could be none to renew; the rights and liberties of the United States could not be cancelled by the declaration of the British intentions. Nothing could abrogate them but a renunciation by the United States themselves.1

In the answer of the British government to this communication, it was stated that Great Britain had always considered the liberty formerly enjoyed by the United States, of fishing within British limits and using British territory, as derived from the 3d article of the Treaty of 1783, and from that alone; and that the claim of an independent State to occupy and use, at, its discretion, any portion of the territory of another, without compensation or corresponding indulgence, could not rest on any other foundation than conventional stipulation. It was unnecessary to inquire into the motives which might have originally influenced Great Britain in conceding such liberties to the United States, or whether other articles of the treaty did or did not, in fact, afford an equivalent for them, because all the stipulations. profess to be founded on reciprocal advantage and mutual convenience. If the United States derived from that treaty privileges, from which other independent nations not admitted by treaty were excluded, the duration of the privileges must depend on the duration of the instrument by which they were granted; and if the war abrogated the treaty, it determined the privileges. It had been urged, indeed, on the part of the United States, that the Treaty of 1783 was of a peculiar character, and that, because it contained a recognition of American independence, it could not be abrogated by a subsequent war between the parties. To a position of this novel nature Great Britain could not accede. She knew of no exception to the rule, that all treaties are put an end to by a subsequent war between the same parties; she could not, therefore, consent to give her diplomatic relations with one State a different degree of permanency from that on which her connection with all other States depended. Nor could she consider any one State at liberty to assign to a treaty made with her such a peculiarity of character as should make it, as to duration, an exception to all other treaties, in order to found, on a

1 Mr. J. Q. Adams to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 25, 1815. American State Papers, fol. edit. 1834, vol. iv. p. 352.

peculiarity thus assumed, an irrevocable title to indulgences which had all the features of temporary concessions.

It was by no means unusual for treaties containing recognitions and acknowledgments of title, in the nature of perpetual obligation, to contain, likewise, grants of privileges liable to revocation. The Treaty of 1783, like many others, contained provisions of different character; some in their own nature irrevocable, and others merely temporary. If it were thence inferred that, because some advantages specified in that treaty would not be put an end to by the war, therefore all the other advantages were intended to be equally permanent, it must first be shown that the advantages themselves are of the same, or at least of a similar character; for the character of one advantage, recognized or conceded by treaty, can have no connection with the character of another, though conceded by the same instrument, unless it arises out of a strict and necessary connection between the advantages themselves. But what necessary connection could there be between a right to independence and a liberty to fish within British jurisdiction, or to use British territory? Liberties within British limits were as capable of being exercised by a dependent as by an independent State; and could not, therefore, be the necessary consequence of independence.

The independence of a State could not be correctly said to be granted by a treaty, but to be acknowledged by one. In the Treaty of 1783, the independence of the United States was certainly acknowledged, not merely by the consent to make the treaty, but by the previous consent to enter into the provisional articles, executed in 1782. Their independence might have been acknowledged, without either the treaty or the provisional articles; but by whatever mode acknowledged, the acknowledgment was, in its own nature, irrevocable. A power of revoking, or even of modifying it, would be destructive of the thing itself; and, therefore, all such power was necessarily renounced when the acknowledgment was made. The war could not put an end to it, for the reason justly assigned by the American minister; because a nation could not forfeit its sovereignty by the act of exercising it; and for the further reason that Great Britain, when she declared war against the United States, gave them, by that very act, a new recognition of their independence.

The rights acknowledged by the Treaty of 1783 were not only

distinguishable from the liberties conceded by the same treaty, in the foundation on which they stand, but they were carefully distinguished in the wording of the treaty. In the 1st article, Great Britain acknowledged an independence already expressly recognized by the other powers of Europe, and by herself in her consent to enter into the provisional articles of 1782. In the 3d article, Great Britain acknowledged the right of the United States to take fish on the Banks of Newfoundland and other places, from which Great Britain had no right to exclude any independent nation. But they were to have the liberty to cure and dry them in certain unsettled places within the British territory. If the liberties thus granted were to be as perpetual and indefeasible as the rights previously recognized, it was difficult to conceive that the American plenipotentiaries would have admitted a variation of language so adapted to produce a different impression; and, above all, that they should have admitted so strange a restriction of a perpetual and indefeasible right as that with which the article concludes, which left a right so practical and so beneficial as this was admitted to be, dependent on the will of British subjects, proprietors, or possessors of the soil, to prohibit its exercise altogether.

