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into which shall be copied, in the English language, all official letters and notes in the order of their dates, which are written by the Consul or Commercial Agent; a book for the entry of protests, and in which all other official consular acts likewise shall be recorded; and, at seaports, a book wherein shall be recorded the list of the crew, and the age, tonnage, owner or owners, name and place to which she belongs, of every American vessel which arrives. Consuls and Commercial Agents shall make quarterly returns to their government, specifying the amount of fees received, the number of vessels, and the amount of their tonnage, which have arrived and departed; the number of seamen, and what portion of them are protected; and, as nearly as possible, the nature and value of their cargoes, and where produced.

Sec. 23. And be it further enacted, That as soon as a Consul or Commercial Agent shall have received his exequatur, or been provisionally recognized, he shall apply to his predecessor for the archives of the consulate or commercial agency, and make an inventory of the papers, and such other articles as they may contain, for which he shall pass a receipt and transmit a copy thereof to the State Department.

Sec. 24. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of State be, and he is hereby, authorized to prescribe such additional regulations for the keeping of the consular books and records, and insuring proper returns, as the public interest may require.

Sec. 25. And be it further enacted, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to bestow the title of Consul-General upon any United States Consul in Asia or Africa, when in his opinion such title will promote the public interest.

Sec. 26. And be it further enacted, That all acts and parts of acts authorizing attachés to any of our legations, or the payment to Ministers and Consuls of the United States of outfits or infits, or salaries for clerk hire and office rent, be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

Sec. 27. And be it further enacted, The provisions of this act to take effect from and after the thirtieth of June next; any law or laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.

APPROVED, March 1, 1855.

APPENDIX, NO. III.

DEBATE ON NEUTRAL RIGHTS.1

HOUSE OF COMMONS, July 4, 1834.

Mr. J. PHILLIMORE rose to move, pursuant to notice, the following resolution: "That it is the opinion of this house, that, however, from the peculiar circumstances of this war, a relaxation of the principle, that the goods of an enemy in the ship of a friend are lawful prize, may be justifiable, to renounce or surrender a right so clearly incorporated with the law of nations, so firmly maintained by us in times of the greatest peril and distress, and so interwoven with our maritime renown, would be inconsistent with the security and honor of the country." He thought that Parliament ought not to be silent, when so great a change was made in the law and practice on this subject. The general opinion was, that the policy, now for the first time adopted by her Majesty's government, would, if it were generally followed, diminish the miseries of war; but he held a different opinion. Two great principles had always been laid down on this subject: first, that the goods of an enemy on board the ship of a friend were lawful prize; and, secondly, that the goods of a friend on board the ships of an enemy ought to be restored. Those principles ran through the law of England; they had been laid down by the Consolato del Mare, confirmed by Grotius, and ratified by his approbation. Vattel, Bynkershoek, and other writers on international law, had followed in the same track; the same principle had been established by the old law of France, which was extremely severe on this subject. There had been several private treaties by which this rule had been regulated, and in such a way as to expose the interests of this country to no danger whatever. We had made stipulations with France, with which country we had generally made war by sea; and with Holland, with which we had generally been at peace; so that with neither of those countries were we likely to be compromised by acting upon this principle. It was at the time when this country was laboring under the pressure of the American war, and also engaged with the three great maritime powers of Europe France, Spain, and Holland that the Empress of Russia put forth her pretensions on the subject of neutral ships making free goods; but although this country was then in great difficulties, we refused to give way to those pretensions; and subsequently to that period, treaties had been frequently made which

