been termed private international law, and especially of the conflict between the municipal laws of different States.

and state

nonymous

former used

cally for the

But the peculiar objects of international law, are The terms those direct relations which exist between nations and sovereign states. Wherever, indeed, the absolute or unlimited used symonarchical form of government prevails in any State, ly, or the the person of the prince is necessarily identified with metaphorithe State itself: l'Etat c'est moi. Hence the public latter. jurists frequently use the terms sovereign and state as synonymous. So also the term sovereign is sometimes used in a metaphorical sense merely to denote a state, whatever may be the form of its government, whether monarchical, or republican, or mixed.

§ 5. Sovereignty de

Sovereignty is the supreme power by which any State is governed. This supreme power may be fined. exercised either internally or externally.

Internal

Internal sovereignty is that which is inherent in the people of any State, or vested in its ruler, by its muni- sovereignty. cipal constitution or fundamental laws. This is the object of what has been called internal public law, droit public interne, but which may more properly be termed constitutional law.

External sovereignty consists in the independence of External one political society, in respect to all other political sovereignty. societies. It is by the exercise of this branch of sovereignty that the international relations of one political society are maintained, in peace and in war, with all other political societies. The law by which it is regulated has, therefore, been called external public law, droit public externe, but may more properly be termed international law.

The recognition of any State by other States, and its admission into the general society of nations, may depend, or may be made to depend, at the will of those other States, upon its internal constitution or form of government, or the choice it may make of its rulers. But whatever be its internal constitution, or form of government, or whoever may be its rulers, or even if it be distracted with anarchy, through a violent contest for the government between different parties among the people, the State still subsists in contemplation of law, until its sovereignty is completely extinguished by the final dissolution of the social

tie, or by some other cause which puts an end to the being of the State.

§ 6. Sove

Sovereignty is acquired by a State, either at the reignty, how origin of the civil society of which it is composed, or acquired. when it separates itself from the community of which it previously formed a part, and on which it was dependent.1

This principle applies as well to internal as to external sovereignty. But an important distinction is to be noticed, in this respect, between these two species of sovereignty. The internal sovereignty of a State does not, in any degree, depend upon its recognition by other States. A new State, springing into existence, does not require the recognition of other States to confirm its internal sovereignty. The existence of the State de facto is sufficient, in this respect, to establish its sovereignty de jure. It is a State because it exists.

Thus the internal sovereignty of the United States of America was complete from the time they declared themselves "free, sovereign, and independent States," on the 4th of July, 1776. It was upon this principle that the Supreme Court determined, in 1808, that the several States composing the Union, so far as regards their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers of sovereign States, and that they did not derive them from concessions made by the British king. The treaty of peace of 1782, contained a recognition of their independence, not a grant of it. From hence it resulted, that the laws of the several State governments were, from the date of the declaration of independence, the laws of sovereign States, and as such were obligatory upon the people of such State from the time they were enacted. It was added, however, that the court did not mean to intimate the opinion, that even the law of any State of the Union, whose constitution of government had been recognized prior to the 4th of July, 1776, and which law had been enacted prior to that period, would not have been equally obligatory.2

The external sovereignty of any State, on the other hand, may

1 Kluber, Droit des Gens moderne de l'Europe, § 23.

2 Cranch's Rep. vol. iv. p. 212.-M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's lessee.

require recognition by other States in order to render it perfect and complete. So long, indeed, as the new State confines its action to its own citizens, and to the limits of its own territory, it may well dispense with such recognition. But if it desires to enter into that great society of nations, all the members of which recognize rights to which they are mutually entitled, and duties which they may be called upon reciprocally to fulfil, such recognition becomes essentially necessary to the complete participation of the new State in all the advantages of this society. Every other State is at liberty to grant, or refuse, this recognition, subject to the consequences of its own conduct in this respect; and until such recognition becomes universal on the part of the other States, the new State becomes entitled to the exercise of its external sovereignty as to those States only by whom that sovereignty has been recognized.

The identity of a State consists in its having the 7. Iden§ tity of a same origin or commencement of existence; and its State. difference from all other States consists in its having a different origin or commencement of existence. A State, as to the individual members of which it is composed, is a fluctuating body; but in respect to the society, it is one and the same body, of which the existence is perpetually kept up by a constant succession of new members. This existence continues until it is interrupted by some change affecting the being of the State.1

If this change be an internal revolution, merely alter- How affecting the municipal constitution and form of government, ed by interthe State remains the same; it neither loses any of its tion. rights, nor is discharged from any of its obligations.2

nal revolu

The habitual obedience of the members of any political society to a superior authority must have once existed in order to constitute a sovereign State. But the temporary suspension of that obedience and of that authority, in consequence of a civil war, does not necessarily extinguish the being of the State, although it may affect for a time its ordinary relations with other States.