It was, therefore, surely obvious that the word right was, throughout the treaty, used as applicable to what the United States were to enjoy in virtue of a recognized independence; and the word liberty to what they were to enjoy as concessions strictly dependent on the treaty itself.1

The American minister, in his reply to this argument, disavowed every pretence of claiming for the diplomatic relations. between the United States and Great Britain a degree of permanency different from that of the same relations between either of the parties and all other powers. He disclaimed all pretence of assigning to any treaty between the two nations, any peculiarity not founded in the nature of the treaty itself. But he submitted to the candor of the British government whether the Treaty of 1783 was not, from the very nature of its subjectmatter, and from the relations previously existing between the parties to it, peculiar? Whether it was a treaty which could

1 Earl Bathurst to Mr. J. Q. Adams, Oct. 30, 1815. American State Papers, fol. edit. 1834, vol. iv. p. 354.

have been made between Great Britain and any other nation? And if not, whether the whole scope and object of its stipulations were not expressly intended to establish a new and permanent state of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which would not and could not be annulled by the mere fact of a subsequent war? And he made this appeal with the more confidence, because the British note admitted that treaties often contained recognitions in the nature of perpetual obligation; and because it implicitly admitted that the whole Treaty of 1783 is of this character, with the exception of the article concerning the navigation of the Mississippi, and a small part of the article concerning the fisheries.

The position, that "Great Britain knows of no exception to the rule, that all treaties are put an end to by a subsequent war," appeared to the American minister not only novel, but unwarranted by any of the received authorities upon the law of nations; unsanctioned by the practice and usages of sovereign States; suited, in its tendency, to multiply the incitements to war, and to weaken the ties of peace between independent nations; and not easily reconciled with the admission that treaties not unusually contain, together with articles of a temporary character, liable to revocation, "recognitions and acknowledgments in the nature of perpetual obligation."

A recognition or acknowledgment of title, stipulated by convention, was as much a part of the treaty as any other article ; and if all treaties are abrogated by war, the recognitions and acknowledgments contained in them must necessarily be null and void, as much as any other part of the treaty.

If there were no exception to the rule, that war puts an end to all treaties between the parties to it, what could be the purpose or meaning of those articles which, in almost all treaties of commerce, were provided expressly for the contingency of war, and which during the peace are without operation? For example, the 10th article of the Treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great Britain, stipulated that "Neither the debts due from individuals of the one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys, which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war, or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated." If war put an end to all treaties, what could the parties to this engagement intend by making it formally an article of

the treaty? According to the principle laid down, excluding all exception, by the British note, the moment a war broke out between the two countries this stipulation became a dead letter, and either State might have sequestered or confiscated those specified properties, without any violation of compact between the two nations.

The American minister believed that there were many exceptions to the rule by which the treaties between nations are mutually considered as terminated by the intervention of a war; that these exceptions extend to all engagements contracted with the understanding that they are to operate equally in war and peace, or exclusively during war; to all engagements by which the parties superadd the sanction of a formal compact to principles dictated by the eternal laws of morality and humanity; and, finally, to all engagements, which, according to the expression of the British note, are in the nature of perpetual obligation. To the first and second of these classes might be referred the 10th article of the Treaty of 1794, and all treaties or articles of treaties stipulating the abolition of the slave-trade. The treaty of peace of 1783 belongs to the third class.

The reasoning of the British note seemed to confine this perpetuity of obligation to recognitions and acknowledgments of title, and to consider its perpetual nature as resulting from the subject-matter of the contract, and not from the engagement of the contractor. While Great Britain left the United States unmolested in the enjoyment of all the advantages, rights, and liberties stipulated in their behalf in the Treaty of 1783, it was immaterial whether she founded her conduct upon the mere fact that the United States are in possession of such rights, or whether she was governed by good faith and respect for her own engagements. But if she contested any of these rights, it was to her engagements only that the United States could appeal, as the rule for settling the question of right. If this appeal were rejected, it ceased to be a discussion of right; and this observation applied as strongly to the recognition of independence and the boundary line, in the Treaty of 1783, as to the fisheries. It was truly observed in the British note, that in that treaty the independence of the United States was not granted, but acknowledged; and it was added, that it might have been acknowledged without any treaty, and that the acknowledgment, in whatever