selves; between the different States of Italy; and between Great Britain and the United States of America.

§ 6. Titles

princes and

All sovereign princes or States may assume whatof sovereign ever titles of dignity they think fit, and may exact from States. their own subjects these marks of honor. But their recognition by other States is not a matter of strict right, especially in the case of new titles of higher dignity, assumed by sovereigns. Thus the royal title of King of Prussia, which was assumed by Frederick I. in 1701, was first acknowledged by the Emperor of Germany, and subsequently by the other princes and States of Europe. It was not acknowledged by the Pope until the reign of Frederick William II. in 1786, and by the Tuetonic knights until 1792, this once famous military order still retaining the shadow of its antiquated claims to the Duchy of Prussia until that period. So also the title of Emperor of all the Russias, which was taken by the Czar, Peter the Great, in 1701, was successively acknowledged by Prussia, the United Netherlands, and Sweden in 1723, by Denmark in 1732, by Turkey in 1739, by the emperor and the empire in 1745-6, by France in 1745, by Spain in 1750, and by the Republic of Poland in 1764. In the recognition of this title by France, a reservation of the right of precedence claimed by that crown was insisted on, and a stipulation entered into by Russia in the form of a Réversale, that this change of title should make no alteration in the ceremonies observed between the two courts. On the accession of the Empress Catharine II. in 1762, she refused to renew this stipulation in that form, but declared that the imperial title should make no change in the ceremonial observed between the two courts. This declaration was answered by the court of Versailles in a counter declaration, renewing the recognition of that title, upon the express condition, that, if any alteration should be made by the court of St. Petersburg in the rules previously observed by the two courts as to rank and precedence, the French crown would resume its ancient style, and cease to give the title of Imperial to that of Russia.2

1 Ward's History of the Law of Nations, vol. ii. pp. 245-248. Klüber, Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, pt. ii. tit. 1, ch. 2, § 107, note c.

2 Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatie Française, tom. vi. liv. iii. pp. 328–364.

The title of Emperor, from the historical associations with which it is connected, was formerly considered the most eminent and honorable among all sovereign titles; but it was never regarded by other crowned heads as conferring, except in the single case of the Emperor of Germany, any prerogative or precedence over those princes.

The usage of nations has established certain mari§ 7. Maritime ceremonials to be observed, either on the ocean, time cereor those parts of the sea over which a sort of supremacy is claimed by a particular State.

monials.

Among these is the salute by striking the flag or the sails, or by firing a certain number of guns on approaching a fleet or a ship of war, or entering a fortified port or harbor.

Every sovereign State has the exclusive right, in virtue of its independence and equality, to regulate the maritime ceremonial to be observed by its own vessels towards each other, or towards those of another nation, on the high seas, or within its own territorial jurisdiction. It has a similar right to regulate the cere monial to be observed within its own exclusive jurisdiction by the vessels of all nations, as well with respect to each other, as towards its own fortresses and ships of war, and the reciprocal honors to be rendered by the latter to foreign ships. These regulations are established either by its own municipal ordinances, or by reciprocal treaties with other maritime powers.1

Where the dominion claimed by the State is contested by foreign nations, as in the case of Great Britain in the Narrow Seas, the maritime honors to be rendered by its flag are also the subject of contention. The disputes on this subject have not unfrequently formed the motives or pretexts for war between the powers asserting these pretensions, and those by whom they were resisted. The maritime honors required by Denmark, in consequence of the supremacy claimed by that power over the Sound and Belts, at the entrance of the Baltic Sea, have been regulated and modified by different treaties with other States, and espe

1 Bynkershoek, de Dominio Maris, cap. 2, 4. Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, liv. iv. ch. 4, § 159. Klüber, Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, pt. ii. tit. 1, ch. 3, §§ 117-122.

cially by the convention of the 15th of January, 1829, between Russia and Denmark, suppressing most of the formalities required by former treaties. This convention is to continue in force until a general regulation shall be established among all the maritime powers of Europe, according to the protocol of the Congress of Aix la Chapelle, signed on the 9th November, 1818, by the terms of which it was agreed, by the ministers of the five great powers, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, that the existing regulations observed by them should be referred to the ministerial conferences at London, and that the other maritime powers should be invited to communicate their views of the subject in order to form some such general regulation.1

1 J. H. W. Schlegel, Staats Recht des Königreichs Dänemark, 1 Theil, p. 412. Martens, Nouveau Recueil, tom. viii. p. 73. Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, t. i. liv. 2, chap. 15.