1 See Part IV. ch. 3, § 23, p. 541, note. Also Introductory Remarks, p. clii.

most fully recognized the provisions on this subject which then Russia disputed. In 1793 Russia herself entered into a convention with Great Britain, in which she engaged to controvert the principle that free ships made free goods; so did Spain, so did Portugal, and afterwards Sweden and Denmark. In 1794 America, by a treaty, recognized the same principle; therefore, he thought, that he had pretty well established his proposition, that, so far as the great maritime powers were concerned and the greatest authorities went, there could be no dispute upon the subject; and he defied any person conversant with the works of the chief writers on the law of nations upon that subject to controvert that principle, or to say that it had not formed the basis of international law. But there was another authority still more important, and that was the authority of the American government. Jefferson wrote upon this subject:-"I believe it cannot be doubted that, by the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessel of an enemy are free, and the goods of an enemy found in the vessel of a friend are lawful prize." That was the opinion of a man not particularly noted for his partiality to this country; and in answer to a remonstrance, in 1793, “It is true," said he," that sundry nations have introduced by treaty another principle, but that is the effect of a particular or special treaty, and not the general principle of the law of nations." In the proceedings of Congress, in 1795, he observed that a source of complaint had been, that the English took goods in neutral vessels, which, it was said, was against the law of nations, and ought to be prevented by them, (the Americans); but, on the contrary, they considered it to be an old established principle in the law of nations, that the goods of a friend, if found in the enemy's vessels, were free, and an enemy's goods in the vessels of a friend, were lawful prize. That was also the opinion of the secretary, Mr. Pickering, and also of Chancellor Kent, who had said that neutral ships did not afford protection to the enemy's property, which might be seized if found on board such a vessel beyond the limits of neutral jurisdiction. Indeed it was formerly a question whether a neutral vessel itself, conveying an enemy's property, was not liable to confiscation; but that principle had been abandoned in 1793, by the naval powers of Europe, and was not sanctioned by the existing law of nations. During the whole of the series of wars which grew out of the French Revolution, the government of the United States admitted the English rule to be a valid one, and that it was the true doctrine of the international law, that an enemy's property was liable to be seized if found on board neutral ships. The same principle was also distinctly laid down by Professor Wheaton, who said they ought not to restore an enemy's property seized in neutral vessels. The answers made by secretaries Pickering and Jefferson were to the effect, that there could not be any doubt with regard to the authority, or much question as to the right of America to insist on this principle. Chancellor Kent had said, there was a marked difference in the principles upon which war was carried on by land and by sea. The object of maritime war was the destruction of the enemy's commerce and of his naval power, and the capture and destruction of private property was essential to that end, and was allowed by the law of nations. But the reason why a different principle was to be observed in continental wars, carried on by land, was not so clear. Was it true that the same principle did not prevail in continental wars? Was it true that they were carried on with a strictness and regularity, as respected private property, which formed a marked contrast to war carried on by naval means? He (Mr. Phillimore) must say that a careful perusal of history had

not led him to form any such conclusion. Was not the earliest thing they read of, in reference to this subject, the axiom that wars should always be made to support themselves? Gustavus Adolphus was reputed a humane and enlightened warrior, but he acted upon that principle; so did Marshal Turenne, Frederick the Great himself, and the most renowned French general, within the last century, whose instructions were to occupy portions of territory without respect to private right; and they found such expressions in those instructions as "The Prince of Waldeck is indisposed, you must seize all you can in his territory." That was the principle of the great Napoleon; and did not our own history show that we had acted upon much the same principle? Let them look at the storming of towns and the sacking of cities, described in the history of the Peninsular war. It was, therefore, not true that there was so much more regularity and superiority in carrying on continental, as compared with maritime wars, but the case was exactly the other way. The only difference was, that in carrying on continental wars injury to private property was often necessary; whereas in maritime wars it was absolutely essential, as a means of weakening the enemy's power. He thought, therefore, the reason of such a proceeding was plain, and that there could not be any kind of doubt whatever of the authority. But dismissing the question of authority altogether, he would argue it on reason alone, for it was upon that the whole argument turned. He took it for granted that every one desired a principle should prevail which would render war less probable; but the contrary would be the case, if the principle that free ships made free goods prevailed, for it tended to increase the probability of war, by making it the harvest of neutral nations, and every neutral nation would desire to involve its neighbors in hostilities, that it might gain advantages from which, at other times, it was necessarily excluded. It gave every neutral nation a direct interest in the hostilities of foreign States. On what principle, he asked, did they prohibit neutrals from carrying contraband of war? On what principle did they confiscate a ship that carried despatches to the enemy? On what principle did they prohibit a ship from sailing into a blockaded port? Why upon this that they would not allow a belligerent to do, by means of a neutral, that which it could not do by itself; whereas, by the adoption of the principle that free ships made free goods, they would, instead of locking up their enemy's produce, and, in consequence of the failure of his resources, increasing his desire for peace, allow it to be carried all over the globe, and thus destroy the effect of their own efforts. Surely, if it was desirable that the blood and treasure expended in war should produce any effect, it was desirable that the blood they shed and the treasure they expended should produce the greatest possible return; and the consequence of not allowing it to do so must be, that they would have to shed more blood and treasure to accomplish the objects for which war was originally commenced. The object of war, while it lasted, was to do as much injury as they could to their enemy, and to deprive him of the advantages of peace. If they allowed him to enjoy those advantages, of what use was it to expend the blood of their soldiers and the taxes wrung from the hard labor of the people? (Hear.) His motives for desiring peace would vanish, just in proportion as he enjoyed the advantages of peace in the time of war. It was absurd that, during a time when they were taxing the revenue of the country and the resources of the people, and inducing them to enlarge those resources as much as possible, with a view to inflicting

