did not do, within fifteen months, England was to aid the mother-country to subject them by force. Spain, thus became her own judge, and instead of publishing a declaration of such rights, as the Spanish Americans actually possessed, with a solemn guarantee, that the same should form the basis of the adjustment, she tells them at once, to send over their deputies, but not elected as in the Peninsula, and not as there corresponding to each 50,000 souls. She tells them to obey, without having altered their governing system, without granting them a free trade, without destroying their galling

monopolies, and, in short, without giving them that practical equality which Spain herself possessed, or removing one of the material causes of complaint.

The Cadiz Regency, consequently, signified its readiness to accept the proffered mediation, but, on examination, its conditions, as laid down by the Cortes, were found such, as to be supposed "incompatible with the principles, on which alone the British government could consent to interfere. Under all circumstances, however, it was thought proper to name commissioners, at the head of whom, Commodore Cockburn was placed, His Majesty's ministers, trusting that the Cadiz government, in consideration of the honourable and liberal conduct, Great Britain had invariably observed, throughout her existing alliance with Spain, would so ameliorate and alter the objectionable conditions above alluded to, as to enable the commissioners to bring about the reconciliation, so devoutly to be wished, on terms, equally calculated to insure the future happiness and security of the American subjects, and, at the same time, keep unimpaired the honour and dignity of the Spanish mo narchy."

From the 10th to 11th of July, 1812, this question was agitated in the Cortes, in secret sessions, and after a report of a committee, had been heard. The American deputies, went into all the details, necessary to explain the origin of these dissentions, and recapitulated the points in contest. They pleaded in favour of the measure, on the grounds of humanity and justice, and recommended conciliation, as a more honourable and secure means of adjustment, than the terror of arms. To promote it, they argued, no instrument was so powerful

and proper as England, who had made so many sacrifices, and possessed the confidence of both parties. The Spanish deputies, without bringing forward any specific or insurmountable objections, alluded to the interested motives which induced England to propose this measure, and the darkest and most pointed stabs, were aimed at her national honour and faith. Some complained, that the revolution in Mexico, had increased for the want of rigour, and others alluded to the difficulty of any thing effective being done, by foreign commissioners, who did not understand the points at issue. In short, all that tended to give influence to England, or open to her any access to Spanish America, was viewed with jealous disapprobation; and it was resolved, that a mediation could only be applied to Caracas and Buenos Ayres, already nearly out of the control of Spain, but that it could, by no means, extend to Mexico, where it was asserted, that no revolutionary government existed, wherewith to treat. A national Junta, nevertheless, was, at that very time, organized in Sultepec, which had long possessed the confidence of the inhabitants. Indeed, New Spain, has ever been the most suitable section of Spanish America, for the adoption of this measure, from its being more exempt from those extreme democratic and frenchified principles, which have been manifested in some other sections, and because it contained a larger degree of ta lent and collected influence.

That excess of caution, with which Spain, as Robertson, says, has always thrown a veil over her transactions in America, and the peculiar solicitude, with which she has concealed them from strangers, were particularly remarkable, during this and the debate on the question of

free trade. The cabinet of St. James, was, perhaps, not inclined to expose itself to another mark of disrespect, nevertheless, the most weighty reasons existed, to have a complete explanation on this subject, and to understand, perfectly, the views and intentions of the Spanish government. Yet, if we were to content ourselves, with merely asking a favour; if we were to address ourselves, in the tone of supplication, and not urge those strong reasons which actuated our conduct, and if particularly, we did not fully explain and guarantee the integrity of our intentions, as a preliminary measure, it is a pity, England ever exposed herself to a fresh and insulting rebuff, in proposing a mediation, after the fate of the free trade question, was known. In a measure of this kind, it was on the good sense and virtue of the nation at large, that we had to rely; and if the powerful engine of the press, was daily contributing its influence to the extension of opinions, calculated to misrepresent our views, and eventually to deprive us of all confidence; to neglect an antitode, was only doing the thing by halves. By such means, extensive animosity against us, had made its way into the public mind, without there encountering a just sense of the great sacrifices we were making, or of the humane and honourable motives which stimulated our conduct. In vain, did we testify the sincerity of our views, to the executive of Spain, if these testimonies never passed its office doors, whilst the French, on the one hand, and the illiberal party on the other, were actively employed in blackening our national character. Though in the free trade question, illiberality and invective, had lost us the measure, we, on this more important occasion, again neglected to

destroy those false and specious grounds, on which the opposition had taken their stand, and though it was evident, that the same would have their influence in the question now alluded to, still we sought not to attach the wavering, or gain the well-disposed to friendship. We disregarded that furious and malignant spirit, which had infused itself into the publications of the day; and though England could have demanded a free trade and mediation, as the reward of services, from which were flowing great and lasting benefits; though without any departure from those principles, which were held as fundamental to her treaty, she might have insisted on them, and convinced the Spanish people of their justice; the most effective means were, however, overlooked.

The points in question, were, indeed, delicate in their nature, as long as the Cadiz monopolists held so much sway; yet they could no longer remain untouched, without hazarding the most serious consequences. The wanton and unjust horrors committing in Spanish America, and the manner in which the resources of Spain,. and the supplies of England, were wasted, were circumstances, in which the honour of both were implicated. It was, besides, time to settle the commercial relations of each, by amicable relations; points to which the interest and gratitude of Spain, were expected to contribute. However, to render a mediation effective, a great practical knowledge of the laws, institutions, manners, and even language of the countries to which it referred, were particularly essential. No mission of any kind, to a foreign country, was more difficult than the one to which I allude, and though it required a certain weight of character, it rather stood in need of practical men,