CHAPTER IV.

RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.

§ 1. Naprietary

THE exclusive right of every independent State to its territory and other property, is founded upon the title tional prooriginally acquired by occupancy, conquest, or cession, rights." and subsequently confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time, or by treaties and other compacts with foreign States. (a)

private pro

This exclusive right includes the public property or § 2. Pubdomain of the State, and those things belonging to lie and private individuals, or bodies corporate, within its terri- perty. torial limits.

nent do

The right of the State to its public property or do- §8. Emimain is absolute, and excludes that of its own subjects main. as well as other nations. The national proprietary right, in respect to those things belonging to private individuals, or bodies corporate, within its territorial limits, is absolute, so far as it excludes that of other nations; but, in respect to the members of the State, it is paramount only, and forms what is called the eminent domain; that is, the right, in case of necessity or for the public safety, of disposing of all the property of every kind within the limits of the State.

(a) [See, on the subject of the inviolability of national territory, the correspondence between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton, in the case of the Caroline, destroyed at Schlosser, in December, 1837. Webster's Works, vol. vi. p. 292.]

1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. ch. 20, §§ 235, 244. Rutherforth's Inst. of Natural Law, vol. ii. ch. 9, § 6. das Heffter, Europäische Völkerrecht, §§ 64, 69, 70.

§ 4. Pre

The writers on natural law have questioned how far scription. that peculiar species of presumption, arising from the lapse of time, which is called prescription, is justly applicable, as between nation and nation; but the constant and approved practice of nations shows that, by whatever name it be called, the uninterrupted possession of territory, or other property, for a certain length of time, by one State, excludes the claim of every other; in the same manner as, by the law of nature and the municipal code of every civilized nation, a similar possession by an individual excludes the claim of every other person to the article of property in question. This rule is founded upon the supposition, confirmed by constant experience, that every person will naturally seek to enjoy that which belongs to him; and the inference fairly to be drawn from his silence and neglect, of the original defect of his title, or his intention to relinquish it.1 (a)/

quest and

by compact

and the lapse of time.

§ 5. Con- The title of almost all the nations of. Europe to the discovery territory now possessed by them, in that quarter of the confirmed world, was originally derived from conquest, which has been subsequently confirmed by long possession and international compacts, to which all the European States have successively become parties. Their claim to the possessions held by them in the New World, discovered by Columbus and other adventurers, and to the territories which they

1 Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. cap. 4. Puffendorf, Jus Naturæ et Gentium, lib. iv. cap. 12. Vattel, Droit des Gens, tome i. liv. ii. ch. 11. Rutherforth's Inst. of Natural Law, vol. i. ch. 8; vol. ii. ch. 9, §§ 3, 6.

"Sic qui rem suam ab alio teneri scit, nec quicquam contradicit multo tempore, is nisi causâ alia manifeste appareat, non videtur id alio fecisse animo, quàm quôd rem illam in suaram rerum numero esse nollet." Grotius in loc. cit.

(a) [This same principle was recognized as the rule, in the suit of Rhode Island against Massachusetts, in reference to the northern boundary of the former State, decided in 1846. The Court said: "No human transactions are unaffected by time. Its influence is seen over all things subject to change. And this is peculiarly the case in regard to matters which rest in memory, and which, consequently, fade with the lapse of time, and fall with the lives of individuals. For the security of rights, whether of States or individuals, long possession under a claim of title is protected. And there is no controversy in which this great principle may be invoked with greater justice and propriety than in a case of disputed boundary." Howard's Rep. vol. iv. p. 639, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.]