1 Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. cap. 9, § 3. Rutherforth's Inst. b. ii. c. 10, §§ 12, 13. Heffter, Das Europäische Völkerrecht, § 24.

2 Grotius, lib. ii. cap. 9, § 8. Rutherforth, b. ii. c. 10, § 14. Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent. lib. viii. cap. 12, §§ 1-3.

Conduct of

foreign

wards an

involved in

civil war.

Until the revolution is consummated, whilst the civil States to- war involving a contest for the government continues, other nation other States may remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing to treat the ancient government as sovereign, and the government de facto as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy; or may espouse the cause of the party which they believe to have justice on its side. In the first case, the foreign State fulfils all its obligations under the law of nations; and neither party has any right to complain, provided it maintains an impartial neutrality. In the latter, it becomes, of course, the enemy of the party against whom it declares itself, and the ally of the other; and as the positive law of nations makes no distinction, in this respect, between a just and an unjust war, the intervening State becomes entitled to all the rights of war against the opposite party.1

Parties to civil war entitled to rights of

war

against each other.

If the foreign State professes neutrality, it is bound to allow impartially to both belligerent parties the free exercise of those rights which war gives to public enemies against each other; such as the right of blockade, and of capturing contraband and enemy's property.2 But the exercise of those rights, on the part of the revolting colony or province against the metropolitan country, may be modified by the obligation of treaties previously existing between that country and foreign States.

§ 8. Identity of a State, how

external

If, on the other hand, the change be effected by external violence, as by conquest confirmed by treaties of affected by peace, its effects upon the being of the State are to be violence. determined by the stipulations of those treaties. The conquered and ceded country may be a portion only, or the whole of the vanquished State. If the former, the original State still continues; if the latter, it ceases to exist. In either case, the conquered territory may be incorporated into the conquering State as a province, or it may be united to it as a coördinate State with equal sovereign rights.

1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. ch. 4, § 56. Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 2, §§ 79-82.

2 Wheaton's Rep. vol. iii. p. 610.- United States v. Palmer. Vol. iv. p. 63.– The Divina Pastora. Id. p. 502.- The Nuestra Signora de la Caridad.

3 See Part IV. ch. 3, § 3. Rights of War as to Neutrals.

nal and ex

firmed by

Such a change in the being of a State may also be § 9. By the joint efproduced by the conjoint effect of internal revolution and fect of interforeign conquest, subsequently confirmed, or modified termal vioand adjusted by international compacts. Thus the lence conHouse of Orange was expelled from the Seven United treaty. Provinces of the Netherlands, in 1797, in consequence of the French Revolution and the progress of the arms of France, and a democratic republic substituted in the place of the ancient Dutch constitution. At the same time the Belgic provinces, which had long been united to the Austrian monarchy as a coördinate State, were conquered by France, and annexed to the French republic by the treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville. On the restoration of the Prince of Orange, in 1813, he assumed the title of Sovereign Prince, and afterwards King of the Netherlands; and by the treaties of Vienna, the former Seven United Provinces were united with the Austrian Low Countries into one State, under his sovereignty.'

Here is an example of two States incorporated into one, so as to form a new State, the independent existence of each of the former States entirely ceasing in respect to the other; whilst the. rights and obligations of both still continue in respect to other foreign States, except so far as they may be affected by the compacts creating the new State.

In consequence of the revolution which took place in Belgium, in 1830, this country was again severed from Holland, and its independence as a separate kingdom acknowledged and guaranteed by the five great powers of Europe, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Prince Leopold of SaxeCobourg having been subsequently elected king of the Belgians by the national Congress, the terms and conditions of the separation were stipulated by the treaty concluded on the 15th of November, 1831, between those powers and Belgium, which was declared by the conference of London to constitute the invariable basis of the separation, independence, neutrality, and state of territorial possession of Belgium, subject to such modifications as might be the result of direct negotiation between that kingdom and the Netherlands.2 (a)

1 Wheaton's Hist. Law of Nations, p. 492.

2 Wheaton's Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 538-555.

(a) [The annexation of Texas to the United States, consummated by the