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chastisement upon the enemy, they should enable that enemy, by means of neutral ships, to preserve his commerce, and enjoy those advantages which it would otherwise be impossible for him to obtain. He could perfectly understand the arguments of those who, like his honorable friends the members for Manchester and the West Riding, upheld upon benevolent, though he thought very mistaken principles, that war ought to be abandoned, or, rather ought never to be undertaken; but if the principle was to be adopted, that, being at war, they ought not to do the enemy all the mischief they could, and, while carrying on war, to allow him, in a great measure, to enjoy the advantages of peace, that the blood they shed and the money they spent was not to inflict injury on the subjects of the power with which they were at war, they had better recall their ships, disband their armies, and lower their flag; but if they thought. otherwise, they should certainly not do that which would have a tendency to neutralize the exertions they were disposed to make. For those reasons he trusted that the house would adopt the resolution of which he had given notice. He had stated his proofs, and given the authorities who appeared to him to be necessary; and he believed, with the exception of some modern writers, and a few who wrote with a particular purpose, they were unanimous in their opinions, and gave the strongest reasons showing that it was a mistaken humanity to suppose that a nation could carry on a maritime war, and at the same time allow their enemy the advantages of peace. He thought he should be justified in that opinion by the authority of every statesman that this country had produced up to the present time; and he hoped we should not surrender that bulwark which we had hitherto preserved impregnable, or descend from that strong ground which our ancestors had thought their blood and treasure had been well employed in obtaining for us; and he would admit no principle, the effect of which would be to diminish our strength, or make us less able to resist either the open or disguised attacks of any earthly despot. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. MITCHELL seconded the resolution; but, in doing so, observed that he did not altogether concur in the first part, which was to the effect, that, from the peculiar circumstances of the present war, any relaxation of the principle was justifiable. He had a very strong opinion upon the course which had been pursued during the progess of the present war, but had hitherto had no opportunity of expressing it, or of hearing a discussion upon the important principles involved in it. There was no member of the house who had followed the course of trade consequent on the changes in the system of management during the war, more closely and carefully than himself, having been deeply interested all his life in trade. He believed that no relaxation of the principle relating to the trade of Russia, while we were engaged in war with that country, would be at all conducive to the advantage of the trade of this country; and there was, probably, not a man well acquainted with Russia but would admit, that no surer means could be employed to humble her than the destruction of her trade. That country exported produce annually to the amount of from £12,000,000 to £15,000,000, a large portion of which went directly, in the shape of revenue, to the great Russian landholders. If, therefore, they destroyed that outlet for their produce, there could be no question that it would be tantamount to depriving the only class which had any influence upon the government of the country, except the emperor himself, of their revenue: and the only way of proceeding effectually was to

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